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Why do militaries invest in some emerging technologies but not others? 
Conventional wisdom suggests that capable states have reasons to hedge their bets and 
invest in emerging military technologies as widely as they can. Yet, even the most capable 
states do not invest in all technologies of military utility. Moreover, in some cases, early 
investments in research and development (R&D) are not sufficiently sustained to lead to 
any realized capability. This dissertation answers the question of why some emerging 
technologies are able to attract and sustain military investment while others cannot. I argue 
that decisions over such investments are influenced by relevant actors’ assessment of 
feasibility during the R&D process, the military requirement the technology fulfills, and 
the availability of alternatives. In particular, a dominant belief in low feasibility, highly 
stringent requirements, and available alternatives can create an unfavorable condition that 
makes an emerging technology unappealing as an investment opportunity. Such a condition 
can prevent a technology from attracting or sustaining investment even if it were to have 
legitimate military use. Three case studies are conducted to illustrate this argument: 
biochemical non-lethal weapons, neuropharmacological treatment for combat stress, and 
aircraft nuclear propulsion. This dissertation yields important policy implications for 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Acquisition of novel military capabilities has become integral to American military 
readiness. For instance, robotics, particularly autonomous ones, has attracted significant 
military interest in recent years. In February 2016, researchers from the University of 
California, Berkeley, reported that they had designed a robot capable of crawling through 
tight, confined crevices, much like the organism that inspired its design—a cockroach.1 
This “robot cockroach,” which the research team has named CRAM (Compressible Robot 
with Articulated Mechanisms), was developed with the Collaborative Technology Alliance 
grant funding from the Micro Autonomous Systems and Technology (MAST) program 
from the United States Army Research Laboratory. The researchers claim that the “robot 
cockroach,” for its ability to withstand forces significantly greater than its body weight and 
to traverse vertically confined spaces, can be useful in emergency response and rescue 
operations to disasters where victims may be trapped under tens of feet of rubble that are 
hard for first responders and rescuers (or even large robots) to access. Of course, the 
military’s interest in such small-scaled robots is different. According to MAST’s program 
website, the objective of this research and development (R&D) effort is to “enhance 
warfighter’s tactical situational awareness in urban and complex terrain by enabling the 
autonomous operation of a collaborative ensemble of multifunctional, mobile 
microsystems,” or in other words, information and intelligence gathering.2  
 The “robot cockroach” is but one example of the US military’s recent interest in 
combining insights from biological systems with electro-mechanical ones. For instance, 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the “high-risk-high-payoff” 
                                                 
1 Kaushik Jayaram and Robert J. Full, “Cockroaches Traverse Crevices, Crawl Rapidly in Confined Spaces, 
and Inspire a Soft, Legged Robot,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 
113(8) (February 2016): E950-957. 
2 United States Army Research Laboratory, “Micro Autonomous Systems and Technology (MAST) – 
Objective,” http://www.arl.army.mil/www/default.cfm?page=332 (accessed February 11, 2016).  
 2 
research agency of the US Department of Defense (DoD), has funded multiple projects on 
biomimetic robotics within the last decade. These robots range from the Legged Squad 
Support System (LS3) developed by Boston Dynamics, which resembles and is roughly 
the size of a horse and can be used for transporting equipment for dismounted soldiers in 
rough terrain, to the hummingbird-lookalike Nano Air Vehicle (NAV) that can be used for 
surveillance and reconnaissance. Whether these robots truly serve any significant military 
purpose is of course up to debate. Nevertheless, as futuristic and science fiction-like as 
these robots sound, they are not the first time the US has taken advantage of its science and 
technology base to exploit cutting-edge technologies for military purposes. The US 
military has a long tradition of turning scientific and technical ideas into potentially useful 
military capabilities. As unimaginable and unrealistic as some of these ideas may sound 
during their time, many have been and continue to be turned into reality. Since World War 
II, science and technology (S&T) have become a prominent component of the American 
military might, and R&D have enjoyed a privileged status in defense planning. 
This “privileged” status of defense R&D is perhaps most noticeable in the amounts 
of money the federal government allots toward R&D. Since WWII and especially the end 
of the Cold War, significant amounts of federal money for R&D have been channeled 
through the military. Even technologies, such as the laser, that were developed without a 
clear defense utility were able to receive substantial military investment. Charles Townes 
himself has echoed the sentiment that the laser was “a solution looking for a problem”3 and 
has recounted of his work preceding the invention on the millimeter waves, that, “At that 
time, the Navy had no clear goal for millimeter waves,” and that its support for the research 
was to simply to ensure that “no fruitful avenues for practical technologies were missed.”4 
                                                 
3 Charles H. Townes, How the Laser Happened: Adventures of a Scientist (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 4. 
4 Townes (1999), 53. See also page 68. 
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Yet, even without the heightened investment climate that resulted from the intense 
rivalry of the Cold War, the military has continued to have a great amount of influence in 
directing national funding toward R&D. Defense R&D, most of which is channeled 
through the Department of Defense, accounts for approximately half of the total federal 
R&D budget each year (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1 - Federal R&D Spending by Agency (1976-2016)5 
 
                                                 
5 American Association for the Advancement of Science, “Total R&D by Agency, 1976-2016,” R&D Budget 
and Policy Program – Historical Trends in Federal R&D,” http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/Agencies_4.jpg 
(accessed February 11, 2016). 
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While in recent decades there has been a steady increase in federal funding for health and 
medical research (most through the National Institutes of Health), the DoD has continued 
to remain the most important funding source for all federal R&D activities. Based on the 
sheer volume of funding devoted to the development of military technologies it would 
certainly seem that, under the moniker of national security and strategic interest, any 
technology that can bear military utility is justifiable for investment. 
 This tendency toward investing in R&D for military technology is particularly true 
for countries seeking to maintain a technological edge over others in terms of their military 
capabilities. In the US, for instance, where technological superiority has become 
paramount in defense preparations, investing in “innovative” military technology seems to 
be the surest way to supply the military with the capabilities needed for its ever widening 
scope of missions and to prevent any future surprises by adversaries. Yet, despite all these 
reasons to favor investment in emerging and novel technologies for military purposes, not 
all technologies that bear military utility are invested in and, in certain cases, although some 
early investments were present, the R&D efforts could not be sustained to lead to any 
realized capability. 
For instance, during the immediate aftermath of WWII, the Aircraft Nuclear 
Propulsion (ANP) project, which sought to leverage nuclear fission as a durable source of 
energy to power an aircraft at supersonic speeds, was vigorously pursued by the Air Force 
and the Navy. However, despite more than a decade’s worth of initial efforts, the ANP 
project ultimately fizzled out without even getting close to producing any reasonable 
prototype.6 Why did nuclear propulsion have difficulty attracting high-level policy 
endorsement and sustained interest, even though the bulk of the efforts toward its R&D 
occurred during a time when the competition with the Soviet Union stimulated high levels 
                                                 
6 See, for instance, Carolyn C. James, “The Politics of Extravagance: The Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion 
Project,” Naval War College Review, 53(2) (Spring 2000): 158-190. 
 5 
of funding toward defense S&T, and significant research efforts were devoted to emerging 
nuclear technologies, particularly small-scale nuclear power plants/reactors? 
As will be examined in more detail below, several decades later and in an entirely 
different domain of defense technology, the development of incapacitating biochemical 
agents that can be used as a form of non-lethal weapons languished since the early 2000s 
in the United States. This happened despite an increase in government and military interest 
toward brain research and an increasing call for such non-lethal capabilities as a result of 
the widening range of missions that the American military is called upon to carry out. Why 
has the US shied away from developing such non-lethal weapons, when the emerging 
research on neuroscience has continued to unravel the human brain and seems to promise 
potentials for the development of such a capability? 
 While national security has indeed driven and provided justification for many 
technological advances in the military, the empirical record of defense investment shows 
that some new or emerging technologies inevitably do not get invested in or cannot sustain 
investment. Although these emerging, prospective technologies may have military utilities 
that could be useful given the strategic environment under which they are considered for 
development, they nevertheless cannot gather enough sustained interest or support to be 
turned into deployable military capabilities. Why is this so? Why are some emerging 
technologies able to attract and sustain military investment while others cannot? Although 
conventional wisdom provides many reasons as to why militaries have incentives to invest 
in novel capabilities and emerging technologies, it says little about the cases in which they 
do not. 
This dissertation takes an initial step at understanding why some areas of emerging 
S&T do not attract military interest, despite their alleged utility for the military. I argue 
that an emerging military technology’s attractiveness as an investment opportunity depends 
 6 
on how it is understood by relevant actors in the R&D process with regard to its technical 
feasibility, the stringency of the requirement demands it fulfills, and the availability of 
alternatives. I posit that feasibility, requirements, and alternatives together determine 
whether the technical condition of a technology is favorable for investment. A specific 
configuration of these three factors—namely, a dominant belief in low feasibility, highly 
stringent requirements, and the existence of alternatives—creates a technical condition that 
is unfavorable for investing in an emerging technology. This unfavorable condition can 
prevent an emerging technology from attracting or sustaining investment even if it were to 
have legitimate military use. 
This dissertation proceeds as follows: in Chapter 2, I map out potential state 
responses to an emerging military technology and analyze the challenge of military R&D 
investment, particularly for a country like the US that is interested in navigating at the 
technological frontier and being a forerunner. I show why there is this commonly held 
belief that any technology that has military utility gets invested in, particularly from a first-
mover state dealing with emerging technologies. I then posit that in order to understand 
why some emerging technologies do not attract military investment, analyzing military 
R&D from the perspective of opportunity management rather than risk mitigation is 
necessary. 
In Chapter 3, I define the dependent variable (defense S&T investment) and examine 
literature that bears insight on military research, development, and acquisition; predictions 
regarding defense S&T investment behavior; and shortfalls. In Chapter 4, I conceptualize 
the idea of opportunity, which refers to not only the expected utility but also the 
circumstances that make such utility realized. Applying the supply and demand framework 
to defense acquisition and summarizing the “Social Construction of Technology” 
literature, I explain how feasibility, requirements, and alternatives create conditions that 
may be unfavorable to technology investment in some cases. The chapter also includes a 
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discussion of the design and methods underlying the empirical studies and provides a brief 
overview of cognitive neuroscience as a discipline, and the reasons behind its status as an 
emerging area of S&T. 
Chapter 5 examines the R&D of biochemical incapacitants as non-lethal weapons. It 
shows that since the Dubrovka theater incident in 2002, the US investment in this area of 
research has stopped. The case study examines the changes in perceived feasibility, the 
stringent requirements in non-lethality from the DoD, and the institutional partnership 
between law enforcement and military communities, and shows why these factors 
contributed to the abandonment of this technology in the early 2000s. The chapter also 
traces the evolution of discussions on biochemical incapacitants within the Chemical 
Weapons Convention and changes in the US’ stance on their research, development, and 
potential use. 
Chapter 6 studies the changing perception of the effectiveness of 
neuropharmaceuticals in treating combat stress-related disorders such as PTSD from the 
Vietnam War era to the present. The case study highlights how the dominant psychosocial 
model of psychiatric practice during the Vietnam War era impacted the perceived 
feasibility of using psychoactive drugs in treating combat stress. The chapter examines how 
the shift from a psychosocial to a neurobiological model of psychiatric disorder contributes 
to the military R&D in neuropsychopharmacology. 
Chapter 7 presents a summary of the main arguments and provides an analysis of the 
findings from the case studies. A mini-case study on aircraft nuclear propulsion is 
presented as an additional generalizability test of the theoretical model. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of theoretical and policy implications.  
 8 
CHAPTER 2. UNCERTAINTY, RISK, AND OPPORTUNITY – 
FIRST-MOVER DILEMMA AND INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 
2.1 Mapping State Responses to an Emerging Technology 
A technology, no matter how nascent, futuristic, or seemingly impractical, will get 
invested in if it purports to have military utility. Military technologies seem to enjoy a 
privileged status in a country like the US, where a large sum of money is channeled toward 
the research and development of new technologies every year, and it is sometimes hard to 
think about an emerging area of S&T that receives no military support. Why is there this 
perception of defense R&D, and is it true that the military always has the incentive to invest 
in an emerging technology with potential military utility? This chapter analyzes this 
question and provides some insight as to why such a perception exists. By exploring the 
concept of emerging technology in more detail and mapping out potential state responses 
to it, this chapter shows why countries like the United States have a tendency to invest very 
generously in military-relevant emerging technologies. It also presents a case of emerging 
S&T where this conventional wisdom does not apply and provides an alternative 
perspective to conceptualize why, in fact, there are some areas of emerging technology that 
may not see any investment despite military utility. 
2.1.1 Defining Emerging Technology 
This dissertation examines a state’s defense7 investments in emerging technologies. 
As such, it is important to understand what constitutes an emerging technology. In the 
                                                 
7 Recognizing there is a difference between the terms defense and military, whereby the term 
“defense” encompasses both civilian (such as the civilian leadership and can also in some cases include 
other defense-related, but non-military communities, such as the intelligence communities) and military 
components relevant to a nation’s security, this dissertation uses them interchangeably in the context of the 
United States because a very large portion of defense-related R&D is channeled through the military. 
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simplest sense, an emerging technology is a set of technological advancements that are at 
an early stage in their development in a given era. The concept of emerging technology 
thus includes at least two temporal components. The first is internal, referring to the 
developmental stages of a technology. An emerging technology refers to a technology that 
is at a nascent stage of development. The second temporal component is the larger 
historical context. An emerging technology needs to be understood in the context of the 
time period during which it is developed: a technology that was considered emerging in 
the 1960s (such as the laser) may be considered relatively mature today.   
In addition to their temporal contexts, emerging technologies are most often 
characterized by their considerable uncertainty. Due to their nascent nature, emerging 
technologies carry with them a high degree of technical uncertainty in terms of the future 
trajectories of their development, the speed of their maturation toward practical 
applications, and the degree of their disruptive potential to existing market structure, 
societal norm, or organizational competence. The uncertain nature of emerging 
technologies makes investments in them highly risky, in the sense that the investors have 
little information to assess probability or likelihood that their investments will ultimately 
pay off. 
Equally unpredictable as the futures of emerging technologies are the sources from 
which emerging technologies arise. New discoveries in basic research generate new areas 
of scientific inquiry with the potential for technology development. The invention of a 
piece of technological equipment can excite new research programs and breed new 
industries. The convergence of existing streams of research can create new synergy 
between previously separate scientific disciplines and engender unexpected innovations. 
As George Day and Paul Schoemaker describe, 
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Emerging technologies are science-based innovations that have the 
potential to create a new industry or transform an existing one. They include 
discontinuous technologies derived from radical innovations…as well as 
more evolutionary technologies formed by the convergence of previously 
separate research streams…Each of these technologies offers a rich source 
of market opportunities that provide the incentive for risky investments.8 
These many and varied sources further complicate the prospect of anticipating where 
emerging technologies may develop and projecting where they may go. 
 Nascence and uncertainty, nevertheless, merely provide the baseline for describing 
many of today’s emerging technologies. Throughout the literature, contemporary emerging 
technologies have taken many additional characteristics that make their definition even 
more complex. Some, for instance, have emphasized the dual-use and converging nature 
of today’s emerging technologies,9 while others focused on their revolutionary or 
transformative potential.10 In a 2014 report by the National Research Council, 
contemporary emerging technologies are further connoted as often readily available, 
possessing traits such as low barriers to entry, rapid change, and the blurring of basic and 
applied research.11 Today’s emerging technologies have the potential to revolutionize or 
transform human lives, both inside and outside the national defense and military circles. 
                                                 
8 George S. Day and Paul J.H. Schoemaker, “A Different Game,” in Wharton on Managing 
Emerging Technologies, ed. George S. Day, Paul J.H. Schoemaker, and Robert E. Gunther (Hoboken, NJ: 
John Wiley &  Sons, Inc., 2000), 2. 
9 Wilson W.S. Wong, Emerging Military Technologies: A Guide to the Issues (Santa Barbara, CA: 
Praeger, 2013), 1-13.  See also Mihail C. Roco and William S. Bainbridge, eds., Converging Technologies 
for Improving Human Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and 
Cognitive Science (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003). 
10 Edna F. Einsiedel, “Introduction: Making Sense of Emerging Technologies,” in Emerging 
Technologies: From Hindsight to Foresight, ed. Edna Einsiedel (Vancouver, Canada: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2009), 3-4. 
11 National Research Council, Emerging and Readily Available Technologies and National 
Security: A Framework for Addressing Ethical, Legal, and Societal Issues (Washington, D.C.: The 
National Academies Press, 2014). 
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This rich set of descriptors on the nature of emerging technologies provides a 
nuanced foundation upon which defense investments in science and technology programs 
are examined. In this dissertation, emerging technology refers broadly to an area of new 
scientific discoveries with the potential for practical applications or a set of nascent 
technological advancements in a given era. Understood in the context of defense 
investments, such a technology may be generated from within the military or other national 
security sectors, or it can be adapted from the civilian or commercial world. Emerging 
military technologies carry the potential to generate novel or significantly enhanced 
capabilities that impact the ways militaries operate and wars are fought. Therefore, 
understanding a state’s interest in investing in them is an important component of 
deciphering how states determine their security needs and respond to threats in today’s 
highly complex international security landscape. 
2.1.2 Military S&T Investment in Strategic Context 
States desiring security in the international system must provide security for 
themselves. This central tenant in structural realist thinking of international relations is 
rooted in the anarchic nature of the international system. The absence of a higher sovereign 
in the international system dictates that states engage in self-help. Since states cannot be 
sure of the intentions of other states, they must expend some efforts in providing means to 
protect themselves.12 These efforts can be external or internal: External efforts most often 
refer to alliance behaviors between states. Internal efforts refer to a state’s actions to 
strengthen its economic and military competitiveness.13 Since not all states possess the 
capacity to fully ensure security on their own, some states inevitably engage in external 
                                                 
12 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 105-
7. 
13 Waltz (1979), 118.  See also James D. Morrow, “Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search 
for Security,” International Organization 47(2) (Spring 1993): 207-233, and Barry Posen, Sources of 
Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1984), 61-63. 
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balancing efforts by forming alliances.14 Alliance formation and internal arms buildup thus 
constitute the traditional balancing behavior for states seeking security. 
Investment in science and technology15 for military purposes, in this sense, is an 
act of internal balancing. According to Keir Lieber and Gerard Alexander, internal 
balancing is characterized by increased defense spending, enlargement of the armed 
services, or investment in military research and technology.16 Military strategists, 
policymakers, and international relations theorists alike have long considered technology 
a major component of state power.17 States invest in the research and development of 
military technology because the history of warfare has shown that technology matters. The 
effects of nuclear weapons and radar during World War II are well known. Advancements 
in information and communications technology and precision guidance during the Gulf 
War have led some to herald the arrival of a new revolution in military affairs (RMA).18 
While few researchers today espouse such a deterministic view that technology alone 
defines power,19 almost no one has found it wise to categorically dismiss the influence that 
technology has in the international system and national security affairs. 
                                                 
14 States may ally against or bandwagon with the source of threat.  See Stephen M. Walt, The 
Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
15 In this dissertation, S&T is understood as the early stages of the research, development, testing, 
and evaluation (RDT&E) of the acquisition process.  Within the United States, such investments are 
characterized by budget activities 6.1, Basic Research, 6.2, Applied Research, and 6.3, Advanced 
Technology Development. 
16 Keir A. Lieber and Gerard Alexander, “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not Pushing 
Back,” International Security 30(1) (Summer 2005): 119 
17 Martin van Crevald, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present (New York, NY: The 
Free Press, 1991); Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under Security Dilemma,” in Offense, Defense and War, ed. 
Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2004): 3-50; George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (New York, 
NY: Wiley, 1977). 
18 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” in In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for 
Conflict in the Information Age, ed. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 1997), 23-60; Eliot Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 72(2) (March/April 
1996): 37-54; Andrew Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions,” The 
National Interest 37 (Fall 1994): 30-42. 
19 For a discussion of technology as a component of military power, see, for instance, Stephen 
Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2004). 
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For states possessing the capacity, internal balancing is considered a more reliable 
measure to ensure a state’s security, for it does not depend on the strength and reliability 
of a state’s allies.20 However, internal balancing efforts have important strategic 
ramifications. A state taking measures to increase its own security can inadvertently 
undermine the security of others. This phenomenon, known as the security dilemma, 
contributes to the escalation of tension in the international system and the potential of an 
arms race. In the realm of military R&D, investments in S&T that create the potential for 
a state to increase its military capability can at the same time undermine that of others, and 
a demonstration of technological prowess can elicit significant great power responses. The 
Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957, for instance, sped up the process for the US to launch its 
own first satellite, Explorer 1, in 1958. Sputnik is also thought to have provided the impetus 
for the creation of institutions such as National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) and what is now known DARPA. Military investments in S&T, therefore, 
contribute to the determination of national power and the dynamics of interstate relations. 
2.1.3 Potential State Responses to an Emerging Technology 
Given the importance of military technology, how does a state respond to 
advancements in military technology, particularly when a new technology has just arrived 
on the scene? Should an investment be made? In what manner should a state pursue these 
nascent technologies? Do states have a choice in terms of how they can respond? When a 
state faces a nascent field of scientific research or an emerging area of technological 
development that carries the potential for military applications, it has several choices of 
acquisition strategy. The fact that this new area of S&T has potential military applications 
does not mean that states will always decide to put money toward R&D. In some cases, the 
potential military applications of the emerging S&T may not be relevant to the state’s 
                                                 
20 Waltz (1979), 168. 
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security needs, or the state may simply not have the human, financial, or organizational 
capacity to develop the technologies on their own. Under these conditions, a state may 
choose not to invest militarily in the emerging S&T and entirely let go of the potential 
applications. This is especially true for states that have little to no established military (such 
as Monaco, Panama, and Costa Rica). For these smaller states whose security requirements 
are low and whose domestic scientific or technological capacities are limited, measures to 
ensure security are likely to be entirely external: they seek protection from major powers 
rather than build up armed services of their own. These states thus will forego the 
opportunity to invest in an emerging military technology. 
Even if the military capabilities developed from this nascent area of S&T are 
desirable, states may still not invest in R&D. Instead, they may choose to simply procure 
the technology or the technological systems once they are developed by others, provided 
that the means to such procurement exist and that the developer country is willing to 
become a supplier of this new technology. This phenomenon, generally known as “arms 
transfer,” has become prevalent since the second half of the twentieth century, when the 
norm of self-sufficiency in a state’s military research, development, and production was 
replaced by a new emphasis on strong alliances and mutual support between states as a 
result of the Cold War.21 Furthermore, despite the fact that globalization has broadened the 
S&T base worldwide, very few states can actually produce or develop military systems that 
incorporate cutting-edge S&T. According to estimates by the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2011, for instance, the top ten military spenders 
constituted 75% of the world’s military spending.22 This high concentration of defense 
spending in only a few states suggests that most states do not have the financial capacity 
                                                 
21 Martin Edmonds, “International Military Equipment Procurement Partnerships: The Basic 
Issues,” in International Arms Procurement: New Directions, ed. Martin Edmonds (New York, NY: 
Pergamon Press, 1981), 1-2. 
22 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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to conduct independent research and development for military technologies as well as 
procure the necessary weapons and systems. Outside the select few military technology 
producers, most states acquire military technologies from foreign procurement.23 
When a state has the scientific and technological capacity as well as the incentive 
to acquire some level of indigenous capability on an emerging technology, it may choose 
to invest in R&D. Here, a state faces two options as an investor: it can mimic what other 
states are developing as a second-mover,24 or it may pioneer the R&D efforts in this new 
technology as a first-mover. While the records of great power struggles and arms race 
suggest that the anarchic international system provides strong incentives for states to be 
first-movers, there is increasing recognition that states sometimes deliberately choose to 
invest in military technologies as a second-mover. For instance, China is known to be a 
skilled imitator and creative adapter of technologies (including military ones) through its 
strategy of “introduce, digest, assimilate, and re-innovate (IDAR).”25 Despite the common 
critique that countries like China imitate and adapt because they lack the capacity to truly 
innovate, states have the option of pursuing a new technology as a second-mover. Figure 
2 below illustrates the different paths a state may take in response to a new military 
technology. 
 
                                                 
23 For the purpose of this dissertation, the term investment refers to the money put towards 
military R&D. Procurement activities, in this sense, are not considered investments. 
24 The second-mover, in this case, encompasses all states that are not the first-mover in a given 
field of military technology.  For the purpose of this dissertation, whether the second-mover is an early or 
late entrant to the technology after it has been introduced is not of concern. 
25 Tai Ming Cheung, “The Chinese Defense Economy’s Long March from Imitation to 
Innovation,” in China’s Emergence as a Defense Technological Power, edited by Tai Ming Cheung (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 32-3. See also William C. Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi, 
Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2013), 62. 
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Figure 2 - Potential State Responses to an Emerging Technology 
 
2.1.4 The Concept of a Technology First-Mover 
A technology first-mover is an intuitive concept that is elusive to define. It is 
intuitive because all technological innovations must begin somewhere, and, inevitably, 
someone must be the first to develop a technology. Yet, defining the timing of when an 
actor becomes a technology first-mover can be challenging: is a state considered a first-
mover when it begins to invest in a new technology before others do, or is a state a first-
mover only when it has successfully developed a technology? Or, does a first-mover only 
exist when someone has been able to introduce the new technology to the market? These 
various potential entry points in the R&D process complicate the concept of a first-mover. 
The literature pertaining to business management and military innovation in the 
realm of S&T have by and large characterized first-mover as an actor that first brought a 
technology to the market, despite the fact that this definition is better suited for 
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understanding the advantageous effects of being a first-mover rather than clarifying the 
decision process of one. The idea of a first-mover and the advantage such a position can 
achieve can be traced back to Schumpeterian entrepreneurial profit, which posits that 
innovation can help the first-mover generate market advantage by creating essentially a 
temporary quasi-monopoly position where profits are gained.26 A first-mover in this 
context is understood as an actor who introduces a new technology to the market. 
In the context of military technological innovation, a technology first-mover refers 
to a state that is the first one to introduce a military technology to the international system. 
Whether or not the technology first-mover is conferred an advantage depends on the extent 
to which it can effectively incorporate the technology into military strategy, organization, 
and doctrine.27 In both cases, a first-mover is identified only after the technology has been 
introduced. Such a definition, while useful in understanding first-mover advantage, 
provides little room to contextualize the decisions made about a technology by an actor 
prior to the unveiling of the technology. 
This dissertation, in the context of defense R&D investment decisions, understands 
a technology first-mover in general, conceptual terms. In some cases, the first-mover will 
be among the first to have visible investments in a new military technology, whether 
through the allocation of financial resources or the establishment of organizational 
infrastructure for its R&D. In others, the first-mover will refer to those that are among the 
first to indicate an interest in an emerging technology. But the concept is also used without 
specifying a particular technological domain to indicate a state that has the tendency to 
engage in cutting-edge military research. Not restricting the definition of first-mover to a 
                                                 
26 Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, 
Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle, with a New Introduction by John E. Elliott (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1983), 128-156. 
27 Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for 
International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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specific benchmark allows one to use the concept more broadly and apply it to cases where 
some of these markers may be difficult to identify.  
The concept of a first-mover fascinates business and military strategists alike due 
to the potential advantage such a position confers. Being a technology first-mover has its 
challenges, however, and being a late-comer is not without benefits. In particular, first-
movers face the challenge of a tremendous amount of risk and uncertainty associated with 
investing in new and uncharted areas, while second-movers reap the benefits of avoiding 
much of such uncertainties. A second-mover often can base its investment decisions on the 
information derived from the actions of the first-mover. What remains rather unclear, 
however, is how a first-mover makes its decision amidst uncertainty. Scholarship on 
diffusion (of military power more generally and of military technology more specifically) 
has, in recent years, begun to unravel the dynamics of how states respond to military 
innovations as a second-mover.28 However, how the first-mover makes its decisions is a 
rather under-conceptualized area in the study of defense innovation.29 This paucity of 
scholarship on how first-movers make investment decisions is curious, since an answer is 
far from apparent. The following section provides further insight into the unique challenges 
that a technology first-mover faces and reveals why a first-mover’s ability to make a 
decision is in fact a puzzling phenomenon. 
2.2 Dilemma for Technology First-Movers 
                                                 
28 How military technology spread throughout the international system, or in other words, how it is 
adopted by second-movers once it is introduced, has been the subject of attention for an growing set of 
literature on diffusion. See, for instance, Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds., The Diffusion of 
Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003); Andrea Gilli and Mauro 
Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organizational, and Infrastructural Constraints,” 
Security Studies 25(1) (February 2016): 50-84; and Horowitz (2010). 
29 Studies on weapons innovation have examined the process and success (or the lack thereof) in 
the development of major weapons systems, particularly in the context of the Cold War arms race. Yet, 
little has been said about how states make investments as a first-mover, and almost nothing on how they 
make decisions in areas of nascent science rather than on a weapon system. For a select set of this 
literature, see note 72. 
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2.2.1 Investing as a Technology First-Mover 
For a state interested in maintaining the “technological edge” and harnessing the 
advantage of being a technology first-mover, such as the United States, investing in new 
military technologies is not just desirable, but imperative. The anarchic international 
environment provides strong incentives for states to do what they can to stay ahead of 
others – while being the first-mover does not always guarantee an advantage, not being 
proactive at the technological frontier carries the greater risks of being blindsided by others 
in conflict.30 In the United States, this belief of maintaining leadership at the technological 
frontier is deeply ingrained in the military and strategic mindset, much of it arguably a 
result of the success the US enjoyed in its qualitative arms race against the Soviet Union.31 
Others have traced the root of this determination to Vannevar Bush’s advocacy that science 
is essential for national security. Regardless the origin, defense and military communities 
in the US are “committed to a U.S. position of overall technical superiority in military 
technology; technical leadership is regarded as being essential in itself as well as being 
necessary to preclude technological surprise.”32 
The need to maintain technological superiority in the US military has been 
continuously highlighted in various strategic and national security documents,33 
                                                 
30 Efforts to understand and mitigate this kind of technological surprises are reflected in several 
studies, including National Research Council, Avoiding Surprise in an Era of Global Technology Advances 
(Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2005) and National Research Council, Avoiding 
Technology Surprise for Tomorrow’s Warfighter: A Symposium Report (Washington, D.C.: The National 
Academies Press, 2009). 
31 Ashton B. Carter, Marcel Lettre, and Shane Smith, “Keeping the Technological Edge,” in 
Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future, ed. Ashton B. Carter and John P. White (Cambridge, 
MA: Preventive Defense Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy 
School, 2000), 127-162. 
32 Franklin A. Long and Judith Reppy, “Decision Making in Military R&D: An Introductory 
Overview,” in The Genesis of New Weapons: Decision Making for Military R&D, ed. Franklin A. Long and 
Judith Reppy (New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1980), 4. 
33 See, for instance, Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 2001 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001), 40; Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense 
Review Report, February 2006 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006), 3; and Department of 
Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 
2010), 81.  
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reconfirmed in 2012 by then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, that the US is “shaping a 
Joint Force for the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, 
and technologically advanced,” and this force “will have cutting edge capabilities, 
exploiting our technological, joint, and networked advantage.”34 This need is also shown 
through the interest that the DoD has in engaging in direct, collaborative partnerships with 
innovation centers within the US in recent years. The opening of two DoD innovation hubs 
called Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DISx) in Silicon Valley and Boston, in 2015 
and 2016 respectively, under the current Secretary of Defense Ash Carter confirms this 
trend. To defense planners in a state desiring to be a technology first-mover, efforts in 
military R&D and investments in emerging S&T are essential to maintaining this 
technological advantage. 
2.2.2 The Dilemma 
Despite the importance of military technology, managing military technological 
innovation is rather difficult. This is, in part, due to the unpredictable nature of the direction 
of any technological progress and the uncertainty embedded in any R&D process. This 
technical uncertainty refers to the inability for one to estimate the potential outcome or the 
probability of such an outcome from the R&D process. Furthermore, unlike their 
commercial counterparts, technological advancements in the defense sector do not enjoy 
the market mechanisms that oftentimes provide the feedback for the innovation (such as 
the profitability of a new product). As a result, the advantages they confer on the users 
cannot be proven until the technologies are deployed on the battlefield in armed conflicts, 
which are rare events.35 In this sense, a manager of military technology investment 
                                                 
34 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2012). 
35 For a more detailed discussion on how to assess the return of investment for military technology 
and how it may differ from commercial ones, see Albert Sciarretta et al., A Methodology for Assessing the 
Military Benefits of Science and Technology Investments (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University 
Center for Technology and National Security Policy, 2008). For a detailed discussion on assessing military 
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decisions also face the problem of strategic uncertainty, which, under certain circumstances 
one may have difficulty estimating the need for a technology and the probability that such 
a technology may meet the security demands. 
The sentiments about these uncertainties, which were observed in the US 
development of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) in the 1950s, still are true 
today: 
An irreducible element of conjecture is intrinsic in most weapons decisions. 
Knowledge of enemy capabilities and intention is at best incomplete and 
ambiguous. Attempts to anticipate the main lines of scientific advance [are] 
always a hazardous enterprise. While the element of unpredictability in 
advanced engineering is less dramatic, precise calculations of cost and lead 
time, as well as the operational utility of new weapons, have again and again 
defied systemic attempts at prediction.36 
In this sense, managing military technological progress seems to be an effort of muddling 
through uncertainties. The way in which a defense planner determines the necessary course 
for military R&D investment thus relies on the extent to which he can mitigate the effects 
of uncertainty. 
What further complicates the military R&D investment decisions is that any S&T 
choice made has long-term ramifications. Decisions about military R&D are important in 
that once they are made, they shape the rest of the decisions throughout the acquisition 
process. A closer examination of the full life-cycle cost of any military technology at a 
                                                 
technology performance, see John A. Alic, “Managing US Defense Acquisition,” Enterprise & Society 
14(1) (March 2013): 1-36. 
36 Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1969), 6.  Similar views can be found in Stephen Peter Rosen, 
Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 
221. 
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given time demonstrates that while the spending on the production, procurement, 
operation, and maintenance is most often disproportionally bigger than funds initially 
allocated for the R&D, these back-end activities inevitably flow from acquisition decisions 
made years ago during the R&D stage. “From a management point of view,” claims Edwin 
Deagle, “careful design and control of the military R&D process is one of the critical keys 
to successful financial and programmatic management of the much more expensive 
systems and military force structures which flow from that process.”37 Since many of the 
basic technical details and characteristics for a military technology are settled in the early 
conceptual stages of acquisition (namely R&D), the decisions made during these stages 
affect everything that follows. 
This path-dependent nature of defense acquisition has led Judith Reppy and 
Franklin Long to conclude that the “peculiar significance of military R&D is that the R&D 
projects are the principal determinants of future weapons,” and that while “the relations 
between military hardware, military strength, and national security are not rigid…they are 
sufficiently strong that the decisions on the RDT&E budget can have significant impact on 
force structure for years to come.”38 From the non-technical dimension, the interest built 
around a new military technology inevitably grows over time. R&D programs which have 
been started and are underway, thus, greatly influence the character of military R&D 
programs: “Not only is there substantial commitment to continue these programs in the 
expectation of getting deployable systems, there are also substantial bureaucratic pressures 
from contractors and Congressmen to continue these systems.”39 Military R&D 
                                                 
37 Edwin A. Deagle, Jr., “Organization and Process in Military R&D,” in The Genesis of New 
Weapons: Decision Making for Military R&D, ed. Franklin A. Long and Judith Reppy (New York, NY: 
Pergamon Press, 1980), 162. 
38 Judith Reppy and Franklin A. Long, “The Decision-Making Role of Congress,” in The Genesis 
of New Weapons: Decision Making for Military R&D, ed. Franklin A. Long and Judith Reppy (New York, 
NY: Pergamon Press, 1980), 182. 
39 Judith Reppy and F. A. Long, “U.S. Military R&D: A Set of Questions,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 34(5) (May 1978): 36. 
 23 
investments, thus, face a serious “lock-in” effect: once a decision is made, it impacts the 
future course of the technology’s development, and whatever is spent early on will 
determine the trajectory of what will likely be spent in the future. 
For defense planners, as a result, managing military R&D investments is a perpetual 
dilemma. On the one hand, they are compelled to act, for it is only through investing in 
military R&D that they can hope to maintain the technological edge and avoid future 
surprises. Yet, there is widespread recognition that the R&D process is filled with 
uncertainties and risks, and that any investment decision made will inevitably involve a 
level of conjecture. On the other hand, the difficulty in making a choice amidst uncertainty 
is further exacerbated by the lock-in effect that yesterday’s choice shapes the course of 
action today, and the investments made today oftentimes lead to commitments of resources 
tomorrow. Leveraging and paraphrasing what others have said about the uncertainties 
embedded in the process of military transformation, defense planners in a state desiring to 
be a technology first-mover have to make investment decisions that can potentially define 
the trajectory of technological progress in the military ex ante, while the effects of such 
investments and potential change on the military can only be appreciated and understood 
ex post.40 How can a defense planner hope to cope with this element of choosing and 
committing amidst uncertainty that others have referred to as “flying blind”?41  
2.3 Emerging Technologies and Cross-Cutting Pressure 
The dilemma a first-mover faces is further complicated today by the rise of a new 
wave of emerging technologies, the shifting security requirements, and the mounting 
budget pressure. As mentioned previously, a whole set of emerging technologies today 
                                                 
40 Adam N. Stulberg, Michael D. Salomone, and Austin G. Long, Managing Defense 
Transformation: Agency, Culture, and Service Change (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 
2007), 14. 
41 Stulberg, Salomone, and Long (2007), 14. 
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promises exciting transformational opportunities for the military. Yet, the complex dual-
use and interdisciplinary nature of these technologies and attendant uncertainties in the rate 
and direction of how these technologies progress suggest that making decisions and choices 
about them presents difficult challenges. The pursuit of emerging technologies for military 
use, in turn, seems to be a quintessential case of choosing amidst uncertainties where the 
dilemmas facing a technology first-mover are the most pronounced.   
Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, many of the structural elements in the 
international and national security landscape that may have helped a technology first-
mover like the US alleviate the effects of uncertainties are long gone. During the Cold War, 
the mantra of nuclear dominance and arms race defined the structure of international 
competition. The clear threat environment helped reduce some uncertainties regarding how 
and where to invest for military R&D. The primacy of nuclear weapons as the currency of 
power during this period spelled out rather clearly what technological options were 
important and desirable – weapons systems designed around the delivery, monitoring, and 
response to the nuclear force largely characterized the military R&D agenda. This threat 
environment has changed, and the US defense communities realize this. Since the end of 
the Cold War, efforts in defense transformation and force modernization have been 
ongoing and are being pursued even more rigorously during the past decade. This high 
fluidity in the international security environment however makes it even more difficult to 
determine which investments may ultimately pay off. 
In addition, it is widely recognized that the United States has been in a continued 
process of drawing down its defense spending since the end of the Cold War. Although the 
total defense budget rose to a new height in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001, and was sustained for several years due to the operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the global economic downturn since 2008, the drawdown of the 
American engagements in Afghanistan, and the 2011 Budget Control Act that has led to 
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the sequestration all have reignited the push towards the reduction of government spending. 
To date, the effects of the sequestration have received mixed assessments: some have noted 
that the industries are doing better than expected and that many of the doomsday 
predictions have not come to pass.42 Even the Department of Defense, which has 
previously warned against the potentially crippling cuts,43 has shown that it was able to 
weather sequestration better than expected.44 Others have emphasized that the current 
minimal impact is merely the “calm before the storm”, and that the true impacts of the 
sequestration will be seen during coming years. Regardless of which story turns out to be 
more accurate, budget-watchers agree on at least one thing – that no matter how the pie is 
sliced, defense investments will take a hit. As Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr., former President of 
the National Defense Industrial Association, suggests, 
Assuming [the] sequester continues for some time, the choices are shaping 
up to be between force structure and investment. There is talk of a reduction 
of flying squadrons in the Air Force, lower numbers of Army brigade 
combat teams, fewer battalions in the Marine Corps and a smaller fleet of 
Navy aircraft carriers. The problem is that force structure takes some time 
to come down. That leaves investment – research, development and 
procurement – and operations as the bill payers in the shorter term.45 
As acquisition and other components of DoD expenditure, such as military pay and 
healthcare, become more expensive,46 this reduction in the investment budget (even with 
                                                 
42 David A. Fahrenthold and Lisa Rein, “They Said the Sequester would be Scary. Mostly, They 
were Wrong,” Washington Post (June 30, 2013). 
43 “Squeezing the Pentagon: The Wrong Way to Cut America’s Military Budget,” The Economist 
(July 6, 2013). 
44 Stephen Dinan, “DoD Reversal: Sequester Pain Less Than Anticipated,” Washington Post 
(August 6, 2013). 
45 Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., “Sequester Impact: More Than Meets the Eye,” National Defense 
(September 2013): 6. 
46 Cindy Williams, Making Defense Affordable (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2013), 
6. 
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the protection of the S&T component of the R&D budget)47 will likely add pressure on 
how the DoD makes investment decisions and selects S&T programs. 
The decision to invest in this complex and nascent set of emerging technologies, 
exacerbated by the shifting international security environment coupled with increasing 
fiscal austerity pressure, suggests a set of challenging questions: Of the many and varied 
military applications made possible by emerging S&T, which ones deserve to be pursued? 
How can defense planners begin to draw conclusions about the expected utility or 
appropriateness of these various applications and define a path for their pursuit before these 
emerging technologies arrive on the scene? Do states invest in military research in certain 
areas of emerging S&T but not others? Is it possible to understand where other countries 
are likely to hedge their bets amidst the uncertainties associated with emerging 
technologies? Is it possible to understand what drives a state’s S&T investments amidst 
uncertainty and why states choose to invest in certain technologies the way they do?  
2.4 Uncertainty, Flexibility, and the Strategies for Risk Mitigation 
Both scholars and policymakers dealing with defense planning writ large and the 
R&D process in particular understand the problem of uncertainty inherent in the 
management of technological innovation. Burton Klein, for instance, noted that both 
supply and demand uncertainties exist in military R&D decisions.48 Supply uncertainties 
refer to the risks embedded in the R&D process, such as the technical uncertainty described 
above. Especially at the early stages of investing and pursuing emerging technologies, the 
potential costs, development direction, and timeline are all unknown and subject to large 
                                                 
47 Department of Defense, Defense Budget Priorities and Choices (Washington, D.C.: Department 
of Defense, 2012), 10. 
48 Burton H. Klein, “Policy Issues Involved in the Conduct of Military Development Programs,” in 
Economics of Research and Development, ed. Richard A. Tybout (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University 
Press, 1965), 319. 
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amounts of error in estimates. These uncertainties create the risk that the technology 
invested in may ultimately not achieve the desired payoff. 
Demand uncertainties refer to the uncertain nature of the security requirements 
imposed by a state’s actual or potential enemies, similar to what is referred to above as 
strategic uncertainty. This kind of uncertainty exists in the international system and is 
external to the R&D process, but it nevertheless shapes the R&D decisions, for defense 
investments are sensitive to the threat environment. A strategic environment in which the 
source of threat is ill-defined would, thus, heighten the level of demand uncertainties, and 
states can run the risk of investing in programs that ultimately do not meet the security 
demands. 
In both cases, risks can be understood as the probability of a negative outcome. In 
the DoD acquisition process, for instance, risks are defined as “future events or conditions 
that may have an negative effect on achieve program objectives for cost, schedule, and 
performance.”49 The measure of risk, thus, includes both the probability of an undesired 
outcome as well as the consequence of such an outcome. However, unlike in economic 
theories, in which the concept of risk refers to situations where the decision-maker has the 
knowledge of all possible outcomes and probabilities of their potential occurrence and is 
thus distinct from uncertainty, in this dissertation the concept or risk subsumes uncertainty, 
in which the consequences of an outcome and the probability for such an outcome are both 
unknowns or are difficult to estimate.50 The uncertainties associated with investing in an 
emerging technology are not separate from the risk calculus. Furthermore, in this 
                                                 
49 Department of Defense, Risk, Issue, and Opportunity Management Guide for Defense 
Acquisition Programs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems 
Engineering, 2015), 3. 
50 This echoes how risk has been defined in the realm of foreign policy making, in which the lack 
of complete information is the norm, which makes risk calculus in the classical economic sense untenable. 
See Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power 
Intervention in the Periphery,” Political Psychology 25(2) (2004): 182. 
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dissertation, the negative outcome is defined as a technology investment not meeting the 
security demands through problems associated with technical or strategic uncertainties. 
Klein suggests that being flexible pays when the future is uncertain: it mitigates the 
risks that arise from supply (technological) and demand (strategic) uncertainties. Adopting 
Klein’s approach, Stephen Peter Rosen extends the logic of flexibility to military 
technological innovation.51 According to Rosen, uncertainty can be managed by Klein’s 
Type I flexibility, which in the context of technological innovation refers to investments 
on technologies that are multiuse – such as weapons that can be used for every 
contingency.52 Since the cost of pursuing Type I flexibility is high, Rosen argues that 
uncertainty can also be managed by Type II flexibility, which is a hedging strategy that 
seeks to buy more information during early stages of development and defer costly 
decisions to a later date.53 While the costs of these strategies are different, they both help 
defense planners manage the risks associated with high levels of uncertainty. In both 
instances, the probability of a negative outcome – that of an investment not meeting the 
security demand, is expected to be lowered even the value of such a probability is not 
known. 
2.5 US Defense Investments in Cognitive Sciences Research – A Probe 
Conventional wisdom thus suggests that when navigating through uncertainties, 
states are best off when they diversify or hedge, for such strategies help mitigate the risks 
                                                 
51 Rosen (1991), 243-249. Thomas McNaugher advocates very similar strategies. See Thomas L. 
McNaugher, New Weapons, Old Politics: America’s Military Procurement Muddle (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1989). 
52 The capabilities-based uncertainty-sensitive planning, which aims to produce capabilities that 
can be used in a wide range of contingencies, is a form of Type I flexibility. See for instance Paul K. Davis, 
“Uncertainty Sensitive Planning,” in New Challenges, New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking, ed. Stuart 
E. Johnson, Martin C. Libicki, and Gregory F. Treverton (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 
141-144. A shift from threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning was also discussed in the 
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2006). 
53 Articulations of acquisition policies that follow this Type II flexibility can be found in Paul H. 
Richanbach et al., The Future of Military R&D: Towards a Flexible Acquisition Strategy (Alexandria, VA: 
Institute for Defense Analyses, 1990). 
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embedded in R&D investments. Yet, do states actually follow this wisdom? An 
examination of some current defense S&T programs suggests that the story is more 
complicated. For instance, in the past decade, the United States in particular has been active 
in leveraging emerging cognitive science and neuroscience (hereafter collectively called 
cognitive sciences) research for military purposes. Like many other emerging technologies 
today,54 cognitive sciences research is dual-use,55 interdisciplinary, and controversial. 
Unlike most other critical emerging technologies in previous military technological 
epochs, cognitive sciences enable a wide range of possible military capabilities. Some of 
these applications can be developed into field-deployable weapons systems, while others 
are non-deployable but mission, capability, or capacity-enabling. Cognitive sciences have 
also been heralded as transformative because they tackle the matters of human mind – they 
study and make transparent the underlying cognitive and neurological processes of human 
thoughts and behaviors. In this sense, cognitive sciences’ greatest promise to the defense 
communities is their potential to alter, redefine, or potentially revolutionize the use of the 
very foundational unit in military operations – the warfighters. 
                                                 
54 For scholarship discussing the military potential of other emerging technologies one may 
consult: for nanotechnology, Jürgen Altmann, Military Nanotechnology: Potential Applications and 
Preventive Arms Control (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006); Daniel Ratner and Mark A. Ratner, 
Nanotechnology and Homeland Security: New Weapons for New Wars (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 2004); Margaret E. Kosal, Nanotechnology for Chemical and Biological Defense (New York, NY: 
Springer, 2009); Margaret E. Kosal, “The Security Implications of Nanotechnology,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 66(4) (July 2010): 58-69; Frank Simonis and Steven Schilthuizen, Nanotechnology: Innovation 
Opportunities for Tomorrow’s Defense (Netherlands: TNO Science and Industry Future Technology 
Center, 2006). For genomics, see for instance The MITRE Corporation, JASON Program Office, “The 
$100 Genome: Implications for the DoD” (December 2010). For a more historical case on artificial 
intelligence, one may consult reports such as Stephen J. Andriole and Gerald W. Hopple, Defense 
Applications of Artificial Intelligence (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988); Paul E. Lehner, Artificial 
Intelligence and National Defense: Opportunity and Challenge (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Tab Professional 
and Reference Books, 1989); Allan M. Din, Arms and Artificial Intelligence: Weapons and Arms Control 
Applications of Advanced Computing (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987). 
55 Both in the traditional sense that it can be used for both civilian and military purposes, as well as 
the modern definition that it can be used for both beneficial and harmful applications.  See, for instance, 
National Research Council, Committee on Assessing Fundamental Attitudes of Life Scientists as a Basis 
for Biosecurity Education, A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in the Life Sciences: A 
Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and the American Association for the Advancement 
of Science (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2009). 
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How do cognitive sciences impact warfighters?  The answer lies in the myriad of 
their potential military applications. These applications range from building computational 
models of cognition, which can be used to impact the recruitment and training of soldiers,56 
to developing better brain-computer interfaces that produce greater integration of human-
machine systems and allow a soldier rehabilitation through intelligent prosthetics.57 Other 
uses often discussed include the development and use of neuropharmaceuticals for a 
warfighter’s performance enhancement or degradation58 and neuroimaging technologies-
enabled field-deployable biomarkers that monitor a warfighter’s health and performance. 
These novel capabilities, while promising, are for the most part still at an early stage of 
technological development, even outside the realm of military research.59 Given the 
complex and nascent nature of cognitive sciences research, the transformative potential 
they carry, the widely divergent possible applications and potentially risky payoffs, 
investments in the cognitive sciences R&D are highly uncertain and should present 
significant technology first-mover challenges to defense planners. Furthermore, due to 
their potential of drastically changing a warfighter’s capabilities and nefarious uses, the 
uncertainties embedded in and the potential risk of military investments in cognitive 
sciences seem to be best managed by a Type II flexibility strategy of low-cost hedges that 
buys information and delays commitment. 
Yet, the manner in which the United States, as a technology first-mover in military 
cognitive sciences research, has pursued its R&D programs in this emerging S&T in the 
                                                 
56 National Research Council, Opportunities in Neuroscience for Future Army Applications 
(Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2009), 23-33. 
57 National Research Council, Opportunities in Neuroscience (2009), 85-87.  For a more general 
discussion on neuroscience’s impact on prosthetics, see also The National Academies Keck Futures 
Initiative Smart Prosthetics Steering Committee, Smart Prosthetics: Exploring Assistive Devices for the 
Body and Mind (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2007). 
58 National Research Council, Opportunities in Neuroscience (2009) 45-66; National Research 
Council, Emerging Cognitive Neuroscience and Related Technologies (Washington, D.C.: The National 
Academies Press, 2008), 134-139. 
59 To date, at least within the United States, very few, if any, of these cognitive sciences 
applications have been developed past the stage of Advanced Technology Development (6.3), thus in terms 
of the larger acquisition process, most of these technologies are before the stage of the proof of concept.  
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past decade presents a rather different picture. The US military investments in cognitive 
sciences and related technologies, which have risen in the past decade, are broadly 
distributed across defense agencies like DARPA and the R&D arm of individual services. 
Yet, instead of pursuing a strategy of low-cost hedges, the US has chosen to invest in some 
areas of military-relevant cognitive sciences research but not in others. For instance, the 
types of cognitive sciences-related programs funded through DARPA include Human 
Assisted Neural Devices, Reliable Neural Interface Technology, Maintaining Combat 
Performance, and Revolutionizing Prosthetics. Among the services, the Army has allocated 
most of its funding to programs such as treatments for traumatic brain injury (TBI), 
neurosensory injury prevention and reduction, psychological resilience to Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD), and neuroergonomics. The Navy invests in programs on human 
systems, human performance, training, and education, and in-house laboratory research on 
human performance sciences. Finally, the Air Force’s investments include programs in 
human performance enhancement through cognitive modeling, mitigation of stressors on 
cognitive functions, performance evaluation in extreme environments.60 If one were to use 
the general “framework” of health/medical applications, performance enhancement 
applications, and performance degradation applications61 to categorize this diverse set of 
US military investments in cognitive sciences, a great majority of the investments go to 
health/medical and performance enhancement, but very little, if any, to performance 
degradation applications. Figure 3, using DARPA investments in cognitive sciences from 
2000 to 2013 as an example, shows the investment across these three domains of military 
cognitive sciences. The red trend line marks the absence of investment in performance 
degradation applications. 
                                                 
60 These investment areas are drawn from the President’s Budget between 2008 and 2013. 
61 These categories are used in studies such as National Research Council, Emerging Cognitive 
Neuroscience (2008) and The Royal Society, Brain Waves Module 3: Neuroscience, Conflict, and Security 




Figure 3 - Budget Requests for Cognitive Sciences Programs (in $ millions) - DARPA 
(2000-2013) 
 
The performance degradation applications, in this sense, most often refer to the use 
of biochemicals or other means as non-lethal weapons (NLW). These NLW applications 
include irritants, which “can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling 
physical effects which disappear within a short time following the termination of 
exposure,” or incapacitants, which “cause more prolonged but still transient disability and 
include centrally acting agents producing loss of consciousness, sedation, hallucination, 
incoherence, paralysis, disorientation or other such effects.”62 It is important to note that 
while the use of chemical-based incapacitants in war is prohibited under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC), their use is permitted in law enforcement, including for the 
                                                 




















purpose of domestic riot control.63 Furthermore, the military application potential of 
cognitive sciences in the form of refinement of calmatives and incapacitants is well-
recognized, for other countries have engaged in R&D (such as the Czech Republic and 
China) 64 and actual use of non-lethal incapacitants (such as in Russia in the 2002 Dubrovka 
Theater Incident against Chechen rebels).65 
In this sense, the absence of military investments in non-lethal applications of 
cognitive sciences is curious, particularly when there is the increasing realization of the 
need for non-lethal weapons in today’s counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare often 
fought in highly urban terrain. Furthermore, US defense planners are cognizant of the 
potential of non-lethal applications from the emerging cognitive sciences research. The 
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD), established in 1997, as well as the 711th 
Human Performance Wing in the Air Force, have called for proposals to explore the 
“Chemical Immobilizing Agents for Non-Lethal Applications,” and “‘Chemical pathway 
area…to degrade enemy performance and artificially overwhelm enemy cognitive 
capabilities’” in 2000 and 2009, respectively.66 Yet, very little, if any, visible military 
investments have gone to this area of performance degradation application of cognitive 
sciences research in the past decade. 
                                                 
63 And it is also important to note that this ambiguity in the CWC was discussed during the 2nd 
Review Conference in 2008 and 3rd Review Conference in 2013 without resolution. 
64 Alan Pearson, “Late and Post-Cold War Research and Development of Incapacitating 
Biochemical Weapons,” in Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons: Promise or Peril? ed. Alan M. Pearson, 
Marie Isabelle Chevrier, and Mark Wheelis (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 89. 
65 Mark Wheelis, “Nonconsensual Manipulation of Human Physiology Using Biochemicals,” in 
Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons: Promise or Peril? ed. Alan M. Pearson, Marie Isabelle Chevrier, and 
Mark Wheelis (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 5-6. 
66 See Department of Defense, Chemical and Biological Defense Program, “Topic CBD00-108: 
Chemical Immobilizing Agents for Non-lethal Applications,” Small Business Innovation Research 
Solicitation, FY 2000, http://www.acq.osd.mil/osbp/sbir/solicitations/sbir20001/cbd001.doc (accessed 
September 10, 2016), CBD-13-14. 
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This pattern of US military investments in the emerging cognitive sciences begs the 
question “Why do states invest militarily in some areas of emerging S&T but not others?”  
Additionally, it raises several other interesting and related questions: 
1) Since investments in emerging S&T are shrouded with uncertainty, how 
do states invest as a technology first-mover? 
2) What happens when they do not hedge? What guides their investment 
decisions? 
The lack of hedging in US military investments in the emerging cognitive sciences 
research is not entirely unique. States do not always hedge even when faced with great 
uncertainty in emerging S&T investments. For instance, when considering nanotechnology 
investments, others have observed how Russia and the US make divergent investment paths 
in spite of uncertainty.67 This dissertation, therefore, seeks to examine how a state invests 
militarily in an area of nascent science and technology research as a technology first-
mover. It explores the possibility that when facing uncertainty, states make investments by 
pursuing a strategy of managing opportunities rather than mitigating risk. 
                                                 
67 Adam N. Stulberg, “Flying Blind into a New Military Epoch: The Nanotechnology Revolution, 
Emerging Security Dilemmas, and Russia’s Double-Bind” (paper presented at annual convention of the 
International Studies Association, New York, NY, February 2009). 
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Figure 4 – Two Perspectives on First-Mover Behavior 
 
2.6 The Concept of Opportunity 
As shown in Figure 4, when making investment decisions amidst great uncertainty, 
a technology first-mover’s strategy can be understood from two different perspectives. As 
suggested before, the first-mover may hedge its investments by being flexible. The hedging 
strategy, which broadens the investment portfolio by investing widely and delaying 
commitment to any particular technology, helps an investor manage uncertainty by 
mitigating against potential risks in the R&D process. In the case of investments in an 
emerging S&T like the cognitive sciences, the hedging strategy would suggest that the 
United States invests across as many cognitive sciences-based military capabilities as 
possible, including medical and health applications, performance enhancement 
applications, and performance degradation applications. In this sense, for a state pursing a 
hedging strategy, one should not observe an area of emerging military technology that does 
not receive investment, and certainly not one that has the most direct military utility. 
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However, as shown in the manner that the US has actually invested in cognitive 
sciences, the first-mover may sometimes invest in only a subset of potentially military-
relevant areas of emerging S&T. In those instances, the investor’s decisions are likely 
influenced by how the opportunities of the investment are understood. Opportunity, in this 
case, includes both the projected utility that can be derived from a technology as well as 
the set of conditions that will lead to the realization of such projected utility. The 
management of opportunity, therefore, means structuring investments in a manner that will 
maximize the likelihood that certain utilities will be realized. It also provides a means to 
understand why certain technologies are invested in while others are not – in the most 
simple sense, the technologies that do not get invested in may be unappealing opportunities. 
Avoiding risk amidst uncertainty is conventional wisdom, but in practice, when 
states invest in emerging military technologies, some get money and others do not. Hence, 
it is important to understand how defense investment decisions may be framed according 
to opportunities rather than risk. Framing and differentiating technological investments 
according to the opportunities they present provides a way to understand why some areas 
of an emerging technology are pursued by a first-mover while others are not. Whereas a 
strategy of risk mitigation, such as hedging, avoids prioritizing investment in a given 
technology, a strategy of managing opportunities explains how such a prioritization would 
occur precisely because the technological options are different in terms of their projected 
utility as well as the circumstances that will lead to their projected utility’s realization. 
In other words, framing S&T investments according to opportunities provides a 
way to show how various emerging technologies are in fact different from one another. 
Not only are utilities of different emerging military technologies different, but the 
circumstances (or conditions) under which these technologies can be realized are also 
different. The following two chapters examine this concept more closely. Chapter 3 defines 
the dependent variable – the defense or military investment in S&T – and provides a review 
 37 
of three theoretical perspectives of defense S&T investment, with attention to how 
opportunity is understood under each perspective. Chapter 4 expands on this concept of 
opportunity and provides an argument for why, under certain technical conditions, an 




CHAPTER 3. DEFENSE S&T INVESTMENT – CONSEQUENCE 
OF STRUCTURAL IMPERATIVES, IDEATIONAL FRAMING, 
OR BUREAUCRATIC INTERESTS? 
3.1 The Dependent Variable: Defense S&T Investment 
This dissertation seeks to explain investment in emerging defense S&T. It asks 
whether or not, to what extent, and why an area of S&T is funded by the defense 
establishments in a given country for the purpose of obtaining certain military capabilities. 
Defense establishments, in this case, refer to government agencies that are responsible for 
the supervision, coordination, and provision of national defense and national armed forces 
operations. In the United States, such establishments would entail an agency such as the 
Department of Defense. Although defense contractors are also often considered part of a 
country’s defense establishments, their investments toward basic and applied research, 
such as independent research and development (IR&D) projects, do not count as defense 
S&T investment. The IR&D projects are initiated by contractors but not performed under 
contract, and most are conducted to improve existing products, meet dual-use demands, or 
address a known or potential requirement.68 While such projects contribute to and help 
shape a country’s defense S&T programs, they do not directly represent the defense 
establishments’ priorities and interests. Therefore, they are not considered part of the 
defense establishments for the purpose of evaluating S&T program funding in this 
dissertation. 
                                                 
68 “Dual-use” here refers to the traditional definition, which indicates a technology’s ability to be 
used in both civilian as well as military sectors. For the US Department of Defense’s definition of IR&D, 
see Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 31.205-18, “Independent Research and Development and Bid 
and Proposal Costs,” http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/FAR_31.pdf (accessed 
October 6, 2016). 
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The term S&T, in the context of defense investments, refers to the earliest stages of 
a defense establishment’s Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
process. In the case of the United States, it entails basic research, applied research, and 
advanced technology development. In terms of funding, these activities fall under budget 
categories 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 in the annual budget requests for the Department of Defense. 
The definitions of these activities are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1 - Budget Categories and Definitions for Defense S&T Programs in the US 
Budget 
Category R&D Activity Definition 
6.1 Basic 
Research 
Systematic study directed toward greater knowledge or 
understanding of fundamental aspects of phenomena and of 
observable facts without specific applications towards 
processes or products in mind 
6.2 Applied 
Research 
Systematic expansion and application of knowledge to 
develop useful materials, devices, and systems or 





Development of subsystems and components and efforts to 
integrate subsystems and components into system 
prototypes for field experiments and/or tests in simulated 
environments 
 
Investment here refers to government funding. Defense investment, in this 
dissertation, refers to government funding channeled through and managed by the defense 
establishments. For the Department of Defense, such funding may occur through multiple 
channels: in addition to contract programs with laboratories and industries, DoD also funds 
S&T research through other collaborate avenues, including partnerships with universities 
through the Multi-Disciplinary University Research Initiative (MURI) or with small 
businesses through the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program. During the 
appropriation process, Congress may also earmark and fund specific programs or areas of 
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R&D through the DoD. These earmarked programs will also become part of defense S&T 
investment. Collectively, these streams of money from the DoD constitute the defense S&T 
investments in the United States. 
Multiple research institutions perform R&D with funding from the DoD, ranging 
from national laboratories to small businesses. These institutions have been collectively 
referred to as the defense research (& engineering) enterprise,69 and they can be either 
intramural or extramural to the defense establishments. Although variation exists, across 
the services in the US, basic research is most often conducted in university and service-
specific laboratories, whereas applied research and technology development, for the most 
part, take place in service and industry laboratories. Figure 5 below shows the general 
distribution of the recipients of DoD S&T funds (using the 2008 President’s Budget as an 
example). Defense-wide R&D institutions such as the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) also 
manage programs for both intramural and extramural defense R&D, although neither is 
associated with specific in-house laboratories.  
                                                 
69 See, for instance, National Research Council, Strategic Engagement in Global S&T: 
Opportunities for Defense Research (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2014) and Office 
of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research & Engineering, DoD Research and Engineering Enterprise 
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2014).  
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Figure 5 - Recipients of DoD S&T Funding70 
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, defense S&T investment in the US is 
operationalized dichotomously as either present or absent. The presence of defense S&T 
investment indicates that a given area of S&T has been funded by the DoD. This can be 
measured directly as funding for programs shown in the President’s Budget, regardless of 
the type of funding (whether a MURI, SBIR, or other types of funding contract) or the 
recipient of such funding. The absence of investment indicates that a given area of S&T 
does not appear in the budget request, even if it has otherwise been discussed in public or 
policy discourses as an area that warrants S&T investment from the defense establishments 
or has appeared in the DoD’s request for proposals (RFPs). The presence and absence of 
funding, thus, also reflect a defense establishment’s decision to invest or not to invest in an 
                                                 
70 Bob Baker, “Fiscal Year 2011 President’s Budget Request for the DoD Science and Technology 
Program” (Briefing at the 12th Annual Science & Engineering Technology Conference, National Defense 
Industrial Association, North Charleston, SC, June 21, 2011). 
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area of S&T. An indirect measure can also be used by examining the extent to which a 
program exists in official government records, which may include descriptions of research 
activities that have been undertaken as shown in research or other government reports. Both 
measures are used in this dissertation to determine the presence or absence of defense or 
military investment in an emerging technology. 
As is the case in many other countries, federal R&D funding for defense-related 
technologies in the US can be subjected to control and regulation. Most often, such 
measures occur through the classification of information. It is therefore possible that a 
technology program does not appear explicitly in public documents such the President’s 
Budget because it has become classified (gone “black”). It is important to note, however, 
that most programs that are still at the S&T stages of R&D are required by law to remain 
unclassified, and this is particularly true since 1985 when National Security Decision 
Directives (NSDD) 189 mandated that “the products of fundamental research remain 
unrestricted.”71 This policy has since been upheld by subsequent administrations, most 
recently in 2010 by Ash Carter, then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics. Emerging military technologies considered in this dissertation, 
most of which entails primarily basic and applied research, should therefore be unclassified 
and traceable in the annual budget or other publicly available records should they receive 
investment from the DoD. 
3.2 The Context of Current Literature 
If one accepts that military technology plays an important, if not pivotal, role in 
both national and international security, then the question of how military investments are 
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made in emerging S&T deserves further scrutiny. Yet, the extant literature has yet to 
provide a satisfactory answer to this question. This lack of insight on defense S&T 
investment is perhaps understandable for a couple of reasons. First, much of the literature 
that concerns the politics of defense acquisition has focused on major weapons systems or 
military platforms.72 There are good reasons why so much attention has been given to 
weapons systems and platforms like the strategic bombers, ICBMs, or missile defense. 
Since they constitute the bulk of the defense acquisition budget, both in terms of RDT&E 
as well as procurement, and they make up a large portion of the strategic and operational 
capability for the US military, an understanding of how these systems develop and whether 
they are successful is critical. Yet, this almost exclusive focus on major weapons systems 
and platforms also has limitations. Because the security and financial ramifications of their 
success or failure are significant, these studies have typically focused on later stages of the 
acquisition process (technology development, testing, evaluation, and procurement) rather 
than initial S&T investment decisions. As a result, they provide rather limited direct insight 
into the questions that concern this dissertation. Furthermore, since the R&D activities for 
major military systems and platforms are conducted by defense contractors, the 
explanations for R&D focus on the military-industry-Congress relationship with little 
attention paid to the functions of basic research and the roles of scientists outside the 
military-industrial complex (i.e., university scientists). 
The second reason why the existing literature provides little insight into states’ 
military S&T investments results from the inherent difficulty in studying this type of 
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inquiry. Studying why technologies are generated in the form and pursued in the direction 
they are is no easy task. Most researchers are more inclined to treat the direction of 
technological innovation as a given or as exogenous to the explanations at hand. In fact, 
“[s]ocial scientists have generally been reluctant to examine the causes of technical change, 
preferring instead to analy[z]e its consequences.”73 It arguably is easier to assess the impact 
that technology may have on the international system and military affairs than to explore 
why certain technologies or technological options are favored.74 In this sense, 
technological innovation is often considered a possible, if not important, contributor to 
explanations of issues concerning military and security, but the nature of the actual 
technological pursuits is rarely examined itself. 
The following sections provide a critical overview of three theoretical perspectives 
that have been used to examine the question of defense S&T investment: structural realism, 
social constructivism, and bureaucratic politics. The analysis focuses on why these 
theoretical perspectives are relevant to the question of defense S&T investment. An 
analysis of the limitations of each theoretical approach will conclude each section.  
3.3 Realism and Structural Imperative 
3.3.1 The Logic of Structural Realism 
One of the explanations for the presence or absence of defense investments in 
emerging technologies can be derived from structural security imperatives. Structural 
                                                 
73 Ajey Lele, Strategic Technologies for the Military: Breaking New Frontiers (Thousand Oaks, 
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realism holds that the roots of state behavior lie in the structure of the international system. 
This structure, according to Waltz, entails an ordering principle of anarchy, sovereign states 
that are functionally undifferentiated, and the distribution of capabilities among them.75 In 
this anarchic international environment, which indicates the lack of a higher sovereign 
capable of managing the actions of the states, each state is forced to assure its own survival. 
As Waltz reasons, “in any self-help system, units worry about their survival, and the worry 
conditions their behavior.”76 Anarchy thus produces a structural constraint in the 
international system that encourages states to do what they can to ensure their security and 
penalizes those who fail to respond to this encouragement. A state engaged in self-help 
thus has the goal, first and foremost, to maximize its security. 
Since in an anarchic international environment “some states may at any time use 
force, all states must be prepared to do so—or live at the mercy of their militarily more 
rigorous neighbors.”77 Yet, a state’s actions to maximize its own security may 
inadvertently provoke others. This phenomenon, known as the “security dilemma,” is a 
consequence of the zero-sum assumption of states’ relative capabilities as well as states’ 
inability to be sure of the intentions and actions of others.78 The security dilemma is a 
constant feature in the international system and cannot be resolved, but its effects can be 
exacerbated or mitigated. It is with respect to managing the security dilemma that the 
different strands of structural realism diverge in their predictions of state behaviors. 
3.3.1.1 Offensive Realism 
                                                 
75 Waltz (1979), 88-99. 
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Simply stated, offensive realists argue that in the anarchic international 
environment states are best off maximizing their own relative capability for the sake of 
achieving security regardless of cost. From the perspective of offensive realism, a state can 
never be completely sure of the intention of others in the international system. Some states 
will inevitably have some type of offensive military capability, and a state will always be 
uncertain how much military power it needs in order to ensure its survival. These 
conditions suggest that states have reason to fear each other. States, realizing that they can 
best ensure their survival by being the most powerful entity in the international system, do 
whatever they can to stay ahead of others. 
According to John Mearsheimer, great powers in an anarchic system are always 
primed for offense. Even if a great power does not possess the capacity to achieve 
hegemony, “it will still act offensively to amass as much power as it can, because states 
are almost always better off with more rather than less power.”79 States therefore are 
always exploiting opportunities to take advantage of one another and are willing to use any 
measure that helps them gain advantage over others. States thus constantly engage in 
security competition, and the security dilemma, as a result, cannot be effectively 
ameliorated as long as states operate under anarchy. 
3.3.1.2 Defensive Realism 
Whereas offensive realists maintain that states in an anarchic system will continue 
to engage in power competition, since they cannot ensure their security otherwise, 
defensive realists argue that states can in fact achieve security without provoking others. 
Defensive realists claim that states can ensure their security by maintaining the balance of 
power and that the effect of the security dilemma can be alleviated by the existing offense-
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Company, Inc., 2001), 35. 
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defense balance. Offense-dominance and the inability to distinguish offense from defense 
worsen the security dilemma and encourage conflict. Defense-dominance and the ability 
to distinguish defense from offense lessen the severity of the security dilemma, providing 
potential for peace and cooperation. 
Unlike offensive realists who argue that great powers will remain unsatisfied with 
the status quo unless they can achieve hegemony, defensive realists suggest that under 
certain conditions, it is possible for status quo powers to adopt compatible or cooperative 
security policies rather than competitive ones.80 For them, a state’s efforts at self-
preservation do not have to result in power competition such as an arms race.  This is 
especially true if the risks and costs of such a competition are high, if defense is dominant 
and the capabilities necessary to achieve defense are distinguishable from offensive ones, 
and when states are able to communicate their benign intentions through visible military 
policies. In short, even in an anarchic environment, rational actors, defensive realists argue, 
can reduce the competitive effect of security dilemma. 
3.3.2 Predictions of Structural Realist Explanations 
Offensive and defensive realists offer divergent predictions on a state’s defense 
S&T investments through different mechanisms. For offensive realists, the anarchic 
international environment and its inherent uncertainty provide strong incentives for states 
to invest in and exploit any S&T option available. In other words, if a state has the capacity 
to pursue a new military technology, it should do so.   
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The logic behind offensive realism-based understanding of a first-mover imperative 
is perhaps best shown in John Mearsheimer’s articulation of reasons behind the 
competition for nuclear superiority: 
Great powers always prefer to be the first to develop new technologies; they 
have to make sure that their opponents do not beat them to the punch and 
gain the advantage for themselves. Thus, it made sense for each superpower 
to make a serious effort to develop counterforce technology and ballistic 
missile defense. At a maximum, successful breakthroughs might have 
brought clear superiority; at a minimum, these efforts prevented the other 
side from gaining a unilateral advantage.81 
In this sense, offensive realism predicts that states will always have an incentive to be a 
technology first-mover, and it also predicts that states will invest, at a maximum, in 
everything they can, and at a minimum, according to the threats that exist in the 
international environment. In other words, for offensive realists, defense S&T investment 
is an imperative, but their argument is limited in lending theoretical insight as to why some 
technologies are pursued but not others. It also fails to account for the variance in 
technological investments across states. Particularly in an environment where sources of 
threat are fluid and resources are limited, offensive realism faces difficulty generating 
useful predictions regarding military technology investments. 
For defensive realists, technology contributes to the determination of offense-
defense balance. Technology that confers advantage to attackers contributes to offense-
dominance, whereas technology that confers advantage to defenders increases defense-
dominance. In this sense, offense-defense balance is a systemic variable, and the 
technology that defines it is assumed to have systemic effects on a given era of warfare. 
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When offense-defense balance is treated as a systemic variable, and the nature of the 
technology is treated as a given, the theory itself provides no direct prediction as to why a 
state would invest in military technologies a certain way. 
It is possible, however, to define the logic of offense-defense balance in a dyadic 
manner (between two states, for instance) rather than a feature of the international system.82 
In the dyadic formulation of offense-defense balance, it is possible that a state may be 
inclined to invest in new military technologies according to the impact it will have on the 
offense-defense balance. For instance, a state may be inclined to invest in offensive 
technologies in order to tip the balance towards offense, or vice versa. This, of course, not 
only requires a clear understanding of how to measure the offensive vs. defensive nature 
of a technology, but it also requires a definable source of threat in the international system 
to which a state is responding. 
 In his critical assessment of defensive realists’ claims, Keir Lieber finds that 
determining offense-defense balance and distinguishability is difficult and predictions are 
often empirically unsound, but he agrees that states can, and often, exploit a technology to 
advance policy objectives. Labeling this “technological opportunism,” Lieber suggests that 
“states will rarely view technological developments as means to maintain status quo or 
preserve their power position,” and “even defensive technological advances will tend to be 
seized upon by states as potential opportunities to pursue offensive political objectives.”83 
For Lieber, states invest in an area of technology in order to advance their policy objectives, 
and since states are primed for offense, such investments are more likely to be leveraged 
for offensive policies than to preserve the status quo. 
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3.3.3 Critique 
Structural realism has been the dominant theory in providing explanations and 
predictions in the security realm. Its parsimony and intuitive appeal have permitted 
derivation of its logic for a variety of explanations on state behavior. When leveraged to 
explain a state’s investment decision in an emerging military technology as a first-mover, 
however, realism provides mixed results. Offensive realism provides the structural logic 
behind a state’s pursuit of being a technology first-mover, and confirms the intuition (or 
conventional wisdom) that capable states tend to hedge their military technology 
investments when facing uncertainties. Yet, its understanding of S&T investments as an 
imperative does not help explain why in some instances states opt not to invest in a military-
relevant technology. 
Defensive realism provides a more nuanced understanding of investment choices. 
Defensive realist logic allows for the possibility that states may invest according to the 
impact that the technology has on the offense-defense balance.  In other words, the 
opportunity presented by an emerging technology can be framed as either offensive or 
defensive. For a technology first-mover in a strategic environment shrouded with 
uncertainty, however, applying the offense-defense framework may be difficult, for its 
predictions rely on a dyadic evaluation of offense-defense balance, which requires an 
identifiable opponent as well as ways to measure the offensive or defensive nature of new 
technology. As a result, applying offense-defense theory may be difficult for a technology 
first-mover due to strategic and technological uncertainty. 
3.4 Constructivism and Organizational Frame 
3.4.1 The Logic of Organizational Frame 
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In recent years, the social constructivist approach has been increasingly leveraged 
to understand security issues.84 Constructivist approaches emphasize the role of concepts 
such as norms, identities, and ideas in explaining social outcomes. Under the constructivist 
perspective, neither structure nor agency has ontological priority in the classic agent-
structure debate typical for the study of social phenomena, but both are treated as mutually 
constitutive. Under constructivism, structures represent shared meanings between agents 
that arise out of their interactions, and in turn, constrain and shape the agent’s actions. 
One of the variables that has increasingly been used to explain organizational 
behavior is “organizational frame.” In her study on the fire damage of nuclear weapons, 
Lynn Eden identifies organizational frames as “frameworks for action that structure how 
actors in organizations identify problems and find solutions.”85 Organizational frame 
emerges from the social construction of knowledge-laden routines. As organizations solve 
problems, they allocate and build organizational capacity on certain problems but not 
others. The accumulation of organizational capacity in solving certain problems creates 
organizational knowledge that is codified (formally or informally) into routines. These 
routines, in turn, enable the organization to be able to perform certain function and solve 
certain problems while at the same time constraining the scope of the organization’s 
problem-solving. 
In this sense, organizational frame resembles the idea of path dependence in 
historical institutionalism. Path dependence suggests that at any given decision point (or 
                                                 
84 For a selection of work that typify this approach, see Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of 
National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
1997); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Richard M. Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1997); and Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the 
Nonuse of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
85 Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, & Nuclear Weapons 
Devastations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), 50. See also Kathleen M. Vogel, Phantom 
Menace or Looming Danger: A New Framework for Assessing Bioweapons Threats (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013) for use of technology frames in explaining the intelligence analysis 
of bioweapon threats. 
 52 
critical juncture), the actions taken become the basis for future actions. Similar to path 
dependence, the construction of an organizational frame is self-reinforcing—with each new 
problem that an organization faces and solves that fits within the organizational frame, 
greater organizational capacity to problem-solving is generated and the routines of 
problem-solving are reinforced. As explained by Eden, “past choices and actions structure 
future possibilities, both by shaping the understandings that actors bring to the new 
situations and by shaping the social environment in which decisions are made and carried 
out.”86 Like path dependence, the self-reinforcing nature of the organizational frame makes 
change and outside learning difficult. 
Yet, organizational frame differs from historical institutionalism in one important 
regard: whereas path dependence focuses on why an outcome occurs the way it does by 
showing its historical lineage, the concept of framing provides a way to visualize why some 
outcomes, actions, or missions are not present, considered, or pursued. In other words, the 
concept of framing provides logic to the cases of “dogs that don’t bark.” Just like the way 
framing is used in photography – materials that fall outside the frame are outside precisely 
because they are not the focus. 
3.4.2 Predictions of Organizational Explanations 
This effect of framing has been leveraged to explain the notion of “neglect” of 
biodefense from military research, development, and acquisition (RDA) in the United 
States. According to Frank Smith, organizational frames are “shared assumptions and 
heuristics that organizations use to solve problems,” and “[s]hared assumptions and 
heuristics are ideas that provide a framework for interpreting reality.”87 Since the 
assumptions and heuristics only bring attention to a selected subset of reality, the 
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“problems and solutions that are salient inside an organization’s frame benefit from ample 
if not excessive attention,” whereas “problems and solutions that fall outside of an 
organization’s dominant frame are systemically deprived of resources.”88 As a result, 
issues that fall outside an organization’s frame of reference are neglected precisely because 
they do not receive the attention needed for their comprehension. 
Smith argues that the reason why biodefense is neglected by the US military is 
because it falls outside the military’s organizational frame of kinetic warfare. The kinetic 
warfare frame of reference involves projectile weapons and explosives, and disease-based 
bioweapons and biodefense that are non-kinetic consequently fall outside the military’s 
organizational frame. Since the organizational frame defines the types of problems an 
organization will solve through research, development, and acquisition, biodefense is 
neglected in the military’s RDA efforts. 
Smith’s explanation of the neglect of biodefense lends important insight to the 
question of why states may invest heavily in some areas of emerging military technology 
but not others. According to his hypothesis on RDA, the opportunity to invest in an 
emerging military technology is defined by the kinetic warfare frame of reference. 
Therefore, military applications that provide opportunities for kinetic warfare will be 
invested in, while others that do not will be neglected and receive comparatively less 
attention and funding. 
3.4.3 Critique 
Organizational frame provides a parsimonious explanation as to why some 
technologies are pursued in earnest while others are not: technologies that fall within the 
organizational frame will get the attention and receive resources for research, development, 
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and acquisition, and technologies that fall outside the frame will be neglected. There are, 
however, several problems with explaining military investment decisions through 
organizational frame. First, the kinetic frame that the military supposedly espouses has 
difficulty explaining certain empirical facts. Smith argues that the military’s frame of 
reference for RDA decisions is kinetic warfare and that technologies that are considered 
kinetic will receive attention. However, the medical application investments in cognitive 
sciences as well as information security-related investments by the DoD in recent years are 
both non-kinetic. The military’s organizational frame, thus, does not seem to explain these 
instances of investment and organizational attention. 
Second, the organizational frame argument Smith employs assumes that the 
military and its frame of reference is the only one that matters. His explanation on RDA 
decisions using organizational frame focuses on only one organization, which in this case 
is the military. Yet, investment as well as acquisition decisions are complex processes that 
involve more than just the military services.  In this case, how other actors’ frame of 
references are accounted for and to what extent they matter is unclear. This oversight is 
especially important when the empirical evidence shows that the military makes decisions 
to invest in areas outside its frame of reference. 
Finally, it is not clear why “kinetics” is the organizational frame that would define a 
military’s investment in a given area of S&T rather than a different frame of reference. 
Although the goal for the military’s RDA process is to produce military capabilities to 
engage and hopefully succeed in armed conflicts, RDA as a decision process itself involves 
more than just considerations for the production of kinetic capabilities. For instance, some 
defense agencies, such as DARPA, invest in high-risk, high-payoff technologies that carry 
the potential to influence how warfare is conducted, whereas the services’ investments, 
even in basic and applied research, are often targeted at evolutionary improvements to 
existing capabilities. Whether and to what extent such “shared heuristics” as to how these 
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organizations understand their primary missions in S&T investments influence their 
decisions is unlikely to be accounted for in an explanation that defines military 
technologies merely along the lines of kinetics versus non-kinetics. In other words, frames 
of reference, as an ideational and social construct, can be highly fluid. Since they can be 
defined in a myriad of ways, why certain frames dominate over others in the RDA process 
begs further scrutiny. 
3.5 Bureaucratic Politics and Interest Competition 
3.5.1 The Logic of Bureaucratic Politics 
Unlike the structural arguments proposed by the realists which derive the incentive 
and explanation of military technology investment decisions externally, and organizational 
frame arguments that derive explanations from the frame of reference of a single 
organization, the bureaucratic politics model argues that decision processes in reality are 
often much more complicated. Bureaucratic politics proponents, such as Graham Allison 
and Morton Halperin in their studies of foreign policy decision-making, eschew the idea 
that political decisions can be understood structurally. Instead, they suggest the need to 
“open the black box” of domestic politics in order to gain insight into the policymaking 
process. In the simplest sense, the bureaucratic politics model suggest that the concepts of 
“state” and “government” are in fact a collection of agencies, bureaucracies, organizations, 
and individuals, each with its own set of parochial interests and objectives.89 Thus, so-
called policy decisions result from competing interests of a constellation of subnational 
political actors. 
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Applying the model of bureaucratic process and organizational interests, John Alic 
has observed that institutionally, the process of defense acquisition in the United States 
involves three sets of relationships that help determine the decision outcome: the inter- and 
intra-service rivalries, the competition between military and civilian authorities, and the 
interaction between the policymakers and the industry.90 These overlapping relationships 
suggest that the choice of investment or, in this case, acquisition at large, is rarely defined 
by national interests. Similarly, emphasizing the interests of armed services, Thomas 
Mahnken suggests that it is the culture of the individual US armed services that influences 
and helps determine the technologies they choose to pursue.91 Investment decisions, in this 
sense, are a result of individual services picking and choosing technologies to suit their 
organizational culture. 
According to the bureaucratic politics model, the presence or absence of investment 
in a military technology is likely to result from different agencies or political actors 
competing for influence in the decision process. Such an argument has intuitive appeal, 
since it better captures the complexity and multiplicity of actors involved in the 
policymaking process than the unitary actor assumption embedded in structural arguments. 
Indeed, the majority of Cold War-era studies of military innovation, which focuses less on 
S&T investments but more on military systems acquisitions, employs various forms of 
bureaucratic politics arguments. For instance, in his study of the Air Force’s development 
of its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program, Edmund Beard notes the civil-
military struggle and highlights the importance of civilian intervention in reshaping the Air 
Force’s traditional preference towards manned bombers.92 Harvey Sapolsky and Michael 
Armacost similarly evoke inter-service rivalry in their studies of the Polaris missile systems 
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and the Thor-Jupiter controversy, respectively.93 Bureaucratic interest competition is thus 
a common alternative to structural arguments when the latter fail to generate useful 
explanations or predictions. 
3.5.2 Predictions of Bureaucratic Explanations 
Despite its popularity, the bureaucratic politics and interest competition model 
provides surprisingly little direct and predictive insight into the presence or absence of 
investment in a military S&T program. In a general sense, the bureaucratic politics model 
argues that the players involved in policy decisions have different preferences that reflect 
their parochial interests. The various military applications derived from emerging S&T, 
thus, represent different opportunities and have different meanings for different 
bureaucracies, and each has its own interpretation of what these new applications and 
capabilities mean and has varying degrees of interest in them. Some opportunities will 
appeal to the interest of certain agencies and organizations but not others. As a result, the 
interest competition between different agencies helps influence which opportunities are 
pursued and, in turn, which areas of S&T are invested in. 
This type of explanation is of course difficult to operationalize without specifying 
what the interests for the various bureaucratic actors are and what these technologies mean 
to them. It is also difficult to generate any prediction as to whose interest will ultimately 
win out in the competitive process without specifying the rules of the game and what 
determines success. For some, the common interests that define all bureaucratic actors are 
greater resources and more autonomy in performing their bureaucratic missions. In other 
words, all bureaucracies, whatever their other parochial interests may be, will chase after 
more money and independence. This insight, then, helps to generate some predictions, less 
so about defense S&T investment decisions, but about bureaucratic behavior in light of 
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such an investment. First, an agency or organization that is funding a certain S&T program 
is unlikely to surrender it to other agencies or organizations. Second, when facing a new 
area of investment, an agency or organization is likely to try to legitimize its claim over 
this new “pot of money” in order to expand its proverbial “turf” vis-à-vis others. 
3.5.3 Critique 
The bureaucratic politics and interest competition model provides a compelling 
vision of how the political reality of policymaking might work. Without carefully defining 
the interests of each actor, the rules of the interest competition, and the criteria for success, 
the bureaucratic politics model, however, cannot generate predictions about defense S&T 
investment a priori. In fact, it is a common critique that when underspecified, bureaucratic 
politics arguments are tautological: a bureaucratic actor’s interest in a specific defense S&T 
investment wins out because that S&T program is invested in. In this sense, the 
bureaucratic politics model is good at providing detailed explanations of the policy process, 
but poor at predicting policy outcomes. 
If one were to accept the assumption that all bureaucratic actors desire more 
resources and greater autonomy, then such defined interests may yield some predictions 
about bureaucratic behavior concerning an S&T investment. Yet, such predictions that a 
bureaucratic actor is unlikely to give up its “turf,” if not actively try to expand it, merely 
reinforce why an emerging military technology is likely to be invested in, yet do not explain 
a lack of investment. In short, the bureaucratic politics model provides limited utility in 
explaining the presence or absence of a defense S&T investment. 
3.6 Conclusion 
When an emerging military technology arrives on the scene, great powers with the 
capability to pursue R&D as a technology first-mover have an interest in doing so. Yet, as 
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shown by the way that the US has invested in the military research of cognitive sciences, 
not all military applications based on this research received attention and investment. Why 
are some emerging military technologies invested in while others are not? What accounts 
for the presence or absence of defense investment in an emerging technology? 
The above analysis outlines three major perspectives that can be employed to 
explain decisions concerning defense S&T, but each has fallen short to account for why 
certain programs are funded by a technology first-mover while others are not. In the 
following chapter, I seek to provide an explanation by leveraging insights from the Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) literature. I argue that explanations based on 
structural realism, ideational framing, and bureaucratic politics are insufficient because 
they fail to properly conceptualize how certain properties of a technology, such as the 
feasibility of technical resolutions, become understood in the R&D process. I suggest that 
properties that help determine the favorability of technology as an investment opportunity 




CHAPTER 4. FEASIBILITY, STRINGENCY, AND 
ALTERNATIVES – SUPPLY AND DEMAND FACTORS THAT 
CONDITION DEFENSE S&T INVESTMENT 
Why do some nascent areas of S&T attract militaries’ interest and investment while 
others do not? In this dissertation, I propose that investments of emerging military S&T 
are conditioned by how the opportunity of the technology is conceived and defined by 
relevant actors in the R&D and political processes. In other words, a technology and its 
military implications are not exogenous to the process from which it evolves – during the 
acquisition process certain understandings and meanings of a technology are confirmed 
and reinforced while others are rejected and undermined. In particular, I argue that how the 
expert communities define and come to a consensus or a dominant opinion on the 
feasibility of the technology, how the military define its requirements for the technology, 
and whether technology or institutional alternatives to fulfilling the capability gap are 
available determine the appeal of a given technology as an investment. I further posit that 
these variables together generate certain conditions for investment, and under unfavorable 
conditions, investments in certain emerging S&T are less likely to be initiated and 
sustained, despite the technology’s military utility. 
As examined in Chapter 3, existing structural, organizational, and bureaucratic 
explanations of defense acquisition all fail in some critical aspect in their ability to explain 
military technology investments, particularly in cases where the technology, by their 
predictions, should receive investments but does not. I posit that such a failure arises in 
part because these explanations 1) obscure the technical details of a technology, 2) ignore 
how different actors within the acquisition process, particularly the ones outside the 
military institutions, understand and define these details, and 3) fail to account for the 
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possibility that understandings of the technical content of a technology may change over 
time. The argument presented and hypotheses generated in this chapter seek to provide a 
preliminary way at addressing these failings. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. In part one, I examine three analytical 
frameworks that contextualize S&T as a variable in the defense acquisition process. The 
supply and demand framework identifies the relevant actors and institutions in defense 
acquisition. The Social Construction of Technology literature provides a means to 
understand how S&T is itself a variable in the acquisition process rather than a static, 
objective fact or product as it is often conceptualized in existing explanations. The quadrant 
model of scientific research provides a way to situate military basic research as potentially 
both knowledge and use-inspired. Part two explains feasibility, requirements stringency, 
and alternatives as meaningful variables in defense investment and acquisition, as well as 
their interactions, and advances a model of their potential impact to investment decisions. 
Finally, part three articulates the case-study research design for this dissertation, describes 
the methods used to understand the variables, and provides a succinct explanation for the 
emerging nature of cognitive neuroscience as an area of scientific research and technology 
development. 
4.1 Contextualizing S&T as a Variable 
4.1.1 Defense S&T Investment from the Perspective of Supply and Demand 
The use of supply and demand as a framework to explain defense technology is not 
new. One of the most prominent examples where this economics-driven perspective is 
applied to weapons technology is in the field of nuclear proliferation. Scholars unpacking 
the dynamics of how nuclear weapons spread in the international system often rest their 
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explanations on one side of this debate or the other.94 From the supply perspective, nuclear 
weapons proliferate because suppliers of nuclear technology provide critical information 
(such as weapons design) or material (such as weapons-grade fissile material or 
construction of enrichment or reprocessing facilities) assistance to potential proliferators.95 
Scholars from the demand perspective, on the other hand, have attributed nuclear 
proliferation to security concerns, domestic interests, and normative or cultural 
considerations of the proliferators.96 While this debate on proliferation is far from settled, 
the supply and demand framework has provided analytical unity to the many factors that 
impact state decisions and interstate dynamics for the acquisition of nuclear capabilities. 
Others have similarly applied the supply and demand framework to arms 
production in a regional context. In analyzing the efforts of weapons acquisition and 
production of regional powers such as India, Israel, and Brazil, Amit Gupta finds that the 
interaction between demand and supply factors leads to a constraint on these countries’ 
ability to develop their force structure.97 According to Gupta, the need to counter a threat 
or a desire to fulfill competing bureaucratic interests among the armed forces, national 
leadership, and defense industries create a need for the weapons, but such a demand is 
complicated by factors such as the availability of external supplies and the state’s ability 
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to raise resources for weapons procurement. The constraints created by both of these 
factors often lead these regional powers to have incomplete force structures, spotty 
modernization efforts, shifting military doctrines, and greater success at developing 
strategic as opposed to conventional weapons. Supply and demand, thus, can be a useful 
framework to understand the dynamics of acquisition of defense technology. 
The supply-demand framework does not only apply to proliferation and acquisition 
dynamics in the international system, however. As a system of production, each state’s 
own national defense system can also be conceptualized in terms of supply and demand 
institutions and forces. In her discussion of the weapons succession process (the process 
through which one weapons system succeeds another), Mary Kaldor articulates what such 
forces entail as they pertain to military technology. “Classical economics was concerned 
with the mechanism for reconciling demand and supply, the process by which resources 
are organized to satisfy a particular need,”98 but such a process needs not be limited to the 
production of commercial goods and tradable commodities. Supply and demand factors 
exist in all systems that entail acts of production and consumption and can be applied to 
the fulfillment of a variety of socio-economic tasks. 
In the realm of defense technology, the demand factors can be defined as the need 
to have and use a technology. Kaldor makes a clear distinction between acquisition and 
use: 
Demand theories are primarily concerned with the use of armaments, as 
though there were no distinction between use and acquisition, as though 
requirements defined by some external situation could be immediately 
translated into resources through the agency of some “rational” decision 
maker. If, however, the act of purchase is separated in time from the use of 
                                                 
98 Mary Kaldor, “The Weapons Succession Process,” World Politics 38(4) (July 1986): 577. 
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the weapons, then the peacetime demand for weapons has to be assessed in 
terms of the situation of purchase as well as the potential or imagined 
situation of use (emphasis in original).99 
The separation in time between acquisition and use is not just a matter of distinction as a 
consequence of peace or wartime. Technologies in early developmental stages also rely on 
potential or imagined uses as the demand-side factor. 
Kaldor further explicates the different components of the demand-side institutions 
in defense technology. According to Kaldor, “The potential requirement for weapons as 
defined by the international situation can be said to be the systematic aspect of demand,” 
but how this situation “is mediated by the perceptions of the armed services, various 
bureaucratic departments, and politicians represents the institutional aspect of demand 
(emphasis in original).”100 In this sense, existing structural, organizational, and 
bureaucratic theories focus primarily, if not exclusively, on the demand side of defense 
acquisition. 
Kaldor also distinguishes the supply-side institutions in the production of a 
defense technology. She posits: 
There are two types of supply institutions: those associated with the 
invention stage of the weapons succession process and those associated with 
the innovation stage. The former are primarily government, university, or 
private nonprofit laboratories. From these emerge new military 
technologies, some of which may be “revolutionary” in the sense that they 
challenge existing doctrine and organization…At the innovation 
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stage…prime contractors generally undertake responsibility for 
development and production of complete weapons systems.101 
For Kaldor, the conservatism inherent within military organization and the 
resistance of bureaucracies to change suggest that in the absence of direct external 
security incentives (such as a war), military technological change (be it invention 
or radical innovation) is unlikely a result of demand-side factors or influence. 
Supply-side factors and pressure, thus, are more effective in causing such change. 
The supply-demand framework has also been used to explain the dynamics of 
technology innovation. After all, one of the main goals for investment in R&D is 
innovation, and this applies to both the civilian as well as the military sectors. Technology 
innovations have long been understood to come from two separate but not mutually 
exclusive sources: technology-push or demand-pull.102 Since the military is the main 
consumer of military technology, the dynamics of demand-pull are also understood as 
requirements-pull or capability-pull. Capability-pull occurs when the S&T investment is 
leveraged to fulfill or redress a capability gap. Technology-push occurs when the S&T 
investment creates new knowledge of potential military applications. When interpreting 
the opportunities arising from R&D investments, the military, whose interest is a technical 
solution and requirements-driven, tends to approach the decisions from the capability-pull 
perspective. On the other hand, scientists, particularly the ones who work in traditional 
open science institutions such as universities, are more likely to embrace the knowledge-
generation opportunities in S&T investments. 
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Depending on the nature of the technology and institutional context under which it 
is invested, the push and the pull dynamics may carry different weight in the R&D process. 
For instance, an emerging area of S&T that engenders multiple but divergent military 
applications or has significant non-military applications (such as dual-use technology)103 
may create conditions in which the research scientists hold greater sway over the 
investment decisions. This is due to the possibility that the varied applications create 
multiple stakeholders whose interest in an emerging field of S&T may diverge. This is 
particularly true for dual-use technologies which have stakeholders both in and outside the 
military. This diffusion of stakeholder interests creates conditions where 1) the scientists 
can have alternative sources from which their research are supported (i.e. the scientists 
have a wider scope of “audience” to whom they can pitch their ideas), and 2) the 
uncertainty in potential developmental trajectories allows scientists to leverage their 
expertise to identify where the R&D opportunities may lie. Both features increase the 
latitude of the scientists to sway the decision-making process. 
Certain institutional conditions, such as the level of openness in the military R&D 
system, are also likely to impact the level of access a scientist has toward the R&D decision 
process. In discussing the different styles of military technological innovation between the 
US and the USSR, Matthew Evangelista highlights several characteristics important for 
innovation and suggests that these organizational features are important determinants for 
whether a new idea can be promoted within the R&D process.104 In a relatively open 
military R&D system where there are fewer organizational and bureaucratic barriers to 
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R&D decisions, the scientists have a greater likelihood to promote their interests and ideas, 
facilitating the dynamics of technology-push. 
The above discussion on the supply and demand factors and institutions in the 
production of a defense technology highlights several key considerations for understanding 
defense S&T investments: 
1) Defense S&T investment, as part of the production of new military 
technology, is not just a political decision but also an economic one, where the 
potential or imagined needs (demand) are reconciled with potential or 
imagined possibilities of technological solutions (supply). 
2) Defense S&T investment concerns both demand-side systemic and 
institutional factors, such as the variables employed in existing structural, 
organizational, and bureaucratic explanations, as well as the underexplored 
supply-side institutions such as the scientific or technical community and 
industry who produce the knowledge or the technology. 
3) Supply and demand institutions are distinct – they have different functions 
and interests in the defense research, development, and acquisition process, 
thus they are likely to understand and conceptualize a technology differently.  
4.1.2 The Social Construction of Technology 
Existing theoretical insights regarding defense S&T investment often fail to 
consider whether or not S&T itself plays a role in investment decisions. They often 
consider the actual S&T, be it just the general scientific field or a specific set of 
technologies or technological systems, to be exogenous. This means that most structural, 
organizational, or bureaucratic explanations treat a technology as something that exerts 
influence or is simply “used” as is in the political process. As a result, in the existing 
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literature, S&T is static – it does not involve any “process” but is instead treated as a 
product; it does not change, and even if it does, the changes are often not a critical 
component to the discussions at hand. However, understanding how a technology is viewed 
by the relevant actors is critical to appreciating the different meanings and opportunities 
they attach to such a technology, which, in turn, impacts the acquisition and investment 
decisions. 
The very areas of science or technology programs that the defense community at 
large or the militaries in particular are interested in funding are not exogenous to the 
systems that create them. This alternative, constructive conceptualization of S&T in the 
political processes raises three important assumptions about science and technology that 
often evade realist and positivist inquiries into political processes: “First, science and 
technology are importantly social. Second, they are active—the construction metaphor 
suggests activity. And third, they do not provide a direct route from nature to ideas about 
nature; the products of science and technology are not themselves natural (emphasis in 
original).”105 Science and technology are social because, for one, the generation of 
scientific knowledge and the production of a technology involve more than just one 
individual. Even if new knowledge is created by a lone scientist, such a scientist still works 
within the milieu of a socially defined profession. Science and technology are active 
because scientific research and technology development are social activities and involve 
processes. Even if they are used to denote specific scientific knowledge or technological 
artifacts, such knowledge and artifacts still embody the process through which they are 
produced. In other words, an end S&T product embodies the research, communications, 
debates, compromises, and many other human activities that shape its production. Finally, 
science and technology are not natural but are instead very human endeavors. While 
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science as a discipline seeks to explain nature, the act and the need to explain are not by 
themselves natural. The premise of social-constructivist arguments about science and 
technology is thus that they cannot be understood without references to the human actions 
that shape it. 
In their now seminal study of the origin of modern-day bicycle design, Trevor J. 
Pinch and Wiebe E. Bijker articulate what this “social construction” entails.106 The Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT) model they develop, which posits that a technological 
artifact develops from a process of alternation and selection, entails three important 
components that clarify what is involved in the social construction of S&T. First, social 
construction of both science and technology involves a demonstration of “interpretive 
flexibility.” This interpretive flexibility refers to the possibility that “different 
interpretations of nature are available to scientists and hence that nature alone does not 
provide a determinant outcome to scientific debate.”107 In scientific terms, such interpretive 
flexibility most often refers to the existence of a scientific controversy where the “truth” 
and meaning of an observation or scientific finding are contested. In the study of 
technology, such interpretive flexibility refers to “how people think of or interpret artifacts 
but also that there is flexibility in how artifacts are designed (emphasis in original).”108 
This flexibility, whether on scientific opinion or on artifact design, moves the process of 
S&T from the material and the natural to the human and the social. 
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Second, interpretive flexibility results in the formation of “relevant social groups,” 
which refers to the “institutions and organizations (such as the military or some specific 
industrial company), as well as organized or unorganized groups of individuals,” who 
“share the same set of meanings” attached to a specific artifact.109 The relevant social 
groups need not only be consumers or users, although their interest and connection to an 
artifact are rather apparent. Scientists, engineers, and marketers also constitute relevant 
social groups as a result of their participation in the development process of the artifact. 
Different relevant social groups associate different meanings to an artifact and as a result 
permit the exercise of interpretive flexibility. A single artifact, thus, can mean very 
different things to different relevant social groups. 
Finally, the social construction of S&T involves the closure of the controversy or 
problem that has led different relevant social groups to have different opinions on an 
observation or finding or to associate different meanings to an artifact. This closure can be 
achieved by an actual resolution to the debate or problem, a “rhetorical” closure that 
permits the relevant social groups to “perceive” the debate or problem as resolved, or a 
redefinition of the problem, whereby the solution is achieved through reframing the key 
problem within a debate or an artifact. Since the process of technology development is 
inevitably social, the closure of a debate or the solution to a problem need not be actual – 
a closure is obtained so long as the “disappearance” of the problem is achieved.110 
If the debates and controversies are such crucial elements in scientific research and 
technological development, where do they normally occur? Thomas Hughes, in his study 
of the electric light system, evokes the military concept of a “reverse salient,” whereby an 
area of technology (most often within a technological system) is lagging as a result of 
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uneven technological development.111 Just like an advancing military frontline with 
sections of backward bow that are caused by enemy strongholds, the reverse salient in 
technological system development refers to barriers that prevent or perturb the process of 
development. As a result, just as generals are likely to focus their forces on the reverse 
salient in order to be able to advance the frontline, scientists and technologists are 
motivated to focus their efforts on the elimination of the reverse salient and might define 
it as a set of critical technical problems that, when solved, will allow the technology or the 
technological system to advance. 
Yet, as Hughes points out, the social constructive nature of the development of a 
technological system suggests that the reverse salient does not necessarily need to be a 
technical one. In a complex system where multiple societal influences may be at play, the 
reverse salient may be a social, political, or economic one (or a combination thereof). 
Hughes, for instance, attributes the reverse salient in the development of the electric system 
to the significant losses that result from the need of transmitting high voltage currents over 
a long distance. This, of course, is not just a technical bottleneck but also a socio-economic 
issue. To make the system marketable, it has to be able to compete with the then existing 
gas system and be able to operate the electric system at a cost that is at least as competitive. 
This socio-economic consideration, thus, led to the pursuit of light-bulb filament that has 
high electrical resistance, which would then result in relatively high voltage as compared 
to the current. 
The nature of this reverse salient may itself be contested. In his study of the 
development of guidance systems that have over time drastically improved the accuracy of 
missiles, Donald MacKenzie suggests that it would not be right to view the reverse salient 
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as given and independent of the actors involved.112 “To agree on what constitutes a barrier 
to progress requires agreement on what one is trying to achieve,” he elaborates, and “[m]ore 
interesting, even those who believe that they are in agreement with respect to goals may 
not agree on what precisely it is that hinders achievement of those goals.”113 The reverse 
salient, or the controversy and problem it embodies, is in this case similarly subject to 
social influences. People with different skills are therefore likely to view the nature of the 
reverse salient differently – different types of engineers, for instance, may disagree on 
whether it is the hardware or software that constitutes the reverse salient. 
The highly social nature of the reverse salient and the potential for its fluid 
definition by relevant social groups have led MacKenzie to conclude that most often it is 
only with “the wisdom of hindsight (and sometimes not even then) will the nature of the 
barriers to advance be beyond at least potential dispute.”114  Prospectively, the issue of the 
reverse salient becomes a debate over what is possible, a question over which there is of 
course plenty of room for disagreement. Is the reverse salient something that can be solved 
by devoting research efforts, or is it simply an “intractable natural limitation”?115 
MacKenzie finds in his study that the existing, dominant form of missile guidance system 
was also once believed by some to be physically impossible. As a result, he concludes that 
“beliefs about the true nature of the world differ widely and often in socially patterned 
ways,” and these “beliefs can bear directly on the forms of technical change that are taken 
to be feasible.”116 
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Unlike existing structural, organizational, and bureaucratic explanations which 
often treat science and technology as exogenously given, history and sociology scholars 
examining science and technology have shown that science and technology are in fact not 
as static as they are often portrayed as. Science and technology, in this sense, are not merely 
products of research and development efforts, but they also embody the very R&D process 
that created them. This process is social, active, and human. In other words, scientific 
knowledge and technological artifacts are social constructs and cannot be understood 
without the social, political, economic, and other human factors involved in the processes 
that create them. 
The SCOT literature also highlights the importance of debates, controversies, and 
problems as critical components of this constructive process. These controversies and 
problems create opportunities for interpretative flexibility, whereby different actors 
involved in the R&D process are able to attach their own understanding and definition to 
findings and artifacts, permitting them to mold the process as well as the final product. Of 
course, as stated, these so-called “reverse salients” are often contested themselves. 
Scientists, along with other parties of interest, may not agree on where the bottleneck may 
lie, and any agreement that can be achieved might not necessarily be a result of natural 
observation but one of a social construction. 
This deliberate focus on science and technology as a variable may appear to some 
as another form of technological determinism, yet such an understanding is incorrect. By 
examining science and technology as a social process and its products as a construction, 
scholars of SCOT are deliberate in arguing that science and technology are not a sole or 
dominant determinant of social processes but are in fact products of such processes. The 
SCOT literature problematizes S&T as a variable rather than treating it as static, and by 
doing so, it creates room for social processes to interact with technological ones and 
generates more nuanced understandings of their mutual impact. 
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The Social Construction of Technology literature thus provides a means to 
understand how S&T and their main parameters, as variables, are able to change. It 
emphasizes the social forces that are part of the creation of an area of scientific research or 
technology development. These characteristics are not static – they are constructed by those 
involved in defining what each characteristic means for a technology. For the defense 
community, the military constructs its needs and expresses them in terms of requirements, 
whereas the scientific community constructs the utility of a technology through their 
interpretation and definition of its feasibility and possible applications. 
Technology itself in this case is problematized. It is conceived as a construction of 
social forces surrounding it rather than as an objective fact. By association, the 
understanding of what a technological opportunity entails, is in and of itself a social 
construction – the utility of an emerging technology as well as the conditions that matter 
for its realization are determined by the experts who study and create it as well as the users. 
4.1.3 The Nature of Defense S&T Investment: Pasteur’s Quadrant 
One of the complexities that face defense S&T investment concerns the issue of 
application, which is an especially acute problem when applied to basic research. Basic 
research is most often defined as not application driven. As a result, understanding military 
S&T investments in basic research from the demand perspective – namely, investment with 
the goal of fulfilling a customer’s needs, seems problematic. If basic research is by 
definition not application driven, then where does the demand-side interest – namely that 
of the military in defense S&T investments – come in, aside from the general belief that 
the investment would contribute to some abstract notion of future military capabilities? 
As many have noted, the basic research investment in the military is, in fact, not so 
“basic.” Very few defense R&D programs are conducted for the sole purpose of advancing 
scientific knowledge. The R&D activities in the service laboratories address a specific 
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service’s needs, and even a service specific research organization, such as the Air Force 
Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) or the Army Research Office (ARO), contracts 
research with a specific service’s mission, needs, and requirements in mind. As opposed to 
traditional “blue sky” or “exploratory” notions of basic research, service-specific basic 
research programs are mission, application, and requirement oriented. In this sense, the 
directionality of their investment is influenced, implicitly or explicitly, by the demands of 
the services. 
This particular tendency of the DoD to invest in “basic research” with an eye 
towards applications has raised concerns across multiple communities. In 2005, the 
Congress mandated that National Research Council (NRC) to conduct a study on the 
character of defense basic research programs. This study was motivated by concerns of 
university research departments and defense laboratories that “[s]ome research conducted 
using funds designated specifically for basic research is not, under the DoD’s definition, 
considered basic research.”117  The concern was that a diversion of funding from basic to 
applied research or technology development defies the purpose of the DoD’s basic research 
funding, which is to help ensure a robust and competitive technological base. 
The NRC committee found, however, that the nature of the issue has less to do with 
the appropriateness in the allocation of funding. According to the report, DoD “research 
managers apply consistent and reasonable judgment on the level of specificity that is 
appropriate to the purposes of basic research.”118 Instead, what the committee uncovered 
was that the very definition used for basic research is not at all helpful. As referred to in 
Chapter 3, basic research in the DoD is defined as “[s]ystematic study directed toward 
greater knowledge or understanding of fundamental aspects of phenomena and of 
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observable facts without specific applications towards processes or products in mind.” For 
the committee, the criterion “without specific applications towards processes or products 
in mind” is not helpful to distinguish basic research from other kinds of R&D activities. 
The committee instead defines basic research along a set of attributes and characteristics 
that are not constrained by the “end-use” phrasing in the original definition. 
The committee further finds that the 6.1 money, which is categorized as basic 
research, in fact funds several types of R&D activities, all of which can qualify under the 
broad notion of basic research. These activities include, but are not limited to: 
1) Exploratory, unrestricted research that is not tied to short-term goals or specific 
applications at the frontier of knowledge which may carry long-term benefits to 
military capabilities, 
2) Research that aims to develop standard reference data, 
3) Research that develops exploratory systems or devices intended to enhance 
specific functions or performance without consideration for the design’s final 
robustness or cost-effectiveness. 
The committee found that the various missions these research programs serve and 
the motivation behind them are essential for fulfilling the wide range of basic research 
needs, but the distinction of these activities also revealed that in recent years, there is an 
increasing emphasis on the second and third types of activity listed above. The report 
highlights that the mounting budgetary pressure and increasing scope of demand for 
defense S&T resources have made program managers more inclined to invest in shorter-
term, more sharply focused programs that are easier to “justify.” The report warns that a 
focus away from “unfettered” exploratory aspects of basic research will likely undermine 
national security interests in the long-term. 
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The rather optimistic assessment of the DoD basic research program from the NRC 
was not without debate, however. In a 2009 JASON119 study sponsored by the Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E),120 an independent panel of scientists found 
that the issue of “6.1 drift,” or “the extent to which 6.1-funded activities conform to the 
definition of 6.1 research or rather are of a more applied character” was more pronounced 
than the NRC report suggested.121 The panel of JASON scientists, in examining grants 
funded by the AFOSR and ARO, observed that many programs do not conform to the 6.1 
definition of basic research. In their judgment, among the proposals that received 6.1 
funding, 25% to 81% were not basic research.122 While this observation, as the panel 
suggested, does not serve as a judgment on the value or worthiness of the funded programs, 
it highlights the possibility that a large subset of the DoD’s basic research programs are 
funded with goals of deliberate, albeit general, applications in mind. 
This observation of the possibility of a “6.1 drift” is further reinforced by the ways 
through which the program managers at the DoD describe their job and daily routines, 
according to the 2009 JASON report. From their conversations with DoD personnel, the 
JASON panelists find that the program managers for basic research programs think of their 
jobs as matching the capabilities of the universities or other research communities to the 
needs of the services. In particular, the program managers highlighted that one of the 
critical criteria for funding a research program is “‘where there is a “service” customer for 
the resulting data,’” and that it is only when such a customer exists that a program manager 
would consider funding the research.123 In this sense, the basic research programs in the 
services are funded with particular customer needs in mind. Although this does not mean 
                                                 
119 JASON is a scientific advisory group to the US Department of Defense. 
120 The title to this position has changed several times throughout the past decades. Since 2011, 
this position is officially known as the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering). 
121 JASON, S&T for National Security (McLean, VA: The MITRE Corporation, May 2009), 22. 
122 JASON (2009), 23. 
123 Interview quoted in JASON (2009), 25. 
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that only research that addresses specific, short-term goals of the services will attract 
funding, it shows that the research needs to at least be able to engender some kind of future 
application that can solve service-specific requirements or capability gaps in order to be 
funded. 
The lack of agreement regarding the nature of the DoD’s investments in basic 
research programs prompted a third comprehensive study by the Defense Science Board 
(DSB) task force in 2010. The task force, in addition to being charged with advising on 
long-term planning and strategies for defense basic research, was also asked to evaluate 
the quality of DoD basic research programs and, among other things, to determine whether 
current 6.1 programs are basic or applied in character. As a response to this mandate, in a 
study conducted by the Director for Basic Research in ASD(R&E) with a sampling of basic 
research projects conducted by and for all services, it was found that on average, over 85% 
of the extramural research and over 70% of the intramural research in 6.1 are deemed basic 
in nature.124 A subset of the task force members performed similar tasks for DARPA 
programs and reached similar results. The task force concluded that DoD 6.1 funding is in 
general appropriate for the purpose of basic research and highlights that it is impossible to 
draw a sharp distinction between basic and applied research. 
This “6.1 drift” is not just a concern for the defense community or the government, 
however. Some in the scientific and other research communities at large share this belief 
that the character of defense basic research is changing. The shifting security requirements 
from engaging in large-scale, technology-driven interstate competition to countering a 
“loosely organized, deliberately low-tech enemy” heightens the need for “‘soft’ skills such 
as trust-building, intelligence-gathering and cultural insight” while diminishing the 
                                                 
124 Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Basic Research 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 
January 2012), 28. 
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importance and influence of science.125 Consequently, echoing the JASON report, some in 
the scientific communities see recent developments in defense S&T as “a lack of sustained 
Pentagon support for blue-sky basic science and a preference for applied research with a 
short-term pay-off.”126 Ironically, in recent defense budget drawdowns, some of the 
greatest reductions are coming out of the later stages of technology development, whereas 
attempts have been made to preserve most of the basic research budget. 
This controversy over the basic versus applied nature of defense 6.1 funding has 
not fazed all parties, however. In both the NRC and the DSB reports, it is recognized that 
drawing a distinction between basic and applied research is not only impractical but is often 
impossible. In fact, some agencies have thrived on working along the blurry boundaries 
between these two categories of research. For instance, the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA), an R&D organization within the DoD known to be the radical 
innovator in military technologies, has long had a sizeable investment in basic research 
programs, but much of its investments in cutting-edge, innovative basic research have a 
distinctively applied character. According to former DARPA director Regina Dugan and 
deputy director Kaigham Gabriel, “The presence of an urgent need for an application 
creates focus and inspires genius,” and a “central reason DARPA has been so successful 
over time is its unwavering commitment to work in…pushing the frontiers of basic science 
to solve a well-defined, use-inspired need.”127 It is in this so-called “Pasteur’s Quadrant,” 
named after Louis Pasteur by political scientist Donald Stokes, that DARPA has found its 
ingenuity. 
                                                 
125 Sharon Weinberger, “The Changing Face of Military Science: Basic Research Funded by the 
Pentagon is Facing an Uncertain Future,” Nature 477 (22 September 2011): 386 
126 Weinberger (2011), 386. 
127 Regina E. Dugan and Kaigham J. Gabriel, “‘Special Forces’ Innovation: How DARPA Attacks 
Problems,” Harvard Business Review 91(10) (October 2013): 77. DARPA’s interest in the application-
oriented basic research finds its roots in the 1970s, when Mansfield Amendment to the Defense 
Authorization Act of 1970 forced all defense research to have direct and apparent relationship to military 
functions and needs. See Erica R.H. Fuchs, “Rethinking the Role of the State in Technology Development: 
DARPA and the Case for Embedded Network Governance,” Research Policy 39 (2010): 1137. 
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Donald Stokes challenges the belief that the goals of understanding and application 
in scientific research are empirically distinct.128 Contrary to the linear model of technology 
development which envisions the trajectory of technology from basic research, through 
applied research and technology development, to production, testing, and evaluation,129 
Stokes argues, research can occur at the intersection of the basic research’s pursuit of 
understanding and the applied research’s goal for use (see Figure 6). 
 Research is inspired by?   


















Figure 6 - Quadrant Model of Scientific Research130 
 
Whereas the linear model of research envisions scientific research to fall strictly 
within the domain of pure basic research (Bohr’s quadrant), which is “guided solely by the 
quest for understanding without thought of practical use,”131 or the domain of pure applied 
                                                 
128 Donald E. Stokes, Pasteur’s Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997). 
129 This linear model of technology development also serves as the basis to the R&D funding 
categories in the DoD. 
130 Stokes (1997), 73. 
131 Stokes (1997), 73. 
 81 
research (Edison’s quadrant), which is “guided solely by applied goals without seeking a 
more general understanding of the phenomena of a scientific field,”132 the more dynamic 
quadrant model creates space (Pasteur’s quadrant) for basic research that fulfills both the 
goals of fundamental understanding as well as consideration of use. 
In this sense, most, if not all, of the DoD basic research programs can be understood 
as occurring within the Pasteur’s quadrant. The limited amount of basic research at the 
service laboratories is likely to reflect an individual service’s organizational mission and 
needs, whereas the extramural basic research, most of which occurs in universities, is 
funded by the DoD because it represents opportunities to technologies and applications that 
can be beneficial to the military, no matter how abstract and long-term such an application 
may be. As Stokes points out, this differentiation of goals needs not be a result of the 
institutional setting under which the research is taking place. Not all research that carries 
the applied characteristics is the consequence of institutional or sponsor influence, and “the 
annals of research are replete with examples of work by investigators who were directly 
influenced both by the quest of general understanding and by considerations of use.”133 
Therefore, even the research initiated by investigators at a university, who have a genuine 
interest in expanding understanding and knowledge of a particular field, can have equally 
legitimate interest from the investigators in terms of its real-life applications, including 
potentially military ones. 
his dissertation posits that all basic research conducted with sponsorship by the DoD 
can have knowledge- as well as use-inspired goals. The possibility that some research may 
fall under the domain of pure basic research does not diminish the possibility or importance 
of those basic research programs that are also use-inspired. In particular, this dissertation 
is interested in how the opportunity for such use is conceived by both the scientific 
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community and the military, regardless of whether such research also carries inherent 
pursuits of understanding of a phenomenon in a scientific field. 
4.2 The Argument 
Leveraging the supply-demand and SCOT frameworks outlined above, with 
recognition of the “quadrant” model of scientific research, I argue that military investments 
in an emerging area of S&T are conditioned by the interaction between supply and demand 
variables. These variables are built upon how the supply and demand side institutions 
conceive of the opportunity that an area of S&T may bring. In other words, how the 
scientists and the military conceive and define the scientific possibility and the military 
need. These variables, combined, can produce favorable and unfavorable conditions for 
investment. These conditions can make an emerging area of S&T easier or more difficult 
to sponsor and justify as well as initiate and sustain, which in turn, impacts the levels of 
investment. In other words, opinions regarding feasibility, stringency of the technical 
requirements, and the availability of alternative access to capability impact the expected 
cost-utility calculus regarding an investment. 
More specifically, I argue that defense investments in a new or emerging 
technology are impacted by how the technology is conceived by the supply-side 
institutional actors, such as the scientific or technical expert community, as well as the 
demand-side institutional actors, like the military. I posit that certain characteristics of how 
an emerging technology may be defined and understood by the technical community and 
the military can make it unappealing for investment, and this lack of appeal is conditional 
upon how the possibility and the need are constructed. While I detail below the logic behind 
each individual supply- and demand-side variable, my main argument is that a set 
combination of these variables creates a condition under which a new area of technology 
becomes unappealing for military investment despite its utility. 
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4.2.1 Supply Side Variable – Consensus on Technical Feasibility 
As Kaldor suggests, a military innovation system (such as the weapons succession 
she describes) contains a set of both supply and demand institutions. From the supply side, 
she distinguishes between the invention and the innovation stages of the military 
innovation system: invention-stage supply institutions entail government, university, and 
defense laboratories, whereas innovation-stage supply institutions entail prime contractors 
in the defense industry. The supply in this case refers to the supply of knowledge, expertise, 
and research and development activities. Despite the services’ knowledge of military 
affairs and control over the requirements process, the actual task of performing scientific 
research and advancing technological progress is nevertheless delegated to the scientists 
and engineers in the laboratories and industries.134 The military personnel who set the goals 
for military R&D and who ultimately benefit from new weapons systems or other scientific 
progress often do not themselves have expertise in science, nor do they perform the R&D. 
Therefore, how an area of S&T is understood by the scientific or technical expert 
community is an important component of the R&D process as well as investment decisions. 
The meaning that the expert community attaches to an area of S&T is of particular 
importance when there is a high degree of uncertainty, such as is the case when the S&T 
is emerging. “The relation between science and government policy is one of functional 
authority,” and with regard to R&D, policymakers often defer to scientific opinions 
because the complexity of the process often renders a decision impossible without some 
                                                 
134 As described in Chapter 3, in the United States, S&T funding for military R&D encompasses 
Basic Research (6.1), Applied Research (6.2), and Advanced Technology Development (6.3).  The 6.1 
funding most often goes to the scientists and researchers in universities through Department of Defense 
contracts, and 6.2 and 6.3 generally funds R&D that has transitioned to the defense laboratories. This 
roughly corresponds with Kaldor’s distinction between invention and innovation stages of supply 
institutions. 
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kind of simplified form.135 The relationship between the military and the scientific, expert 
community is a case of functional delegation. It typifies the situation where one who lacks 
ability defers to authority. This trust in the functional authority of the scientific community 
is not necessarily based on the veracity of the scientific claims, but rather, on the 
competence of the scientific system. Policymakers therefore rely on the expert community 
to produce the necessary heuristics, and in some cases, specific guidance, that aid the 
decision-making process. 
With their functional authority scientists or technical experts can play several 
different roles in the policy process. In certain socio-economic contexts, scientists exercise 
the role as an instrument of persuasion on policy decisions, whereas in other contexts the 
scientific community’s main function may be the holder and interpreter of scientific as well 
as technical information.136 Still, scientists may play an even more active role in 
policymaking through their advising capacities in regulatory agencies, performing 
functions such as setting standards and assessing safety, and internationally, through their 
roles as representatives of knowledge communities, coordinating international policy.137 
Of course, scientists’ functional authority and expert knowledge are not devoid of the 
socio-economic and political influences under which their roles in the policy process take 
place.138 Yet, the possession of expert knowledge, which serves as the basis to the 
                                                 
135 René von Schomberg, “Controversies and Political Decision Making,” in Science Politics and 
Morality: Scientific Uncertainty and Decision Making, ed. René von Schomberg (Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 7. 
136 For the range of scientists’ role in policymaking, see for example Etel Solingen, “Domestic 
Structure and the International Context: Toward Models of State-Scientists Interaction,” in Scientists and 
the States: Domestic Structures and the international Context, ed. Etel Solingen (Ann Arbor, MI: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1994), 1-31; and Roger A. Pielke, Jr., The Honest Broker: Making Sense of 
Science in Policy and Politics (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
137 See, for instance, Sheila S. Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic 
Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization 46(1) (Winter 1992): 1-
35. 
138 In fact, scholars studying the relationship between science and policy often argue quite the 
opposite. See, for instance, Jasanoff (1990). 
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functional authority that the scientific and technical communities exercise, can play a non-
trivial role in the policy process and political decision. 
Studies of the US military innovation system confirm this view that scientists and 
the technical community can play a vital role in the military’s investment decisions in 
technology. According to Evangelista, “[t]he first of the five stages in which U.S. weapons 
innovations area carried out generally begins when scientists in weapons laboratories and 
military officials in close contact with them recognize technical possibilities for new 
weapons.”139 Evangelista argues that US military technological innovation begins with 
what he terms as “technocratic initiative,” where the innovation decisions are not made at 
the higher levels of policymaking, but by the technical and organizational procedures for 
R&D. This was evident in the early developments of tactical nuclear weapons, which 
occurred during a time “when strategic bombing dominated U.S. military thinking and 
discussion of alternatives was rare.”140 Yet, the scientists who saw the potential for tactical 
nuclear weapons still were able to get funding because “they held a monopoly on 
information about nuclear weapons and they enjoyed tremendous prestige within the U.S. 
government and among the public at large.”141 These scientists were thus able to influence 
policy directions, sway funding priorities, and guide investment decisions. 
In terms of the investment decisions with respect to an emerging area of S&T, one 
of the most important authorities the scientific community exercises is defining the 
technical possibilities. The uncertain nature of emerging technologies suggests not only 
that the policymakers are reliant on the scientific community to set the boundaries of what 
is possible, but also that such possibility can be highly contested even among the scientists 
and technologists themselves. In this case, the scientific and technical communities’ 
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function is more than “selling” a “technical potential.” It is “a vital resource of 
technologists (as distinct from political leaders, generals, or corporate executives),” 
articulates Donald MacKenzie, “that in questions of weapons design they are arbiters of 
what is feasible as distinct from the ‘softer’ issues of what is acceptable, needed, or 
affordable (emphasis added).”142 When confronting the uncertain nature of emerging 
technologies, it is as important to define what is infeasible as it is to define what is possible, 
and the interpretation of such information relies on scientific or technical authorities. 
To determine whether or not a technology is feasible, it is necessary to understand 
where the “reverse salient” lies and what constitutes the barriers to the realization of a 
capability. Of course, as a concept, the reverse salient is constructed and can be highly 
contested even among the experts. As aforementioned, it would not be right to view a 
reverse salient as given, for an agreement on what constitutes a barrier requires an 
agreement on the goals one is trying to achieve, and such a claim is often subject to 
controversies and debates. Yet, even if one were able to define what the end goal may be 
(in terms of technology development), or if such a goal is understood as a given, those who 
are in agreement with the goals may not agree on what are the obstacles to achieving these 
goals. Not only are people with different kinds of skillsets likely to understand what 
constitutes the reverse salient and how to address it differently, but there may also be 
disagreements over the nature of the barrier. Some barriers could be overcome with 
concerted R&D efforts and investment, while others may be intractable problems that are 
difficult if not impossible to resolve. 
For these reasons, one of the key variables analyzed in this dissertation is how the 
scientific or technical expert community, as a relevant social group in the decision process, 
leverages its expertise and expresses a consensus (or lack thereof) regarding the feasibility 
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(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), 10 
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of an area of science (to be used for a particular purpose) or the development of a 
technology or technological system. The scientific and technical expert community, in this 
case, can include scientists participating in the military R&D process in a variety of 
capacities as discussed above. These scientists may serve in an advisory role to the military, 
such as on boards or study groups, or they may take an advocacy role and attempt to 
influence the R&D process and outcome. The community may also include experts who 
are directly involved in the military R&D process, whether as program managers or 
research scientists. What “binds” them as a community is their shared interpretation of a 
specific controversy in an area of S&T. Similar to the “epistemic communities” that Peter 
Haas describes, which is “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area,”143 the scientific community refers to the network of 
scientists, technologists, engineers, or other technical experts who hold expertise in a 
scientific or technical domain.144 
The term consensus here refers to a general agreement between the participants in 
a social group on a position about a certain issue at hand. In terms of considering the S&T 
as a process, as the SCOT literature suggests, it indicates a closure.145 Scientific consensus 
refers, thus, to the collective opinion, judgment, and position of the community of scientists 
on a given topic. In this dissertation, consensus does not imply unanimity but rather the 
strength of collective opinions, neither does it necessarily exist in dichotomous terms 
(whether a consensus exists or it does not). A spectrum of potential states of the collective 
opinions is possible—in other words, scientific opinion can converge toward consensus or 
diverge towards the lack of consensus. The concept of consensus is important because it 
                                                 
143 Haas (1992), 1. 
144 Although this dissertation does not assume that they have to hold certain shared normative 
beliefs as articulated in Haas’s definition of epistemic communities. 
145 Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, eds. The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Direction in the Sociology and History of Technology, 6-7. 
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conveys the level of policy-informing power that a scientific or technical opinion may 
have. Since the “functional authority of science is threatened whenever there are signs of a 
controversy,”146 the policy-influencing power of the scientific claims declines as 
controversy increases. Therefore, the greater the degree to which there is an agreement on 
a scientific or technical opinion, the more weight such an opinion will carry in the policy 
process. 
The term feasibility refers to the possibility of something being done. In terms of 
S&T investment, it refers to whether the proposed use of a particular scientific 
advancement or the production of a certain technology or technological system is possible. 
From the perspective of SCOT it refers to the possibility for a “reverse salient” to be 
overcome. The barriers to feasibility of course can be manifold and are perceived 
constructions – the lack of feasibility may be a consequence of human factors such as 
social, economic, or political barriers, or it can be technological such as technical 
impossibility or natural limitations given an existing state of knowledge.147 
These two components of the supply side variable constitute three conceptually 
distinct potential states of scientific or technical opinion on feasibility: consensus on 
feasibility, lack of consensus (lack of apparent agreement on feasibility), or consensus on 
infeasibility. These three states, however, produce two different conditions regarding the 
R&D investment (see Figure 7). 
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  Scientific Consensus 




No Not Favorable 
Figure 7 - The Impact of Consensus of Feasibility on R&D Investment Conditions 
 
General agreement on a technology or technical system’s feasibility incentivizes 
and provides justification for investments in research and development. A lack of 
consensus on feasibility indicates the potential for controversy and debate among experts, 
which can provide incentive for further research investment (in order to resolve the 
controversies). At a minimum, a lack of consensus regarding feasibility is unlikely by itself 
to preclude further R&D efforts. Scientific opinions tending toward a consensus on the 
infeasibility of a technology, however, can disincentivize R&D investment: a technology 
that is regarded by experts as “impossible” is less likely to attract sustained, mainstream 
investment.  
Since this dissertation is interested in how scientific or technical expert opinions 
can shape investment incentives for an emerging technology, it is not as concerned about 
the nature of the scientific consensus or the veracity of the feasibility claims. Extensive 
literature exists to show that scientific opinions can be shaped by extra-scientific factors 
including culture, power and funding, politics, and personal credibility and can be achieved 
through various sociopolitical processes and mechanisms, including result negotiation, 
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boundary construction, micro-politics of translation, and bandwagoning practices.148 
Similarly, scientific consensus does not necessarily indicate veracity – scientific 
agreements are products of time and are reflective of the state of knowledge of a given era. 
States of knowledge can change, and “truths” once established can be overturned by future 
studies, insight, and evidence.149 For the purpose of this dissertation, scientific consensus 
thus neither assumes a socio-politically neutral position of science, nor does it indicate 
transcendental truths. It indicates only the strength of the collective opinions of the expert 
community on an issue and the way it impacts investment decisions: as the scientific 
opinion converges toward a consensus on the infeasibility of a technology, or as the 
opinions on a technology’s infeasibility become dominant, the incentive to invest in such 
a technology declines. 
Hypothesis 1: As scientific agreement on the feasibility of an emerging military 
technology declines, the investment condition for such technology also becomes less 
favorable. 
4.2.2 Demand Side Variable – Defining Technical Requirements 
The demand side variable in the military R&D processes is the articulation of the 
performance parameters of a given defense technology within the military requirements 
process. From the military perspective, defense technology is designed and developed to 
meet capability needs of a service, and these capability needs, in turn, are derived from the 
types of missions that a particular service needs to conduct. A requirement, thus, is a stated 
                                                 
148 See, for instance, the concise summary provided in Uri Shwed and Peter S. Bearman, “The 
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149 See, for instance, Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Third Edition 
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operational need for the military. Such a need may have developed in the field as a result 
of some observed operational problem, or it could have resulted from an analysis of 
projected future missions. In some other cases, a requirement may be developed as a 
response to a new technology opportunity. In any case, it refers to the demand of a 
capability and the operational parameters under which this capability is expected to work.  
The structure of the defense industry is unique in the sense that it constitutes a 
relatively rare, monopsonistic or oligopsonistic “market” structure where only a single 
buyer or very few buyers exists. In such a market, the buyer exercises a great degree of 
influence over the terms via which a product is developed, produced, or sold. In the defense 
industry, where the government is often the sole buyer of defense technology products, the 
military exercises significant control of the R&D process through its unique power in 
articulating the requirements. In their studies of the defense industries’ role in 
implementing military modernization, particularly with regard to network-centric warfare, 
Peter Dombrowski and Eugene Gholz describe this unique role of the military: “One major 
component of military transformation is producing a new set of equipment 
requirements…our theory suggests that developing the technology to implement the 
envisioned military innovation will require firms to respond to the new requirements, and 
to add their engineering capabilities and their political strength to the military’s 
authoritative interpretation of the international environment.”150 In Dombrowski and 
Gholz’s view, the defense market is customer-driven, where the military’s visions of the 
security environment, perceptions of the desirable capabilities, and articulations of what is 
needed are dominant features of defense innovation. 
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Innovation and the Defense Industry (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), Kindle Edition, 
Location 801-802 of 4981. 
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In the United States, civilian control over the military has long been a tradition, but 
such control “has not often been effectively exercised in the somewhat specialized area of 
military R&D.”151 As Deagle describes: 
The central political feature of the…acquisition process is that its control 
inevitably resides mainly in the hands of the services. No one else in the 
system has the information and the financial and staff resources to wield the 
day-to-day influence over programs that “micromanagement” permits. 
Moreover, no one can match the unique claim to control of the military-
requirements process that the wearing of a uniform conveys.152 
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that since there are multiple civilian authorities 
and political constituencies to the DoD, their interests are inevitably pluralistic and 
fragmented, which diffuse and limit their abilities to influence the defense acquisition 
process. 
Yet, the process of articulating a military requirement is by no means autonomous 
and free from other sociopolitical influences. Despite the primacy that the military has over 
the requirements process, a myriad of actors is involved in defense acquisition and holds a 
stake in the investment and development decisions of a military technology. As Deagle 
further attests with regard to the organization and process of defense acquisition, “the 
stakes involved – programmatic, institutional, financial, and frequently the highest national 
interests – guarantee that management of military R&D will be buffeted by intense political 
forces.”153 The current staffing and validation process in the Joint Capability Integration 
and Development System (JCIDS) in the United States reflects this situation:  
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The staffing process ensures stakeholders are afforded visibility into 
proposed new capability requirements, or changes to previously validated 
capability requirements. This visibility enables Sponsors to benefit from 
stakeholder inputs as they refine their capability requirement documents, 
ensuring that new or altered capability requirements are compatible with, 
and collectively provide the best value to, the Joint Force. It also enables 
validation authorities to shape and validate capability requirements to best 
serve the needs of the Joint Force.154 
In other words, at least in the US, the process in turning a military demand of a capability 
into a material solution is designed to ensure that various stakeholders within and outside 
the Joint Force are able to influence the articulation of the requirements. 
This problem of multiple stakeholders is especially acute when the capability being 
developed has high technological uncertainty, is complex, and impacts multiple end-users 
both inside and outside the services. As Thomas McNaugher accounts in his study on 
defense procurement, the problems of failed projects often begin with the initial articulation 
of requirements, where cost schedules, performance goals, and technical specifications are 
established amidst pressures to compromise and consensus-building. Such pressures lead 
to elaborate requirements, some may be competing with one another, because each 
stakeholder wants to protect capabilities, technologies, or performance specs that matter to 
the political actor it represents.155 As a result, cost and schedule overrun become constant 
features in defense acquisition. 
                                                 
154 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, CJCSI 3170.01I, “Joint Capabilities 
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formalized in the United States in 2003, under the direction of then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, 
in order to address problems with joint force capability development. Prior to the JCIDS process, the 
requirements in the United States were service specific. 
155 McNaugher 124-135. 
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Even if such a consensus-building process has not led to a maze of competing and 
contradictory performance goals, the military itself may not always possess accurate and 
complete information to determine requirements that would permit a smooth development 
process. Such is the problem of “flying blind,” where both strategic as well as technical 
uncertainties preclude rational decision-making. In Michael Brown’s study of US strategic 
bombers, for instance, he notes that “in every case examined…the air force decision makers 
compounded the unknowns their programs faced by setting performance requirements 
beyond, frequently far beyond, the state of the art.”156 Because of this lack of information 
and in some cases, the lack of ability to obtain such information, “doctrinal and 
organizational preconceptions [play] an important role in shaping key decisions” regarding 
performance parameters and the technical criteria used in developing a capability or 
technology can be far from technical realities.157 
Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman have perhaps summarized best this socially 
constructed and political contested nature of defense technology requirements. As they 
suggest:  
In the military, as elsewhere, organizations develop technological style and 
preferences which are embodied in the criteria they use to evaluate technical 
changes. In effect, organizations can come to hold socially specific 
definitions of what it is for a technology to ‘work’.158 
They elaborate on this by using the development of a rifle as an example: 
In the case of the ordnance corps, the definition of what it was for a rifle to 
work was influenced strongly by the ‘gravel-bellies’, the sharpshooters 
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whose key criterion was the accuracy of a weapon in controlled, deliberate, 
long-range firing on the best range.159 
Since “it is impossible to test any technology for all possible conditions, or to shape it to 
satisfy all possible demands on it,” they conclude, “an organization must select criteria,” 
and “[t]he criteria it prioritizes will depend in part on its history and its relations to other 
competing organizations.”160 The militaries, thus, generate, articulate, and define the 
parameters under which a technology works according to its organizational style and 
mission. 
In his seminal work on the development of inertial guidance systems, MacKenzie 
shows this highly sociopolitical nature of the military requirements. The navigational 
requirements for the early strategic ballistic missiles were set at 5,000 feet, which, after a 
flight time potentially as great as ten hours, was an extremely demanding specification for 
accuracy. This requirement was later adjusted to 1,500 feet of circular error probable in the 
contracts for the MX-1593 (Atlas) missile.161 A theoretical analysis by Charles Draper and 
his colleagues at the Instrumentation Laboratory in 1947 reveals that in order to achieve 
even just a nautical mile of accuracy (a little more than 6,000 feet) after an hour of flight 
time, the inertial guidance system required gyroscopes that were at least a hundred times 
more accurate than what was available as the state of the art.162 MacKenzie argues that 
“[t]here was of course nothing ultimately sacrosanct about this requirement,” for the “later 
British inertial navigator project had an Air Staff accuracy requirement of five miles after 
20 minutes.”163 Such a demanding requirement in the US likely stemmed from the Air 
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Force’s unwillingness to adopt the missiles into its operations, which were regarded at the 
time as a competitor to the strategic bombers. Since, during the same time period, the 
circular error for “blind” bombing by a strategic bomber was believed to be 1,500 feet, it 
was expected the ballistic missiles would need to “perform” at least equally well in order 
to be an acceptable system for the Air Force.164 The requirements, in this case, are defined 
not according to a reasonable expectation of the existing technical or scientific possibility 
but a performance measure that is designed to preclude the missiles from being an 
acceptable investment and development option. 
Because of the competing political pressure both within and outside the military 
organization as well as the inherent uncertainties embedded within the acquisition process, 
the military sometimes defines the requirements for a military technology with operational 
parameters quite independently of the scientific and technical realities. Beard, recognizing 
this, concludes about the Air Force’s reluctance to the earliest developments of ICBM this 
way, “Whatever the reasoning, there was in the highest levels of the Air Force R&D 
hierarchy opposition to the accelerated development of long-range ballistic missiles and an 
apparent failure to appreciate technological unpredictability or even to recognize 
technological advances.”165 This is not to say that the military makes requirements 
decisions in a void and free from scientific or technical input, but that such decisions may 
be made with very limited scientific and technical information. In some cases, such 
information may even take a back seat to existing understandings of a military 
organization’s mission, operational doctrine, and dominant technology.  
Regardless of their potentially political and contested nature, requirements and their 
associated operational parameters are a critical component to defense acquisition and the 
military’s investment decisions. They materialize “consumer demands” in the defense 
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technology market and reflect how the military perceives and understands a technological 
opportunity. The levels at which the military sets its desired operational parameters for a 
technology, thus, impact the attractiveness of the technology as an investment option. As 
seen from the case of the early developments of the ICBM, a highly demanding 
requirement can undermine potential and in some cases, actual investments to a 
technology. The more demanding a requirement is, the less likely that it is going to be 
achieved, which in turn leads a technology to be regarded as an insufficient solution to a 
capability gap or mission need. 
In this dissertation, the degree to which a requirement is “demanding” is 
conceptualized as the stringency of the requirement. The word stringency is used here to 
connote a sense of tightness, strictness, and specificity. A stringent requirement is one that 
articulates the operational parameters within a narrow range, precludes deviations from 
such parameters, and allows little room for interpretation. With regard to technology 
development, stringency also suggests difficulty to achieve a requirement. A stringent 
requirement in this sense is one that is defined far from the existing technological frontier 
and will require tremendous research efforts in order to be reached. Since it is impractical 
and often impossible to define a threshold of stringency, the stringency of a military 
requirement is understood in this dissertation in comparative terms to other similar military 
demands or the state-of-the-art science and technology of the time. 
Hypothesis 2: The more stringent a military requirement, the more difficult it is to be 
achieved, and the less favorable are the investment conditions for a technology intended 
to address such a requirement. 
4.2.3 Institutional and Technology Alternatives 
Investment decisions are impacted by the availability of alternatives. Alternatives 
refer to both the potential for as well as the existence of more than one option to the way 
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that a capability gap is addressed through the acquisition process. In other words, an 
alternative is an additional technological option or an additional way that a technology may 
be accessed and acquired beyond indigenous development from the military R&D system.  
Not all military mission requirements and capability gaps require material solutions 
developed from R&D. Some capability gaps maybe addressed by additional training and 
changes in existing force organization and management, while other mission requirements 
maybe met by shifts in policy and adjustments to operational doctrines. In the US, this is 
reflected in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), where 
deliberate (non-urgent or emergent) requirements identified and validated in the initial 
capability documents (ICD) can translate to material solutions (through Capability 
Development Documents), non-material solutions (through the Joint DCR166), or a 
combination of both.167 The recent focus on stability operations as part of core US military 
missions since 2005 is one such example where changing missions have required non-
material solutions based on doctrinal changes and updates.168 
When a technical or material solution is required, however, alternatives can exist 
from both an institutional as well as a technology perspective. Institutional alternative 
refers to alternative avenues through which a technology can be developed and the 
capability need fulfilled. This may refer to efforts conducted by industry IR&D,169 by other 
agencies, or by existing R&D for commercial/civilian purposes. In this sense, a technology 
may be acquired from outside the military R&D process. In Beyond Spinoff, John Alic and 
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others discuss several modalities where military and civil technologies influence one 
another.170 These include deliberate investment and development choices as well as, more 
often, indirect and unintended pathways toward technology development. According to 
Alic et al., there are several ways for the military to acquire a technology without being the 
sole funder for its development. For instance, technology can be developed concurrently 
for use in both military as well as civilian sectors, and this can occur in the form of a 
technology component, as in the case of a major contractor’s development of jet engines 
and aircrafts,171 or technological infrastructure, such as the development of small-scale 
nuclear reactors for electric power production. This is especially likely when an area of 
science or a technology is dual-use. 
Since the military is but only one government agency that invests in scientific 
research and technology development, other government agencies may also invest in 
technologies that can be leveraged by the military. In certain technical areas, the military’s 
needs may overlap with the missions and functions of other agencies. In the US, for 
instance, certain DoD technological needs may overlap with those of the Departments of 
Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, or the intelligence 
communities. This is especially true for today’s military whose mission scope continues to 
broaden and for technologies that are dual-use or infrastructural in nature. These different 
government agencies can serve as cost-sharing partners for R&D or alternative technology 
developers/funders. Technologies developed in this manner can thus be a multi-agency 
effort, such as the early developments of artificial intelligence which attracted investments 
from DARPA, NIH, and NSF.172 In his study on American biodefense, Smith has similarly 
noted that although biological weapons have traditionally been within the military domain, 
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civilian authorities such as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) have in 
recent years become the major sponsor and funder for defense against such weapons, 
including the research, development, and acquisition of biodefense technologies.173 Smith 
attributes such a neglect of the military investment in and the rise of civilian sponsorship 
of biodefense to the military’s faulty stereotypes of biological weapons and its kinetic 
organizational frame of reference. Such stereotypes and frames caused the defense against 
biological weapons to fall outside the military’s problem-solving domain, and as result, 
even when opportunities arose during the 1990s and early 2000s, the military’s interest in 
funding biodefense languished. In other words, the stereotypes and organizational frames 
prevented the military from seeing biodefense as its problem, and since “military and 
civilian biodefense involve similar science and technology,”174 it was not difficult for the 
military to pass the responsibility of biodefense on to someone else.175 
The military can also acquire a technology as a result of a “reverse spin-off” (or 
“spin-on”) where a technology developed entirely in the civilian sector is adapted for use 
by the defense communities. Alic et al. suggest that, for instance, CMOS (Complementary 
Metal-Oxide Semiconductor) circuits, a technology integral to today’s integrated circuits, 
were perfected in Japan for wristwatches but are now used in military applications due to 
their status as the dominant chip technology. Although the Department of Defense has 
since made further investments in chip technologies, it provided very little funding for the 
early R&D efforts. Commercial products developed and acquired in this manner can be 
used off the shelf by the military, or they can be subject to further R&D and other sorts of 
modification (such as hardening, for instance) in order to better suit the needs and the 
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specific operational environment of the military. In either case, the military may have 
invested very little, if at all, in the technologies it uses. 
Alternatives can also exist in terms of suitable technology options to fulfill a 
mission or capability need for the military. In this case, a technology alternative refers to 
the possibility or the existence of one or more alternative technologies that can be 
developed to fulfill a capability gap. For a given mission, from which technological 
requirements are derived, the capability gaps may be addressed by an array of possible 
technological options. The presence or absence of technology alternatives can be highly 
influenced by the way a given mission is understood and defined by the relevant services. 
Many studies focusing on the development of specific weapons systems and the inter- or 
intra-service rivalry attest to this. For instance, in the early stages of the development of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles in the United States during the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
the lack of technological maturity, the declining defense budget, and the long time horizon 
have led the Air Staff to favor the development of subsonic bombers over long-range 
missiles, despite having won the right to its R&D from other services.176 From this 
perspective, the Air Force considered strategic bombers viable alternative technology to 
ballistic missiles in fulfilling the mission of long-range air bombardment, which in term 
impacted the order of priority in terms of missile research and development.177 Whether or 
not this perception was accurate during the early stages of development, the Air Staff 
estimated the need for ICBMs to be low due to the ability to conduct strategic bombing 
missions using the then heavily focused on bombers.  
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In other words, alternatives refer to the availability of options—options both in 
terms of access to a technology as well as the technology itself. Both institutional and 
technology alternatives are supply-driven, but alternatives can also exist from a resource 
and demand perspective. In this sense, there may be alternative sources of demand that 
impact the incentives to invest. The military may not be the only institution that is interested 
in a given area of science and technology, and other political entities or institutions’ interest 
can impact the military’s calculus regarding technology investment. In some cases, 
alternative demands may create incentives for the military to invest in a certain area of 
science and technology. This can occur as a result of higher order policy (such as a 
President’s directive) that permits additional resources to be allocated through the defense 
sector for certain S&T fields. Other times, this may mean that there is a mandate for 
investment in specific S&T areas and that specific funds may be provided through the 
military. In the United States, this most often occurs in the form of congressional earmarks, 
where the Congress directs certain funds from the discretionary portion of the federal 
budget toward certain locales or for certain purposes. 
This is not to say that the funds allocated through the military this way necessarily 
compromise the military’s interest, constrains its investment choices, or misguides its 
priorities. It is possible and often that such an “alternative demand” is consistent with the 
military’s needs or is at least not in direct contradiction to military functions. Such demand 
alternatives provide ways for the military to invest in R&D for technology options that may 
be outside its existing portfolio or to supplement existing efforts through expanded funding. 
As Smith notes in terms of the civilian adoption of biodefense, where the Clinton 
administration has issued Presidential Decision Directives to delegate such authorities to 
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the HHS, and its subsequent failures, “decisions made by Congress and the president have 
an independent effect on policy.”178 
The presence or absence of alternatives, whether institutional or technological, can 
have an impact on investment decisions. Availability of institutional alternatives can 
undermine the military’s interest in pursuing or maintaining research and development 
efforts in a technology that may entail tremendous developmental uncertainties. It also 
presents the possibility that funding as well as research efforts can become highly diluted 
and interests highly dispersed, undermining the chance for the military to want to sustain 
its efforts. A technological alternative, on the other hand, dilutes the demand requirements. 
The more alternatives to a technology exist, the fewer claims the military has to any 
particular technological option. As a result, as the availability of institutional and/or 
technological alternatives increases, the interest to invest in any given, specific technology 
decreases, making an investment unappealing. 
In this dissertation, an institutional alternative refers to the possibility of a 
technology to be developed by an institutional actor (i.e. a firm, a government agency, an 
organization, etc.) that is not the sponsor under consideration whose need is being fulfilled. 
This institutional alternative can be either inside or outside the defense establishments 
depending on how broadly the sponsorship is defined. For instance, for the Air Force’s 
development efforts on ICBMs, the Army and the Navy may serve as internal institutional 
alternatives, whereas for the DoD’s effort in developing treatments for PTSD, the NIH or 
the pharmaceutical industry may be an external institutional alternative. 
A technology alternative is said to exist when, for a given mission need, more than 
one technological solution is possible. Such a definition relies on how the mission is 
defined as well as how the need is articulated. Using the familiar examples from above, 
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ICBMs and strategic bombers may be considered alternative technologies to the strategic 
nuclear missions of the Air Force, for both can implement the necessary long-ranged 
bombing. On the other hand, to solve the need for missile guidance, inertial and radio 
guidance systems can also be considered alternative technologies. Each technology 
alternative carries with it different stakeholder interests and developmental challenges, to 
be sure, but each is considered an alternative because it is a viable pathway through which 
a defined need or problem is redressed. The importance of technology alternatives in 
shaping investment conditions increases when a given technological option’s ability to 
fulfill the military requirements declines, and for a given technology, the greater the 
availability of alternatives, the less favorable is the condition for its investment. 
Hypothesis 3 – Increased availability of institutional or technology alternatives to 
address a capability gap reduces the interest of the military to invest in any particular 
technology option, resulting in less favorable investment conditions. 
4.2.4 Cost, Time, and Performance 
Military acquisition decisions are influenced by estimates of product life-cycle cost, 
time required to bring a technology to operation, and projected performance. These 
interlinked variables are often evoked as both reasons to acquisition decisions and metrics 
for acquisition failures: one of the most common complaints of the acquisition process, 
both in the policy circle as well as in the academic community studying it, is that the 
existing system is broken because of escalating life-cycle costs, schedule overruns, and 
compromised performance of the products. These variables are therefore perpetual features 
of defense acquisition, have become the focal points for the numerous reports and studies 
that try to “fix” the system, and are, rightfully, critical components of the acquisition 
process. 
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Cost, time, and performance are important considerations for acquisition decisions 
and integral mechanisms to the acquisition system, and in this dissertation they are also 
accepted as important variables that matter for defense investment decisions. As can be 
expected, investment in a military technology can be sidetracked, paused, or terminated 
because of high costs, schedule overruns, and under-delivered performances. These 
measures are therefore components of a rational, expected-utility based calculation 
regarding investment decisions. 
Yet, as aforementioned, the inherent uncertainties embedded in emerging S&T 
complicate matters by making predictions about cost, time, and performance difficult. The 
lack of clarity regarding the development trajectory of an emerging technology makes it 
difficult to predict with confidence the amount of money and time needed for a technology 
to become mature enough for deployment, and such a lack of clarity also makes it difficult 
to have reliable expectations about a technology’s ultimate performance. As a result, 
amidst uncertainties, these variables integral to acquisition decisions are at best heuristics 
and not always reliable measures for determining investment decisions. 
The supply and demand-side variables articulated above regarding technical 
feasibility and requirements stringency nevertheless impact cost, time, and performance. 
A low level of agreement on the expected feasibility means that a technology may be far 
beyond the existing technical horizon, for it often indicates, at a minimum, that significant 
controversies still exist and significant research efforts are needed to resolve certain 
bottlenecks. This also generally means that such a technology would require more time and 
money to develop than those that the experts deem feasible. Disagreements on feasibility 
may also lead to a lack of clarity in reasonable performance expectations of the technology. 
The issues of feasibility are further complicated by the way that the consumer, in 
this case the military, sets the requirements demanded from the technology. Given a state 
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of scientific or technical feasibility, the more stringent the requirement, the more difficult 
it is to achieve, and the more time and money it is likely to take in order to fulfill it. The 
requirements also directly impact the expected performance of a technology. Stringent 
requirements can undermine the expected performance, thereby making a technology less 
appealing, especially when compared to more viable and more easily obtainable 
alternatives. MacKenzie’s study of missile accuracy demonstrates this: the 1,500-foot 
circular error probable requirement during the early stages of ICBM development, which 
the US did not achieve until two decades later, made it impossible for the ICBM to 
“perform” on par with the strategic bombers.179 Stringent requirements can thus preclude 
a technology from being competitive in the acquisition decisions. 
Cost of R&D, time to maturation, and quality of expected performance impact 
investment decisions. In this dissertation, by contextualizing S&T as a variable, I show that 
the technical contents as conceived by the relevant actors in the investment decisions 
process can produce conditions that make an emerging technology more or less attractive. 
Under unfavorable conditions, the cost of R&D is likely to rise, the time to technology 
maturation and deployment lengthen, and the expected performance decline. Technical 
feasibility and requirements stringency are therefore tied to the expected cost, time, and 
performance for a military technology investment. 
4.2.5 The Model 
The discussions of feasibility, requirements stringency, and alternatives above 
delineate the different mechanisms via which S&T can influence technology investment. 
Yet, because the extent to which a technology is appealing as investment cannot be solely 
determined by supply or demand side factors, I argue that each of these variables is 
insufficient to impact investment decisions. In other words, these variables are individually 
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necessary but not individually sufficient to alter investment conditions. Furthermore, I 
argue that these variables interact – the relative importance of each as a contributor to the 
favorability of investment condition relies on the value of the other variables. 
It is recognized in this dissertation that variables such as degree of consensus on 
technical feasibility and requirements stringency operate on a continuum. However, for the 
purpose of clarity and simplicity, both variables are evaluated in a dichotomous manner 
and are examined in relative terms. A consensus opinion on a technology’s feasibility and 
a lack of consensus, in this case, are treated as functionally the same, for they both 
incentivize R&D efforts. Availability of alternatives refers to the presence and absence of 
either or both institutional and technology alternatives. It is understood as the availability 
of an alternative pathway to fulfilling a capability gap. The investment conditions 
generated by these three variables are summarized in Table 2. 
 

























Together, technical feasibility and requirement stringency constitute the technical 
content of an emerging military technology and, along with availability of alternatives, 
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condition its investment at a given time. As offensive realists argue, the special status of a 
military technology and its role in national defense suggest that, given available resources, 
decision makers have an incentive to invest. In other words, given the resources, investing 
in a military technology is the normal practice. The favorability of investment conditions, 
for this reason, is defined “negatively”: a favorable condition means that there is an absence 
of sufficiently compelling reasons that make a technology an unappealing opportunity. 
Nevertheless, the “favorable” conditions that result from the different configurations of 
these three variables are not all equal – in some cases, investing in a technology may be an 
easy choice, while in others more considerations may be necessary regarding the potential 
cost, time schedule, and expected performance. 
For instance, when a technology is generally regarded feasible and the performance 
goals it is trying to meet are not very difficult, the R&D efforts are more likely to yield 
returns (such as allowing the technology to be produced). However, given the same level 
of feasibility but a highly stringent performance goal, the technology may still be produced 
but will likely incur greater cost and take longer to mature. While in neither case the 
acquisition of the technology has become so prohibitive that it would prevent a defense 
planner or decision maker from making the investment (in neither case would the 
investment conditions be unfavorable), they carry different implications regarding the 
potential cost, time, and performance expected from the R&D process. 
As stated above, feasibility, requirement stringency, and availability of alternatives 
are interacting variables, and the relative importance of contributing to the favorability of 
investment of each is dependent on the value of the other. For instance, the stringency of 
the requirements becomes especially important when the feasibility of a technology is 
considered low. Low feasibility suggests that the technology may have bottlenecks that, 
even with significant investments in R&D, are difficult if not impossible to eliminate. 
Under this setting, a highly stringent performance requirement will make the technology 
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even less appealing for investment, for the investors will unlikely be able to achieve the 
expected performance. 
On the other hand, the idea of feasibility carries with it an implicit assumption about 
an outcome. Generally speaking, a feasible technology is one that is possible to exist. In 
this case, the expected outcome is implied as some kind of truth about nature. However, 
feasibility can also be understood with respect to an expected level of performance. In this 
case, feasibility may be used to denote the possibility of achieving a certain outcome that 
is functionally defined or threshold driven. Therefore, the meaning of feasibility of a 
military technology may shift during the acquisition process. At the beginning of the 
acquisition, feasibility may merely mean a proof of concept, but as the acquisition process 
progresses, feasibility may refer to the possibility of achieving a specified, expected level 
of performance. Furthermore, as noted above, the experts’ beliefs in feasibility are 
themselves a product of time – their assessment of as well as their ability to assess the 
feasibility of a technology are built upon an existing state of knowledge. As science 
progresses, however, previously established beliefs may be overturned, due to new 
techniques, approaches, and evidence. For these reasons, a consensus verging toward low 
feasibility alone does not preclude a technology from being invested in, not only because 
that consensus can be overturned, but also because the issue of feasibility is mitigated by 
what is expected of the technology. 
Finally, the existence of technology or institutional alternatives becomes 
increasingly important as the difficulty of acquiring a capability increases. It plays the 
greatest role in shaping investment conditions when low levels of feasibility and highly 
stringent requirements suggest that a technology may not be able to be developed to meet 
the performance goals. When a technology is unlikely to be developed according to the 
expected performance levels, the military may still choose to invest if there is sufficient 
demand for such a capability and if there are no alternative ways to fill the gap. This may 
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require increases in expected cost and time, a recalibration of research focus (by 
concentrating on overcoming one specific bottleneck, for instance), or an adjustment of 
expected performance if possible, but the military will continue to have an incentive to 
invest despite the fact that the condition would not be ideal. However, given the same 
context with available technological or institutional alternatives, the military is more likely 
to abandon the troubled technology and opt for the alternatives. Therefore, the role that 
technology and institutional alternatives play in shaping investment conditions for a 
technology is dependent on the degree of difficulty (which is impacted by feasibility and 
requirement stringency) in acquiring such a technology to resolve a capability gap. 
As shown in Table 2, consensus regarding the lack of feasibility, highly stringent 
performance requirements, and available technology or institutional alternatives together 
creates an unfavorable condition for the military to invest in a technology. As stated before, 
these factors are likely to increase the expected cost and time of the R&D and can also 
impact the expected performance, and as a result, the technology would become 
unappealing as an opportunity. Yet, how specifically does an unfavorable condition impact 
the levels of investment in a military technology? What does a lack of appeal for investment 
do to a technology during the acquisition process? To answer these questions requires an 
examination of how a new technology is introduced and its investment sustained in the 
acquisition process. The early stages of such a process are characterized by advocacy, 
consensus building, and sponsorship promotion, and after R&D has been initiated, the 
sustainment of investment requires the technology to continue to be justifiable despite 
potential challenges. 
According to Evangelista, in a relatively open military R&D system like the one in 
the United States, the introduction of a new military technology is more likely to come 
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from the bottom.180 For him, the impetus for technological innovation comes from 
scientists who work in close contact with military officials. The proposal for a new 
technology and early investment decisions rest with lower levels of decision-making, such 
as program managers, and are only pushed up the decision hierarchy as the technology 
progresses into advanced development, integration, and production. This characterization 
of the early stages of defense R&D within the US, although written at the end of the Cold 
War, contains elements that continue to ring true today. As suggested in the Defense 
Science Board 2012 study of DoD basic research, for instance, all major decisions of DoD 
funding on basic research are highly subjective.181 In this context, investment decisions at 
the early stages of R&D are highly influenced by the access that individual scientists have 
to relevant program managers and their ability to advocate for their novel ideas. 
 Of course, in order for the idea for a technological opportunity to germinate within 
the acquisition process and attract long-term investment, simple advocacy is often 
insufficient. If an idea for a new technology is to attract support and funding, it needs 
promoters who are willing to work with relevant people, both in the military and expert 
communities, to generate interest.182 In this case, the promoters not only need to be able to 
relate the new technology to the military’s needs, but they also need to be able to 
demonstrate feasibility of the new technology. The greater support the promoters are able 
to gather from the expert community and military officials, and the greater ability the 
promoters have in demonstrating (or finding endorsements for) the viability of the new 
technology, the more likely the technology will be sponsored. 
 Under favorable investment conditions, thus, technology opportunities will attract 
and accumulate interests as described above and be invested in. Yet, not all technology 
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opportunities enter the acquisition process under such favorable conditions, and even if 
they did, conditions can change over time. Under unfavorable conditions, as articulated by 
the theoretical model, these mechanisms for advocacy, consensus building, and promotion 
may fail, causing a technology opportunity to not be able to gather sufficient support to be 
initiated. Thus, one way that the technical contents can impact the investment is by making 
it difficult for the technology to go through the necessary mechanisms to build and 
consolidate interest. 
 Hypothesis 4: When the condition is unfavorable, a technology has difficulty 
generating sufficient support to attract sponsorship and be initiated. 
 The ability to get a new technology to enter initial R&D does not guarantee the 
sustained investment required for a technology to be developed into a capability. Even 
during the early stages of R&D, a new technology may run into difficulties, which may 
arise from a multitude of organizational, political, or in some cases social challenges. One 
possible organizational challenge, for instance, may arise if the technology poses a 
challenge to a military organization’s traditional missions. The early development effort of 
the ICBM is one such example, where the missile’s challenge to the Air Force’s strategic 
bombing mission caused it to have limited support within the Air Force. Political 
challenges may also arise from multiple sources: interagency rivalry, political pork 
barreling, and in some cases, arms control concerns, for instance. These challenges can 
threaten the continued viability of a technology investment. 
 In some cases, those promoting a technology or having an interest in its sustained 
investment may leverage external threats or certain critical events as justifications for the 
technology’s continued development. Yet, threats and critical events work both ways. A 
change in actual or perceived external threat may lower interest in some technological 
capabilities and, depending on what event one is dealing with, may also lead to 
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reevaluations of the investments. As much as the promoters of a technology may advance 
their interest by leveraging threats and events, those who oppose its development may also 
encounter opportunities that embolden their challenge. In this sense, the favorability of the 
investment becomes important, for under unfavorable conditions, the technology may 
become vulnerable to these challenges. This effect can be articulated as follows: 
 Hypothesis 5: When the condition is unfavorable, a new technology is less resistant 
to potential organizational, political, or social challenges, making it more difficult to 
sustain should such challenges arise. 
The political mechanisms articulated above regarding the initiation and sustainment 
of a technology investment are not intended to be comprehensive with regard to how the 
technical dimensions of a technology may impact investment decisions. Nevertheless, they 
provide some initial ways to envision how the political process of military technology 
acquisition may work differently under different investment conditions. It is recognized 
that other mechanisms may exist, and it is hoped that by pursuing a case study design, any 
additional pathways through which the technical content of a technology impacts its 
investment will be revealed. The following section describes the design and methodology 
used for this study. 
4.3 Design and Methodology 
4.3.1 Research Design and Case Selection 
This dissertation employs a qualitative, case study design to assess the way different 
actors envision an emerging military technological opportunity. The case study approach 
helps reveal how a technology becomes defined and understood during the acquisition 
process and how such understandings can condition investment decisions. A study on why 
the military invests in some emerging technologies but not others requires scrutiny of 
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programs that are invested in as well as those that purportedly have the potential for 
military applications but are nevertheless not invested in. While some data on invested 
programs are available, a potential military technology that is not invested in often leaves 
few records and scarce information. Therefore, a case study approach to this dissertation is 
used because a comprehensive dataset on investment and non-investment in emerging 
military technologies is not available, making systematic, quantitative study untenable. 
The case study approach is also useful for examining more closely the highly linked 
variables studied and hypothesized in this dissertation. As aforementioned, technology 
feasibility, requirements stringency, and alternatives availability do not individually 
constitute sufficient conditions for non-investment in an emerging technology. The 
interactive and constructed nature of these variables makes it difficult to conduct 
systematic comparisons across the cases. A case study approach, which allows for situating 
these variables in different contexts, can better illuminate the impact they have on 
investment decisions. 
Finally, the case study approach allows the opaque mechanisms through which the 
scientific and technical “content” of an emerging technology influence investment to be 
better explored. As has been shown by the extensive literature on military innovation and 
defense technology, explanations of military investment decisions are by nature multi-
causal, and there are multiple ways in which the technical contents may interact with other 
social, political, organizational, or structural factors and impact the decision to invest in a 
technology. A case study approach therefore offers opportunities to examine such 
mechanisms more closely and has the potential to allow the uncovering of any missing or 
alternative mechanisms not already postulated. 
The main question addressed in this dissertation is motivated by the curious absence 
of noticeable investment in the R&D of non-lethal weapons applications based on military 
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neuroscience in the last decade despite increasing military attention and funding for 
cognitive neuroscience as an area of emerging S&T. In order to address this, I use cognitive 
neuroscience-enabled military applications as the basis for the cases chosen in the 
dissertation. As aforementioned, this dissertation adopts the categorizations of the 2008 
NRC report assuming that the applied cognitive neuroscience technology has three 
“markets” – health, enhancement, and degradation. The two cases chosen for this study fall 
under two different categories of investment. The first case, examining the non-lethal 
weapons, focuses on the performance degradation application of cognitive sciences. The 
second case, the treatment and prevention of combat stress disorders, investigates one of 
the many medical/mental health applications of cognitive neuroscience research. This 
dissertation does not choose a case from the third area of application in performance 
enhancement because the technologies that fall under this category and their investment 
patterns do not have sufficient variance to yield useful analytical insight. 
Since investments in biochemical incapacitants as non-lethal weapons and 
neuropsychopharmacological treatment for combat stress disorders have changed over 
time, these two cases provide an opportunity for within-case comparisons. Media and 
policy attention toward human brain research in recent years, particularly through cognitive 
neuroscience, have presented this area of S&T as emerging, and the United States is at the 
frontier of pushing the boundaries of the understanding of the human brain. Indeed, 
significant military research efforts to date in this area of S&T remain in basic and early- 
applied research. Yet as explained in greater detail below (section 4.3.3), military interest 
in research of the human brain has a long history. In both of the cases studied in this 
dissertation, despite this long-standing interest, levels of military investments have varied 
over time, and this variation allows for multiple observations in each case and helps reveal 
how the technical contents of these technologies, as conceptualized and defined by the 
expert communities and the military, have mattered for investment. 
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By using these two case studies I do not suggest, nor do I argue, that these cases 
are structured as direct comparisons. In fact, R&D efforts in non-lethal weapons and mental 
health treatments occur in and are funded through different components of the DoD, and 
the scientific community that is involved and expertise required for developing each 
application are not exactly the same (despite recent interests in them and the belief in their 
military potential are driven by advancements in cognitive and neuroscientific research). 
Nevertheless, these two cases provide a way to showcase how, despite their roots in a 
common area of emerging science, different conceptualizations of their feasibility and 
utility influence the military’s investment interests. 
Most importantly, the two cases examined in this dissertation raise significant 
doubts on existing structural, organizational, and bureaucratic explanations of defense 
technology investment. Structural theories suggest that states respond to strategic needs 
from the international system and are primed to invest in new military technologies as long 
as they can. Yet, this logic fails to explain why the US has not more rigorously pursued the 
non-lethal weapons applications from recent advancements in cognitive neuroscience. 
Structural theories also have difficulties explaining why the US has had more visible 
investments in medical applications of neuroscience. Clearly, US engagements in 
Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001 have generated significant concerns over issues of PTSD 
and TBI of returning service members, but investments toward treatments of these 
disorders and injuries are less reflective of a strategic necessity in the current era than a 
domestic concern. This demand for treatment R&D as a result of recent US overseas 
operations, whether structural or domestic, also fails to account for the relative lack of 
attention the military gave to similar problems during and in the immediate aftermaths of 
the Vietnam War. 
Theoretical predictions based on the military’s organizational frame also have 
difficulties in explaining military investments in neuroscience applications, particularly if 
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such a frame is understood as a kinetic one. A strict understanding of the military’s kinetic 
frame, namely that the military focuses its attention only on the RDA of kinetic weaponry 
such as projectiles and explosives, suggests that the military would neglect investments in 
all cognitive sciences research, since none is, strictly speaking, kinetic. To a certain extent 
this is true, since the amount of military investments in cutting-edge cognitive neuroscience 
research is much smaller than that for conventional kinetic weaponry. Yet, this logic fails 
to explain why there are varied levels of investment in the different types of neuroscience 
applications. Furthermore, the kinetic frame hypothesis has little reason to predict that, 
presently, the military would invest in medical treatments of cognitive and neurological 
deficits and trauma over non-lethal weapons. The lack of military investment in non-lethal 
weapons applications and the relatively greater attention to treatment technologies since 
the early 2000s suggest that the organizational frame hypothesis has difficulty providing 
predictions for the cases considered in this dissertation. 
Bureaucratic explanations of investments that define bureaucratic interests as 
quests for resource and autonomy would suggest that the military has an interest in 
investing in cognitive neuroscience applications as policy attention and resources given to 
this area of research increases. Once a research program is established, the military is 
unlikely to give up its functional authority over the program to other competing 
organizations or agencies. Furthermore, bureaucratic explanations would also suggest that 
the military is likely to “fight harder” for getting or keeping the functional authority of 
R&D in an area of emerging S&T, should that area of S&T and the capabilities produced 
fall traditionally within the domain of the military. These predictions, however, are better 
at explaining presence of investments than the lack thereof, particularly in an area of S&T 
that is traditionally military-relevant, such as non-lethal weapons. As the case studies 
reveal, while some bureaucratic interests are at play in a political decision such as a military 
technology investment, these interests alone do not explain the investment patterns.  
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4.3.2 Methods and Data 
To evaluate the cases, this dissertation employs the congruence method and, to the 
extent possible, process-tracing. These two analytical methods are chosen because: 1) the 
cases of investment or non-investment do not constitute the ideal controlled comparison, 
but each case can be examined independently for the variables’ validity, and 2) the 
mechanisms and processes of how technical contents as understood by the relevant actors 
impacting investment decisions are sometimes opaque, and the process-tracing method 
may reveal additional insights regarding these processes. The congruence method “begins 
with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a 
particular case.”183 For this research, congruence method has a special appeal, because the 
three main variables need to be configured in a very specific way in order to predict non-
investment. Testing for congruence in this manner adds more validity to the model 
proposed. Process-tracing “attempts to identify the intervening causal process—the causal 
chain and causal mechanism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the 
outcome of the dependent variable.”184 For this dissertation, process-tracing is used to 
explore how the investment conditions generated by feasibility consensus, requirement 
stringency, and alternatives availability impact investment decisions. 
Each case study examines the historical context surrounding the development of 
the respective technologies and investigates the nature of their status as emerging military 
technologies. As is discussed in greater detail below, the military applications of cognitive 
neuroscience have received more media and policy attention in the last decade primarily 
due to breakthroughs in the techniques to understanding the human brain, but each of these 
applications has seen different iterations and levels of research efforts for many decades 
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before. Each case study then examines the levels of feasibility, stringency of requirements, 
and availability of alternatives. In each instance answers to the following questions are 
sought: 
1) Is the technology feasible? What are the recognized technological barriers or 
other “reverse salients” in its development? To what extent do the expert 
communities agree on its feasibility and was there a dominant opinion regarding 
feasibility? 
2) What are the requirements for the technology set by the military? How stringent 
are the requirements? How were these requirements determined? 
3) Do institutional or technology alternatives to the technology capability exist, and 
if so, which ones? 
Each case will then examine how these different understandings of the technology matter 
for the decision process and explore the ways in which the different conditions produced 
by the variables led to investment decisions. 
As data availability across the cases is different, not all cases will use exactly the 
same types or sources of data, and each case will entail different levels of use of primary 
and secondary source materials. In terms of measuring the supply-side variable, the degree 
to which there is an agreement or a dominant opinion on the feasibility of a military 
technology by those in the expert communities, the main unit of analysis is scientific or 
technical opinion, which in this case refers to a scientific or technical expert’s evaluation 
regarding the viability of the technology. In cases where the viability of an emerging 
technology is in doubt, the reasons (expected bottlenecks and the nature of such 
bottlenecks) will also be noted. The degree to which there is consensus in the scientific or 
technical community regarding a technology’s feasibility is evaluated by assessing the 
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opinions on the subject and by drawing on the existing literature.185 In this dissertation, 
such opinions are drawn from a variety of sources, including academic and policy journals, 
scientist assessment reports from government agencies as well as advocacy groups, 
forecasting studies, briefings, survey results, and news reports. 
Studies on scientific consensus formation within a discipline have employed a wide 
variety of techniques, but outside discipline-specific studies, consensus has been 
determined primarily via immersion in a scientific domain or subject, evaluation of existing 
literature, and thus obtainment of conclusions about the status of the field. Efforts to move 
beyond this approach have employed surveys186 and network analysis of citation records187 
to assess the nature and the formation of consensus. Due to the limited availability (small 
n) of reported expert opinions on feasibility in some of the cases studied, and the fact that 
much of such opinions are expressed through non-academic publications and venues, this 
dissertation analyzes consensus through qualitative evaluation of the expressed opinions 
by relevant experts on feasibility and the extent to which any particular opinion has become 
the dominant interpretation of the feasibility of a technology among these experts. 
The demand side variable examines the military requirements for a technology, 
which is most formally expressed in the US as Key Performance Parameter (KPP) and Key 
System Attribute (KSA) in the acquisition process. Key Performance Parameter refers to 
attributes of a system “considered critical or essential to the development of an effective 
military capability,” whereas Key System Attribute refers to attributes of a system 
“considered important to achieving a balanced solution/approach to a system, but not 
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critical enough to be designated as a KPP.”188 Both KPPs and KSAs are expressed with a 
threshold and an objective value, whereby the threshold indicates a value under which the 
performance is considered not operationally effective or suitable, and the objective value 
indicates a value of higher level performance that “represents significant increase in 
operational utility.”189 For the purpose of this dissertation, the threshold value of KPPs and 
KSAs of a technology is used when available as the most definitive measure of the 
stringency of the requirement, for technologies that perform under the threshold are 
deemed not suitable for operation and run the risk of being cancelled. 
In contemporary US military acquisition systems, KPPs and KSAs for technology 
development are articulated in requirements documents. Yet, these operational attributes 
and objective values are not necessarily available across all cases, since both cases contain 
a historical component where these contemporary benchmarks for performance may not 
exist. For these reasons, in this dissertation, less formal statements of the requirements and 
the expected threshold values for performance will also be considered. Depending on the 
case and where possible, military requirements for a given technology will be drawn from 
primary source documents, including announcements, proposal requests, program reviews, 
reports, and reference books. Where formal declarations of requirements are not accessible 
or non-existent for a technology (as in the case of technologies that are early in R&D and 
technologies that are not being invested in), other primary and secondary sources will be 
leveraged to show the kinds of requirements that would be demanded from functionally 
comparable technologies. 
The presence and absence of alternatives, both institutional and technological, are 
analyzed through interpreting primary and secondary source accounts of a technology’s 
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development goals and the types of missions or capabilities it is trying to satisfy. Such 
information may be articulated in agency announcements and requests, or conveyed 
through other types of policy documents such as reports and recommendations. 
Institutional alternatives can be said to exist when a technology program is or can be funded 
and developed by institutional actors (both agency and industry) other than the expected 
sponsor for the development of a capability. In general, the more broadly defined a mission 
requirement is, the more likely that it can be fulfilled by multiple technological solutions. 
Similarly, technology programs that have greater dual-use potentials or have their 
technology base outside traditional military domains are more likely to have alternative 
sponsors and developers outside the military. 
For most military technologies, a complete lack of institutional and/or 
technological alternatives is rare. Furthermore, the presence of alternatives has its greatest 
impact on investment decisions when low feasibility and highly stringent requirements 
make a technology a difficult investment option. Therefore, the importance of the presence 
of alternatives as a contributing factor to investment conditions is contingent upon the 
technical content of an emerging military technology as understood by the expert 
community and the military. 
4.3.3 What is Emerging about Cognitive Science and Neuroscience? 
The two cases used in this study, namely biochemical incapacitants as non-lethal 
weapons and medical treatments to combat stress related disorders, have received in recent 
years popular as well as policy attentions as areas of cognitive neuroscience research that 
can impact the military and future war. The rapid growth of academic literature in cognitive 
neuroscience research in the last decades brought with it new insights on human cognitive 
functions as well as new “possibilities” to unpack and manipulate the human brain. Along 
with nanotechnology, biotechnology, and information technology, cognitive sciences have 
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long been considered part of converging technological trends at improving human 
performance and altering human existence.190 
Yet, what exactly is emerging about cognitive science and neuroscience? Recent 
discussions on cognitive neuroscience research seem to imply that there is something new 
about human brain research, but the history of science suggests otherwise. The following 
section seeks to set the recent “emergence” of cognitive neuroscience in its historical 
context. A brief history of cognitive neuroscience shows that human brain research has in 
fact been ongoing for centuries, albeit it has in many instances appeared under very 
different guises. The following account also reveals that the quest to unraveling the human 
brain has been highly techniques and tools driven. Much of what is emerging about 
cognitive neuroscience today has to do with refinements of measurement tools and 
advancements in analytical techniques, most notably in computational modeling and 
noninvasive imaging. This has resulted in better understanding of the neuroanatomy of the 
brain. This increasing knowledge of the roles that various parts of the brain play on human 
cognitive behavior has permitted the various functions of the brain to be explored, studied, 
and where possible, influenced or altered. 
4.3.3.1 Brief History of Cognitive Neuroscience 
While cognitive neuroscience, as a term and as a discipline, has only come into 
existence in the late 1970s, the quest for understanding human cognition has a much longer 
history.191 The word cognitive refers to the “psychological and physiological processes 
underlying human information processing, emotion, motivation, social influence, and 
development,” and the term neuroscience denotes “the study of the central nervous system 
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(e.g., brain) and somatic, automatic, and neuroendocrine processes.”192 In this sense, 
cognitive neuroscience is an approach to the study of the human mind, and more 
specifically, it refers to the study of cognitive processes by examining the neural substrate 
to such processes. This is done through fine-grained studies of neuronal activities as well 
as examinations of regions of the brain and collective neuronal activation patterns. 
The belief that human cognitive tasks and functions are tied to the brain structures 
and neural processes can be traced back to early 19th century phrenology, a study of the 
human skull, based on the assumption that certain human cognitive functions are tied to 
specific regions of the brain. Leading phrenologists of the time, Franz Gall and J. G. 
Spurzheim, posit that if one uses certain brain functions more than others, the parts of the 
brain that are associated with those functions will grow, causing bumps in the skull. They 
therefore believe that careful studies of the skull can lead to an understanding of the 
personality of a person. This localizationist view of the human brain and cognitive function 
was challenged by the aggregate field theory championed by Jean-Pierre Flourens, a French 
physiologist. In his studies on brain lesions in birds, Flourens discovered that the birds 
were able to recover with no apparent impairments from the lesions regardless where they 
occurred in the brain, leading him to believe that the entire brain participates in the 
generation of behavior. Of course, these early studies have since been discredited. Yet, they 
helped establish the assumption that the mind is a function of the brain, providing a basis 
to many of the later neurological studies of the human mind. 
 By the mid- to late 19th century, early phrenology and aggregate field theory had 
given way to clinical studies based on behavioral observations of patients who have 
suffered from neurological deficits or injuries. In England, John Hughlings Jackson’s study 
on patients with epilepsy led him to propose a topographic organization of the cerebral 
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cortex where the different regions of the brain are proposed to be linked to human body 
parts. In France, Paul Broca found that stroke-induced damage to a patient’s left interior 
frontal lobe led to speech impairment and, in Germany, Carl Wernicke discovered in his 
patient that stroke damage to posterior regions of the left hemisphere (where temporal and 
parietal lobes meet) caused a different language acquisition problem, where the patient was 
able to speak but lacked comprehension. These clinical discoveries further helped establish 
not only that the human brain is linked to cognitive functions, but also that damage to 
specific brain regions can cause specific behavioral deficits. 
 The work by Jackson, Broca, and Wernicke emphasized the importance of localized 
regions of the brain in contributing to cognition and behavior and inspired later studies on 
categorizing human brain regions, such as the work by Korbinian Brodmann, who, in his 
analysis of the cellular structures of the cortex, characterized 52 distinct regions. These 
advances in understanding the structure of the human brain were accompanied by further 
explorations of how neurons function. In particular, Camillo Golgi’s development of a 
silver stain that allows individual neurons to be visualized, and Santiago Ramón y Cajal’s 
extension to confirm the unitary nature of neurons and the directional electrical 
transmission within a neuron, provided the foundation to much of 20th century studies in 
neurology and neuroscience. Thus, even before the development of cognitive neuroscience 
as a discipline, the quest toward understanding human cognition and the brain has seen 
contributions from a variety of disciplines through clinical as well as scientific discoveries.  
As have been amply demonstrated by Mitchell Glickstein in his recount of the 
history of neuroscience, each new discovery of the way human brains are structured and 
how they function entails a long road of past discoveries, improvement of techniques, and 
accumulation of insights. Like in many other scientific disciplines, what the scholarly 
community knows about various forms of sensation and perception, types of disease, and 
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categories of human behavioral functions relies on a history of past work.193 In particular, 
as an interdisciplinary field of research, cognitive neuroscience relies heavily on a variety 
of techniques, methods, and other contributions from its consisting disciplines.194 
Advancements in this diverse set of methods and tools have propelled cognitive 
neuroscience research in the last several decades. 
In addition to conceptual contributions from cognitive psychology, modern 
cognitive neuroscience research includes a wide range of methods and techniques, and as 
discussed above, some of the major discoveries regarding the human brain have relied on 
neurological studies or clinical observations of patients suffering from brain lesions and 
other neurological disorders. Yet, such studies are by nature limited to animal studies where 
deliberate surgical manipulations are possible, or in the case of human studies, due to 
chance. This lack of systematic ways to examine a normal human brain has led to 
developments of a set of modern neuroscience techniques, including, but not limited to, 
computational modeling, functional neuroimaging, and neuropharmacology. The 
continued refinement and convergence of these techniques and tools are what defines 
cognitive neuroscience as an emergent area of research and development. The following 
section explores functional neuroimaging as an area of emerging techniques for cognitive 
neuroscience research. While it is important to note that imaging is not the only area in 
which neuroscience techniques have seen significant advances, it has most certainly 
become one of the most dominant. A result, a better understanding of it helps clarify what 
is emerging about cognitive neuroscience. 
4.3.3.2 Modern Imaging Techniques 
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Most modern-day research in cognitive neuroscience relies heavily on functional 
neuroimaging techniques in order to capture the fluctuations in the brain state responding 
to external stimuli. Functional neuroimaging, in short, is a “class of research techniques 
that create images of functional organization of the brain.”195 This is particularly important 
because it allows greater insight into the way that activation patterns impact normal human 
cognitive processes in a timely manner rather than understanding various cognitive 
functions and their neural substrates through the structural studies generated through 
neurological disorders or injuries. Through functional neuroimaging, researchers are 
finding more and more that human cognitive functions engage multiple parts of the brain 
and that a single brain region may contribute to multiple cognitive functions. 
Many imaging techniques and technologies are used in the study of human 
cognition, and their utility can be differentiated by levels of spatial and temporal 
resolutions (see Figure 8 for a comparison between common cognitive neuroscience 
techniques and technologies). Spatial resolution refers to the ability to detect and 
distinguish changes in and across spatial locations.196 Higher spatial resolution indicates 
greater granularity in the image acquired from the imaging technology, which in 
neuroscience most often means that changes can be detected in smaller brain structures and 
at greater depth from the cortical surface. Increase in spatial resolution helps the 
identification of the locales of brain activation. Temporal resolution refers to the ability to 
distinguish and detect changes over time. Higher temporal resolution indicates a more 
frequent sampling rate at which a measurement is made. Higher sampling rates allow 
greater amounts of images to be captured during a time period and better detection of quick 
changes in activation. Together, spatial and temporal resolutions contribute to the level of 
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granularity at which brain activation can be detected and analyzed in terms of both location 
and speed. 
The different neuroimaging techniques can also be distinguished by their 
invasiveness and the types of signal they detect. Invasive techniques often provide both 
greater spatial and temporal resolutions, but at the cost of greater potential for damage or 
risk. For instance, electroencephalography (EEG), which measures the electrical currents 
generated through neuronal activation by placing the electrodes on the skin surface (in this 
case, the scalp), is non-invasive and can be used widely on human patients. In a similar 
technique called electrocorticography (ECoG), the electrodes are applied to the cortical 
surface, which allows greater spatial resolution as well as better signal-to-noise ratio but is 
also more invasive, for its operation requires craniotomy. The planting and removal of 
electrodes in ECoG therefore carries clinical risks—even if the surgery is successful, the 
intruded portions of the scalp are still subject to infections and other complications. 
The types of signals that modern imaging techniques detect can be roughly divided 
into two categories: electromagnetic and metabolic. Techniques such as EEG and 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) detect changes in electrical potentials and magnetic flux 
that result from neuronal activation. Depending on the level of invasiveness, the electrical 
signals can be detected form the scalp, the surface of the cortex, and within the brain, 
whereas techniques using the magnetic properties of neuron firing are for the most part 
non-invasive. Electrical and magnetic signals in general enjoy a greater response time 
between activation and detection but are often subject to noise from surroundings. Other 
techniques, such as near-infrared spectroscopy (NIRS) and positron emission tomography 
(PET), rely on metabolic activities. NIRS uses an optic window in which skin, muscle, or 
bone tissues are transparent but hemoglobin is visible to measure the blood flow. PET, on 
the other hand, relies on tracking radioactive isotopes to reveal changes in blood glucose 
levels. Unlike electrical and magnetic signals, metabolic signals are indirect measures of 
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neuronal activity, for they detect metabolic changes that result from neuronal firing, such 
as the consumption of blood oxygen and glucose. As a result, although such measures often 
have greater spatial resolution (for they can track neuronal activity that occurs further way 
from the surface of the cortex), the signals are often “sluggish” and have less temporal 
resolution than techniques like the EEG.  
 
 
Figure 8 - Temporal Resolution, Spatial Resolution, and Invasiveness of 
Neuroscience Techniques197 
 
Amidst all neuroscience techniques that have been used to study human cognition, 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has in recent decades become dominant.198 
The increasingly wide-spread use of fMRI is largely due to both hardware and software 
improvements that have occurred with magnetic resonance imaging in the last two decades. 
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On the one hand, there has been tremendous growth in the power of MRI machines, while 
on the other, computational power and tools capable of handling large volumes of imaging 
data have also grown. Improvements in both hardware and software have allowed MRI 
machines to produce images with greater clarity and granularity that can be analyzed at 
greater speed.199 These advancements have enabled this imaging technique to be used for 
understanding human brain functions in not just clinical but also cognitive research 
settings. 
Functional MRI uses blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) signals to detect 
neuronal activity. The firing of neurons consumes energy (in the form of glucose), and 
following neuronal activations, oxygenated blood flows to the activated regions to restore 
the neuron into pre-activation, polarized state. Since blood oxygenation levels change 
quickly following the neuronal firing, and because such changes are localized to the 
activation sites, changes in blood oxygenation levels produce localized signals of brain 
activation. Using the hemodynamic properties of neuronal activity, fMRI has been used to 
identify neural activations in the brain that contribute to certain cognitive functions and has 
allowed scientists an opportunity to examine in vivo the dynamic nature of cognition. 
Functional MRI has gained its importance in the research of cognitive neuroscience 
because of its ability to achieve relatively high spatial resolution when compared to other 
non-invasive imaging techniques (see Figure 8 for comparison between fMRI and other 
neuroscience techniques).200 Although the temporal resolution of fMRI is relatively low 
(when compared to other techniques that detect electrical signals) due to the sluggish nature 
of hemodynamic processes (which can last up to 10 seconds after the neuronal activation), 
fMRI, to date, remains one of the non-invasive imaging methods with the greatest spatial 
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resolution. Of course, each neuroscientific and imaging technique has its unique strengths 
and weakness, and no single method can be suited to all neuroscience research tasks and 
designs. Nevertheless, as shown by the increasing literature on cognitive neuroscience 
studies using fMRI,201 fMRI has established itself as a powerful tool in the study of 
cognitive neuroscience and has brought with it significant breakthroughs in the 
understanding of the human brain. 
As the above discussion has shown, cognitive neuroscience research relies on a 
variety of measurement techniques, research methods, analytical tools, and forms of 
inquiry, and to understand it as an emerging field of scientific research and technological 
development, one needs to have a better appreciation for what and how the different 
techniques, methods, and tools are generating insights regarding the human brain. As 
Gazzaniga, Ivry, and Mangun suggest, neuroscientists “are continually refining techniques 
for measuring and manipulating neural processes at a finer and finer level,” and each year 
there is “development of more sensitive equipment to measure the electrophysiological 
signals of the brain or the metabolic correlates of neural activity, and the mathematical 
tools for analyzing these data are constantly becoming more sophisticated.”202 Questions 
about the brain and the mind that can be answered are necessarily tied to the available 
measurement tools and analytical techniques, and new tools and techniques also help frame 
the types of questions that can be asked. The current emergence of cognitive neuroscience 
is thus, for the most part, driven by the increasing ability of scientists to analyze the brain 
in greater detail and to an extent, to manipulate brain functions more precisely. 
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A quick review of the historical developments in cognitive neuroscience has also 
revealed that research of human cognition has long been ongoing, and this applies to R&D 
that occurs both inside and outside the military domain. At least in the United States, 
notable national security-related research regarding aspects of human cognition and 
neuroscience can be traced back to as early as the 1960s. Investment in brain research has 
waxed and waned, but with the arrival of improved neuroimaging technologies and the 
maturing of their analytical techniques in the last couple of decades, there has been a 
reinvigoration of interest. Most certainly, at least in the US, research of the brain has now 
gained policy attention, and more deliberate and greater amounts of federal funding are 
devoted to it. While one often refers to this recent attention as the emergence of cognitive 
science research, it is important to note that research of the brain and human mind is not 
something that has only started to exist recently, and that any account for its current 
investment needs to be understood in historical context. 
The following two chapters consist of case studies of military applications of 
cognitive neuroscience research in which the arguments and model posited in this chapter 
are applied. Chapter 5 examines the non-lethal weapons application of cognitive 
neuroscience, namely, the potential for weaponizing neurochemical incapacitants. Chapter 
6 looks at medical aspects of cognitive neuroscience research regarding treatment and 
prevention measures of combat related stress disorders.  
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CHAPTER 5. BIOCHEMICAL INCAPACITANTS AS NON-
LETHAL WEAPONS 
One of the major potential application areas for the military regarding 
contemporary cognitive neuroscience research is the possibility of designing 
neurochemicals as incapacitating and otherwise non- or less-than lethal weapons. 
Especially for a country like the US, whose military continues to face an ever-widening 
scope of possible missions, having the ability to do something that is not just a choice 
between “shout or shoot” is becoming increasingly important. Non-lethal capabilities,203 
in this case, provide the military the option to address complex operational scenarios in 
which casualties of non-combatant civilians may be an operational concern. 
In this sense, the military has a vested interest in cognitive science and neuroscience 
research. For the military planners and those concerned with military cognitive sciences 
research in the policy realm, “it is the expectation that knowledge and techniques gained 
from advances in neuroscience could enhance [soldiers’] combat effectiveness while 
degrading that of their opposition that makes neuroscience such an alluring subject to 
military planners.”204 As discussed, one of the major considerations of military use of 
neuroscience research is that such research can lead to better, more efficient non-lethal 
biochemical incapacitants, the use of which can be particularly relevant when the mission 
requires dealing with a mixture of armed combatants and civilians. Since “most discussions 
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of drugs and their effects are organized along the lines of current models of the brain and 
nervous system functioning,” changes “in models of brain function may create new and 
surprising ideas about how, when, where, and why drugs produce their effects” and about 
the kinds of neurochemicals that can alter human functioning.205 Advances in the 
knowledge of the brain, particularly in neuropharmacology and drug delivery across blood-
brain barrier, can present opportunities and unique challenges to the military’s pursuit of 
an increasingly diversified portfolio of weaponry and can in particular engender new forms 
of biochemical incapacitants. 
Despite its purported military utility and the increasingly voiced concerns by its 
skeptics, this particular area of research on biochemical incapacitants has seen fluctuated 
levels of investments from the US DoD. In particular, as shown in Chapter 2, since the 
early to mid-2000s, there has been little to no visible US military investments in this area 
of research, despite that military investment in cognitive sciences has been on the rise. Why 
did this happen? This chapter answers this question in the following manner: it first 
provides a recount of US investments in non-lethal programs, with particular attention to 
the programs that leverage research in biochemistry, pharmacology, and neuroscience that 
engender the weaponization of biochemical incapacitants. This chapter analyzes the 
evolving expert opinions on the feasibility of non-lethal weapon systems based on 
bio/neurochemicals as well as the military demand specifications for such weaponry, with 
particular attention given to injury risk and lethality. It is argued that the low levels of 
feasibility, highly stringent performance requirements, and the availability of alternative 
acquisition pathways have made the military investment in this area of research 
unappealing. The chapter then analyzes the international legal issues that concern 
biochemical incapacitants and shows how a shift in the international opinion on the 
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viability and acceptability of developing such weapons likely reinforces the US’s lack of 
interest to continue its investment in this area of cognitive sciences research. 
5.1 “Non-Lethal” Chemical Weapons – A Historical Overview 
5.1.1 Early Investments: Law Enforcement or Military Technology? 
The idea of weaponries that are designed not to kill, but to disable or incapacitate, 
is not necessarily novel. Some of the earliest reported usage of such non-lethal chemical 
agents can be traced back to World War I, where the prevalent use of chemical agents has 
earned the war the moniker as the “Chemist’s War.” Although some of the most well-
known cases of the deployment of chemical agents, such as chlorine gas, were lethal in 
nature, non-lethal chemical irritants or harassing agents were also deployed by both sides. 
For instance, at the outset of the war, the French used ethyl bromoacetate, a lachrymatory 
agent, following the practice of police-issue tear gases earlier in the decade.206 The 
Germans soon followed with the use of upper respiratory mucous membrane irritant 
Niespulver (o-dianisidine chlorosulphonate) at Neuve-Chapelle in October 1914, albeit 
with little success.207 While the development and use of chemical agents soon escalate to 
the lethal varieties following the first-use of chlorine, a broad range of non-lethal chemical 
agents also became a mainstay of the war and were developed, produced, weaponized, and 
deployed.208 
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The early efforts in producing non-lethal chemical agents, particularly around the 
time of WWI, focused on bromoacetate-based tear gases that are usable for both military 
and law enforcement purposes. Tear gases are lachrymatory chemical irritants that 
stimulate nerves in mucous membranes in the eyes, nose, and lungs, which can cause 
crying, sneezing, coughing, and other irritations. These irritants are quick in their onset of 
action and their effects often wear off in tens of minutes to a few hours. As opposed to 
chemical agents designed to produce casualties, non-lethal irritants force the enemy to put 
on protective gear such as respirators, disrupts his operational plan and activities, and 
reduces his combat effectiveness. An enemy exposed to a lachrymatory agent may 
temporarily lose his ability to carry out his mission but can recover relatively easily after 
the exposure ceases. 
As the war wore on, however, the interest and search for more potent irritants also 
increased. By the end of the war, all belligerents had developed more potent forms of non-
lethal chemical irritants. In the US, for instance, the development of a more potent 
lachrymator, chloroacetophenone (CN), has received significant renewed interest in the 
immediate aftermath of the war. Although developed too late in the war to be useful in the 
military operations, this military-originated lachrymator soon became used for riot control 
and law enforcement purposes. According to Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), “In the 1920s the US Army Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) conducted 
more research on CN than on any other agent: in 1921 the CWS offered a CN device for 
experimental trial to the Philadelphia police, and built a manufacturing plant for the agent 
at Edgewood Arsenal in the following year.”209 Other countries soon followed and 
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developed CN, and “during World War II it was the principal lachrymatory harassing agent 
in the chemical-weapons stockpiles” for many countries, albeit it was not used.210 
As can be observed with the development of CN, prior to WWII, the main source 
of innovation in non-lethal capabilities came from military investments in chemical 
weapons. This is so because during this time law enforcement agencies often lacked any 
significant research and development budget (if they had any at all).211 As a result, although 
there was longstanding recognition that the law enforcement communities need capabilities 
that are beyond just “point and shoot,” most of the development of police-use non-lethal 
capabilities came as civilian by-products of military R&D. In the US, this situation 
persisted into the 1950s and 1960s, when rampant crime in cities as well as major protests 
and riots resulting from prevalent racial inequalities and anti-war movements focused 
policymakers’ attention on the need of the law enforcement communities.212 
In particular, the report from the President’s Crime Commission on Law 
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in 1967 and the 1969 Report of the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders both recommend restriction on as well as 
provisions of alternatives to the use of lethal force by the police. These commission reports 
further recommend that “The Federal Government should sponsor a science and 
technology RDT&E program with three primary components: systems analysis, field 
experimentation, and equipment-system development”213 and highlight the need for federal 
support to local officials in “Develop[ing] guidelines governing the use of control 
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equipment and provid[ing] alternatives to the use of lethal weapons” when maintaining 
control of incidents that could lead to disorder.214 
With the passing of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act in 1968, which 
established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) within the US 
Department of Justice, grants became available to state and local police for the purpose of 
enhancing their capabilities, including the acquisition of non-lethal weapons. In addition, 
the Act also established the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 
(NILECJ)215 within the LEAA, which provided the law enforcement communities grants 
for research and development. The law enforcement communities therefore in the 1960s 
and 1970s started to become contributors to the development of NLWs. 
This is of course not to say that the military interest in non-lethal chemical irritants 
has dwindled. According Neil Davison, by the 1950s, countries have begun to find tear gas 
agent CN lacking in its consistency and potency.216 The British military, in particular, 
which at the time had troops in various colonial holdings on internal security duties and 
faced the increasing need of controlling civil disturbances, had a high demand for a better 
and more effective substitute to CN.217 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS), first investigated 
during the interwar period, which proved in British operations in Cyprus to be a more 
effective tear gas agent than CN, was developed and stockpiled. By 1959, CS was also 
adopted by the US military for combat training and riot control purposes. 
The law enforcement communities also soon adopted CS as the main tear gas agent, 
but primarily after this nominally “riot control agent” was used the most extensively during 
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the Vietnam War, starting in 1965. According to the SIPRI 1971 study, “Almost every type 
of weapons delivery system in Viet-Nam has a CS capability, so that CS could swiftly be 
spread over almost any size of target area, at any range and, if necessary, in close 
coordination with other forms of firepower.”218 This prevalence and unrestricted use of CS, 
however, was not done for the purpose of exploiting the non-lethal capability of the agent 
on the enemy, but was done in order to make more effective other forms of firepower.219 
In the end, the rate of casualty incurred was not reduced despite the use of a non-lethal 
agent – the enemy inflicted with irritants that incapacitated his ability to fight only made 
shooting him that much easier. 
5.1.2 BZ Weaponization and Destruction 
As a result of the burgeoning of biochemistry and the pharmaceutical industry and 
the increasing interest in non-lethal capabilities in the 1960s and 1970s, the military began 
exploring new options for biochemical weapons that are more effective at disabling an 
enemy beyond just eye or respiratory irritation. Many of today’s non-lethal capabilities by 
the military or the police can trace their origins to this period.220 Besides irritants, the 
chemical/biochemical agents explored by the US during this time included obscurants 
(smoking agents to obscure sight), sticky foams, malodorants, lubricant (to make surfaces 
slippery and thus impassable), and incapacitating neurochemicals (see definition and 
analysis of desired characteristics of an “incapacitant” in section 5.2 below). As noted by 
James Ketchum and Frederick Sidell in 1997, “Virtually every imaginable chemical 
technique for producing military incapacitation has been tried at some time” between 1953 
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and 1973, and “Chemicals whose predominant effects were in the central nervous system 
were of primary interest and received the most intensive study.”221 
One of the chemicals that received significant military attention was a chemical 
deliriant called 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ). As an anticholinergic agent, BZ blocks the 
effects of acetylcholine, a principal neurotransmitter that operates in both the peripheral as 
well as central nervous system on voluntary neuromuscular functions. Inhibiting the effects 
of acetylcholine leads to physical weakness, delirium, and possible hallucination.222 
Although BZ was not the first psychochemical agent that attracted the military’s attention 
as a chemical incapacitant (other psychedelics such as lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) 
has been studied extensively in the 1950s), its ability to achieve effect at very low dosage 
increased its appeal to the military, and by 1962 it was standardized and produced into M43 
cluster bomb and M44 generator cluster as part of the US chemical weapons stockpile.223 
Nevertheless, the stockpiled BZ munitions were considered to have significant operational 
problems and were, therefore, never deployed.224 
In addition to the exploration of BZ, the military has also extended its search to 
other drugs, including anesthetics, analgesics, tranquilizing agents, and vomiting agents, in 
the 1960s. Other anticholinergics, such as glycolates, received attention from the military 
as a possible replacement to BZ due to its quicker onset of effects. Yet, this active search 
for psychoactive chemicals occurred during the peak of US involvement in Vietnam. The 
extensive use of herbicides (defoliants) such as Agent Orange and tear gas such as CS, 
along with the deaths caused by these chemical agents, attracted public criticism, 
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particularly from the international community.225 Furthermore, the failed open-air test of 
VX agent at the Dugway Proving Ground in 1968 and the congressional discovery of 
Operation CHASE (Cut Holes and Sink ‘Em)226 in 1969 both led to further domestic 
demands for a review of the military’s chemical and biological weapons programs.227 As 
a movement to divert the public’s attention, President Nixon in 1969 unilaterally renounced 
the US biological program and at the same time, reaffirmed the US stance on non-first-use 
of chemical weapons.  
President Nixon’s speech on November 25, 1969, reflected a six-month long review 
process and interagency bargaining.228 Despite the military interest in maintaining the 
programs and existing stockpile, the general consensus across agencies, including some 
among the civilian leadership at the Pentagon, was that the biological weapons were 
ineffective as a battlefield weapon and carries more risk than the benefits they may provide. 
President Nixon endorsed this perspective in his statement, emphasizing that “Biological 
weapons have massive, unpredictable and potentially uncontrollable consequences.”229 He 
further stated that the United States “reaffirms its oft-repeated renunciation of the first use 
of lethal chemical weapons” and “extends this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating 
chemicals.”230 As a confirmation to these points, the President further called for the Senate 
ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which the United States had signed, but had, 
at that point in time, yet to ratify. 
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As a result of President Nixon’s unilateral disavowal of biological weapons 
programs and reaffirmation on the no-first-use policies regarding chemical weapons, both 
lethal and non-lethal, the US stockpile of BZ munitions were declared obsolete a few years 
after.231 Although a number of incapacitating biochemical continued to be explored past 
1969, the military interest and R&D activity in incapacitating biochemical agents started 
to wane toward the end of the Vietnam War in 1975.232 The BZ stockpile was eventually 
destroyed at the Pine Bluff Arsenal in the late 1980s, before the US entered into a bilateral 
agreement with the Soviet Union on the destruction of chemical weapons in 1990 and 
signing the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993. 
5.1.3 Interim Years – Turn to Other Agents 
As a result of a decrease in immediate demand and an increase in public scrutiny, 
in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, interest in the research and development of non-lethal 
weapons declined to an extent. Some other chemical agents studied in the 1970s, such as 
EA 3834,233 were never weaponized. According to Davison, however, some research and 
development continued, including explorations on new chemical compounds and methods 
of delivery.234 For instance, by the mid-1980s, the previous focus on psychomimetic 
compounds, such as the anticholinergics, has shifted to analgesics, including opioid drugs 
such as fentanyl and its analogues, and much of the effort on the discovery, research, and 
development of new compounds were linked to developments in the academic and 
commercial research on better anesthetics. 
In addition to the search of a more potent biochemical compound, from the mid-
1970s through the 1980s, some research efforts were also devoted to the weaponization of 
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biochemical compounds. In a chronology generated by Malcolm Dando of incapacitating 
chemical weapon program research during this timeframe compiled from DoD reports to 
the US Congress, thermal dissemination of agents through explosives and pyrotechniques 
was studied and experiments were conducted during this period.235 Some efforts were also 
devoted toward exploring the possibility of delivering the agent through routes other than 
inhalation (such as percutaneously through the skin). Although the full extent to which 
these efforts were successful were difficult to determine (for none seemed to have yielded 
actually deployable systems), the historical records show that at least some R&D activities 
continued at places like the Edgewood Arsenal on all fronts of the incapacitating chemical 
weapons program. 
During this time, interest from the law enforcement communities also prompted 
continued research on incapacitating chemicals. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ, 
formerly NILECJ), for instance, initiated programs on less-than-lethal technologies in the 
late 1980s, and some of its earliest efforts focused on the development of incapacitating 
chemicals were in collaboration with the Army.236 The military has also adopted the 
language of less-than-lethal weapons to describe these capabilities. These joint 
developments helped facilitate the process through which the military redefined the R&D 
conducted in this area as “Advanced Riot Control Agent Device” (ARCAD) rather than 
chemical incapacitants. In a NBC (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) Modernization Plan 
released in 1992, the ARCAD is described as a “‘hand held grenade, or device,’” that “‘will 
deliver a potent riot control compound, which will provide a rapid onset of effects where 
the safety of the individual(s) is the primary concern).”237 Although the description does 
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not specify the actual chemical agent that would be deployed in the ARCAD, it does 
indicate that the “‘candidate compound will be effective primarily through the respiratory 
tract,’” suggesting that the candidate agent will achieve its effect through inhalation and 
would likely be designed as an area effect weapon rather than individual effect capabilities 
in which the law enforcement communities have more interest.238 
When the Chemical Weapons Convention opened for signature in 1993, the 
prospect of using any kind of Riot Control Agent by the military became severely limited, 
which curtailed further developments on the ARCAD (see section 5.4 below for an analysis 
of CWC and NLWs). Nevertheless, the R&D efforts toward incapacitating chemical agents 
continued. Several agency requests and submitted proposals to the Edgewood Research, 
Development, and Engineering Center (ERDEC) reveal the ongoing military interest. For 
instance, in a SBIR solicitation issued by the US Army in late 1992 and early 1993, it was 
noted that “most recent less-than-lethal (LTL) programs at U.S. Army ERDEC focused on 
the fentanyls as candidate compounds” which are “well-characterized, rapid acting, very 
potent, and reliable in their activity,” but “for many LTL applications they have safety 
ratios that are too low and durations of actions that are too long.”239 As a result, “candidate 
immobilizers with improved safety ratios and shorter duration of action are needed.”240 
Some of the agents under consideration during that the late 1980s and early 1990s 
included the ones that act upon the alpha2 adrenergic receptors.241 Agonists of alpha2 
adrenergic receptors, such as medetomidine, a sedative used in veterinary practices, 
activates the inhibitory functions of the receptors which with catecholamines and can lead 
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to heavy sedation. Although agonists of alpha2 adrenergic receptors can lead to side effects 
such as hypotension (low blood pressure), it was deemed to be “safer” because, “‘Unlike 
opioids, these compounds are devoid of the usual liabilities associated with respiratory 
depression, physical dependence and environmental concerns after dissemination.’”242 
Other proposals in the early 1990s nevertheless showed that the interests in the opioids 
continued despite the known dangerous side effects of respiratory depression. These 
proposals, which suggested research toward synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl analogues, 
as well as strategies to mitigate the side-effect by mixing agonist and antagonists, revealed 
that the prospects of using opioid analgesics as incapacitants or less-than-lethal weapons 
were still within the purview of the military’s interest at the time.243 Other research 
proposals suggested the possibility of using serotonin antagonist244 to achieve “calming” 
effects. Although information was limited and there was no conclusive evidence, it 
appeared that these proposals were not funded. Nevertheless, these activities suggested that 
at least in the early 1990s chemical non-lethal or less-than-lethal incapacitants continued 
to be within the scope of military interest in the US. 
At the same time, the law enforcement community has also continued to explore 
biochemical incapacitant as NLWs. For instance, in late 1992, the NIJ initiated projects 
with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) to review potent 
pharmaceutical agents that are able to be used as non-lethal weapons, particularly fentanyl 
and its derivatives. The study conducted at LLNL was but one of the many collaborative 
projects on LTL weapons that the NIJ had with various Department of Energy (DOE) 
                                                 
242 Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center (1989-94), Scientific Conference 
on Chemical and Biological Defense Research: Abstract Digest, US Army Chemical and biological 
Defense Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, quoted in Dando (1996), 162. 
243 Davison (2009), 114-115. 
244 5-HT receptors, or 5-hydroxytryptaime receptors, are activated by serotonin and have 
inhibitory as well excitatory effects on the neuronal activities through its release of multiple kinds of 
neurotransmitters as well as hormones. 
 146 
national laboratories at the time.245 Similar to previous military explorations, one of the 
major themes of the work at LLNL was to analyze the feasibility of using a combination 
of fentanyl and its derivatives along with an antidote to mitigate the side effects of 
respiratory depression and enhance the safety margins. In addition to the research on 
biochemical incapacitating agents, researchers at LLNL also investigated the potential 
ways of weaponizing them. Inspired by skin patches used to deliver drugs, the researchers 
examined the possibility of transdermal application of fentanyl through felt pads soaked in 
the fentanyl solution. While it is unclear as to what extent further research was conducted 
by the LLNL, it was clear that the law enforcement communities shared much of the 
military’s interest in this area of biochemical incapacitants. 
Incidents in Somalia in the early to mid-1990s further justified the military and law 
enforcement communities’ continued search for better NLWs. During the early 1990s, the 
United Nations had a series of operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II) to address issues 
of widespread famine and disease, as well as armed engagements between the various 
clans, but the operations reached very little success. In particular, the nation-building and 
disarmament objectives of UNOSOM II led to significant turmoil and oppositions from the 
warlord-controlled local militia. In late 1994 the UN operations were declared failures and 
peacekeeping forces began to withdraw. During the US-led withdrawal operation, 
Operation United Shield, the marines were equipped with many of the then-available 
NLWs (such as various forms of blunt impact projectiles, OC sprays, stinger and flash bang 
grenades, sticky foams, and dazzling lasers) and some of which were deployed during the 
operation. Although the full extent to which these NLWs were effective was unclear, their 
use received positive endorsements from those in charge of the operation and gained wide 
media attention. 
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5.1.4 Establishment of the JNLWD 
The operations in Somalia and the various strands of non-lethal weapons research 
led to increasing discussion of combining the dispersed efforts into a single entity that 
focuses on a cohesive plan to develop military non-lethal weapons. Until the mid-1990s, 
non-lethal weapons have been developed in a variety of national laboratories under 
contracts with different services as well as some industry ones. In its 1995 report on non-
lethal weapons technology at the time, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) noted that 
in the absence of a national policy, “development of non-lethal technologies has been 
largely driven by various scientific laboratories offering proposals as their nuclear warfare 
budgets were reduced.”246 This lack of coordination has made it difficult for the US to 
include non-lethal options as part of military and foreign policy planning.  
With the founding of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate in 1996, however, 
R&D on NLW received a new home base in the military with the Marine Corps and gained 
some new momentum. Of note, in 1999, the Army, in consultation with JNLWD, issued a 
solicitation through its SBIR initiatives on “Chemical Immobilizing Agents for Non-Lethal 
Weapons,” which sought to “identify new agent and agent combinations including an 
analysis of ‘recent breakthroughs in the pharmacological classes such as 
Anesthetics/analgesics, tranquilizers, hypnotics, and neuromuscular blockers.’”247 By 
2000, a contract under this initiative was given to OptiMetrics, Inc., with the principal 
researcher a past ERDEC scientist who had worked on calmative agents. 
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In addition, a literature review was conducted by the Applied Research Laboratory 
and the College of Medicine at Pennsylvania State University, which resulted in a report 
in 2000 titled The Advantages and Limitations of Calmatives for Use as a Non-Lethal 
Technique. This report provided a review of medical literature on drugs or other 
biochemical agents that could be used as NLW. Although the JNLWD and the NIJ denied 
funding this report, researchers like Davison note the strong connection between the two 
institutions and Penn State. 248 Furthermore, at the same time that the Penn State report 
came out, the JNLWD awarded funding to Army’s Edgewood Chemical and Biological 
Center (ECBC, previously ERDEC), which proposed to conduct workshops and analyses 
on “‘identifying “non-lethal” chemical materials for further testing which have minimal 
side effects for immobilizing adversaries in military and law enforcement scenarios.’”249 
These activities revealed that in the early 2000s, even after the signing of and the 
ratification of the CWC (which entered into force in 1997), the military continued to have 
interests toward investing in biochemical incapacitants. 
Experiences from Somalia notwithstanding, the interest in developing greater non-
lethal weapons capacity at this time seemed to be particularly justifiable and warranted 
given the types of peacekeeping missions with which the American military was engaged 
at the time. For instance, in 1997, an incident in Brčko, Bosnia, where the US stabilization 
forces were attacked by civilians with rocks and two-by-fours prompted the US to have an 
emergency procurement of off-the-shelf NLWs and to equip its soldiers with tear gas, 
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sponge grenades, and dye-marking kits.250 While the NLWs were not used in Bosnia, the 
US operations there showed the need for greater military non-lethal capabilities.251 
The military’s interest in developing its non-lethal capabilities was reinforced two 
years later when, during US peacekeeping missions in Kosovo, NLWs were both supplied 
to and used by the troops. For instance, in April 2000, the US troops seized contraband 
weapons from Sevce, a small village in Kosovo, and were attacked by the local people 
using rocks and sticks upon their exit.252 The troops, reinforced with non-lethal weaponry, 
responded with sponge grenades, stinger rounds, and other non-lethal munitions and were 
able to disperse the crowd.253 Less than a year later, the US ground forces in Kosovo faced 
a similar situation in removing an illegal roadblock and was able to scatter the crowd using 
NLWs. “‘The ability to use non-lethal weapons,’” claimed the on-site commander, “‘saved 
hundreds (possibly more) of lives’”254 and prevented the troops from having to take lethal 
measures in order to ensure their own safety. 
In addition to Bosnia and Kosovo, non-lethal weapons were also used during US 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s. For instance, in Iraq, the US troops 
consistently used NLWs for crowd control at locations for food and fuel distribution.255 In 
Afghanistan, dazzling lasers were used to deter locals from throwing rocks at the troops 
and their vehicles.256 NLWs had over time demonstrated their utility in US military 
missions that have become more complex and requiring more delicate measures to deal 
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with violence from civilians. Despite this increasing attention, the continued pursuit of 
biochemical incapacitants as a non-lethal weapon has not led to deployable systems that 
can be used and tested in operational settings, at least not until the 2002 Dubrovka theater 
incident in Moscow that brought speculations of the utility of such weapons into reality. 
5.1.5 The Moscow Theatre Incident 
On October 23, 2002, a group of radical militant Chechen separatists from the 
Special Purposes Islamic Regiment, led by Movsar Barayev, took over the Dubrovka 
Theater in Moscow. The theater was at that time putting on a popular musical, Nord-Ost. 
Over 900 hostages were taken captive by a group of 40 Chechen separatists armed with 
automatic weapons, pistols, and various forms of explosives.257 In addition to the female 
separatists who had explosives attached to their belts, the separatists also planted in the 
theater a large bomb that could lead to its collapse (a bomb which, after the crisis ended, 
was found to be incapable of being detonated).258 Through the former minister of 
propaganda of the Chechen Republic, Movladi Udugov, and the few interviews granted to 
Russian and other western media, the separatists exhibited a “militant radical Muslim 
stance” and ultimately demanded the end of military operations and the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Chechnya.259 
Several performers were able to escape the building from back stage during the 
initial siege. Upon taking over the theater, the Chechen separatists released some of the 
hostages, including children, some women, foreigners, and those requiring medical 
attention, and a couple of hostages managed to escape. Over the next two days, the hostage-
takers conducted negotiations with several intermediaries, some of whom including Duma 
                                                 
257 John B. Dunlop, The 2002 Dubrovka and 2004 Beslan Hostage Crises: A Critique of Russian 
Counter-Terrorism (Stuttgart, Germany: Ibidem-Verlag, 2006), 131-2. 
258 Dunlop (2006), 125. 
259 Dunlop (2006), 133-5. 
 151 
deputies and journalists, and allowed at least one doctor to enter the theater and treat 
hostages. Several more hostages were released on each day of the negotiation, but aside 
from agreeing to some necessary sustenance, nothing else was reached by the negotiations.  
As the negotiations were taking place with the voluntary mediators (or ones 
demanded by the hostage-takers), the Putin administration was also making plans for a 
Special Forces raid of the building. During this time, the Russian government made only a 
few direct announcements to the Chechen separatists, and in one of the message sent the 
head of Federal Security Service (FSB), Nikolai Patrushev, guaranteed the lives of the 
hostage-takers should the hostages be released. The negotiations that helped buying time 
continued well into the evening of October 25, when the separatists were told that a special 
representative would begin engaging in serious negotiations the next day. By 5PM on 
October 25, nevertheless, Russian President Vladimir Putin came to an “irrevocable” 
decision to storm the theater, according to Duma faction leader Grigory Yavlinsky.260 
Early in the morning of October 26, the Spetsnaz from the FSB began pumping a 
“gas” into the theater through its ventilation system. According eye witness accounts, some 
of the hostage takers as well as the hostages originally thought that the “smoke” came from 
a fire.261 It was soon realized that some unknown gas was pumped into the building, which 
immediately created panic in the main auditorium where the hostages were held. Some of 
the Chechen separatists who had gas masks equipped left the main auditorium in 
anticipation of the impending attack by the Russian forces. Half an hour after the initial 
pumping of the gas, hostages and most separatists fell unconscious, and the siege of the 
theater took place. The remaining rebels who were still conscious at the time of the siege 
were killed during the exchange of fire, and the ones who had been incapacitated by the 
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gas were shot dead by the Spetsnaz team. At 7AM, approximately two and half hours after 
the initial attack, the building was secured and the evacuation began. 
Among the hostages who were still held captive by the time the Russian troops 
stormed the theater, at least 125 (~15%) died during the raid or in the immediate aftermath 
of the crisis. According to Andrei Seltsovsky, the chair of the Moscow Committee on 
Health, only a couple of the hostages died of gunshot wounds while the rest died from 
effects of the gas.262 However, a final account of the number of victims continued to be 
debated, and in some accounts, the number of hostages who died due to the effects of the 
chemical agent has been estimated to be over 200, with many more who have suffered 
long-term impairments.263 Despite this, the Russian government initially withheld the 
specifics of the death toll as well as the identity of the gas used prior to the raid, claiming 
that the casualties were victims of terrorism and their deaths caused by heart attacks and 
other health issues exacerbated by the hostage situation. It was not until a few days later, 
when several countries pressed for more information about the agent used in order to better 
administer treatment, that the Russian authorities responded. According to Yuri 
Shevchenko, the Russian Health Minister, the “gas” used during the raid was an aerosol 
mixture that contained derivatives of fentanyl.264 Nevertheless, to date, both the final death 
count of the hostages as well as the specific agent that was used during the raid continued 
to be points of controversy regarding this crisis. 
The use of chemical agents by the Russian authorities during this crisis, 
furthermore, has attracted attention from policymakers and the scientific communities alike 
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from abroad. Prior to the official statement from Shevchenko, a wide range of chemical 
compounds were speculated to have been used, including some report by the Russian media 
identifying the agent as Kolokol-1, which is suspected to be an inhalational anesthetic using 
fentanyl derivatives mixed with halothane. Since the Russian authorities declined to 
provide any more information about the agent beyond Shevchenko’s declaration, and due 
to the fact that all hostage casualties were a result of poisoning from the agent used, experts 
on toxicology, anesthesiology, and chemical and biological weapons, some of whom 
challenged the Russian claims, began their own diagnostics.265 Some have suspected that 
compounds more potent than any fentanyl or its derivatives, such as etorphine (a derivative 
of morphine used in veterinarian practices), were likely the agent used in order to have 
such a rapid onset effect, while others speculated that some derivative forms of BZ were 
used. Nevertheless, barring further information from official Russian authority, these 
diagnostics have continued to remain speculations. 
5.1.6 Current Postulations on NLW and Neuroscience 
The many specifics of the Dubrovka incident, including the exact agent used and 
the death count, and its ramifications, such as its legality under the context of the CWC, 
continue to be debated. Nevertheless, the incident has brought the biochemical 
incapacitants to the forefront of public discussions of non-lethal weapons. In the US, 
however, this incident seemed to have resulted in the abatement of the research activities 
on such incapacitants. Despite the increasing attention and funding toward cognitive 
sciences research, since the early 2000s, very little, if any, visible investment has been 
made by the US military towards the R&D of new biochemical agents capable of being 
used as non-lethal incapacitants. In his 2007 recounting on the R&D of chemical 
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incapacitants over the previous decade, Alan Pearson observed that “little information is 
publicly available about the U.S. activities since early 2003,” and “No U.S. government 
documents concerning delivery systems have made references to immobilizers, calmatives, 
or incapacitants other than malodorants, tear gas and pepper spray since 2002.”266 Davison 
came to similar observations in 2009, suggesting that “since the 2003 NRC report 
recommending expanded research on incapacitating agents there has been no further 
openly available information on the military programme.”267 Although overall investment 
in cognitive sciences research has grown during this time, almost none of the funding has 
been allocated to activities that can be characterized in anyway as developing biochemical 
incapacitants. 
Observing this absence in investment, Pearson reached three possible explanations: 
“This may reflect a decision to discontinue or put a hold on such work, or it may simply 
mean that the work is continuing under conditions of increased secrecy,” and a “third 
possibility also exists—that the U.S. military has already identified a short list of 
biochemical incapacitants it considers adequate and has placed payload development on 
hold pending further improvement of delivery and dissemination devices.”268 While the 
following discussions in this chapter endorse the first view and provide an explanation as 
to why an unfavorable technical condition has likely caused the effort to be discontinued 
by the US military, the other two explanations warrant further discussion. 
First, existing records indicate that as of the early 2000s the requests for 
biochemical incapacitants were still aiming at identifying novel agents, making the third 
explanation unlikely. Second, while federal R&D funding for defense-related technologies 
in the US can be subject to classification of information, most programs at the S&T stages 
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of R&D are required by law to remain unclassified since 1985, according to the National 
Security Decision Directive 189, which prescribes that “the products of fundamental 
research remain unrestricted.”269 Since any radical advancement in identifying or creating 
a biochemical incapacitant through cognitive neuroscience research is likely attributable to 
new understandings of neuropathways in the human brain, it is more likely that such 
research work will occur in basic or early applied research where significant exploration is 
still possible. Investment for such work should thus be observable in the annual budgets, 
particularly from an agency like DARPA. Finally, in both 2013 and 2014, senior officials 
representing the US at international arms control forums have made public statements 
confirming that the US is not engaging in any development, production, stockpiling, or use 
of biochemical incapacitants.270 These reconfirmations lend support to the explanations 
provided below. 
5.2 What is an Incapacitant? 
Prior to examining the issues of feasibility, requirement stringency, and availability 
of alternatives, it is essential to understand what an incapacitant271 is and what its ideal 
attributes are. Some of the earliest articulation in the international arena regarding the 
difference between an “incapacitant” and the more commonly referred to “riot control 
agent” (RCA) appeared in a World Health Organization (WHO) report on the Health 
Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, where a distinction was made between 
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traditional lethal chemical agents (such as vesicants and nerve agents), incapacitating 
agents (including psychochemicals such as LSD and BZ), and harassing agents (agents 
such as CS and CN).272 According to the report, a lethal agent is one that is designed to kill 
or injure an enemy severely that will require the target to seek medical treatment, an 
incapacitating agent puts a target completely out of action for several hours or days but the 
target is able to recover from the disablement without medical aid, and a harassing agent 
disables an enemy while he remains exposed, but as soon as the person leaves the area of 
exposure, he can recover very quickly on his own. 
These distinctions, of course, are tactical in the sense that they rely on the types of 
effects an agent can produce on a target and are not reliant on the toxicological properties 
of the agent. Yet, as the report suggests, “If too much of an agent intended for harassment 
is used, it may kill or severely injure”; likewise, “if a low concentration of lethal agent is 
disseminated, its effects may be only incapacitating or harassing.”273 Therefore, to define 
chemical agents according to the effect they have on a target is problematic, for the 
boundaries between the categories of these weapons are often blurry and can become quite 
fluid depending on the concentration levels a target receives. 
It is perhaps for this reason that the US military has come to understand chemical 
incapacitants according to both their intended effects as well as their toxicological 
properties. According to US military doctrines and similar to the WHO definition, 
An incapacitating agent is a chemical agent which produces temporary 
disabling conditions. The disabling conditions persist for hours to days after 
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exposure to the agent (unlike that produced by riot control agents, which 
usually are momentary or fleeting in action).274 
In terms of site of action, an incapacitant is a highly potent chemical that produces the 
incapacitating effects “by altering the higher regulatory activity of the CNS” that are 
temporary in duration and unlikely in producing permanent injury.275 In this sense, an 
incapacitant is different from a RCA in that it produces effects by acting on the central 
nervous system (CNS), such as the human brain, rather than the peripheral nervous system. 
This distinction has in recent years become one of the more accepted 
understandings of what distinguishes an incapacitant from other non-lethal chemicals. For 
instance, in the Spiez Laboratory’s report from its 2011 workshop on incapacitating 
chemical weapons, it is noted that while there has been little consensus on what an 
incapacitating chemical agent (ICA) is despite the many proposals for its clearer definition, 
the ICAs are indeed distinguishable from the common RCAs because of their site of action 
on the human body.276 Similarly, in the 2012 Royal Society report, ICAs are considered 
“substances intended to cause prolonged but transient disability and include centrally 
acting agents producing loss of consciousness, sedation, hallucination, incoherence, 
paralysis, disorientation or other such effects (emphasis added).”277 While there is still a 
lack of accepted ways to fully differentiate an incapacitant from a lethal agent, the site of 
action of the agent provides ways to set riot control agents and incapacitants apart. 
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A wide range of biochemicals that act on the central nervous system can achieve 
the kinds of incapacitating effects described in the Royal Society definition. Ketchum and 
Sidell, for instance, suggest that such agents can be grouped into four general categories: 
stimulants, depressants, psychedelics, and deliriants.278 Using different categorizations, 
others have suggested the list of potential candidates can include anesthetic agents, skeletal 
muscle relaxants, opioid analgesics, anxiolytics, antipsychotics, antidepressants, and 
sedative-hypnotic agents.279 In essence, any biochemical that acts on the human central 
nervous system that can alter an individual’s psychological or other behavior functions 
have the potential to be used as an incapacitant. 
Despite this wide range of potential candidates, to design an ideal incapacitant is 
not an easy task. Any such agent used as a NLW needs to, at a minimum, be able to 
accomplish the task effectively while maintaining safety (wide safety margins with a 
relative lack of toxicity), be quick to the onset of the effect and have defined, short, and 
predictable durations, and be logistically feasible to produce and deliver. Table 3 below 
identifies the basic criteria as well as the ideal characteristics of an incapacitating 
biochemical agent. 
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Table 3 - Basic Criteria and Ideal Characteristics of Incapacitants 
Basic Criteria Explanation Ideal Characteristics Explanation 
Effectiveness 
The agent is able to 
severely impair or 
disrupt an enemy's 
ability to fight 
Potency/Dosage The agent is able to achieve its 
intended effect with minimum 
dosage (µ/kg body weight) 
Toxicity/Safety The agent is low in toxicity that 
when used as intended it produces 
few deaths or permanent injuries, or 
in other words, has a high safety 
margin to the danger of overdosing 
(high therapeutic index) 
Treatability/Reversibility The effects brought about by the 
agent is fully reversible, be it a 
result of the effect naturally wearing 
off or due to the administering of an 
antidote 
Predictability The effects brought about by the 
agent is predictable, in that the 
consequent behavior is consistent 
across populations 
Temporality 
The effects of the 
agent must be 
relatively short in 
terms of duration 
Time to Onset The agent is able to generate its 
effect within a relatively short 
timeframe (within minutes) 
Persistence The effect brought about by the 
agents lasts sufficiently long for the 
mission to be accomplished but is 
otherwise temporary, preferably 
minutes to hours 
Predictability The onset and the duration of the 
effect is predictable across 
populations 
Feasibility 




Stability The agent is chemically stable 
during the production, storage, and 
delivery 
Weaponizability The agent can be incorporated into 
practical munitions or can be 
otherwise weaponized effectively 
(e.g. easy to aerosolize and difficult 
to detect) 
Cost-Effectiveness The agent and its resulting weapons 
system are affordable within the 
context of the overall military 
budget and the type of mission it 
serves) 




The development and use of an effective biochemical incapacitant, therefore, face 
complex and interconnected challenges, both technical and sociopolitical in nature. Some 
of the ideal characteristics of the agent and its resulting weapons system are constrained by 
science and nature, such as the potency of the agent, the quickness to the onset of action, 
the predictability of the effects, and the stability of the agent. Some other characteristics 
are predominantly determined by the sociopolitical context under which the incapacitant 
would be used, such as the cost-effectiveness of the weapons and the predictability of its 
effects. 
Furthermore, some of these criteria or desired characteristics may entail significant 
trade-offs from one another.  For instance, opioids such as morphine or its analogs can be 
highly potent, but its potency also leads to higher levels of toxicity that can more easily 
lead to overdosing.280 On the other hand, psychedelic agents such as LSD may be highly 
potent while maintaining low toxicity (very high levels of therapeutic index), but the 
behaviors it engenders are highly unpredictable.281 As a result, designing an agent that can 
fulfill all the desired characteristics is a significant technical challenge. The sections below 
explain some of these challenges in more detail. 
5.3 Feasibility, Requirements, and Alternatives 
This dissertation argues that the reason as to why the US has little to no military 
investment in biochemical incapacitants as a form of NLWs since the early 2000s was 
likely due to a growing recognition of the unfavorable investment conditions caused by the 
increasingly dominant expert opinion on the lack of feasibility, a stringent performance 
requirement the military has set for the NLWs, and the availability of institutional 
alternatives in developing such a technology. In particular, since the Dubrovka theater 
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incident in Moscow in 2002, many in the scientific and technical communities, particularly 
those in favor of a more restrictive arms control regime on chemical weapons, have become 
increasingly vocal in articulating the significant technical barriers, such as the dose-
response problem, that prevent the development of biochemicals as usable NLWs. Over 
the decade a consensus converging toward the infeasibility of such a technology emerged, 
which led to significant doubts of the viability of such R&D programs. 
Furthermore, at least in the United States, the performance requirement for 
developing a NLW became increasingly stringent as the concept of risk of significant injury 
was developed and codified into the NLW R&D process. A very low threshold of lethality 
and risk of injury made it even less likely that a biochemical incapacitant could be 
developed and used according to expectation. Finally, the long-standing partnership 
between the military and law enforcement agencies regarding NLWs and the tightening of 
international arms control on chemical weapons show that the military has the incentives 
to shy away from investing in biochemical incapacitants, for there is an alternative pathway 
to the research, development, and acquisition of such weapons outside the military R&D 
establishments. The following section illustrates these factors in more detail. 
5.3.1 Technical Barriers and Expert Opinions 
Most recently, in an article published in Natures Reviews Neuroscience, researchers 
Irene Tracey and Rod Flower discussed two issues in designing and using 
neuropharmaceuticals or CNS-activing biochemicals as non-lethal weapons: the 
weaponization and delivery problem and the “dose-response problem.”282 According to 
Tracey and Flower, these problems have plagued many drugs that otherwise, superficially, 
would have appeared to be suitable candidates for use as non-lethal weapons. As the 
decades-long history of military’s interest in such drugs shown above illustrates, many 
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types of biochemical substances, including anesthetics, opioid analgesics, anxiolytics, and 
sedative-hypnotic agents have all been considered at one time or another. Yet getting an 
agent that is easily administered; has rapid, short-lived, and reversible action with little side 
effects; and produces predictable responses from all individuals exposed to it has been an 
elusive goal, because even if an agent can possess all of these qualities, it may still not be 
easily weaponizable, and even if it can be weaponized, it does not guarantee that it can be 
delivered to all individuals in the right dosage. 
5.3.1.1 Weaponization and Agent Delivery 
Although delivering a drug to an individual in a clinical setting is commonplace, it 
is not as easy when such an activity is taking place in an uncontrolled setting with multiple 
intended targets, such as what would be the case for most military operations. First, in 
controlled settings, depending on the pharmacodynamics and the effects desired, drugs can 
be delivered through multiple methods, including oral ingestion or various forms of 
injections. These practices of drug delivery are predicated upon the fact that in a controlled 
setting, chemical substances can be administered in appropriate dosages. 
However, in terms of designing a usable non-lethal weapon, traditional forms of 
drug delivery are neither ideal nor practical, especially if the drug is meant to achieve some 
kind of area effect that impacts multiple targets. This problem is especially acute for 
operations that require covertness and secrecy—it is hardly possible to subdue a group of 
terrorists, for instance, by injecting them with sedatives without them noticing. By design, 
therefore, in order to do achieve an area effect on multiple targets, such drugs or 
biochemicals need to be weaponized in the form of gaseous or vaporized compounds or 
aerosolized liquid droplets or solid particles, and they need to achieve their clinical effects 
via respiratory or transdermal routes – in other words, they need to be small enough 
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particles that can be breathed in or absorbed through skin.283 For instance, in order to 
release a chemical agent through a munition, the munition must be able to convert the 
payload into evenly distributed droplets or solid particles in appropriate sizes. For 
inhalation and lung penetration, the size should range from one to five microns in diameter, 
whereas for skin penetration, the size of the particles should be at least 70 microns in 
diameter or larger.284 
Furthermore, “to exert a pharmacological effect, a drug has to reach its site of action 
in adequate concentrations,” and this can be particularly problematic for neuroactive drugs, 
“as their target is within the CNS so they must also penetrate the blood-brain barrier,”285 
which is in itself a substantial problem. Although in recent years advancements in 
nanotechnology have facilitated the delivery of certain drugs across the blood-brain barrier, 
how to deliver the sufficient amount to the right locale within the brain continues to be a 
challenge for certain substances. Even those who hold favorable views toward the potential 
for such a weapon to be developed recognize this challenge: for instance, in their 2000 
report from Penn State, Joan Lakoski and her colleagues note that the “controlled delivery 
of macromolecular drugs, such peptides, proteins, oligonucleotides and polysaccharides, 
remain a key issue in the development of [calmative] agents as non-lethal techniques.”286 
Weaponization and drug delivery are thus major obstacles in the development of 
biochemical agents as NLWs. 
5.3.1.2 Dose-Response Problem 
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Even if the weaponization and delivery problem were able to be addressed, there is 
still the related pharmacological and toxicological challenge of the so-called “dose-
response” problem. Because biochemical incapacitants used as NLWs do not take place in 
a controlled manner, the way through which they are dispersed in the operational setting 
can highly impact the dosage that each intended target receives. These varied levels of 
dosage, in turn, can create significant problems, for if the targeted population contains a 
mixture of people who vary widely in age, gender, or physical constitution, the targets may 
respond to the drug and the dose received differently. 
Of course, this insight is not new, for as early as mid-sixteenth century it was 
already known that the dosage is what differentiates a drug from being a poison.287 Yet, to 
what extent does this adage apply to the military development of biochemical incapacitants, 
and to what extent can the dosage issue be mitigated and resolved by modern advancements 
in neuroscience and pharmacology, seem to be subject to debate. For one, the history of 
the military interest in the development of biochemical incapacitant, both in the US as well 
as elsewhere, seems to suggest that there is at least some degree of support for the belief 
that with advancements in S&T some ideal agent can be found that could overcome this 
dose-response problem. 
Indeed, historical records from early US interest in this area of R&D 
notwithstanding, some recent accounts on the development of NLW technologies support 
this interpretation. For instance, in the aforementioned 2000 report from Penn State, it is 
noted that “drugs can be tailored to be highly selective and specific for known receptor 
(protein) targets in the nervous system with unique profiles of biological effects on 
consciousness, motor activity and psychiatric impact.”288 The authors of the report further 
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conclude that “The use of pharmacological agent to produce a calm behavioral state…is a 
topic with relevance to achieving the mission of law enforcement and military 
communities.”289 By identifying a list of potential agents, the authors of the report 
“recommended that further research be continued regarding calmatives as non-lethal 
techniques” and that “consideration of partnerships with the pharmaceutical industry be 
explored”290 because of the industry’s current focus on the development of new and 
innovative drugs with increased potency and specificity. 
Similarly, in the aftermath of the Moscow theater incident, Theodore Stanley, an 
anesthesiologist at the University of Utah, comments that, despite the controversies over 
the death counts, in the siege and hostage rescue operation at Dubrovka, over 650 hostages 
survived the incident. He further suggests that “remarkable progress has been made in the 
techniques to deliver immobilizing agents and the development of safer, faster-acting 
potent compounds of extremely short duration”; therefore, the “time may now have come 
to expand this research so that these and superior techniques and drugs may be used by 
special forces to deal with terrorists.”291 These comments from the Penn State researchers 
and Stanley show that some in the scientific community hold the view that the development 
of usable biochemical incapacitants as NLWs is feasible and, perhaps, quite desirable. 
Yet, not everyone in the scientific community working on issues of anesthesiology, 
toxicology, or chemical weapons agree with such an assessment, and many researchers 
interpret the more-than-125 hostage deaths from Dubrovka as evidence to why issues of 
dosage make it infeasible to develop a biochemical incapacitant that could be used in any 
meaningful way as a “non-lethal” weapon. In a 1994 proposal to develop sedative 
compounds such as alpha2 adrenergic agonists as potential NLWs, for instance, it was 
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already noted that for any incapacitant, “‘Operational limitation include the potential use 
in mixed populations of the very young, the elderly, those in poor health and those who 
may react adversely to a specific chemical,’”292 all of whom may react to the varied levels 
of dosage received very differently. 
Of course, the concern is not just with the potential operational problems that such 
a weapon may encounter when it needs to be used on a population with wide-ranging 
physical constitutions. Writing about the rise of non-lethal weapons during the 1990s, 
Dando suggests that it has been challenging to find a suitable agent: “Many chemicals have 
been screened as potential incapacitants and a prime consideration in the US programme 
has been to find agents with a large gap between the effective and the lethal dose so that 
the agent could be used with little risk of permanent harm to those affected.”293 The long 
history that the US has in searching for an incapacitant suggests that there are “probably 
many agents with excellent incapacitant properties which have been rejected because they 
lacked a satisfactory safety ratio.”294 
Ketchum and Sidell similarly noted this challenge of finding a biochemical agent 
with the right kinds of safety ratio and pharmacokinetic profile. According to them, very 
few chemical agents that act on the CNS are actually suitable for use as an incapacitating 
NLW. Most of such psycho/neurochemicals are either not potent enough or produce 
unpredictable behaviors that cannot be reliably expected to produce desired effects if they 
were to be used as weaponry. For instance, depressants such as barbiturates, a drug 
traditionally used for sedation and anesthesia, oftentimes require several hundred 
milligrams in dosage in order to achieve some effect on the target’s performance.295 
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Similarly, part of the reason for BZ’s lack of operational use was attributed to the 
unpredictability in the responses it generates. This lack of potency and predictability of 
effect may be a result of the agent’s pharmacokinetic constraints as well as the difficulty 
in designing an effective delivery system to disperse such an agent. 
The issues of safety, potency, and predictability of a biochemical agent are further 
complicated by the fact that some biochemicals can have dangerous side effects. In a US 
patent filed by the ERDEC in 1998, titled “Opiate Analgesic Formulation with Improved 
Safety,” similarly notes this challenge of finding a suitable agent due to potential side 
effects. Despite the amount of attention opiate or opioid analgesics (like fentanyl) have 
received since at least the 1980s, “the development of opiate drugs to create a drug that 
causes analgesia with respiratory depression has been an elusive goal.”296 Furthermore, 
even more recent developments of opiate drugs with more selective pharmacological 
properties “have not resulted in any significant reduction of respiratory depression 
associated with the opiate agonists.”297 It is also for this reason that some of the research 
on the opioid analgesics in the 1990s focused specifically on mixing the agents with 
antagonists in order to alleviate the agents’ harmful side effects, although the extent to 
which such an approach has reached success remains unclear. 
As some in the expert communities argue, however, even if an agent with 
reasonable safety ratio, potency, and predictability can be found, in operational settings 
where dosage control is not possible the agent can still lead to significant, expected 
amounts of casualties, as was witnessed at the Dubrovka theater in 2002. Prior to the 
incident, in the spring of 2002, in a comment on biochemical non-lethal weapons, Mark 
Wheelis, a microbiologist at University of California, Davis, emphasized the dose-response 
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problem and asserted that “In fact, a categorical distinction between lethal and non-lethal 
chemical agents is not strictly possible, since ‘non-lethal’ agents may be lethal at high 
concentration or for specific individuals.”298 This sentiment was very much so echoed in a 
report on the Dubrovka incident from Nature, where Alan Zelicoff, a former senior scientist 
at the Center for National Security and Arms Control at Sandia National Laboratory, 
comments that “‘It was a grotesque assumption on the part of the Russian leadership that 
sloppy use of highly effective anaesthetics, pumped into a confined room full of weakened 
hostages, would not kill many people.’”299 According to the Nature article, the very narrow 
“therapeutic window” of fentanyl means that potentially fatal side effects of the drug, such 
as respiratory depression, “occur at doses only slightly higher than those required for their 
therapeutic effect.”300 As a result, for some experts, the death toll that came out of 
Dubrovka was not all that surprising – whatever agent was used, the expectation that it 
could have achieved no or very minimal lethality was faulty. 
To demonstrate this faulty assumption, a 2003 study published by the Federation 
of American Scientists (FAS) shows how seemingly non-lethal incapacitating agents can 
in fact be quite lethal in actual use. In the study, an agent with the therapeutic index (TI, 
which refers to lethal dosage in 50% of the population divided by the effective dosage in 
50% of the population, i.e. TI=LD50/ED50) of 1,000, which would be considered 
exceptionally safe by pharmacological standards, would result in 9% deaths within the 
population if the goal is to ensure 100% incapacitation (see Figure 9). The authors of the 
FAS study further contend that even if the agent has an exceedingly high therapeutic index, 
in operational settings of a rescue mission like the one at Dubrovka, the dosage each target 
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receives will depend heavily on factors such as its distance to the agent source and its length 
of time in exposure to the agent, etc., which could make an individual take in doses of the 
agent at a much higher level than anticipated. For these reasons, the authors conclude that 
“genuinely non-lethal chemical weapons are beyond the reach of current science.”301 
 
 
Figure 9 - Relationship among Dose, Incapacitation, and Lethality in a Two Receptor 
Model302 
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The explanation offered by the FAS study and its conclusions have been endorsed 
by others. For instance, Robin Coupland reached similar conclusions in his study on the 
risks and uncertainties of biochemical incapacitants, that “there is no evidence that any 
currently existing pharmaceutical agent, when used as an incapacitating weapon, will 
consistently result in a lower lethality than when other weapons are used.”303 He further 
reiterates that “delivering a rapidly effective dose [of an agent] from a tactical perspective 
means some people will inevitably receive a dangerous if not lethal dose,”304 and there is 
no evidence that the issues of dosage can be regulated to ensure consistency in non-
lethality. Dando similarly remarks in his analysis on the Dubrovka incident that the 
operation demonstrated the dose-response problem: a substance like fentanyl will certainly 
put people to sleep, but “in higher concentrations it will stop people breathing…the 
concentration of fentanyl in any particular part of the building was difficult to control, the 
effects of any given concentration of it on any particular individual would not have been 
known in advance, and crucially, the separation of the lethal and incapacitating effects of 
the drug are not sufficiently large to eliminate the chance that some of the hostages were 
going to die.”305 Unlike the optimism shown in the Penn State Report in 2000, the 
commentaries by experts in the aftermath of Dubrovka clearly reveal that the incident has 
prompted scientists and other experts to vocally express their understanding of the 
technical barriers that face the biochemical incapacitants as NLWs and to cast their doubts 
on the feasibility of their development. 
Perhaps most importantly, the converging consensus on this infeasibility has 
become increasingly and openly endorsed by several important scientific organizations 
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domestically and internationally. In 2007, the British Medical Association in its study on 
the use of drugs as weapons concludes that “the use of drugs as weapons is simply not 
feasible without generating a significant mortality among the target population” and that 
an agent capable of incapacitating without risk in tactical situations “does not exist and is 
unlikely to in the foreseeable future.”306 Within the US, the 2008 NRC report on Emerging 
Neuroscience also notes that delivering sufficient dosage to targets without overkill 
remains a challenge: “Pharmacological agents are not used as weapons of mass effect, 
because their large-scale deployment is impractical; it is currently impossible to get an 
effective dose to a combatant.”307 While the NRC committee notes that technologies could 
be available in the next 20 years that “would allow dispersal of agents in delivery vehicles 
that would be analogous to a pharmacological cluster bomb or a land mine,”308 the extent 
to which the issues of drug effects and dosage and their complex interaction with individual 
humans can be mitigated is unclear. 
The need to understand these issues of technical barriers to the development of 
biochemical incapacitants heightened around the time of the Third Review Conference of 
the CWC in 2013, and the expert opinions on these issues became more resolute. For 
instance, in a 2012 study done by The Royal Society on neuroscience, the participants in 
the working group assert that “It is not technically feasible to develop an absolutely safe 
incapacitating chemical agent and delivery system combination because of inherent 
variables (emphasis added)” that are beyond the control of user in operational settings.309 
Furthermore, a 2012 international workshop convened at the Spiez Laboratory in 
Switzerland on the issue of incapacitating chemical agents and a technical report from the 
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International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) in 2013, both of which were 
intended to serve as technical advice to the Third Review Conference through the Scientific 
Advisory Board (SAB) of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
(OPCW), reached the same conclusions about the infeasibility of achieving any kind of 
meaningful non-lethality through biochemical incapacitants. According to the Stefan 
Mogl, the editor to the Spiez Laboratory report, 
ICA (will) typically act on the CNS, but any effect is dose dependent, and 
any agent – including ICA – will have side effects. Furthermore, there is 
significant variability in the effects due to individual susceptibility… [and] 
over-dosing is a typical occurrence when an agent is used in the field, as is 
known to happen during field use of RCA. There are just too many variables 
to ascertain that a use would be ‘safe’ in all circumstances.310 
This sentiment was endorsed by the IUPAC report, stating that “currently available 
S&T does not have the capabilities required to enable the delivery such ‘incapacitating 
chemical agents’ for law enforcement purposes in a ‘safe’ manner.”311 The scientific and 
expert opinions on the issue of feasibility of biochemical incapacitants as NLWs, thus, have 
over the past decade converged toward a consensus on infeasibility, which contributes an 
unfavorable condition for countries intending to invest in this area of military technology. 
5.3.2 Military Requirements on Risk of Significant Injury 
From the military’s perspective, the potential interest in developing a NLW using 
biochemical incapacitant is subject to the ability to which such a weapon can meet the 
expected performance standards. In an ideal sense, as shown in Table 3, a biochemical 
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agent that functions well as a non-lethal weapon should be easy to administer with 
sufficient potency so that it has a rapid onset of its effects, but at the same time these effects 
need to be reversible and last only a limited duration. Moreover, the ideal agent should 
elicit similar and predictable responses from its targets and have otherwise little side 
effects.312 Although it may be difficult for one agent to satisfy all of these criteria, 
especially when some of them may be at odds with one another, these ideal qualities 
provide guidance as to what the military may desire from a non-lethal capability and 
specify as its requirements.  
Since, currently, there is no visible US military investment in biochemical 
incapacitant as NLWs, there is no direct data on what the current military requirements for 
such a capability would be. However, historical examples of military R&D efforts in this 
kind of capability can provide some insight as to what the requirements may be. One of 
such example is agent BZ, which, as aforementioned, was weaponized and stockpiled as 
part of the US chemical arsenal during the 1960s and 70s. While the exact extent to which 
the military (army) conducted the R&D for BZ is not entirely clear, what is known is that 
it was selected as the incapacitating agent under the general requirements that such agent 
should: 1) have onset action less than one hour, 2) ideally, have no permanent effects 
(though this was desirable, it was not an essential characteristic), 3) be as potent as nerve 
agents, 4) have low toxicity in handling and stability in storage, and 5) be deployable from 
aircraft in all weather conditions.313 Although multiple agents ranging from anesthetics to 
muscle relaxants were considered at the time, psychochemicals such as BZ were preferred 
due to their potency and wider margin of safety compared to other agents. 
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Despite being stockpiled, BZ never went into operational use because it had major 
shortcomings. For one, BZ has a long onset time. In dosages that reach 50% incapacitation 
in its target population, the effect takes approximately an hour to appear. Although this fell 
within the requirements specified for the agent, such a slow onset time limited its use.314 
Furthermore, as a deliriant BZ leads to a high degree of unpredictability in response from 
its targets.315 Some affected individuals remain able to function with assistance, while 
others need to be restrained in order to avoid self-injury. Still others demonstrate paranoia 
and mania both while under the effect as well as during recovery. All of these 
considerations led to BZ’s lack of operational utility and its eventual elimination. 
Surprisingly, in no literature that has examined the reasons for BZ’s elimination is 
the potential for lethality discussed, given in estimation BZ has a therapeutic index of 40.316 
This is possibly due to the fact that non-lethality or the risk for significant injury, at the 
time, was not considered a very important requirement. It is also possible that the lethal 
effect of BZ was never fully realized, for it was never deployed and was tested under only 
very favorable and controlled conditions where dosages were kept low.317 Nevertheless, 
since the 1990s, the degree to which a non-lethal weapon can ensure actual non-lethality 
has become an increasingly important consideration in the R&D of such weapons. 
In particular, after its founding in 1996, the JNLWD has devoted significant efforts 
in understanding a NLW’s human effects, which refers to the “physiological and behavioral 
responses produced by non-lethal weapons employment.”318 Such an effect is advised by 
both the Human Effects Advisory Panel (HEAP), an independent advisory panel, 
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comprised of academic, medical, and law enforcement experts, that conducts assessments 
of human effects, and the Human Effects Review Board (HERB), which is comprised of 
representatives from the offices of services’ surgeons general and legal, treaty, and policy 
experts, and the HERB also conducts its own independent assessments of the health risks 
of a NLW. HEAP and HERB provide guidance to program managers and developers to 
ensure that emerging NLW technologies minimize the risk of injury. 
One of the key components of the human effects assessment is the Risk of 
Significant Injury (RSI). RSI refers to the probability that a NLW will cause a significant 
injury, which includes death, permanent injuries, or injuries that require certain levels of 
healthcare as defined by Health Care Capability Indices 1 and 2.319 While the evaluation 
of RSI has long guided the human effects characterization of NLWs since the late 1990s, 
in 2012, under Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3200.19, it became an official 
requirement, expressed in terms of KPP or KSA, in all developments of NLWs. 
As a KPP or KSA, RSI of a NLW is expressed as a percentage threshold (i.e., X% 
of the targeted population will sustain significant injury) and serves as the key criteria in 
determining the non-lethality of a weapon. Currently, the generally accepted definition of 
RSI levels of a NLW is established at 1% of the population with which 0.5% will die from 
effects of the weapon.320 While, depending on the mission or intended use, this value is not 
necessarily fixed for all NLWs, it is unlikely that a NLW whose performance in ensuring 
non-lethality drastically deviates from these thresholds will be deemed acceptable for the 
US military. 
                                                 
319 Shannon Foley, “Non-Lethal Weapons Human Effects,” November 19, 2014. HCC 1 refers to 
injuries that requires first responder capabilities, such as stabilization and emergency care; whereas HCC 2 
refers to injuries that require forward resuscitation and hospitalization, where advanced emergency, 
surgical, and ancillary services are needed. 
320 John M. Kenny, “Human Effects Advisory Panel Program,” (Presented to NDIA Non-Lethal 
Defense IV, March 22, 2000). 
 176 
As a comparison, one of the more recently developed non-lethal weapons under 
JNLWD, the Active Denial System (ADS), is reported to have RSI under 0.1%.321 As a 
directed-energy system, the mechanisms through which the ADS generates its effects on 
the targets are of course different from a biochemical weapon, and the performance 
measures are thus likely to be somewhat different. Nevertheless, the ADS’s very low RSI 
demonstrates that within the US military, for a non-lethal weapon system to be deployable, 
its ability to maintain very low levels of injury and lethality is likely to be expected. 
Given what is known of existing incapacitating biochemical agents, 0.5% lethality 
is a highly stringent requirement. At a minimum, barring other operational challenges and 
barriers that have been outlined above, the biochemical agent needs to have at least a TI of 
20,000 according to Klotz, Furmanski, and Wheelis’s model in order to achieve such a 
threshold (fentanyl, as a matter of comparison, has a TI around 300). The significant 
technical challenges facing the development of a biochemical incapacitating agent as the 
experts have come to believe and vocalize, combined with a highly stringent performance 
requirement demand from the military, creates an unfavorable condition for those 
interested in investing in the performance degradation applications from emerging 
cognitive sciences research. 
5.3.3 Alternative Development Pathway through Law Enforcement 
The technical challenges facing the development of biochemical incapacitants, 
combined with a highly stringent military operational definition of non-lethality, create an 
unfavorable technical condition and suggest that the military’s investment in this area is 
not only likely to incur significant cost and schedule problems but may even result in 
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failure. What further complicates this effort, however, is that the existing international arms 
control treaty on chemical weapons restricts the latitude that the military has in exploring 
such capabilities (explained in more detail below in section 5.4.1). In particular, the CWC 
specifically prohibits states parties from developing, stockpiling, and using any chemical 
agents (including biochemical incapacitants discussed in this paper) other than for selected 
purposes such as law enforcement. Military developments in this area of research, thus, 
could be hamstrung by treaty obligations. 
This situation is mitigated by the fact that there is an apparent willingness, at least 
in the US, to delegate R&D efforts in this area of research to the law enforcement 
communities. As discussed and shown above, throughout the history of US development 
programs in non-lethal weapons,322 law enforcement communities and the military have 
long-standing, mutually recognized shared interests. Although the operational goals and 
parameters may be different (the military has, in general, focused on capabilities that can 
be used with an area effect, whereas the law enforcement communities have focused their 
work on individual targets),323 the two institutions overlap in their interest in many of the 
technical areas that are meaningful for non-lethal weapons development, including 
biochemical agents. For instance, when the NIJ started its Less-Than-Lethal Technology 
programs in 1987, the first contract was given to the Army’s Chemical Research, 
Development, and Engineering Center at the Aberdeen Proving Ground for feasibility 
assessment on dart-delivered incapacitants.324 
This relationship on technology collaboration between the two institutions was 
codified in 1994 when a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the 
Departments of Defense and Justice on technology developments for Operations Other than 
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War (OOTW) and law enforcement. Under the MOU, a Joint Program Steering Group with 
participants from both institutions will co-direct efforts to share existing technology and 
co-direct future R&D programs relevant for both OOTW and law enforcement. 325 
Although it is unclear as to how much work on biochemical incapacitants have been 
conducted under the premise of this MOU, the agreement establishes the two agencies as 
cost-sharing partners and each other’s institutional alternatives to NLW technology 
acquisition. 
The collaborative relationship between the law enforcement agencies and the 
military becomes especially useful when the latter desires to circumvent the international 
legal prohibitions on its technology acquisition, according to Davison. In a report from a 
joint UK-US meeting on non-lethal weapons and urban operations, it was noted that “If 
there are promising technologies that DOD is prohibited from pursuing, set up MOA with 
DOJ or DOE [Department of Energy].”326 To what extent has this been done to research 
on biochemical incapacitants has not been examined comprehensively, but it is instructive 
to note that while the military has had no visible investments in non-lethal biochemical 
incapacitants since the early 2000s, the NIJ has continued to explore this area of research 
and has funded research to “explore the potential of operationalizing calmatives and to 
examine possible pharmaceuticals, technologies, and legal issues”327 at Penn State in 2007. 
Both historical records as well as more recent endeavors have shown that multiple 
government agencies have a substantial interest in the development of non-lethal weapons. 
As Dando finds, “The more detailed information available on the history of this work [on 
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biochemical incapacitants] in the United States also shows how interest in such chemical 
agents can be switched from and between the police, intelligence and military.”328 At a 
minimum, both the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice have for a long 
time maintained active programs in this area of research. The military, therefore, has not 
just an institutional, cost-sharing partner in the development non-lethal capabilities from 
the law enforcement communities, but the latter also serves as a viable pathway through 
which technology programs that are of interest to both parties can be acquired. 
5.3.4 Summary 
The above analyses show that in the realm of the performance degradation 
application of military cognitive neuroscience research, namely the use of biochemical 
incapacitants as NLWs, the converging consensus on technical infeasibility due to 
significant technical barriers, the highly stringent performance requirements in the US non-
lethal weapons program with regard to thresholds of injury and lethality, and the presence 
of an alternative developmental pathway through the law enforcement communities have 
made it unappealing for the military to continue its commitment to invest in this area of 
research despite decades of efforts in doing so. Even with the rising interest in the 2000s 
on cognitive neuroscience research, which has been widely speculated to potentially enable 
the development of better biochemical agents, the investment from the US military 
languished. 
In particular, the Dubrovka theater incident that took place in Moscow in 2002, in 
which such a biochemical incapacitant was used, has prompted the expert community to 
become more vocal in expressing its reservations on the development of such weapons. 
Furthermore, the increasing discussion on the biochemical incapacitants has also 
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highlighted the level of difficulty for such a weapon to meet the expected operational 
requirement the US military has set for its non-lethal weapons. 
As Pearson notes, it is ultimately “the ability of a prospective weapon to meet 
military and political requirements, within existing political and operational constraints, 
which determines whether the weapon is developed, fielded and used.”329 In the case of 
biochemical non-lethal weapons, the technical constraints cannot be reconciled with the 
expected performance demands from the military, which, along with an increasing 
international recognition of the non-viability of such weapons, have made the investment 
unappealing as an opportunity. The following sections explain the international legal 
considerations regarding developing biochemical incapacitants in more detail. 
5.4 Non-Lethal Chemical Agents and the CWC 
As stated above, one of the peculiarities of discussing the development of 
biochemical incapacitants as non-lethal weapons has to do with international arms control 
treaties and, in particular, the Chemical Weapons Convention. Since biochemical 
incapacitants’ effect on humans is generated by their toxicological properties, regulations 
on their development, stockpiling, and use fall under the CWC. However, due to the 
ambiguous status of incapacitants as potentially a form of riot control, and because of 
RCAs’ permissive use in law enforcement activities, the legality of its development and 
use have been the subject of significant debate. As can be seen below, some states have 
sought to preserve their ability to use incapacitants and other non-lethal chemicals in 
certain conflict scenarios, while others have opposed to such a loophole and have sought 
to tighten the regulations of the CWC. 
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This contention between states parties to the CWC came to a head in the mid-2000s 
when the Dubrovka theater hostage crisis in 2002 brought to the fore some unresolved 
ambiguities within the CWC regarding incapacitating biochemical agents. Prior to the 
Moscow incident, discussions on the legality of biochemical incapacitants have primarily 
been speculative. However, the incident in Moscow drew international attention toward the 
CWC and its provisions for permissible uses of chemical agents, including RCAs and 
ICAs. This renewed (from the original negotiations over the treaty language) debate over 
the legality of developing and using chemicals such as incapacitants has provided the 
impetus to a shift in the understanding of these agents in the context of the CWC, where 
some states parties have begun to actively pursue a tightening of existing treaty loopholes. 
This changing international political context, as is analyzed and argued below, likely has 
further prevented the US from seeing developing biochemical incapacitant as a viable 
opportunity for non-lethal weapons. 
5.4.1 Ambiguities and Loopholes in the CWC 
The issues concerning incapacitating chemicals and the chemical weapons arms 
control regime are age-old. Even before it was open for signing, the CWC had already been 
troubled by the issues of riot control agents or other chemical agents not intended to cause 
lethal effects. This was evident during the negotiating process of the treaty itself in 1992, 
where the states parties disagreed over the treaty terms with regard to the permissible uses 
of RCAs. In particular, the US delegation headed by Stephen Ledogar held the view that 
non-lethal chemical agents, unlike other conventionally lethal ones, can have legitimate 
uses in law enforcement and some defensive military operations to save lives, and the 
ability of states to employ such weapons should be preserved.330 While this particular 
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perspective was not a popular one even among the Western Group (which entailed mostly 
western European states, and traditional US allies such as Australia and Canada) during 
the negotiation process, it did cause the treaty language on “law enforcement” (as a 
“purpose not prohibited”), “riot control agent,” and “method of warfare” to be contentious 
through the final days of the negotiation.331 It was nevertheless clear that compromises 
were needed between states parties that preferred flexibility in treaty language and those 
that preferred a narrower and more defined interpretation on these terms and their 
relationship to one another.  
The compromise that was reached in the end entailed several features as reflected 
in the final treaty language. First, it was recognized that deliberate uses of any toxic 
chemical as a form of warfare is unacceptable. This was not only clearly demonstrated in 
what has come to be interpreted as the General Purpose Criterion of the CWC,332 which 
defines chemical weapons in a comprehensive manner according to the purpose and use of 
any toxic chemical and their precursors, but it was also specifically stated, in Article I.5., 
that “Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.”333 
However, what was left out of the convention was any specific definition of “method of 
warfare.” This omission provided room for states parties to interpret what a “method of 
warfare” may entail, which became very important for countries like the US that preferred 
to have the flexibility in using RCAs in certain military operations that may not be 
construed as “warfare.” 
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Second, the texts on the “purposes not prohibited” under the convention as it 
appears in Article II.9.(d) shifted from “Domestic law enforcement and riot control 
purposes,” which appeared in the rolling text of the convention under the then-outgoing 
chairman Sergey Batsanov, to “Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes” 
in the final agreed upon version.334 This change, which went from defining law 
enforcement and riot control as specifically domestic, to defining domestic riot control as 
a subset of law enforcement, also created room for interpretation on what constitutes law 
enforcement as purposes not prohibited under the convention. 
Finally, while “riot control agent” itself is defined in the convention,335 its relations 
to the types of law enforcement activities permitted as “purposes not prohibited” are not 
clearly specified. Within the CWC, the term “riot control agents” appears in only five 
different places, but its only specification is that its use as a method of warfare is prohibited, 
and in none of these places mentioned are RCAs defined with respect to law enforcement. 
This detachment of RCAs from law enforcement activities is not accidental but rather a 
reached compromise. This was made especially evident regarding the terms of compliance 
and monitoring of RCA in the CWC as specified in Article III.1(e), which, during the final 
rounds of the negotiations in Geneva, went from requiring declarations of chemicals used 
for “domestic riot control and domestic law enforcement” in the earlier drafted texts to 
requiring declarations of only “riot control agents” in the final, agreed upon text.336 By 
placing the emphasis of transparency on RCAs rather than law enforcement activities, the 
CWC has left it open for states parties to have divergent interpretations on what is 
permissible to use for law enforcement activities. 
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These ambiguities in language have several ramifications on the later 
interpretations on RCAs, warfare, and law enforcement within the context of the CWC. 
First, by singling out and defining RCAs specifically, it has led some to argue that RCAs 
are somehow qualitatively different from the rest of the chemicals considered in the 
CWC.337 By granting this special status to the RCAs and by defining RCAs by their effects 
(sensory irritation or disabling physical effects) rather than their toxicological properties, 
the treaty left a loophole for states parties wishing to develop non-lethal chemicals to do 
so under the guise of riot control agents. Indeed, this is what happened in the US in the 
early 1990s. Although the signing of the CWC seemed to have curtailed developments on 
the ARCAD program, some of the Army research at the time on incapacitating chemicals 
was reprogrammed as riot control research.338  
Second, by leaving out any definition of “method of warfare” or “warfare” itself, 
the treaty also opened room for states parties to define whether certain military activities 
can be construed as warfare. Indeed, to preserve the ability to use RCAs during certain 
kinds of military operations, the US has specified in its ratification of the CWC a set of 
conditions that permit the US to use RCAs in conflicts, including against combatants who 
are parties to a conflict, if: 1) the US is not a party to the conflict; 2) the US is conducting 
peacekeeping operations with the consent by the receiving state; and 3) the US is 
conducting peacekeeping operations sanctioned by the Security Council under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter.339 Furthermore, the US also specified in the conditions to the RCAs’ 
permitted use that Executive Order 11850340 of April 8, 1975 be upheld. 
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Third, by treating domestic riot control as a subset of law enforcement activities, 
interpretations on what constitutes law enforcement are left to the states parties. This 
ambiguity in language has led to some concerns as to whether or not chemical agents are 
permitted to be used in law enforcement contexts outside of domestic riot control (such as 
to implement certain international law, for instance). Finally, by disassociating RCAs from 
permitted law enforcement activities, the treaty left open as to what kind of chemical agents 
could be used during such enforcement activities. This particular loophole gave 
justification for the use of incapacitants during permitted law enforcement activities, even 
if the qualification of an incapacitant as a non-lethal weapon or RCA may be subject to 
debate. As shown below, these ambiguities in treaty language led states to by and large 
recognize the legality of Russia’s use of fentanyl at Dubrovka, even though an agent like 
fentanyl would not be in an ordinary sense understood as a RCA. 
As the analysis above shows, many loopholes exist in the CWC. The US in 
particular has embraced these loopholes if not actively advocated for them during the 
negotiation process. Although some US R&D efforts were curtailed by the CWC, it is clear 
that the existing treaty terms do not fully prevent the development of biochemical 
incapacitants. This is likely recognized by the states parties, for research activities in the 
US have continued during the 1990s and into the early 2000s, even after the US has signed 
and ratified the CWC. Signing of the CWC alone thus did not sufficiently disincentivize 
the US from investigating further into incapacitants. 
If this is so, then what caused such a change in US investment during the 2000s? 
As is shown below, this dissertation argues that in addition to the technical conditions that 
have made biochemical incapacitants an unappealing investment, the Dubrovka theater 
incident in 2002 also propelled renewed interest and willingness at the international level 
to reexamine and potentially address the R&D (and use) of such biochemicals as weapons. 
In this sense, as the international opinion toward the non-viability and unacceptability of 
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these biochemical weapons grow, the political costs for deviating from such a position 
increases, which likely has contributed to the unwillingness on the part of the US to sustain 
its investment. 
5.4.2 The Legacy of the Dubrovka Theater Incident 
According to David Fidler, “in the Moscow incident the use of a toxic chemical 
that is not an RCA for law enforcement purposes provides some evidence of State practice 
that the CWC does not limit the range of chemicals that can be used under Article II.9(d) 
to RCAs.”341 Because Russian special forces’ use of a fentanyl derivative has in large part 
been considered by analysts as “legal,” and certainly few states, if any, have voiced strong 
concern of such use of chemical incapacitants, the Dubrovka incident has essentially set an 
international precedent toward the legality of using such agents in a scenario which almost 
all would have identified as “for law enforcement purposes.” 
Yet, the issue of legality in the context of biochemical incapacitants is more 
complex than whether or not an agent can be used. As is specified in the CWC, even if 
certain agents are permissible for states parties to use for specific purposes (such as law 
enforcement), the “types and quantities” of the agents developed, produced, acquired, or 
used must be consistent with such permitted purposes. For this reason, if a chemical agent 
cannot be produced or used in a manner that is consistent with the permitted purposes, it 
can still generate concerns about its legality with respect to the CWC.342 As Fidler argues, 
the use of incapacitating chemicals “in the contexts in which neither individual dosage nor 
the exposure conditions can be controlled is…legitimate only in extreme situations,” where 
there is a “need to resort to potentially lethal force to resolve urgent, life-threatening 
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situation because less violent and dangerous means…have failed.”343 He further posits that 
while the Moscow theatre incident was one such extreme scenario that warranted the use 
of fentanyl derivatives, the Russian government’s lack of timely response to treat rescued 
hostages, particularly those who have suffered from opioid-induced respiratory depression, 
still raised questions from the perspective of international human rights law. 
Legal controversies also surround the term “law enforcement” as stated in the 
CWC’s Article II.9.(d). Although the term is not defined within the CWC, it is generally 
understood and accepted that such a term applies to domestic law enforcements. Such an 
interpretation is not only reflective of the conventional understanding of the term, but it is 
also supported by the texts of CWC, where “domestic riot control purposes” is presented 
as an example of law enforcement. Yet, to what extent can the concept of law enforcement 
be extended beyond the domestic domain of a sovereign government within its jurisdiction 
falls into a grey area. In particular, whether or not this permissive use of chemical agents 
can be applied to the various forms of international law enforcement and non-traditional 
military operations (such as counterinsurgency) have ignited debates. 
According to Fidler, the permissive use of chemical agents to “law enforcement” 
purposes in Article II.9.(d) is clearly not intended for extrajurisdictional enforcement of a 
state’s domestic law, unless such enforcement has the consent of the state under whose 
jurisdiction it is taking place.344 Fidler further posits that, since international law by nature 
has a deficiency in the implementation of its rules, and that peaceful settlements are 
generally the accepted practice in resolving disputes arising from violations of international 
laws, states are not supported from an international legal perspective to attempt to compel 
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others to comply with international law through “enforcement” actions using armed forces, 
regardless whether such actions involve chemical incapacitants.345 
Of course, in certain contexts, armed forces may be employed in traditional or non-
traditional operations that are sanctioned by international law, and some of these operations 
may entail “law enforcement” like activities. For instance, a legitimate occupying power 
has the responsibility to maintain order within its jurisdiction and the security of its people, 
and it may employ armed forces for the purpose of maintaining social order, securing its 
facilities and peoples, and addressing threats from non-combatants in the occupied 
territory. Armed forces may also conduct non-traditional operations, including 
peacekeeping, that are in accordance with international law or mandate. In those situations, 
the use of chemical agents for the purpose of law enforcement is understood to be permitted 
against non-combatants, although, to date, nothing beyond the traditionally defined RCAs 
have been used.346 
In this sense, in addition to bringing the complex legal issues to the fore, the 
Moscow theater incident has also provided a reality check for both advocates and skeptics 
of chemical incapacitants as non-lethal weapons alike. For the proponents, who see the 
promise of biochemicals as a viable means to achieving certain operational goals in today’s 
military missions that may require sensitivity to casualties, particularly in environments 
where civilians and combatants may be mixed, the restriction in the CWC regarding CW 
uses for only the limited setting of law enforcement warrants change. In the 1999 CFR 
report, which holds not just a favorable view toward but makes an urgent call for the 
development of non-lethal weapons, it was suggested that “U.S. security might be 
improved by a modification to a treaty such as the Chemical Weapons Convention or the 
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Biological Weapons Convention.”347 While the CFR task force did not focus on the issues 
of chemical incapacitants in particular aside from the RCAs, from its inclination to change 
restrictions within existing arms control treaties, it was concerned about how such 
restrictions can hinder non-lethal capabilities from being developed and used. 
The skeptics, on the other hand, often emphasize the need to uphold existing terms 
of the arms control agreements. Where they have issues with the existing terms, they often 
refer to the ambiguities in treaty language and promote changes that would lead to more 
precision and greater clarity. Like the proponents, skeptics of chemical incapacitants have 
also taken issue with the provision in the CWC that allows states parties to use chemical 
agents for law enforcement purposes, but their concerns lie with the lack of clear definition 
on whether or not CNS-acting bio/neurochemicals should be considered by the convention 
in the same category as riot control agents and on what constitutes law enforcement. In this 
sense, the skeptics are not only in favor of upholding the existing treaty terms and 
interpreting them in a manner that is the most restrictive to the R&D and use of biochemical 
incapacitants, but some of them have in fact advocated for defining and codifying such 
restrictions into the CWC in order to alleviate ambiguities and close up existing loopholes 
on this issue. The Dubrovka theater incident, in this sense, opened the window for states to 
reengage in this debate about the legality and acceptability of biochemical incapacitants. 
5.5 Evolving Understanding of Chemical Incapacitants and Policy Impact 
One impact that the Dubrovka incident has engendered was a slow-to-evolve but 
growing demand in the international system to clarify existing ambiguities within the CWC 
and to more restrictively define the permissive use of toxic chemicals in specified 
circumstances such as law enforcement. This particular trend can be observed from two 
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perspectives: first, there is an increasing discussion in the international fora regarding the 
loopholes and ambiguities within the CWC and the problems biochemical incapacitants 
present; in addition, there is also an increasing willingness on the part of at least some states 
parties to address these loopholes and ambiguities and to strengthen the CWC. This is 
observable particularly in the three Review Conferences to the CWC, in which the issue of 
biochemical, incapacitating weapons are drawing increased attention. Second, certain 
states have, in their pursuit to closing existing loopholes and defining biochemical 
incapacitants into the CWC, adopted the belief in the lack of legality as well as feasibility 
in developing such weapons. This is observable from the stance that the states parties have 
taken during their discussions on the issues of biochemical incapacitants in the context of 
the CWC. The following sections analyze these trends in more detail. 
5.5.1 A Shift in International Understanding? 
In his discussion on the legal ramifications of the Dubrovka incident in Moscow, 
Fidler notes that the incident seemed to have caused a “sea change” within the US regarding 
the biochemical incapacitants. In particular, he references the two CFR reports on non-
lethal weapons before and after the incident to show such a shift in the mindset. The CFR 
report published in 1999, prior to the incident in Moscow, clearly endorses the need for the 
US to develop non-lethal capabilities even if such pursuits would challenge existing arms 
control agreements. As stated above, in that report the CFR task force members 
contemplated that it might be in the interest of the US to change the treaty terms so that US 
security and technology development efforts would not be hamstrung by them. 
However, this attitude took a drastic change in the 2004 report on NLWs in which 
the task force members argue for the opposite from what was recommended in 1999. More 
specifically, the task force “believes that to press for an amendment to the CWC or even to 
assert a right to use RCAs as a method of warfare risks impairing the legitimacy of all 
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NLWS,” and to press for such an amendment would “free others to openly and legitimately 
conduct focused governmental R&D that could more readily yield advanced lethal agents 
than improved non-lethal capabilities.”348 As a result, the CFR task force recommends that 
it is best for the US to reaffirm its commitment to existing arms control treaties including 
the CWC and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and to provide 
leadership in national compliance to the terms of these treaties. 
In light of this drastic change from the CFR reports, and along with other evidence 
within the US in which the legality of biochemical incapacitants were increasingly 
questioned, Fidler suggests that there is a growing awareness in the US that loosening the 
CWC and BWC for non-lethal weapons purposes would be harmful to US interests, 
threaten the integrity of the treaties, and damage the legitimacy of all NLWs.349 While this 
“sea change” according to Fidler was beginning to take place in the US post-Moscow 
incident, a shift in the understanding of biochemical incapacitants was taking place 
internationally as well during the 2000s. This was most noticeable, perhaps, from the way 
that issues of incapacitants were addressed during the three Review Conferences to the 
CWC in 2003, 2008, and 2013. 
Despite that the first review conference took place only half a year after the 
Dubrovka incident, the topic of advancements in incapacitating, non-lethal chemicals was 
not addressed in anyway aside from a brief mention in the national statements from New 
Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland.350 According to Richard Guthrie, who reported on the 
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second and third Review Conferences, efforts toward addressing the growing biochemical 
incapacitants concerns at the First Review Conference were blocked by the United States 
and others.351 According to some commentators who observed the First Review 
Conference, the time was not quite ripe for any serious discussion on incapacitating 
chemical agent or for the inclusion of its clearer definition into the CWC.352 
For the 2008 Second Review Conference, the topic of addressing existing 
ambiguities regarding incapacitating chemical agents was once again brought up, this time 
with more inputs from the technical community. For instance, in the report from an IUPAC 
meeting in 2007 in preparation of technical advice to the Second Review Conference, it 
was noted that “Many of the chemicals that are being synthesized and screened…will have 
incapacitating properties that could make them suitable as so-called ‘nonlethal agents,’” 
and if “these developments were to continue unchecked…there is a serious danger 
that…the CWC would be undermined.”353 The report, therefore, advocated that states 
parties at the CWC review conference address the potential risks of these technological 
advancements and to assess the compatibility between CWC and the development and use 
of “non-lethal” chemicals for law enforcement purposes. 
The IUPAC advices, conveyed through the Scientific Advisory Board and the 
Technical Secretariat, were relayed to the Second Review Conference by the Director 
General, who, in his speech, suggests that “State Parties may also wish to look into the 
developments related to incapacitating agents and address questions such as the effect on 
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the Convention of their possible introduction for the purposes of law enforcement and of 
new means of their use.”354 This time, a number of states, including Switzerland and 
Pakistan, voiced their concerns and called for the Conference to address the issues of 
incapacitants. Switzerland, in particular, presented a National Working Paper on riot 
control and incapacitating agents, with the aim to get states parties to “consider adopting 
during the Second Review Conference a mandate for a discussion of, inter alia, an agreed 
definition of incapacitating agents, the status of incapacitating agents under the 
Convention, and possible transparency measures for incapacitating agents.”355 
In addition, as noted by Crowley, in a proposal by the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) states and China on the draft report of the Second Review Conference, the issue of 
incapacitant was also brought up. The proposal recommends that the Conference should 
“‘categorically condemn the use of chemical weapons including incapacitating agents or 
riot control agents as a method of warfare by any state, group or individual under any 
circumstances.’”356 Furthermore, the Cuban Ambassador, speaking on behalf of NAM 
states and China during the open-ended working group meeting prior to the Review 
Conference, noted that, “‘The advancements in Science and Technology have increased 
the risk of development new riot control and incapacitating agents…The [Second] Review 
Conference therefore needs to carefully consider their impact.’”357According to Crowley, 
despite that an agreed text indicating the states parties’ willingness to consider the issue of 
incapacitants for law enforcement purposes was not included in the final report from the 
                                                 
354 OPCW, Opening Statement by the Director General to the Second Special Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, RC-
2/DG.2 (April 7, 2008). 
355 Switzerland, Riot Control and Incapacitating Agents Under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, Second Review Conference, RC-2/NAT.12, (April 9, 2008), 5. 
356 Statement of the Cuban Ambassador on Behalf of the NAM and China, 15th Meeting of the 
Open Ended Working Group preparing for the Second CWC Review Conference, OPCW Headquarters, 
The Hague, quoted in Michael Crowley, Application of the OPCW Mechanisms for Reviewing and 
Addressing Science and Technology Developments: The Case of Incapacitating Chemical Agents (ICAs), 
Policy Paper 1, Biochemical Security 2030 Project (Bath, UK: University of Bath, 2013), 19. 
357 Crowley, Application (2013), 19. 
 194 
Review Conference due to last minute objections by Iran, “the issue was rising up the 
OPCW’s agenda.”358 
The momentum to address the ambiguities within the CWC regarding law 
enforcement and biochemical incapacitants continued for the Third Review Conference in 
2013. As stated above, before the official Conference took place, a special meeting was 
convened at the Spiez Laboratory at the request of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to 
address the issues of incapacitants, and the issue was also highlighted by the IUPAC report 
to the SAB, in which it was recognized that “The decision on the appropriateness of the 
development and use of ICAs for law enforcement purposes, including whether such use 
would be permitted under the provisions of the CWC, is an issue which requires political, 
legal, and other inputs.”359 
This sentiment was clearly endorsed by the SAB in its preparation for the Third 
Review Conference, for it has since its 15th meeting in 2010 considered the technical issues 
relating to incapacitants at five of its subsequent meetings throughout 2011 and 2012. In a 
SAB report to the Third Review Conference, the issue of dose-response was highlighted: 
The Board considers the term “non-lethal” as inappropriate when referring 
to chemicals intended for use as incapacitants, because for all chemicals 
toxicity is a matter of dosage. The Board noted that chemicals considered 
having high safety margins in the context of controlled pharmaceutical use 
can have very low safety margins in the context of incapacitants when 
factors such as uneven dissemination, variability in human response, and 
the possible need for a rapid onset are required. It was also emphasized that 
the issue is not just what incapacitating chemical is used for law 
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enforcement purposes, but how it is used, and the consequences such a use 
may have (emphasis added).360 
This technical advice was noted by the Director General, who, in his response to the SAB 
report at a Conference of the States Parties earlier in 2013, suggests that the states parties 
might consider using the Third Review Conference to examine and further discuss the 
issues regarding incapacitants. 
At the Third Review Conference, a number of states voiced their concerns on the 
issue of incapacitants and their potential for law enforcement. A selection of their 
statements pertaining to this topic is presented below in Table 4. What emerges from 
these national statements, reflect, to an extent, the growing awareness of the international 
community on the issue of non-lethal incapacitating chemical agents and their potential 
ramifications within the context of the CWC. Although, as some reports on the Third 
Review Conference noted, there was not much substantive discussion on the topic of 
incapacitants in subsequent plenary meetings, and that much of the discussion conducted 
on incapacitants was at the margins with the goal of finding some commonly acceptable 
text to include in the final report in order to move the issue forward. Nevertheless, the 
degree to which states parties are willing to recognize incapacitants and ambiguities in 
the CWC as relevant issues grew from the first two Review Conferences.
                                                 
360 OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on the 
Developments in Science and Technology for the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States 
Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, RC-3/DG.1, (October 29, 2012), 4. 
 196 
Table 4 - Selected National Statements at the Third Review Conference of CWC on Incapacitants 
State Party O C Statement Representative 
Germany x   
In Germany's view State Parties at this Conference also need to consider ways to prevent that new 
chemical weapons may be developed or produced under the guise of permitted purposes, such as law 
enforcement...In the past years the issue of "toxic chemicals for law enforcement" has been extensively 
discussed in various fora outside the OPCW. These chemicals are commonly called "incapacitating 
chemical agents". There is now a substantial body of scientific analysis on developments that have 
taken place since the entry-info-force of the Convention...in Germany's view, the Review Conference 
should through its final declaration initiate discussions on the issue of "toxic chemicals for law 
enforcement". Rolf Wilhelm Nikel 
Ireland x   
Ireland also notes its conclusions in relation to incapacitating agents. We share the concerns which have 
been expressed in relation to the potential use of incapacitating agents from both a humanitarian and 
legal perspective. We support the proposals made at this Conference to initiate a discussion on this 
topic. Mary Whelan 
Norway x   
State Parties should also pay special attention to the well founded advice from the Scientific Advisory 
Board, and make sure that this is reflected in the outcome document. A particular issue is that of toxic 
chemicals in law enforcement. Norway agrees with the Board that the technical discussions on the 
potential use of toxic chemicals for law enforcement have been exhaustive. This Review Conference is 
an excellent opportunity to further discussing the broader implications of the use of toxic chemicals for 
law-enforcement purposes. Anniken R. Krutnes 
Romania x   
My delegation supports the idea of considering the issue of incapacitants, in the context of relevant 
scientific and technological developments, if it will be agreed by the States Parties. Nineta Barbulescu 
Slovakia x   
We have to be fully aware of the necessity to deal not only with originally declared stockpiles of 
weapons, which might not be absolutely exact as one recent case showed us, but also ready to deal with 
those chemical agents which have not been properly covered by the Convention, especially 
incapacitating agents. Jaroslav Chlebo 
Switzerland x   
My country is particularly concerned about the issue of so-called incapacitating chemical agents. By 
'incapacitating chemical agents' we mean toxic chemicals for law enforcement purposes that are not riot 
control agents and act on the central nervous system...Switzerland fears that the silence and uncertainty 
surrounding the use of toxic chemicals for law enforcement purposes other than riot control agents risks 
eroding the Convention...We hope that all State Parties share our concerns and agree with our 
conclusion that the risks of inaction are far greater than the benefits of keeping the current uncertainty. 
With the proposal, Switzerland hopes to convince State Parties to agree on report language, which will 
allow for a discussion on incapacitating chemical agents to take place within the OPCW. Markus Borlin 
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United 
Kingdom x   
The United Kingdom is taking part in the ongoing discussions on the place of incapacitating chemical 
agents in the Convention, particularly given scientific change and the absence of any definition or 
common understanding of law enforcement. Outside the Convention experts have exchanged views and 
expressed opinions. The Royal Society in the UK highlighted the significance of this issue in its 
February 2012 report on developments in neuroscience. The Director-General's Scientific Advisory 
Board drew attention to the issue in its report to this conference. Both have set out the scientific 
position as well as advancing our understanding of the complex issues surrounding this topic. The 
OPCW should also be willing to address such relevant issues and show leadership...the UK believes we 
should work together to establish a norm to discourage the use of chemicals more toxic than Riot 
Control Agents for law enforcement and consider transparency measures or limitations. Alistair Burt 
United 
States x   
There is much to be done to prepare for the post-destruction era and the challenges both known and 
unknown that it will present. Switzerland and the International Committee of the Red Cross have 
sought to sensitise the international community to one of those challenges--the implications of so-called 
incapacitating chemical agents--for the Chemical Weapons Convention. Concern has increased that 
illicit programmes could possibly be concealed under the guise of a legitimate treaty purpose, such as 
law enforcement. The Convention is clear: the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, or use 
of incapacitating chemical agents--or any other toxic chemicals--in types and quantities inconsistent 
with purposes not prohibited by the Chemical Weapons Convention, is clearly prohibited by Article I of 
the Convention. Nevertheless, we must all be vigilant to ensure that incapacitating chemical agents and 
other technologies do not jeopardise the twin goals of the Convention--the destruction of all chemical 
weapons and the prevention of the re-emergence of chemical weapons. Rose E. Gottemoeller 
The 
Netherlands   x 
Finally, we are deeply disappointed that this Review Conference could not agree to include the 
possibility of discussing incapacitating chemical agents in our final document. We hope we can 
continue this discussion during the next session of the Executive Council. Jan Lucas Van Hoorn 
Switzerland   x 
Nevertheless Mr. Chairperson, on the bright side, discussions on incapacitants have been launched, 
despite the lack of reference in the final document. Due to the increasing support we could experience 
during the last months the momentum has been built. Consequently we will continue our efforts in 
order to further develop it. Philippe Brandt 
O=Opening Statement, C=Closing Statement. Sources: Chemical Weapons Convention Third Review Conference Opening 
National Statements by Germany, Ireland, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, US, and UK, and Closing National Statements by The 
Netherlands and Switzerland. <https://www.opcw.org/rc3/documents-from-the-third-review-conference/national-papers/>  
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The Swiss-led effort to include some texts with reference to further work on 
incapacitants in the final report encountered some opposition, at first by Russia and later 
by the US. Due to the inclusion of a discussion on the RCAs in the original final proposed 
text, a set of chemicals that the US has specific mandates in certain operational uses such 
as the ones specified in Executive Order 11850, the US delegation voiced its concern that 
there were legal issues and needed guidance from Washington. Since the final 
compromised text was not reached until the last day of the Review Conference, and since 
the US delegation did not receive response on the issue before the end of the work day, the 
Swiss delegation withdrew the text from the draft final report.361 Nevertheless, the ability 
for states parties to at least reach some agreement on the need to address the incapacitants 
showed that the issues have gained some momentum and attention from the international 
community. 
It is of particular interest to note here, perhaps, that the US position on the 
incapacitant issue has changed quite significantly upon reaching the Third Review 
Conference, especially when considering the US had played a major role in preventing 
such agents from being addressed in the First Review Conference and had kept silent 
during the Second. As can be seen in the address by Gottemoeller at the Third Review 
Conference, the US was rather explicit in its interest to uphold the terms of the CWC 
regarding toxic chemicals (regardless whether or not they are lethal) and pointing to the 
potential for states to develop “illicit” programs under the guises for law enforcement. 
Furthermore, in the first Executive Council session following the Third Review 
Conference, Robert Mikulak, US Ambassador to the OPCW, made explicit that the US is 
not developing, producing, stockpiling, or using incapacitating chemical agents.362 It was 
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thus clear that as of 2013, at least, the US has adopted position to abide by a strict 
interpretation of the CWC terms on the development and use of incapacitants. 
In the years following the Third Review Conference, the US position on the issue 
of incapacitants became more pronounced as it took a more active role in the efforts to 
resolve existing legal ambiguities within the CWC. For instance, in the March 2015 
Executive Council session at the OPCW, Mikulak remarks, 
We welcome the renewed leadership of the Australian and Swiss 
delegations to informally engage delegations on this issue [of incapacitating 
chemicals as weapons, purported for law enforcement purposes]. In this 
regard, let me re-state once again that the US is not developing, producing, 
stockpiling or using incapacitating chemical agents nor are we using riot 
control agents as a method of warfare. We equally encourage all OPCW 
Member States to follow the example of a number of delegations…to 
confirm in an official statement to the Council that they are not using, 
developing or stockpiling incapacitating chemical weapons for any 
purpose.363 
As of 2015, the United States not only reconfirmed in an international public forum that it 
is not developing incapacitants, but it also for the first time actively encourages other states 
to make clear their position on this issue. 
The US statement in the next Executive Council session in July 2015 was also 
instructive. In his statement, Mikulak emphasizes that, “we encourage all delegations to 
consider and subscribe to the notion that the development of so-called incapacitation agents 
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for law enforcement purposes is incompatible with the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
to put their views on record in the Executive Council.”364 The statement, also for the first 
time alluding to the official US position on the legality of incapacitants within the context 
of the CWC, reflects an embrace of the incapacitant skeptics’ perspective that the 
development of such weapons is against the intention of the treaty. 
Finally, most recently, in the Twentieth Session of the Conference of States Parties 
in December 2015, Mallory Stewart, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Emerging Security 
Challenges and Defense Policy, remarked in her statement to the Conference that the 
United States had co-sponsored a paper, led by Australia and along with 18 other states, 
that highlights the risks posed to the Convention by “the use of central nervous system 
(CNS)-acting chemicals, so-called incapacitating chemical agents, in law enforcement 
scenarios.”365 The US leadership on this issue at the OPCW thus reflects not only a “sea 
change” as suggested by Fidler, but an actual change in the US position on the 
consideration for the developing, producing, and using biochemical incapacitants, which it 
has over the past decade come to deem as incompatible not only with US interests, but also 
with international law. 
5.5.2 State Endorsements 
In addition to this shift in the attitudes of both the US and the larger international 
community toward incapacitants and this increasing willingness to define its restriction 
within the CWC, it is also instructive to examine how, and to what extent, have the 
technical and legal understandings of these incapacitants been adopted by individual states, 
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which likely have contributed to their positions on the issue. In addition to the potential 
threat to CWC’s integrity and the potential for such weapons to be developed in an illicit 
manner under the guise of law enforcement, it is clear, at least from the most recent SAB 
report at the Third Review Conference, that the converging consensus from the scientific 
and technical communities on dosage issue is that a “non-lethal” weapon cannot 
realistically be designed.  
One of the first country-specific endorsements on the non-viability of using 
biochemical incapacitants as NLWs came from Switzerland, which has been particularly 
active in leading the effort toward creating room for discussion on the ICA issue within the 
OPCW. In the National Working Paper that was circulated by the Swiss delegation at the 
Second Review Conference in 2008 on “Riot Control and Incapacitating Agents Under the 
Chemical Weapons Convention,” it was noted that first, incapacitants are different from 
RCAs in that their action on life processes are different: whereas RCAs produces local 
sensory irritant effects, an incapacitant acts on the CNS; impairs cognition, perception, and 
consciousness; and may require antidote for its treatment.366 Second, “Switzerland is of the 
view that the development of substances that will incapacitate a wide range of people with 
varying degree of susceptibility, but not endanger their health, is technically close to 
impossible (emphasis added).”367 Therefore, “Because of their toxicity and their severe 
effects on life processes, Switzerland does not believe that the use of incapacitating agents 
for ‘law enforcement’ purposes in an international context can be brought in line with the 
object and purpose of the Convention.”368 
From this 2008 National Working Paper it is clear that part of the reasons for the 
Swiss delegation to have an interest in defining restrictions on the use incapacitants for law 
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enforcement in the CWC is due to its belief that such weapons cannot technically achieve 
the kinds of non-lethality they “promise” but also that their operational use can actually 
endanger the targets. In a simpler sense, biochemical incapacitants are not viable for 
development and use as a non-lethal weapon. Since 2008, several other states have also 
adopted this view of the non-feasibility of biochemical incapacitants as a weapon that could 
be use in a manner consistent with the goals of the CWC. 
For instance, several states parties have expressed in their national statements at the 
Third Review Conference an agreement with the assessment on the biochemical 
incapacitants as reported by the SAB, which held the view that to call such weapons non-
lethal is unsupported due to the issues of toxicity and dosage. In Germany’s national 
statement, it was made clear that the “extensive” discussions on the issue of biochemical 
incapacitants and the “substantial” body of scientific analysis on their developments 
warrant the attention of states parties at the Review Conference. Norway similarly pushed 
the states parties to pay special attention to the advice from the SAB and to make sure that 
some language for discussion is reflected in the outcome document, for “Norway agrees 
with the Board that the technical discussions on the potential use of toxic chemicals for law 
enforcement have been exhaustive.”369 The United Kingdom made reference to both the 
SAB report as well as the Royal Society 2012 study on neuroscience, which also held the 
belief in the non-viability in developing such weapons, and remarked that “both have set 
out the scientific position (emphasis added)” on the incapacitants and that the international 
community should “work together to establish a norm to discourage the use of chemicals 
more toxic than Riot Control Agents for law enforcement.”370 These statements show that 
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despite a lack of resolution within the official treaty framework at the Third Review 
Conference, there was increasing endorsement by states of the technical position that the 
technical barriers in the development and use of biochemical incapacitants make them not 
acceptable NLWs. 
In addition to Switzerland, recent OPCW efforts at addressing the issue of 
incapacitants have also been led by Australia. In its statement at the Nineteenth Session of 
the Conference of States Parties in 2014, Australia expressed a clear understanding of the 
dose-response problem and endorsed the view that such a problem makes developing or 
using biochemical incapacitating weapons undesirable: 
Australia’s position is that it is not possible for a State Party to disseminate 
anaesthetics, sedatives or analgesics by aerial dispersion in an effective and 
safe manner for law enforcement purposes. The effects of these chemicals 
are dose dependent and determined by a number of factors including the 
individual’s age, weight, gender, general well-being and possible adverse 
reactions with other medications being taken.371 
In the next Conference of States Parties in 2015, Australia reconfirms its position and 
endorsement on the technical infeasibility of such weapons, stating that, 
Many States Parties believe that an unchecked threat to the architecture of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, capable of undermining its integrity, 
are Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals…many of these chemicals 
are highly dangerous – as toxic as sarin and other nerve agents we ban under 
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the Convention. It is not possible to disperse these chemicals through the 
air – en masse – without significant risk of death or serious injury.372 
It is with this understanding that Australia, along with Switzerland and 18 other states 
(including the US), submitted a joint paper to the Conference in order to reinvigorate the 
discussion about incapacitants within the OPCW and to urge other States Parties to 
articulate their positions on these agents. 
This 2015 joint paper, which is co-signed by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Finland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, and the US, 
reflects these states’ collective scientific and technical understanding of the biochemical 
incapacitants in the context of the CWC and their position regarding its feasibility.373 The 
paper makes the following major points: 
1) CNS-acting chemicals pose a challenge for the CWC; 
2) CNS-acting chemicals, which include anesthetics, sedatives, and analgesics, are 
designed to be delivered under strict medical supervision, for some of them have 
lethal doses comparable to traditional nerve agents; 
3) CNS-acting chemicals are not RCAs due to their different sites of action; 
4) Individuals exposed to aerosolized CNS-acting chemicals face safety risks and 
potential long-term health effects; 
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5) It is extremely challenging, if not impossible, to uniformly disseminate CNS-
acting chemicals and to control the dose received by an individual outside clinical 
setting; 
6) Therefore, CNS-acting chemicals cannot be dispersed by aerosol in a completely 
safe manner in law enforcement settings and can thus also potentially used as a 
chemical weapon. 
The technical details presented in this joint paper, which reflect the converging 
consensus over the last decade on the technical barriers challenging the development of 
biochemical incapacitants as non-lethal weapons, not only show that the states skeptical of 
biochemical incapacitants have grounds for their suspicion beyond the issue of their 
legality under the CWC, but also that they have concerns that such a weapon is, in fact, 
due to its technical barriers really indifferent in its effects from other chemical weapons. 
This lack of differentiation, of course, rests on the understanding that such chemicals are 
dangerous to use operationally and cannot be ensured to prevent significant casualties from 
occurring. In sum, several states in the international system have since the mid-2000s taken 
the view that the development as well as use of such weapons cannot be supported and 
justified. 
The above analyses reveal that since the 2002 Dubrovka incident, the international 
community has shown increased attention and interest toward the legal ambiguities within 
the CWC and the challenges the biochemical incapacitants present to the convention. Over 
the last decade, an international understanding on the legal implications of ICAs has slowly 
been forming, with an increasing number of states seeking to clarify existing ambiguities 
in the CWC as well as well as define the biochemical incapacitants, and their development 
and use, into the convention. Furthermore, many states have over time adopted and 
endorsed the technical interpretation on the lack of feasibility in developing biochemical 
incapacitants for NLW purposes. This technical “norm formation,” along with an interest 
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in strengthening the integrity of the CWC, has likely added additional international political 
costs for those states that are considering to deviate from this effort and develop 
biochemical incapacitant weapons. This not only likely reflected a shift in the US interest 
on this issue but also reinforced the unfavorable condition for biochemical incapacitant 
R&D and further prevented continued military investment in this technology in the US. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The potential use of emerging cognitive neuroscience research to develop 
biochemical incapacitants as non-lethal weapons presents an interesting case for military 
technology investment. Although over the last fifteen years the development of non-lethal 
weapons has become increasingly demanded, military investment in cognitive science and 
neuroscience has been on the rise, and significant popular media and policy attention has 
been given to both brain research and its potential to be used for such an application by the 
military, the investment in this area of research by the US military has languished since the 
early 2000s. This, of course, has taken place under the context that the US military has long 
maintained an interest in incapacitating chemical agents and has engaged in its exploration 
and development since at least the 1960s. Why then, is this absence of investment 
happening? 
In this study, it is argued that the US military has refrained from continuing its 
investment in this area of research because it is not an appealing investment opportunity 
despite the alleged potential. In particular, the lack of feasibility on developing such a 
weapon system using biochemical incapacitating agents according to the dominant expert 
opinions, the highly stringent performance requirements the US military has come to 
expect of its non-lethal weapons systems, and the possibility to develop and acquire such 
capabilities through law enforcement if needed, particularly when the military activities in 
this area of research are becoming increasingly scrutinized under international legal 
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obligations, have together created a techno-political condition for this technology that is 
highly unfavorable to sustained support and investment from the military in incapacitant 
research. As a result, the military investment in this potentially emerging technology has 
languished despite an increase in funding and policy attention to cognitive neuroscience 
research. 
It is further argued that this unfavorable technical condition is likely exacerbated 
by the increasing international political costs associated with developing such a weapon. 
Since the Dubrovka theater incident in 2002, the international community has slowly begun 
its effort at resolving the inherent ambiguities within the CWC regarding the issues of 
incapacitants and their potential use in law enforcement. Not only has there been a 
movement toward defining the biochemical incapacitant within the CWC, which would 
not only create significant legal barriers to its development and use by states parties, but 
many states have also embraced and endorsed the technical position that since such a 
weapon cannot be feasibly designed to ensure little to no lethality, its use will undoubtedly 
be contrary to the premise of the CWC and thus be unjustifiable. As a result, states like the 
US are becoming less likely to want to develop, stockpile, and use biochemical 
incapacitants as NLWs not only because it is not fruitful to do so, but also because doing 
so is becoming difficult to justify and support internationally.  
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CHAPTER 6. TREATMENT AND PREVENTION OF COMBAT 
STRESS REACTION AND POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS 
DISORDER 
When President Obama in April 2013 announced the BRAIN (Brain Research 
through Advanced Innovative Neurotechnologies) Initiative, it was described as the new 
“Grand Challenge” similar to the Human Genome Project. According to statements 
released from the White House, the Initiative supports “the development and application 
of innovative technologies that can create a dynamic understanding of brain function,” and 
it “aims to help researchers uncover the mysteries of brain disorders, such as Alzheimer’s 
and Parkinson’s diseases, depression, and traumatic brain injury.”374 This came perhaps as 
no surprise that this major national scientific initiative has a deliberately medical focus, for 
research on human brain has long been driven by, and has been in service to, advancements 
in the understanding of human psychological deficits and ways to redress psychiatric 
disorders. 
This pursuit of medical innovations in dealing with brain-related cognitive or 
neurological disorders is further buttressed by the growing concern that a large number of 
veterans returning from US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have suffered or are likely 
to experience Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).375 Although the reporting on the 
prevalence has varied, many have noted that veterans returning from Operation Enduring 
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Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operational Iraqi Freedom (OIF), especially those 
exposed to combat, seem to have a greater propensity to develop PTSD when compared to 
their non-combat exposed contemporaries. In addition to PTSD, traumatic brain injury 
(TBI) has also become a prevalent issue among veterans returning from OEF and OIF, so 
much that some have termed TBI as the “signature wound” or the “silent epidemic” from 
these two overseas operation.376 Brain-related disorders, particularly as they relate to 
combat trauma and war stress, have thus attracted national policy attention since at least 
the 2000s. 
The problem of the increasing complexity in dealing with combat-related traumatic 
stress disorder and brain injury was also noted in the 2009 NRC Report on Opportunities 
in Neuroscience for Future Army Applications. The report task force not only notes that 
there is increasing evidence that stress disorders, including PTSD, are more common 
among soldiers than previously believed, but it also highlights that there is a “growing 
recognition that minimal to moderate brain traumas have chronic effects” and can have 
“long-term implications for future care requirements and associated costs.” Nevertheless, 
the report is optimistic of the possibility of remedying these issues, stating that 
“Neuroscience research into immediate care in combat areas, rehabilitation, new 
pharmaceutical treatments, and diagnostic tools can provide solutions to these 
problems.”377 
Given these considerations, it is perhaps no surprise that R&D for preventing and 
countering the psychological as well as neurological effects of war have been pursued in 
earnest in the last decade. Not only was there a demand for such measures, but the 
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advancements in science also seemed to promise some solutions to these problems. Yet, 
this apparent increase in military R&D of treatment and prevention measures to combat-
related psychiatric illnesses also raises some interesting questions. For one, this is not the 
first time in which neuroscience-based research could have helped the US military in 
mitigating the negative psychiatric effects of combat. During the Vietnam War, the 
emergence of psychotropic drugs also provided the US military an opportunity to leverage 
the research momentum in psychopharmacology for dealing with combat-related traumatic 
stress. However, the military did not make any visible investments in this area of emerging 
R&D during that time.  
This is particularly perplexing, not only because it was largely due to the 
experiences of Vietnam War veterans that PTSD as a psychiatric diagnosis, which had 
become the defining model of traumatic stress-related psychiatric disorder, was created in 
the late 1970s, but also because certain military medical R&D organizations, such as the 
US Army Medical Research and Development Command (USAMRDC - USMRMC since 
1994) “saw its budget for medical research grow more than fivefold during the Vietnam 
era from the sum of $12 million in 1958 to more than $53 million in 1968.”378 Furthermore, 
psychiatric casualties due to combat stress were an operational concern for the military 
during the Vietnam War, and significant advances in treatments of psychiatric disorders 
had been made through the development of psychotropic drugs just the decade before the 
US involvement in Vietnam. Given these circumstances, there seemed to be no reason as 
to why the US military would not invest in the R&D of the then-emerging 
psychopharmacology for treating or managing combat stress. 
Nevertheless, psychopharmacology did not attract military R&D investment during 
Vietnam. As a telling example, according to Vietnam War-era annual research reports from 
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the Neuropsychiatry Division at Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR), the 
premier military medical research organization on neuroscience and psychiatry during that 
time, there were no research projects that examined the efficacies of existing psychotropic 
medications that were used in theater in Vietnam, nor was there any effort toward research, 
development, or refinement in the then-emerging field of psychopharmacology. Why was 
this so? 
This chapter examines this discrepancy in the R&D investment in 
neuropsychopharmacology between the Vietnam War era and the one after September 11, 
2001. It first provides a history of the evolution in the understanding of combat stress, 
trauma reactions, and the development of psychiatric practices and treatment measures in 
the military. This chapter then analyzes the different scientific contexts under which 
combat stress-related psychiatric disorders have been understood between the Vietnam 
War era and the present. It is argued that when compared to the present, post-September 
11 era, the predominant psychosocial model of combat stress reaction and psychiatric care 
during the Vietnam War created a conceptual barrier to recognizing psychopharmacology 
as a viable area of investment for treating combat stress. This chapter provides an analysis 
of how the shifting scientific understanding of psychiatry and the changing 
conceptualization of trauma and stress interact with political forces to create these two 
quite different pictures in the R&D for combat stress-related treatments and prevention. 
6.1 Combat Stress, Psychiatry, and Neuroscience – A Historical Overview 
The following section provides an overview on the evolving understanding of 
combat stress, psychiatry (particularly military psychiatry), and neuroscience. It serves two 
purposes: First, it provides the historical context under which combat stress can be studied, 
particularly with regard to how it is understood in American military psychiatry before, 
during, and after the Vietnam War. Second, it defines within the process of recounting the 
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history several important concepts that are used in the analysis in this chapter, including 
how illnesses such as PTSD arose as a diagnostic category and how it has changed in terms 
of its diagnostic criteria over time. This section shows that the concept of trauma and stress 
has always been part of the debate on the dualism between mind and body, and that the 
neurobiologicalization of the psychiatric profession toward the end of the 20th century has 
contributed to the R&D of therapeutic measures in addressing combat stress. 
6.1.1 “Shell Shock” – Combat Stress Prior to World War II 
The impact of war on human psyche is a timeless issue. Researchers today studying 
psychiatric reactions to wartime stress claim that the mental impact of war can been found 
in the records of history throughout the ages. Some, for instance, noted a recorded incident 
from the Battle of Marathon (which took place 490 BC) where an otherwise fine and brave 
soldier became blind without any physical injury after witnessing a fellow soldier killed in 
action.379 According to them, similar accounts can be gleaned throughout classic Greco-
Roman (as well as other) tales of wars and battles, found in literary work, and studied from 
memoirs.380 Yet, while the impact of war on human psyche has always been known and 
recorded, it also seems to be conveniently forgotten or fallen into obscurity once a society 
enters a period of relative peace. As the war ends and the memories of the battles fade, the 
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interest to understand what happens to those returning from the war as a changed person 
with mental illnesses also wanes. 
With the industrial revolution, however, the increasing use of machineries such as 
steamed locomotives brought with it man-made, large-scale disasters outside the 
battlefield. Railroad disasters, for instance, caused survivors to display symptoms that were 
reminiscent of those who survived the frontlines. Unusual and lasting reactions from these 
events brought back the need to understand the impact that disastrous events had on human 
body and psyche, especially when some symptoms, seemingly psychological or “mental,” 
could not be attributed to observable damages (such as fractures or lesions, etc.) on the 
human body. This not only led to the creation of the terms such as “railway spine,” and 
later, “traumatic neurosis,” that were used to describe these survivors’ abnormal 
reactions,381 but it also caused a controversy in the longstanding debate on mind and body. 
Some argued that the symptoms were caused by microscopic lesions in the brain or spine, 
while others claimed that the reactions were mental in nature due to the trauma from the 
shock of the incident. Before the argument on the etiology of the “railway spine” was 
settled, however, this debate manifested itself back on the battlefields of the American 
Civil War. 
During the American Civil War, physicians observed in soldiers symptoms such as 
anxiety, rapid pulse, and trouble breathing, and it was hypothesized that the stress and the 
traumatic experience of the battlefield led some to suffer from an overstimulation of the 
heart’s nervous system, for which this syndrome received the name “Soldier’s Heart” or 
“Irritable Heart.” At the same time, however, other symptoms that also appeared which 
seemed less somatic in nature, such as depression, sleeping problems, emotional numbing, 
disassociation, and recurring nightmares, were viewed as based on mechanisms outside the 
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cardiac system and were identified through a resurrected term of “nostalgia.” The 
protracted nature of the American Civil War resurfaced the issue of war experience-
induced psychiatric trauma which, at that point, produced a specific kind of mental illness 
that were implicated with both somatic-organic as well as mental-emotional etiologies. 
This mind-body dualism in the cause of the symptoms notwithstanding, many soldiers who 
were afflicted with these symptoms during the war continued to suffer from them after 
returning home. In an account of the post-war experiences of Indiana’s Civil War veterans, 
Eric Dean, Jr. made the following conclusion: 
one can find [in these veterans] a wide array of symptoms consistent with 
the diagnosis of PTSD (of both acute and delayed variants), although many 
of these veterans seemed eventually to develop more serious, chronic 
mental disorders that left them completely disabled and, often, totally out 
of touch with reality—living in a kind of personal hell in which they were 
constantly in fear of being killed or maimed, or in which they continued to 
relive the battles and horrific experiences of the Civil War.382 
The war experience, thus, seemed to have created a generation of trouble veterans, not 
unlike what occurred a century later as a result of US engagements in Indochina. 
The unresolved issue of whether the stress and trauma reactions stemmed from 
somatic or mental roots continued into World War I. It was during this time leading up to 
the Great War that the concept of “traumatic hysteria,” discovered and coined by Sigmund 
Freud and with its correlates of dissociation, the pathogenic role in forgotten memories, 
and cathartic treatments, had taken hold alongside the more somatically-oriented term of 
neurosis.383 As the shells began to fall along the trench lines on the Western Front and 
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psychiatric casualties started flooding in from the frontlines, however, the question of 
etiology of war reactions urgently needed an answer. Reports started to appear of soldiers 
suffering from some kind of mental disturbance due to the shells. The massively increased 
firepower with large caliber artillery and explosives produced a kind of casualty in large 
numbers that the physicians were unprepared for: some of the soldiers were blinded; others 
became deaf, numb, or semi-paralyzed; still others seemed to have lost their memories or 
abilities to function and react and existed in state of stupor.384 What many of them had in 
common, however, were that they had experienced being shelled on or being near an 
explosive but was able to luckily escape unscathed physically. This led to the creation of 
the term “shell shock” in 1915, which soon took hold in describing this new form of 
psychiatric casualty. 
Yet, despite the term “shell shock” seemed to imply some form of physical trauma 
done to afflicted soldiers, the true origins of these cases of psychiatric casualty remained a 
heated debate. Many physicians were inclined to think that the cause was physical in some 
way, that by being near an exploding shell or mine some aspects of a soldier’s central 
nervous system were damaged, potentially by the concussive forces, though no one knew 
for sure how it worked. Yet, there were also those who believed that the origin of the 
reactions were emotional or psychological, that it was the traumatic experience of seeing 
their comrades dying and the intensity of the war that led to the mental breakdown of these 
soldiers. The fact that some soldiers who reported a narrow escape from an exploding shell 
nearby were able to move on from the incident without developing shell shock seemed to 
support the psychological interpretation. Furthermore, as was found in a June 1916 report 
by Harold Wiltshire, a British physician serving at a base in France, none of those who 
were actually wounded by the exploding shells physically displayed symptoms of shell 
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shock, and in many cases of reported shell shock, the soldier was not even near an 
exploding shell.385 The Wiltshire report thus casted even greater doubts over the biological, 
somatic explanation of shell shock. 
At the same time, the academic issue of etiology was further complicated by other 
pragmatic concerns. Aside from the considerations for the potential of malingering and the 
pension implications of shell-shocked soldiers, one such concern was that as the trench war 
wore on, the evacuated psychiatric casualties from shell shock flooded the hospitals, 
particularly in Britain. This caused not only a large loss of manpower but also significant 
problems back at home. Almost by necessity, the treatment for psychiatric casualties had 
to be conducted closer to the frontline. It was further noticed that those treated closer to the 
frontline, within the military milieu and with support from comrades and a clear 
expectation to return to duty, had a better chance of recovery than those evacuated to the 
rear. Forward treatment as a result became standard, partially out of necessity, but also 
because it was shown to be effective in handling cases of psychiatric casualty, including 
shell shocks. Its principles, summarized by American psychiatrist Thomas Salmon who 
was with the American Expeditionary Force in France, included proximity, immediacy, 
and expectancy (PIE).386 This forward treatment doctrine, as will be explained in more 
detail below in section 6.3.2, became one of the most lasting legacies of military psychiatry 
from World War I and was implemented during World War II and subsequent major 
conflicts in the US military. 
The discovery of the effectiveness of forward treatment doctrine, along with 
increasing evidence that shell shock arose out of psychic trauma instead of physical ones, 
helped marginalize the biological/somatic views of combat stress and trauma reaction, 
despite the term shell shock continued to be used widely during that time period. An 
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alternative term of French origin, “war neurosis,” which was less specific in implicating a 
cause, also emerged. As was reflected later on during the Vietnam War regarding the 
importance of World War I, Peter Bourne commented that, 
It is only since World War I that the Medical Corps has been called upon to 
prevent and treat psychiatric casualties in an effort to conserve the fighting 
strength. At that time because the primary cause of such casualties was 
apparently artillery fire the term “Shell Shock”, was coined. This term was 
unfortunate because it led many people, both patients and physicians to 
believe that it was an organic disorder. By the early part of World War II 
this concept had been discarded, and such terms as “psychoneurosis, anxiety 
state”, “psychoneurosis mixed”, and conversion hysteria” were being 
used.387 
While the etiological debate on psychiatric reactions to war trauma and stress was not 
definitively “solved” as a result of World War I, a certain model of understanding war 
neurosis and its treatment was established for later operations, and that model tried its best 
to downplay the physical nature of reactions to combat stress and trauma. As will be seen 
below, however, almost a century later, the post September 11 American experience from 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq would show that the neurophysiological roots to stress 
and trauma reaction, not unlike what was suspected from the organic explanation of shell 
shock during this time, could in fact be quite important in understanding war-induced 
psychiatric disorders. 
6.1.2 Combat Fatigue – World War II to Vietnam 
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Despite the impact that psychiatric casualties such as shell shock victims had on 
WWI, most countries seemed rather ill-prepared for World War II. Part of the reason was 
perhaps that the twenty years of relative peace provided some space between the experience 
from the previous war and the needs of the current one. According to historian Ben 
Shephard, the time gap was enough for the relationship between psychiatrists and the 
military to lapse and require rebuild.388 Furthermore, WWII ended up being a type of war 
that was quite different from WWI, where the diverse geographical locations and 
intermittent fighting produced a different kind of psychological stress. For most militaries 
in different theaters with different hierarchies, psychiatric care was ignored until it became 
urgently needed. In any case, the insights derived from the WWI experience, particularly 
how to provide battlefield psychiatric care in order to retain force strength, were only 
resurrected after some time into the war as the need to manage psychiatric casualties 
became apparent. 
One particular area of psychiatric practice that countries did learn from WWI, 
however, was the belief in the need of a rigorous psychiatric screening. Given the nature 
of shell shock patients and the influx of psychiatric casualties once the war started, any 
preventive measures that could be taken to avoid the same kind of operational nightmare 
seemed warranted and desirable. Certainly, “If there was one lesson British doctors took 
away from their experiences in the Great War,” it was the need for selection: “Vulnerable 
people like ‘misfits’ and ‘congenital defectives’ must be kept away from the battlefield by 
‘efficient examination of recruits.’”389 This wisdom translated outside Great Britain as 
well. For instance, in the United States, Henry Stack Sullivan, a Neo-Freudian 
psychoanalyst known for his work on the interpersonal theory of psychiatry, served as a 
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consultant to the Selective Service Commission during WWII. “Captive to his theory that 
anxiety is universally pathogenic,” Sullivan promoted policies “that resulted in the 
rejection of young men…if they showed any taint of anxiety or neurotic tendencies,” 
including neuropathic traits such as nail biting.390 As a result of these policies, 
approximately one out of every seven men were deemed ineffective for service due to 
mental or emotional defects. 
To what extent was this selection effective? According to William Menninger in 
his review of WWI and WWII statistics, during WWI, with a more liberal selection policy, 
approximately two percent of inductees were rejected for neuropsychiatric reasons and 
only two percent of the soldiers experienced a breakdown during the war. The more strict 
policy during WWII set by Sullivan, however, led to a rejection rate 11% of all inductees, 
while the rate of breakdown mounted to a staggering 12%.391 The belief that psychiatric 
casualties can be minimized by screening out those with propensity to emotional or 
psychiatric breakdowns, thus, was shown to be unfounded, at least from the evidence 
derived from the World War II experience. 
In addition to its inability to prevent psychiatric casualties, the practice of screening 
had another rather undesirable consequence—it precluded any advanced preparation for 
treating a large number of psychiatric casualties on the battlefield. This was certainly the 
case for the United States, which, for the first two years of its involvement in the war, had 
no psychiatric care personnel or service available at the division or field army level. It was 
not until psychiatric casualties started to turn out in droves in North Africa that more 
systematic forward psychiatric treatment was deployed in the US military. Fred Hanson, a 
psychiatrist who had served in England with the Canadian Army, helped resurrect the 
                                                 
390 Franklin D. Jones, “Military Psychiatry Since World War II,” in American Psychiatry After 
World War II (1944-1994), eds. Roy W. Menninger and John C. Nemiah (Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Press, Inc., 2000), 6-7. See also Shephard (2000), 197-201. 
391 Jones, “Military Psychiatry” (2000), 7. 
 220 
wisdom lost from WWI. In particular, he had a firm belief that most cases of war neuroses 
were due to sheer exhaustion, which lowered a soldier’s ability to adapt to the emotional 
strain of war. He thus advocated a simple treatment regimen close to the frontline that 
involved physical recuperation, counseling, ventilation, and persuasive suggestion to return 
to duty. 
While Hanson’s method may have appeared rather crude and simplistic, it seemed 
to provide the solution the American military needed: “during the battles of Maknassy and 
El Guettar,” he was able to return “‘more than 70% of 494 neuropsychiatric casualties to 
combat after 48 hours of treatment.’”392 It was due to Hanson’s rediscovery of WWI 
principles of battlefield psychiatric care, along with an emphasis on the problems caused 
by exhaustion, that forward psychiatry was re-established in the American military during 
the later years of WWII. “Combat exhaustion” or “combat fatigue,” for this reason, also 
became the first-line diagnosis for psychiatric or emotional reactions to battlefield stress. 
As a result of the WWII experience, psychiatric screening was deemed to be 
ineffective at preventing psychiatric casualties, the PIE principles of battlefield psychiatric 
care were reestablished, and a new emphasis on fatigue and exhaustion, a biophysiological 
explanation for combat stress, was recognized. Although, at the outset of the Korean War, 
the US military was not prepared for battlefield psychiatric care in advance, the WWII 
experiences allowed a combat psychiatric program to be quickly established soon 
afterwards. For the most part, due to these measures, psychiatric casualties seemed to be 
relatively well-managed during the Korean War. Upon the completion of the war, much of 
the insight from the WWII and Korean War experiences became codified in the military 
doctrine (see section 6.3.1 below for more detailed analysis) regarding military psychiatry. 
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Despite the protracted nature of WWII, however, there was very little additional 
analysis on the effects that war trauma has on an individual, unlike the extensive literature 
that was built around the cases of shell shock in WWI.393 One exception was the work done 
by Roy Grinker, a psychiatrist at the University of Chicago and a contemporary of Fred 
Hanson, who served in the US Army Medical Corps during the war in North Africa. In his 
1943 book War Neuroses in North Africa and 1945 book Men Under Stress with John 
Spiegel, which were based on his study of psychiatric casualties among the fliers as well 
as his experience in treating them in North Africa, he posited an explanation of war neurosis 
based on psychoanalytical theories and proposed treatment methods through some form of 
abreactive, cathartic psychotherapy aided by barbiturates, which he called 
“narcosynthesis.” In particular, Grinker and Spiegel claim that for most soldiers and 
airmen, psychological breakdown comes from the weakening of an individual’s ego’s 
strength due to battlefield stress, and the individual is either able to master the 
circumstances in the harsh reality that causes the struggle or would resort to a “neurotic 
compromise and partial defeat.”394 In other words, the psychiatric reactions are a result of 
an individual’s ego losing control of its ability to deal with the environment, and “The 
observable clinical symptoms, the anxieties, the phobic reactions, the host of physical and 
psychological responses to battle stress, should be considered as manifestations of this loss 
of control.”395 While the extensive and explorative nature of narcosynthesis as a therapy 
measure made it difficult to be used extensively and deployed widely on the battlefield, it 
was nevertheless incorporated into the military psychiatric doctrine in the aftermath of the 
Korean War, and Grinker’s articulation of war neurosis also provided the “academic” 
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backing to the psychoanalytical model of war stress that the US military adopted during 
the Vietnam War. 
Another unexpected result of WWII was that it brought psychiatrists from all over 
the world to the United States, and it was becoming apparent at the time that psychiatry as 
a profession lacked standardization. Multiple approaches to understanding mental illnesses 
from different conceptual frameworks using different languages prevented researchers and 
practitioners alike from effectively communicating with each other. This led to the effort 
of developing the first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-I) 
from the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in 1952. Recognizing the need to have 
a way to describe the observed phenomenon of stress reaction that have been seen in the 
two World Wars, DSM-I included a diagnosis, “gross stress reaction,” under the category 
of Transient Situational Personality Disorders. In particular, the diagnosis states that it can 
occur “in situations in which the individual has been exposed to severe physical demands 
or extreme emotional stress, such as in combat or in civilian catastrophe (fire, earthquake, 
explosion, etc.),” but the reactions, which did not include any description of symptoms, 
should be transient and reversible.396 While for clinical use such a vague diagnosis is not 
the most valuable, it does reveal an interest, at least among some in the psychiatric 
community, to codify the war experiences of stress reaction into psychiatric practices. As 
shown below, the way that psychiatry as a profession structures its clinical practices has a 
profound impact on the way military understands combat stress and war trauma. 
6.1.3 Vietnam and Post-Vietnam Era: The Emergence of PTSD and ASD 
The experience from WWII and the subsequent implementation of forward 
psychiatric treatment during the Korean War had a tremendous impact on the Vietnam 
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War. As explored in more detail below, the very model of battlefield psychiatric care and 
management of war stress reactions during the Vietnam War reflected a culmination of 
insights gleaned from these previous engagements. In fact, at the outset of major US 
involvement in Vietnam in 1965, a fully implemented psychiatric care program was in 
place, ready for an anticipated influx of a large number of psychiatric casualties. While 
such an influx never fully materialized during the early stages of the war, the 
implementation of frontline psychiatric care showed that there was increasing awareness 
of the need to manage psychiatric reactions as part of war planning. 
The relationship between the Vietnam War and psychiatric care can be broadly 
understood in three phases. In the earliest days of the conflict, the issue of psychiatric 
casualty was not a major concern, and there were few reports of actual incidents. As the 
war intensified, the theater saw a build-up of the troops, and psychiatric casualties also 
grew but continued to be maintained at a relatively low rate. As troops began to withdraw 
toward the later stages of the war, however, a relatively large number of psychiatric 
casualties that did not follow the traditional patterns of combat stress reactions began to 
take place.397 Psychiatric casualty management in the war zone in Vietnam, thus, seemed 
to have been relatively successful at least in the early stages of the war. However, as 
significant numbers of veterans returning from Vietnam in its aftermath during the 1970s 
began to show psychological and physiological symptoms related to their time in Southeast 
Asia, their difficulties attracted societal attention and prompted the creation of the 
diagnosis of PTSD, which became one of the most important medical legacies of the era. 
Following the practice of treating psychiatric casualties from the two World Wars, 
the initial periods of deployment and buildup in Vietnam saw a range of psychiatric service 
that followed primarily the principles of PIE. Despite the widespread and intermittent 
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nature of the combat, few cases of psychiatric casualties due to combat stress were reported. 
Part of this was likely due to the forward deployment of psychiatric services, but the low 
intensity of the conflict for the most part and the short deployment cycles (which has been 
established since Korean War as a means to prevent combat fatigue and exhaustion) also 
seemed to help lessen the incidences of psychiatric casualties than was originally 
anticipated. According to some early, optimistic reports from Vietnam on battlefield 
management of psychiatric reactions to combat stress, “Psychiatric casualties need never 
again become a major cause of attrition in the United States military in a combat zone.”398 
This view changed, however, toward the end of the 1960s. For one, there was an increasing 
rate of substance abuse and behavioral disorders, which were suspected by some to be a 
result of a decline in troop morale. There was also an increased prevalence of the “short-
timer syndrome” that was caused by the one-year rotational system. By the time of troop 
drawdown in the early 1970s, psychiatric casualties mounted, most of which due to 
substance abuse. Thus, unlike WWII and the Korean War, in which initial measures of 
battlefield psychiatric care were lacking but the management of psychiatric casualties over 
time improved during the war, the Vietnam War saw the opposite trend. 
What was perhaps the most striking about the Vietnam War, however, was the 
amount of veterans who, having returned home, began to experience delayed onset 
symptoms that were related to their war experiences. Although the numbers were subject 
to some debate, many veterans reported recurring nightmares, difficulty of relating to 
people back at home, and problems adjusting back to civilian life. In addition, these 
veterans also experienced continued physiological arousal or heightened anxiety, which 
were reflected in symptoms such as difficulty to concentrate or sleep, irritability, and 
hypervigilance. These symptoms reminiscent of certain aspects of combat stress were 
                                                 
398 Peter G. Bourne, “Military Psychiatry and the Viet Nam Experience,” American Journal of 
Psychiatry 127(4) (October 1970): 487. 
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especially paradoxical, considering that during most of the war psychiatric reactions to 
wartime trauma and stress were considered to be relatively well-managed. 
Some suspected that the veterans’ experience was related to the broader societal 
trend at the time. For one, as the war dragged on in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it 
became increasingly unpopular among the civilian population in the United States, and 
those who served in the war did not enjoy a warm welcome as they returned home. As 
Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely described, the psychiatric woes that Vietnam veterans 
faced “lay not only in the jungles of southeast Asia, but also in the social climate of an 
America that was turning against the military in general.”399 This social climate not only 
impeded the veterans’ ability to reconcile their war experiences with their civilian lives, 
but it also potentially limited the social support to veterans who may have, in fact, been 
suffering from war trauma. 
In addition to larger social trends, the veterans returning home from the Vietnam 
War were also facing certain “technical” issues from the psychiatric profession. In the 1968 
revision to the DSM, the diagnosis for “gross stress reaction” was eliminated. It was not 
entirely clear why that was the case, though some suggested that since the revision was 
written during a time of relative peace, it may have a skewed view of traumatic stress 
reactions, which seemed to be a highly war- or combat-relevant type of mental disorder.400 
Therefore, during peacetime, such a diagnosis became less relevant and needed. Whatever 
the reason, the elimination of such a diagnosis that at least could have provided a name to 
war-related trauma reactions became an impediment for veterans in dealing with hospitals, 
insurance companies, or courts, in which an official diagnosis that categorized their 
                                                 
399 Jones and Wessely (2006), 212 
400 Nancy C. Andreasen, “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A History and a Critique,” Annals of the 
New York Academy of Sciences 1208 (October 2010): 68. In DSM-II, the diagnosis that most closely 
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sickness was needed.401 As result, in the then-ongoing process of revising the DSM-II from 
1968 at the end of the Vietnam War, conscious efforts were made by activists and other 
psychiatrists who have worked with veterans to put in the next DSM a diagnosis for the 
psychiatric conditions from which many veterans were suffering.402 
The diagnosis of PTSD was adopted in the DSM-III published in 1980, but its 
inclusion was not without debate despite the recognition that its creation rectified some of 
the problems that Vietnam War veterans were facing. While the proponents of the 
diagnosis of PTSD reify the concept as a “universal” reaction to distress and trauma, others 
holding a more critical view suggest that such reactions are a natural part of the human 
experience under distress, and that such reactions should not be considered a disorder. Still 
others, noting the social-political nature of its creation, have doubted its objective 
existence.403 Nevertheless, as the concept of trauma and the related stress symptoms that 
follow became solidified in the medical literature, it soon gained wide acceptance by the 
society at large. It also spurred intense research effort into psychological as well as 
physiological understandings of the effects of trauma and stress, that “During the 1980s an 
enormous quantity of time and money was spent in investigating Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, and the resulting literature was infinite.”404 If nothing else, its inclusion in the 
medical nosology and the specification of its diagnostic criteria in terms of measurable 
symptoms provided focal points for clinical as well as academic research of this complex 
disorder. 
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In the 1980 DSM-III, PTSD was first introduced as an anxiety disorder that is 
precipitated by an etiological event that is outside the range of usual human experience.405 
This event, as the stressor, should according to the diagnostic criteria evoke significant 
symptoms in almost anyone, and the symptoms include reliving of the traumatic event, 
emotional numbing or dissociation, and hyperarousal (such as hyperalertness, sleep 
disturbances, or concentration difficulty).406 The disorder may be: a) acute (defined as an 
onset of symptoms within six months of trauma and with a duration of symptoms less than 
six months), or b) delayed (onset of symptom after six months from the event) and/or 
chronic (with the duration of symptoms lasting more than six months). Although hardly a 
precise definition, the presence of a traumatic event or experience as the cause to later 
psychiatric reactions set PTSD apart from other illnesses. 
Over the next few decades, however, the diagnostic criteria for PTSD continued to 
evolve. For one, the concept of a traumatic event as the etiological stressor and the ways 
through which it is “experienced” by the patient widened in the later revisions. For 
instance, in the 1987 revision to DSM-III (DSM-III-R), the patient no longer needed to be 
a direct participant in the traumatic event—indirect experience, such as witnessing or 
hearing about harm done to another individual, can be enough of a cause as a traumatic 
stressor. This change was solidified in the 1994 DSM-IV, in which the criterion to 
experience the traumatic event can be: a) direct personal experience “of an event that 
involves actual or threatened death or serious injury, or other threats to one’s physical 
                                                 
405 It should also be noted that by the time the discussion to create a diagnostic category of PTSD 
was underway in the 1970s, the issue of stress reactions to traumatic events were not limited to Vietnam 
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captures the common elements in the illnesses that were frequently observed among those who had 
traumatic experiences. 
406 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(Third Edition) (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1980), 238. Hereafter shortened in 
subsequent references as DSM-III. 
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integrity,”407 b) witnessing an event that involves those types of threats to others, or c) 
learning about unexpected deaths or serious harm experienced by family members or close 
associates. Furthermore, in DSM-IV, the types and examples of such stressful events were 
broadened to include being diagnosed with life-threatening illnesses or traumatic 
experiences during childhood. In the most recent revision of the DSM in 2013 (DSM-5), 
the diagnostic criteria for the stressor event was further broadened to include “repeated or 
extreme indirect exposure to aversive details of the event(s), usually in the course of 
professional duties.”408 The broadening of the stressor event diagnostic criteria over time 
has allowed a wider range of patients to be identified with PTSD, some potentially with a 
delayed onset of symptoms much later in life from trauma suffered in early stages of life. 
Another component of the diagnostic criteria that has been the subject of revisions 
and debates concerns the symptoms of emotional numbing and dissociation. In the original 
definition of PTSD as articulated in the DSM-III, one of the diagnostic criteria was 
dissociation shown through emotional numbing or reduced involvement with the external 
world (termed in the diagnosis as “psychic numbing” or “emotional anesthesia”), and the 
symptoms for the criteria were refined in the DSM-III-R to include a broader range of 
behaviors, including specific acts of avoiding thoughts related to the trauma or activities 
that could remind the patient of the trauma. These dissociative types of symptoms have 
since DSM-III-R received increased diagnostic weight: for example, both DSM-III-R and 
DSM-IV required three or more of the symptoms to fall under the criteria of emotional 
numbing and dissociation in order for the diagnosis of PTSD to be made for a patient. This 
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particular criterion, which according to some “introduced a psychodynamic coloring that 
was not intended,”409 was reflective of an implicit assumption of the Freudian 
conceptualization of response to trauma, which included attempts to relive the event as 
well as attempts to avoid or defend against the recollections of the event.410 In the most 
recent revision of the DSM, symptoms of avoidance and emotional numbing (termed 
negative alterations in cognitions and mood) are separated into two distinct diagnostic 
criteria for PTSD, and an additional dissociative subtype of the disorder is added to set 
apart certain dissociative traits of the disorder such as depersonalization and derealization. 
These changes in the diagnostic criteria reflect an increasing emphasis on the dissociative 
component of trauma and stress reaction. 
Finally, there have been several changes to the criteria regarding time to onset of 
symptoms and symptom duration. Although in the original DSM-III definition, both acute 
and chronic forms of the disorder as well as the delayed onset of symptoms were specified 
as subtypes of the disorder, these distinction disappeared in the DSM-III-R. Although an 
additional diagnostic criteria of symptoms lasting more than one month was added, there 
was otherwise no mention of an acute form of the disorder in DSM-III-R, and it was noted 
only that the disorder should have a specification of delayed onset if the symptoms 
appeared six months after the traumatic event. In the 1994 DSM-IV, however, the 
distinction of acute and chronic forms was again made as specifications, with the temporal 
marker reduced from six months to three months, only to be removed again in the DSM-5. 
However, since DSM-IV, an additional category of Acute Stress Disorder (ASD) was 
created. In diagnostic terms, ASD resembles PTSD, with greater emphasis on the 
dissociative symptoms such as numbing, depersonalization, or dissociative amnesia and 
with symptoms that last for a minimum of two days, but no more than four weeks and occur 
                                                 
409 Andreasen (2010), 69-70. 
410 Elizabeth A. Brett, Robert L. Spitzer, and Janet B.W. Williams, “DSM-III-R Criteria for 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder,” The American Journal of Psychiatry 145(10) (October 1988): 1232. 
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within four weeks of a traumatic event. Both ASD and PTSD in DSM-IV and 5 also require 
that the disturbances cause “clinically significant distress or impairment” in one’s ability 
to function in order for the diagnosis to be made. 
These revisions on the duration and onset of symptoms have a couple of important 
ramifications. First, the symptoms of stress and trauma related psychiatric reactions or 
mental disorders can occur at various time points with various durations after a traumatic 
event. These revisions showed an increasing recognition that traumatic stress induced 
reactions can occupy a wide time spectrum. This helps connect immediate stress reactions 
to the more delayed and long-term illnesses due to traumatic stress. Second, by 
differentiating between ASD and PTSD, there is also increased understanding that 
traumatic stress can lead to significant psychiatric conditions that impact an individual’s 
ability to function in the immediate aftermath of trauma, and that its management may be 
important for preventing the disorder from spiraling into a more long-term form. 
The understanding of PTSD and the revisions of its diagnostic criteria developed 
along with several other important trends during the 1980s and 1990s. For one, the growing 
weight in the dissociative symptoms in diagnosing PTSD and the lengthening of 
timeframes under which the reactions to a traumatic event may occur reflect an emphasis 
on the central role of “traumatic memory,” which according to Freud and Pierre Janet leads 
to repression and dissociation.411 There was growing interest from the mid-1980s to the 
early 1990s regarding dissociative aspects of trauma and its repressed memories, and the 
discussions on the traumatic memory as the basis PTSD echoed this trend.412 In addition, 
extending from the psychological models of traumatic memory, some of the hypotheses 
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implicating different brain regions involved in the memory consolidation process (such as 
the amygdala and hippocampus, the mechanisms for which are explained in more detail 
below) were also developed during this time to explain the symptoms of PTSD. As imaging 
and other neuroscientific techniques improved over time, some of these hypotheses have 
been able to move beyond animal models and be examined within PTSD patients. 
The recognition that traumatic stress reactions can occur along a wide temporal 
spectrum has also allowed finer distinctions to be made regarding reactions to combat stress 
within the military setting.413 During the last couple of decades in the 20th century, the 
term of combat stress reaction (CSR or currently at least within the US, combat and 
operational stress reaction (COSR)) has emerged and become more widely used in lieu of 
terms such as combat exhaustion or combat fatigue used during earlier wars.414 Although 
CSR is primarily used to denote broadly the transient state of physical, emotional, 
cognitive, and behavioral reactions to combat or operational stress, it is generally 
recognized to be similar to the diagnosis of ASD in civilian nosology with the assumption 
of possibly an immediate onset.415 By understanding traumatic stress reactions along a time 
spectrum, combat stress reaction is placed in the context of its potential long-term 
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ramifications, such as PTSD. This practice also influences the way reactions to combat 
stress and war are viewed and managed. In particular, instead of understanding reactions 
to combat stress as only a transient physiological and emotional response and its psychiatric 
ramification in the long-term as something quite separate, the creation of PTSD and ASD 
helps situate CSR as a prognosis to a spectrum of traumatic stress disorder. 
Nevertheless, this evolution of PTSD as a mental disorder has raised as much 
awareness and attracted as much attention as it has caused concerns. For some, the doubt 
over the usefulness of PTSD as a psychiatric diagnosis comes from the increasing numbers 
of veterans seeking benefits for their war trauma who in fact just lack the interest to get 
themselves reintegrated into the society. Certain celebrated cases of PTSD from the 
Vietnam War, for instance, were later revealed to be fraudulent, and in some cases the 
patient had never even been to Vietnam or only served in rear-echelon units while there.416  
From a research and clinical standpoint, some of the earlier psychological 
explanations of PTSD have become increasingly challenged and discredited throughout the 
1990s. One of the central concern was that the prevailing explanation has not been able to 
account for all the instances in which PTSD did not develop even when one is subject to 
severe stress. PTSD proponents’ reliance on pathological records (such as those reporting 
PTSD like symptoms to the VA) rather than some sort of overall record of post-trauma 
incident report was said to have significantly skewed the perception of the prominence of 
the issue. Nevertheless, despite these concerns and questions, by the time of American 
involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s, PTSD had taken a firm hold in the 
American public’s understanding of stress, trauma, and war; with extensive research on its 
treatment and prevention, it has also become the dominant framework under which the 
management of traumatic stress reactions is considered. 
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6.1.4 Post 9/11 – Conflation of Traumatic Brain Injury and PTSD 
Aside from the problems of non-occurrence and individual susceptibility, the 
research on traumatic stress and PTSD has also been consistently challenged by the issue 
of comorbidity with other psychiatric or behavior disorders.417 By the early 2000s, it was 
known that patients suffering from PTSD frequently had comorbid substance abuse issues, 
antisocial personality disorder, and major depression.418 In fact, many aspects of PTSD 
overlaps with symptoms of these other disorders. For example, symptoms of hyperarousal, 
such as sleep disturbance and trouble concentrating, are also commonly found in patients 
with major depression. Symptoms of diminished interest and avoidance are not only 
present in major depression, but they can also occur in antisocial personality disorder. 
These symptom overlaps have made understanding the nature of PTSD and the effect that 
traumatic stress has on an individual more difficult. As noted in the introduction to this 
chapter, this problem of comorbidity became even more complicated since the US 
engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. The frequent co-occurrence of PTSD and TBI 
observed in OEF and OIF veterans has in particular added a neurobiological character to 
wartime trauma and stress reaction. 
It has been suspected that the prevalence of TBI from OEF and OIF is largely a 
result of the pervasive use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and the increased 
survival rate from blast injuries due to better protective equipment and improved 
medicine.419 According to a RAND report in 2008, approximately 19% of returning service 
members from OEF and OIF have had a possible TBI while deployed, and possibly as high 
as 7% are reporting both probable brain injury with concurrent PTSD or depression 
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symptoms.420 A different estimate from the Defense Veterans Brain Injury Center suggests 
that at least 30% of the troops in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq for four months or more 
likely have suffered some mild form of TBI as a result of the IEDs.421 Although accounts 
do vary, several epidemiological studies have supported the general notion that there is a 
prevalence of TBI in OEF and OIF veterans, which have earned TBI the status as the 
“signature injury” to these overseas operations. 
In the US military healthcare system, a TBI is defined as “traumatically induced 
structural injury and/or physiological disruption of brain function as a result of an external 
force.”422 TBI is indicated by new or worsening of at least one of the following signs 
immediately after the event that caused the trauma: any loss or decreased level of 
consciousness, any loss of memory for events immediately before or after the injury, any 
alteration in mental state, or any neurological or physiological deficits such as sensory loss 
or intracranial lesion. The external forces may take various forms, including causing the 
head to strike an object or being struck by one, causing acceleration or deceleration 
movements of the brain, or causing foreign objects penetrating the brain. Although not all 
people exposed to an explosive blast develop TBI, and many who have suffered some 
milder forms of TBI recover quickly, some do develop more persistent symptoms. 
Although traditional neurological injury from brain trauma during war has been 
understood primarily from more invasive types of injuries (such as blunt trauma that causes 
penetrations to the skull), most cases of TBI from OEF and OIF occur in a less intrusive 
and visible form and are mild in severity similar to what is colloquially known as 
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concussion. Although the definition of diagnostic criteria on mild TBI (mTBI) varies, at 
least in clinical practice by the VA and the DoD, mTBI entails loss of consciousness that 
lasts less than 30 minutes, with alteration of consciousness (including memory loss or 
disorientation) that lasts less than 24 hours. Structural imaging of the brain would appear 
normal for mTBI patients, for any physical injury is likely to be microscopic and not easily 
visible. Table 5 below summarizes these criteria in contrast to moderate or severe TBI. 
 
Table 5 - Severity Levels of TBI and Diagnostic Criteria 
  Mild Moderate Severe 
Diagnostic Criteria 
     Loss of consciousness < 30 minutes 
> 30 minutes &  
< 24 hours > 24 hours 
     Post-traumatic amnesia (memory loss) < 24 hours 
> 24 hours &  
< 7 days > 7 days 
     Confused or disoriented state < 24 hours > 24 hours > 24 hours 





Glasgow Coma Score (GCS) 13 - 15 9 - 12 < 9 
Sources: Traumatic Brain Injury and PTSD <http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/co-occurring/traumatic-
brain-injury-ptsd.asp>, DoD TBI World Wide Numbers since 2000 <http://dvbic.dcoe.mil/files/tbi-
numbers/DoD-TBI-Worldwide-Totals_2000-2016_Q1_May-16-2016_v1.0_2016-06-24.pdf>, Department of 
Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense, VA/DoD Clinical Practice Guideline for the Management of 
Concussion-Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (Washington, D.C.: Department of Veterans Affairs, 2016), 7. 
 
 
While the extent to which veterans of OEF and OIF are having the comorbidity of 
mTBI and PTSD varies depending on the account and there has been few full-scale studies, 
there is growing recognition of this trend in the medical as well as defense circles. 
According to Charles Hoge, former director of the Division of Psychiatry and 
Neurosciences at WRAIR from 2002 to 2009, and his colleagues, who surveyed over 2,500 
infantry soldiers three to four months after their return from Iraq, 44% of the soldiers who 
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reported loss of consciousness and 27% of those reporting altered mental status (such as 
being dazed or confused) from any kind of head injury sustained during deployment met 
the criteria for PTSD.423 This is compared to the 16% of those with other injuries and 9% 
without injuries. These results show that mild TBI is strongly associated with PTSD, 
although Hoge and his colleagues recognize that the specific neurological or biological 
mechanisms for such a strong association is still to be explained. This comorbidity of mTBI 
and PTSD presents a more complex medical picture for OEF and OIF veterans, but it also 
further strengthens the claim that further research towards understanding the neurological 
substrate of PTSD is warranted. 
Many mTBI-related symptoms (also referred to as post-concussive symptoms) are 
somatic in nature, but some do suffer cognitive and affective deficits. The somatic 
symptoms most often include fatigue, dizziness, or headache, whereas the cognitive and 
affective deficits can include symptoms that are also found in cases of PTSD, such as 
anxiety, depression, as well as various forms of hyperarousal or avoidance.424 While many 
patients are likely to experience these symptoms immediately following the event that leads 
to the injury (particularly the somatic symptoms) and are likely able to recover relatively 
quickly in several weeks or a few months, some do report symptoms that can last several 
years. The persistent symptoms are often emotional in nature in a manner highly 
reminiscent of PTSD: “‘free-floating anxiety, fearfulness, intense worry, generalized 
uneasiness, social withdrawal, interpersonal sensitivity and anxiety dreams.’”425 Figure 10 
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below shows the overlap of symptoms between PTSD and persistent symptoms from mTBI 
(termed in the figure as persistent post-concussive symptoms, or PPCS). 
 
 
Figure 10 - Symptom Overlap between PTSD and PPCS426 
 
As can be seen in Figure 10, patients of mTBI suffer from many of the symptoms 
that are also present in PTSD. Since in patients with comorbid mTBI and PTSD the 
etiological trauma that causes these symptoms can overlap, on the one hand, it becomes 
more difficult delineate between the psychological type of causes from the trauma (as in 
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traumatic memory) from the biochemical or physiological ones (such as microscopic 
lesions or wounds in the brain). Particularly for the veterans of OEF and OIF, since many 
cases of the mTBI were likely not documented at the time the traumatic event took place, 
the reporting of persistent symptoms would often take place only sometime after the event, 
which could lead to attribution errors.427 On the other hand, as explored in more detail 
below, the comorbidity provides further justification to studying the neurobiological nature 
of PTSD and reactions to combat stress. As discussed above, in the recent decades, more 
traditional psychological explanations of PTSD (such as the ones based on psychological 
impact of the traumatic memory) have become increasingly challenged. Aligning TBI with 
PTSD thus allows greater emphasis being placed on the potential neurological roots to the 
various psychiatric symptoms in patients suffering from traumatic stress. 
6.2 Neurological Models of Stress, Traumatic Memory, and Psychiatric Disorders 
The above section summarizes the historical contexts under which combat-related 
trauma and stress and their associated psychiatric impact have evolved. As noted, during 
the latter part of the 20th century, particularly after the creation of DSM-III, there has been 
an increase in research on the cognitive and neurological basis of traumatic stress reactions. 
In the following sections, the neurophysiological model of stress, the fear conditioning and 
memory consolidation cognitive neuroscience models of PTSD, and the neurological basis 
to TBI and PTSD are briefly summarized. This section does not intend to serve as a 
comprehensive review of the existing state of scientific literature on these subjects, nor 
does it try to suggest, in any way, that there is necessarily a consensus on the neurobiology 
to trauma and stress. Rather, it is intended to provide an overview of how neurobiological 
mechanisms have been leveraged to explain critical cognitive components that contribute 
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a complex psychiatric phenomenon such as stress-related disorders.428 By doing so, the 
following section also provides the scientific context as to why neurologically-based 
treatment and prevention to stress-related disorders have been able to gain the momentum 
in R&D efforts in the last few decades. 
6.2.1 Neurophysiology of Combat Stress 
For a warfighter, the experience in almost any kind of armed engagement is 
stressful. The battlefield’s uncertainties and its constant threat to one’s life create a highly 
stressful environment in which a warfighter operates. How does this stress impact the 
warfighters? Over the years, scientific research has established a neurophysiological basis 
of trauma and stress from which treatment and intervention measures can be built. This 
neurophysiological model of trauma and stress has also provided the foundation upon 
which a neurocognitive model of PTSD evolved. 
Several neurophysiological systems have been implicated in responses to stress, 
including the serotonin system, the opiate system, and the sex steroidal systems.429 
However, the most prominent explanations come from the activation of sympathetic 
nervous system through the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis. When under 
stress, particularly in a “fight-or-flight” situation, a person’s adrenal gland becomes active 
through the HPA axis that allows for greater release of cortisol from the adrenal cortices 
and epinephrine (adrenaline) from the adrenal medulla.430 The increasing level of 
epinephrine is part of the activation of the sympathetic nervous system that leads to the 
opening of the air pathways, the increased heartbeat, as well as the diversion of blood flow 
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to skeletal muscles (which allows for action). The high level of cortisol will also be released 
to suppress the immune system as well as to speed up the process of gluconeogenesis, 
which provides the “fuel” necessary for mental and physical operations. Although, in a 
limited quantity, the cortisol released by the adrenal glands during stressful situation allows 
a person to be more alert and attentive, a constant high level of stress can lead to permanent 
physiological changes. 
This potentially damaging effect of elevated levels of cortisol have been shown to 
impact the highly malleable hippocampus, particularly in the anterior portion of the 
structure where there is a significant concentration of glucocorticoid receptors that are 
activated by cortisol. A high level of cortisol has been shown to contribute to hippocampal 
atrophy, although the specific mechanisms is not fully known. It is hypothesized that 
impact of corticoid on the hippocampus could involve a regression in dendritic processes, 
an inhibition of neurogenesis, an impairment of neuron’s ability to survive coincident 
insults, or neurotoxicity.431 Some patients with PTSD have been found to have elevated 
levels of cortisol and, in some cases, enhanced sensitivity of glucocorticoid receptors. 
6.2.2 Fear Conditioning, Memory Consolidation, and PTSD 
The stress reaction that leads to the elevation of cortisol provides the 
neurophysiological context for a warfighter experiencing the traumatic stress of combat. 
However, the development of cognitively-related symptoms in stress reactions suggests 
that the functions of cognitive organs are likely also impacted in the development of 
disorders such as PTSD. The fear conditioning and memory consolidation models of 
neurocognitive processes are some of the areas that have been implicated in patients with 
stress-related disorder. 
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As a brain structure, the hippocampus is critical to the process of encoding short-
term memories into long-term ones along with certain spatial learning functions. Surgical 
removal of the anterior portion of a patient’s hippocampus has been shown to contribute to 
anterograde amnesia.432  Further experiments have confirmed that a concentrated level of 
cortisol can impair the formation of episodic memories via its impact on the 
hippocampus.433 It has also been revealed that some PTSD patients suffer from a reduction 
in volume of their hippocampus (possibly due to mechanisms stated above regarding the 
impact cortisol has on the hippocampus), and the degree of atrophy is correlated to the 
level of cognitive impairment experienced.434  These results point to the possibility that the 
high-level of stress experienced by those who developed PTSD can change a person’s 
physiology (in this particular case, the hippocampus) that contributes to later cognitive 
impairments. 
In addition to the impact that stress can place on the hippocampus, stressful 
situations also excite responses from the amygdala, a structure in the brain considered to 
be associated with the learning of emotional memories, particularly fear. More specifically, 
the amygdala has been found to be critical in the implicit learning of fear, which is most 
often demonstrated by the classic “fear conditioning.” For instance, in patients with 
dysfunctional amygdala, it was shown that they cannot be conditioned to respond to 
conditioned stimulus, even though these patients still show normal reactions to 
unconditioned stimulus.435 In other words, patients with dysfunctional amygdala can still 
respond to the unpleasant unconditioned stimulus and understand the concept of fear, but 
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they cannot be made to associate certain things (conditioned stimulus) with fear. Their 
emotional memory of fear, in short, is impaired. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Amygdala Pathways and Fear Conditioning436 
 
In recent years, scientists have developed a vision of how amygdala functions in 
the neuropathways of fear conditioning (see Figure 11). It is hypothesized that the human 
response to fear actually operates along two pathways simultaneously. The quick route, or 
the “low road,” sends the sensory emotional information directly to the lateral nucleus of 
the amygdala through the thalamus. The analysis that the thalamus can provide is limited, 
and the signal sent to the amygdala, as a result, is crude. However, by taking the direct 
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route, the body can respond quickly to the stimulus so it is prepared to act in a timely 
manner. The other route, the “high road,” follows memory consolidation through signals 
that are sent from the amygdala to the sensory cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex 
(particularly anterior cingulate cortex and orbitofrontal cortex, both of which have been 
implicated for decision-making, impulse control, and emotional processing), as well as 
several other brain regions that deal with fear reactions and avoidance behavior.437 These 
brain regions gate the processing of information generated from the fear signal, which is 
eventually processed at the hippocampus where memory consolidation occurs. As shown 
in Figure 11, the lateral nucleus of the amygdala serves an important gating mechanism 
through which fear response is activated. Its processing of fear stimulus is a critical step in 
the regulated release of catecholamine, including both the adrenocorticotropic ones as well 
as cortisol. 
This neuropathway analysis shows that the recurrence of nightmares and war-time 
trauma in PTSD patients is possibly due to the blunting of the hippocampal memory 
process. This can be a result of the stress combined with the increased activity in the 
amygdala that lead to an impairment in properly coding and analyzing the traumatic 
experiences. In other words, the mitigating “high-road” that involves the mediating effect 
that the medial prefrontal cortex has on the amygdala is impaired in PTSD patients, and all 
stimuli that resemble the conditioned fear stimuli (such as loud sound, light flashes, etc.) 
will cause signals to be sent directly through the amygdala, which leads to increased 
adrenergic and noradrenergic activities. In this sense, using blockers for α and/or β-
adrenergic receptors (such as the increasing interest on the use of propranolol) could 
decrease the impact of the catecholamine and reduce the possibility of conditioning one to 
a fear stimulus. Furthermore, this neurological model of fear conditioning and memory 
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consolidation supports the evidence-based treatment methods such as cognitive-behavioral 
and exposure therapies. 
6.2.3 Neurology of TBI and Comorbidity with PTSD 
As discussed above, recent increase in the comorbidity of TBI and PTSD in OEF 
and OIF veterans have prompted greater examination on the neurophysiological 
mechanisms underlying PTSD. Certainly, the debates over its prevalence and its conflicting 
understanding regarding memory mechanisms (TBI being associated with a degree of 
amnesia whereas PTSD cognitive mechanisms rely on the recurrence of traumatic memory) 
notwithstanding,438 the comorbidity between the two illnesses provides interesting and 
fruitful ways to examine the neurology of PTSD. For instance, in patients with the 
comorbidity, one would expect that the brain injury has impacted in regions of the brain 
that are often implicated in the cognitive neurological model of PTSD. 
Hypotheses along this line of inquiry have been generated in order to examine the 
comorbidity that could be caused by the physiological impact of external forces on the 
brain. There are broadly two types of forces that cause brain injury: a contact or impact 
injury that comes from the brain tissues impacting the skull or other objects as a result of 
the force, and an inertial acceleration or deceleration generated by the force. In the former, 
the surface shape of the brain and structural shape of the skull become factors that cause 
certain brain regions to be more susceptible to such an injury, and these include the anterior 
temporal lobe, the lateral and inferior temporal cortices, the frontal lobe, and the orbital 
frontal cortices. In the latter, the acceleration or deceleration forces can result in shear, 
tensile, or compression forces on the brain, which can create axonal injury, tissue tear, or 
intracerebral hematoma. Finally, the mechanical forces acting on the neurons can cause the 
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release of neurotransmitters that can lead to a complex excitotoxic cascade. These types of 
cascade, along with hypoxia and ischemia, can have disproportionate damage on certain 
brain regions such as the hippocampus.439  
Several different types of forces generated by an explosive device like the IED can 
cause these injuries could be generated by a change in atmospheric pressure a result of blast 
wave (primary blast injury), from objects put in motion by the blast wave come in contact 
with an individual (secondary blast injury), and by individuals being put in motion by the 
blast and hitting something (tertiary blast injury).440 Certain brain regions could be more 
vulnerable to specific types of blast injury. For instance, the tertiary blast injury could result 
in acceleration or deceleration forces, and a secondary blast injury could generate contact 
or impact injuries. 
Currently, few studies have produced conclusive results and there are etiological 
debates about this comorbidity: does the PTSD occur as a result of the neurological trauma 
that leads to alteration of the brain (neurological reasons), do both occur as a result of the 
trauma experienced (psychological reasons), or some combination of both etiologies? 
Nevertheless, the increasing incidence has inspired neurobiological studies on the brain 
both with a focus on specific brain structures implicated in the fear or memory circuitry as 
well as an attention to the general connectivity between brain regions. To highlight just one 
example in this area of research, white matter damage (axonal damage) has been observed 
following TBI, which has been implicated to cause changes in cognitive processing speed 
and executive abilities. White matter degradation has also been observed within two 
months of return of a deployed military personnel who has reported mTBI and displayed 
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PTSD symptoms.441 These findings can potentially contribute to understandings of how 
impacts on network connectivity between different brain regions contribute to PTSD. 
6.3 Feasibility, Requirements, and Alternatives 
As the historical summary and the scientific overview above show, since the 
Vietnam War, trauma and stress as they relate to war experiences have over time become 
a policy as well as a research interest. In particular, the emergence of neuroscience has 
impacted the way both general and military psychiatry are practiced, which likely have 
contributed to greater interest in as well as ability to conduct research on neurocognitive 
treatments for stress disorders, such as psychopharmacology. However, this interest in the 
R&D of psychopharmacological treatments did not arise during the Vietnam War, despite 
that just a decade before the war the creation of several psychotropic medications marked 
psychopharmacology as an emerging technology at the time as well. 
The following section explores how psychopharmacology, as a treatment option for 
stress disorders, was viewed and understood by psychiatrists as well as the military during 
the Vietnam War. The feasibility of psychopharmaceuticals as a treatment for combat 
stress, the military requirement for controlling psychiatric casualties, and treatment 
alternatives are analyzed. As is shown below, the dominance of psychosocial explanations 
of combat stress impacts the way psychiatric care was practiced on the battlefield, which 
in turn influenced the perceived effectiveness of pharmacological treatments for such stress 
reactions. 
6.3.1 From Psychotherapy to Pharmacological Treatments 
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In the early 2000s, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved two 
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs), sertraline (Zoloft) and paroxetine (Paxil), 
for treatment of PTSD. While these SSRIs were not originally developed to address PTSD, 
their approval came with evidence from clinical trials demonstrating the independent 
effectiveness (independent of other treatment measures) they have in treating all three 
major symptom clusters of PTSD (re-experiencing, avoidance, and arousal).442 While these 
SSRIs have an overall response rate of only approximately 60% and a full remission rate 
that is less than 30%,443 their approval by the FDA and endorsement by organizations like 
the American Psychiatric Association (APA) suggest that there is an increasing recognition 
in the clinical practice of psychiatry on the feasibility of using pharmacological treatments 
for stress disorders such as PTSD. 
Outside the psychiatric clinical circle, the broader research community is also 
increasingly viewing neuroscience-based treatments as potentially quite effective in 
addressing complex mental disorder such as PTSD. For instance, it was noted in a 2009 
NRC report that, “Over the past two decades, neuroscience has made remarkable advances 
in understanding the neural circuitry of memory, drive, mood, and executive function,” and 
“This knowledge has provided the pharmaceutical industry with targets for developing 
drugs that perturb specific neurotransmitters, with the potential for treating disorders in 
which these neural systems have been implicated.”444 The report further suggests that, 
“Over the next 5 to 10 years, it is highly likely that many new classes of drugs will be 
developed that mitigate symptoms and deviant behaviors associated with neuropsychiatric 
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disorders…some of them are likely to alleviate the adverse neuropsychological 
consequences of combat and other extreme stressors, including major depression and 
stressed related disorders such as post-traumatic stress disorder.”445 Furthermore, not only 
is neuropharmacology expected to provide treatment for chronic illness such PTSD, but it 
is also suggested that it can provide useful measures as first-line intervention to acute stress 
disorders.446 
This potential for neuroscience and psychophysiology-based treatment for stress 
disorder has been recognized by the military community as well. According to the clinical 
guidelines that the DoD and the VA have established for treating PTSD, “There is growing 
evidence that PTSD is characterized by specific psychobiologic dysfunctions, which have 
contributed to a growing interest in the use of medications to treat trauma-related biologic 
effects.”447 In fact, in the guidelines, the FDA-approved sertraline and paroxetine have 
received a Strength of Recommendation of “A” (along with a couple of other ones such as 
SSRI Fluoxetine and Serotonin and Norepinephrine Reuptake Inhibitor (SNRI) 
Venlafaxine), which denotes “A Strong recommendation that clinicians provide the 
intervention to eligible patients,” for “Good evidence was found that the intervention 
improves important health outcomes and concludes that benefits substantially outweigh 
harm.”448 As Jones and Wessely observe, “One area in which consensus has started to 
emerge, lies in the field of drug treatments for PTSD.”449 Among the military, civilian-
clinical, and research communities combatting stress-related disorders, there appears to be 
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an increasing agreement over the value of neuropsychologically-based treatment options, 
particularly psychopharmaceuticals.  
This growing consensus over the last two decades on the feasibility and increasing 
effectiveness of neurologically-based treatments, however, was not the case during the 
Vietnam War, despite just the decade before the war significant advancements in 
pharmacology had allowed several new classes of psychotropic medications to become 
widely available for use in psychiatry. Part of the reason for the doubt over the effectiveness 
of such drugs during that time was a result of a lack of coherent neurophysiological model 
of trauma and stress reactions from which researchers and practitioners (clinical 
psychiatrists) can communicate, but it was also because where there was an agreement in 
clinical practices, the pathology of trauma and stress was believed to be psychosocial in 
nature rather than neurobiological. In other words, how treatment measures for stress 
disorders were understood during the Vietnam War era, particularly in the military, were 
rather different from the kinds of treatment R&D for PTSD today, where the cognitive-
neurobiological models of stress reaction, trauma response and fear conditioning, and 
memory consolidation provide the basis for a large majority of the contemporary research. 
One of the major reasons that the use of psychopharmacology as treatment for combat 
stress was doubted during Vietnam War was thus a conceptual barrier that led to a belief 
that pharmaceuticals had limited utility in treating a psychosocial disorder. 
Peter Marin, a journalist specializing in psychology, argues that psychologists 
working with Vietnam veterans tended to skirt around the issue of judgment on the nature 
of their disorder, which was fundamentally due to the “‘limits of the discipline itself, the 
inadequacy of psychological categories and language in describing the nature and pain of 
human conscience.’”450 Prior to the standardization of PTSD as a diagnostic category for 
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trauma-related disorder, the very phenomenon of trauma and stress reactions and their 
related symptoms were subject to significant debate—there lacked a robust conceptual 
framework to understand the phenomenon of stress reaction, whether acute or delayed. 
As a complex phenomenon, stress reactions necessitate understandings from 
multiple perspectives. For example, from a biological or neurological perspective, PTSD 
may result from structural changes in the central nervous system, such as the neurological 
mechanisms described above. However, a cognitive model of PTSD may examine the 
nature of the problem from the perspective of information and memory processing. Under 
the behavioral approach, the disorder arises as a result of conditioned responses to fear 
stimulus, whereas according to psychoanalytic interpretations, the psychogenesis of the 
disorder lies within the conflict between the conscious and subconscious parts of oneself 
and the larger society. As a result of these competing theoretical and conceptual paradigms, 
beliefs in what may be appropriate treatments for psychiatric disorders due to combat stress 
also varied widely.451 Of course, since PTSD has only been recognized as a psychiatric 
diagnosis in 1980, a direct comparison between today’s treatment and prevention research 
for PTSD and that in the Vietnam War era is impossible. Combat stress, nevertheless, was 
a concern for the military during the Vietnam War, and an analysis on the psychiatric 
practices during that time can yield insight on how such stress was managed and what kinds 
of treatments were viewed as efficacious.   
As compared to the largely cognitive-behavioral and neuro-biological models of 
trauma and stress today, there was a predominance of psychodynamic and psychosocial 
model in American psychiatry during the immediate aftermath of WWII through the 
Vietnam War era.452 This particular psychoanalytic orientation to understanding 
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psychiatric disorder, however, was not friendly toward systematic R&D in treatment 
methods outside of clinical practices. For one, the fundamental assumption of the 
psychosocial model is that the genesis of mental disorder lies with the struggle between 
oneself and the environment, in which war experiences represent the epitome of that 
struggle.453 In this sense, the neurosis that arises from the war experience has to do with 
the suffering individual soldier’s inability to adjust and adapt to the war environment. 
From this perspective, rather than treating stress reactions as a manipulation of the 
symptoms, the treatment method of psychosocial model is to “understand the meaning of 
the symptom and undo its psychogenic cause,” and such cause, under psychodynamic 
terms, is maladjustment and adaptive failure. The main form of treatment for psychiatric 
disorder based on this model is, thus, psychotherapy, in which the patient is made aware 
of the underlying psychic tension and struggle that engender the symptoms, and at least in 
military terms, be reassured of his ability to cope with such maladaptation problem. 
To what extent was the psychosocial understanding of war-related stress and trauma 
reactions used as the basis to psychiatric treatments for combat stress reactions during the 
Vietnam War? In the most authoritative and comprehensive analysis of Vietnam War era 
psychiatry to date, Norman Camp distill the principles of combat psychiatry from senior 
Army psychiatrists and the Army Technical Manual (TM) 8-244, Military Psychiatry: “the 
soldier who becomes incapacitated by combat has undergone a transient psychological 
regression—a failure of adaptation (emphasis added),”454 and this follows a “disruption of 
his physical and psychological defense” that “his dysfunction represents the final common 
pathway produced by the stress of his ordeal in interaction with his physical and personal 
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limitations (emphasis added).”455 From this perspective, the treatment for such psychiatric 
casualty456 is the timely provision of mostly recuperative measures such as safety, wound 
care, and rest; “peer support; and psychologically supportive assistance, including 
recounting their disturbing combat experiences (emphasis added).”457 By treating a 
soldier’s reaction to combat stress as an issue of adaption to the combat environment, and 
that his inability to deal with such adaptation as a result of a disruption of his psychological 
defense, the principle of combat psychiatry during the Vietnam War follows the 
psychosocial model that emphasizes the psychic struggle as the underlying cause. 
Furthermore, the treatment method of recounting combat experiences is also typical of 
abreactive therapy. 
More specifically, TM 8-244, published in 1957 with knowledge gained from the 
Korean War, instructs that psychiatric care is to be provided at three levels: primary care 
at the battalion aid station, specialized care at the brigade/division clearing station, and 
more extensive specialized care in hospitals with psychiatric specialty attachment. Yet, at 
each level, the principle of treatment follows the same psychosocial rationale: at the 
divisional level, non-specialized medical personnel will provide supportive psychotherapy, 
which may be assisted by pharmacologically assisted sleep or rest. At the brigade/battalion 
level, the physician/psychiatrist follows psychotherapeutic techniques that include 
allowing the patient to vent, supporting the patient’s superego, uncovering traumatic 
experiences through abreaction and, if necessary, narcosynthesis. Similar treatments are 
suggested for those hospitalized with specialized psychiatric care, with the additional 
benefit of being further removed from the frontline.458 These treatment guidelines follow 
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the clinical practice of psychotherapy, and pharmaceuticals are used only as assistive 
measures. 
To what extent did military psychiatrists in Vietnam actually follow this 
psychosocial model for therapies and treatment in their encounters with psychiatric 
casualties? Some anecdotal evidence can be drawn from articles published in the US Army 
Vietnam Medical Bulletin, which was published in order to provide information to Army 
Medical Department personnel in Vietnam from 1966 to 1971. For instance, in a 1967 
report from William Baker, a division psychiatrist, it was indicated that following a period 
of heightened combat intensity (combat actions nearly every day), a few cases of combat 
fatigue occurred and most were able to be treated with some rest and sedation.459 However, 
in some of the cases in which he described as the “Ten Month Veteran” syndrome, the 
soldier suffered from all the short-timer symptoms (which is typically understood as a very 
severe case of burnout that includes mental and physical fatigue but in the case of combat 
also increased fear of being killed, irritability, and withdrawn behavior) but also additional 
symptoms. According to Baker, “often there is a fear of artillery noise[;]…some of them 
develop ‘dry heaves’ in response to such noise,” and “The patient is often more distressed 
by his recurrent dreams…[that] are ‘reruns’ of something that did happen,” such as “being 
splashed with a friends [sic] brains, etc.”460 
This syndrome, in today’s diagnostic terms resembling ASD or PTSD, was treated 
“With ventilation, night time sedation, a few days of rest and recreation.”461 The reliving 
of trauma in dreams was “‘cured’” with “h-s [hypnotics-sedatives] sedation” in order to 
interrupt the dream patterns and “talk[ing] about their dreams.”462 In short, concluded the 
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psychiatrist, “most can be returned to duty in 48-72 hours with sedation, rest, recreation, 
supportive psychotherapy.”463 Thus, even for soldiers afflicted with rather severe 
symptoms that would today be qualified as PTSD, the primary model of treatment was one 
based on psychosocial measures, such as support, ventilation, and catharsis, whereby 
pharmaceuticals were used primarily to sedate the patients and alleviate certain symptoms. 
If one is only able to glean from Baker’s report the elements of the psychosocial 
model of military psychiatry at the time in terms of what is shown through treatment 
measures, some others have made this belief in the psychosocial cause for stress reaction 
much clearer through the way they describe the pathogenesis of such reactions. In another 
report on the management of combat reactions, division psychiatrist John Bostrom 
indicated the following: “The Normal Combat Syndrome consists of a state of anxiety 
secondary to the emotional and physical stress of combat…When individuals experiencing 
this syndrome seek help, it must be suspected that what ideally (from a military point of 
view) is egosyntonic is becoming egodystonic (underline in original),” and the “essential 
therapeutic message is aimed at acceptance of the symptoms.”464 In other words, according 
to Bostrom, those who suffered from combat stress had difficulty embracing that the 
anxiety caused by the combat environment was in fact a natural reaction. They, therefore, 
rejected it, and such a rejection caused a psychic disagreement that led to persistent 
symptoms. In order to overcome this, Bostrom suggested treatment measures that would 
on the one hand be supportive in a manner that reinforces a soldier’s belief in his ability to 
adapt, and on the other, rationalizes the symptoms as well as the mission for the soldier. 
In addition to those psychiatrists serving at the frontline, this type of psychosocial 
model-based treatment seemed to be followed by those hospitalized in the rear echelon as 
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well. In a report by the 935th Medical Detachment Team, which was attached to an 
Evacuation Hospital, “Therapeutic approach for psychiatric patients includes brief psycho-
therapy, both ventilative and supportive,” and “Also the usual tranquilizing drugs are 
available.”465 The report further indicated that “The inpatient service is oriented to the 
milieu principle,” where a soldier continues to perform certain functions, such as policing 
the ward area, that would remind him that “he is part of the United States Army in a combat 
situation.”466 By setting the afflicted soldiers in a military social milieu, the belief was that 
the environmental factors would help the soldier-patients readapt to their role as a soldier 
and better adapt to the war environment. 
It is clear from the above anecdotal evidence that for the most part, treatment for 
psychiatric casualties during the Vietnam War consisted of physical recuperation with 
some level of counseling and psychotherapy based on psychodynamic principles. It is also 
clear that the psychiatrists took advantage of the then newly available psychotropic 
(psychoactive) pharmaceuticals, even though from these accounts, the psychoactive drugs 
seemed to be primarily used as tranquilizers or sedatives in order to: 1) assist other 
treatment measures using counseling and psychotherapy, and 2) to manage or alleviate 
certain symptoms such as anxiety or recurring nightmares. The conceptualization of trauma 
and stress reaction during the Vietnam War was, thus, psychosocial in nature, which 
created a conceptual barrier to recognizing the independent therapeutic utility of 
pharmacological treatments. 
Yet, psychotropic drugs used during the Vietnam War, including anxiolytics such 
as Valium or Librium, and neuroleptics, such as Mellaril and Thorazine, had just been 
developed the decade before and were adopted in psychiatric practices only a few years 
before the US deployed full-scale ground force in Vietnam in 1965. Since none of these 
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drugs were developed specifically for treating combat stress, there was little information 
on these drugs’ believed feasibility in treating combat stress-related disorders by the 
research community. One way to understand the technical feasibility of these drugs, then, 
is to assess the clinical community’s opinion in their efficacy in treating combat stress 
disorders during the Vietnam War. To what extent did the psychiatrists in Vietnam endorse 
their feasibility as useful treatment to combat stress, especially when compared to other 
treatment measures? 
Aside from the anecdotal accounts detailed above, two broader and more systematic 
reports shed light on how treatment measures such as psychotherapy and 
psychopharmacology were perceived by those providing psychiatric care during the 
Vietnam War. The first was a survey conducted two years into the Vietnam War, in 1967, 
on the use of psychotropic prescription medication in Vietnam by Army physicians not 
stationed in a hospital. Part of the motivation for doing this survey, according to report 
authors William Datel and Arnold Johnson, was because “The Vietnam conflict represents 
the first period of armed hostility in which this country engaged after the advent in the mid-
1950’s of modern psychopharmacology.”467 Since combat is a highly stressful human 
activity, and since the new drugs at that time had been “hailed as distress reducers,” a look 
into their efficacy as a treatment option was warranted. 
What Datel and Johnson found was that the use of the newly developed drugs was 
quite pervasive: out of the 110 Army non-psychiatrist respondents (general physician or 
physicians of other specialty who were assigned to troop clinics or mental health clinics as 
primary care) who returned the survey (233 were sent the survey), 92 indicated that one or 
more of the psychoactive drugs that were available to them had been prescribed during the 
preceding 30-day period. Of the eight psychiatrists who responded (23 were sent the 
                                                 
467 William E. Datel and Arnold W. Johnson, Psychotropic Prescription Medication in Vietnam 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1978), 1. 
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survey), including two from the Navy who were serving in the Marine divisions, all 
reported the use of one or more drugs during the preceding 30 days. Despite the low 
response rate, this pervasiveness was surprising, for, the official Army model of treating 
psychiatric casualties at the time considered medications only assistive measures primarily 
meant for sedation. Furthermore, Datel and Johnson reported that “In general the 
psychotropic drugs prescribed were perceived by the prescribing physicians as being quite 
efficacious,”468 and this seemed to have been the case for almost all the major psychiatric 
conditions the physicians were seeing, except for anorexia and headaches. 
While Datel and Johnson’s report portrayed a rather favorable picture for the 
efficacy of the then newly available psychotropic medication as a treatment option for 
psychiatric casualty, there are some caveats, some of which the authors themselves noted. 
First, since the survey was based on assessing the psychotropic medication prescribed 
rather than the psychiatric disorder diagnosed, not all of the psychotropic drugs prescribed 
were intended for, strictly speaking, psychiatric problems. For instance, among all the cases 
for which primary care physicians prescribed psychotropic medications, 45% were for 
gastroenteritis (stomach flu) and another 2% were for hypertension, and Compazine and 
Serpasil, both of which qualified as major tranquilizers, were prescribed for these 
conditions, respectively. This is notable, not only because it skewed the statistics on the 
prevalence on the use of psychotropic medication as well as their perceived effectiveness, 
but it also showed that the physicians were using some of these drugs not for their 
properties to address psychiatric illnesses but rather, to alleviate certain somatic symptoms 
that may not be related to psychiatric conditions. 
Second, although both non-psychiatrist physicians and psychiatrists used 
psychotropic drugs, the non-psychiatrist physicians tended to view the effectiveness of 
                                                 
468 Datel and Johnson (1978), 9. 
 258 
medications much more favorably than the psychiatrists. Of course, part of this could be 
attributed to the fact the psychiatrists, as specialists, were referred the more difficult cases 
that would be harder to treat, but it could also suggest that psychiatrists, who were likely 
more skilled in using other forms of psychotherapies, had less confidence in the 
effectiveness of psychotropic drugs in treating illness than other treatment methods. 
Certainly, based solely on this report, which did not compare psychopharmacological 
treatments to other therapies, whether or not this was true would be hard to determine. 
Finally, not all of the cases reported in which psychotropic medications were 
prescribed were defined as combat fatigue. In the Datel and Johnson report, cases of combat 
fatigue were a subset of anxiety cases (which was 56 out of 464), but the specific criteria 
for its identification were not reported. Thus, for the purpose of understanding the 
effectiveness of psychotropic medication in treating combat fatigue or stress reactions as a 
specific psychiatric condition, two critical elements were missing: First, it was not clear 
how many cases of combat fatigue were treated without prescribing psychotropic 
medication, and to what extent were the treatments effective. Second, it was not clear as to 
how many of the combat fatigue cases were able to return to combat duty, and if they did, 
how well they were able to perform during the remainder of their tour. Thus, while the 
Datel and Johnson report did provide a useful and rather favorable first-hand evaluation of 
the use of psychotropic medications in Vietnam, some questions remained. 
In a postwar survey conducted in 1982 by the Walter Reed Army Institute of 
Research on Army psychiatrists who served in Vietnam, some of these problems that 
plagued the Datel and Johnson report were better addressed. In this survey, the psychiatrists 
were asked to recall what was done in theater for incidences for combat stress reactions 
and were inquired about the treatment for CSR cases in general as well as treatment for 
specific symptoms. The report analyzed the responses according to the duration of the CSR 
symptoms: acute CSR was defined as symptoms to last less than two days, extended 
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between two to five days, and persistent greater than five days. This classification of CSR 
symptoms corresponded with the types of cases that would have been treated at the three 
different echelons of psychiatric care in Vietnam. Most of the psychiatrists who responded 
to the survey treated CSR cases in more than category of duration, the most common being 
extended CSR. 
The psychiatrists were asked about their perception of the effectiveness of different 
major therapeutic measures to treat CSR, including physical recuperative, social milieu, 
psychotropic medication, interpersonal therapy, and environmental protective disposition 
on a scale of 1-to-5 (1 being seldom useful and 5 being most useful).469 Overall, the rating 
of effectiveness for social milieu-based treatment, interpersonal therapy, and psychotropic 
medication were rated similarly for their effectiveness for acute, extended, as well as 
persistent CSR: social milieu-based treatments ranked the highest across all durations of 
CSR, whereas psychotropic medication was deemed more effective in acute CSR cases 
than interpersonal therapy, but the latter was deemed more effective when the CSR 
symptoms became extended or persistent. Physical recuperative measures were the most 
useful for acute CSR when compared to all other treatment measures, but its effectiveness 
drastically dropped as the symptom duration lengthened. Environmental-protective 
disposition measures saw the reverse trend and their effectiveness increased as the 
symptom duration lengthened, but was otherwise not perceived to be very effective. The 
respondents were also asked to rate the effectiveness of different interpersonal therapy 
measures, for which abreaction and counseling were rated as the most effective in general 
when compared to other interpersonal treatment, although as CSR symptoms became more 
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persistent group therapy and individual psychotherapy also became more effective, 
whereas narcosynthesis saw the opposite trend.470 
Finally, the psychiatrists directly rated their endorsement on four kinds of 
psychotropic medications that were used during the Vietnam War, including anxiolytics 
(Librium and Valium), neuroleptics (Thorazine, Mellaril, and Stelazine), sedatives 
(Chloral Hydrate) and antidepressant (Tofranil), cross-analyzed with the severity of the 
symptoms.471 Although the author of the survey report concludes that psychiatrists who 
treated CSR “highly valued psychotropic medications, especially the neuroleptics and 
anxiolytics, in the treatment of soldiers with normal fear/apprehension and with combat 
stress reactions of all stages”;472 the actual data collected and presented seem to suggest a 
different picture. For one, across the four categories of psychotropic medications 
prescribed, Valium was the only one that consistently had endorsement of use by over 50% 
of the psychiatrists across multiple levels of symptom severity (other than complete 
disorganization) and was the only drug that received an over 50% endorsement rating (at 
54%) for the normal fear/apprehension severity level. All of the other drugs that were 
surveyed received less favorable endorsement ratings, ranging from as low as 4% 
(Stelazine) to a  high of 43% (the other anxiolytic drug, Librium). Second, neuroleptics, 
such as Thorazine and Mellaril, received endorsement ratings from a majority of the 
psychiatrists only for severe cases of CSR (partial or complete disorganization). Since they 
were considered major tranquilizers, their favored use for more severe cases of psychiatric 
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reactions were expected. Nevertheless, contrary to the report author’s conclusion, most of 
the psychotropic drugs were not seen as useful for treating less severe CSR cases. For these 
reasons, instead of viewing the psychotropic medications as something that were “highly 
valued” by Vietnam War psychiatrists, their endorsement of the psychotropic medications 
as an effective treatment for CSR was lukewarm at best, other than for the cases in which 
the reactions were severe. 
The report from the WRAIR survey did present an additional interesting finding 
regarding the effects that psychotropic drugs may have on combat performance, where 
certain kinds of drugs seemed to be favored over others for soldiers who needed 
maintenance medication upon returning to duty. Psychiatrists were surveyed about the 
medications they “routinely prescribed” for soldiers returning to duty followed CSR 
treatment. The result showed that none of the drugs was particularly “endorsed” by a large 
number of psychiatrists: the highest endorsement rating (in terms of percentage of 
psychiatrists endorsing the use/prescription for treating continued CSR symptoms) was 
30% for Librium and Mellaril in cases of persistent CSR. It was speculated that Mellaril 
was preferred over other neuroleptics because it has less impact on combat performance: 
it was “less sedating than Thorazine and less activating than Stelazine.”473 Although there 
was no conclusive evidence that psychiatrists during the Vietnam War were fully aware of 
the all the potential effects the psychotropic drugs prescribed had on combat performance, 
the limited levels of prescription of drugs that were mild in effect suggested that some may 
have at least been cognizant of the potential side-effects. 
To an extent, the concerns for potential side-effects of psychotropic drugs to impact 
performance were also shown in anecdotal evidences from psychiatrists’ reports, although 
the results were quite mixed. In one 1970 account by Edward Colbach, a theater hospital 
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psychiatrist, and Matthew Parrish, a Neuropsychiatry Consultant during the war, it was 
suggested that the psychotropic drugs (particularly phenothiazines, such as Thorazine and 
Mellaril) “‘have been safely used to control excessive anxieties in combat infantry men 
without any apparent interference in duty performance.’”474 Yet, in another recollection 15 
years later, Colbach offered a more mixed account: “Our main psychotropic weapons [in 
Vietnam] were the major tranquilizers, primarily the phenothiazines…Many soldiers went 
into the field with Thorazine or Mellaril in their pockets,” but “Among ourselves we 
debated whether this was really a good idea,” for “Obviously the medication made people 
less alert.”475 As a result, prescribing psychotropic medication was “a balancing act, trying 
to weigh the benefits of medication against its drawbacks.”476 In this sense, although the 
impact that psychotropic drugs used during Vietnam had on soldier performance would 
likely never be fully known due to a lack of systematic data, it could be safely suggested 
that at least some, if not most, of the psychiatrists had at least some reservation about the 
use of those drugs due to the potential effects on the soldiers’ ability to perform.477 
What to make of all these evidences presented by anecdotal accounts and more 
systematic studies regarding the treatment model during the Vietnam War, the 
effectiveness of psychotropic drugs used, and the expert opinions on them? While it is 
difficult to conclude definitively what the “consensus” may have been, several important 
trends arise: 1) compared to the current model of stress and trauma disorders, which is 
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based more on the understanding of their cognitive-neurological mechanisms, the 
psychiatric as well as treatment model for combat stress during the Vietnam War era was 
distinctly psychosocial, in which the roots to a soldier’s psychiatric problems from combat 
stress was understood to be a maladaptation to the environment; 2) Compared to the present 
era, in which neurobiological treatment methods such as psychopharmaceuticals have been 
endorsed as an independently feasible treatment option to address stress disorders such as 
PTSD, neurobiology-based treatments during the Vietnam War era were not deemed 
sufficiently feasible to treat psychiatric disorders caused by combat stress. 
As can be gleaned from the anecdotal reports as well as the systematic surveys, 
psychotropic medication was used during that time by deployed psychiatrists in their 
encounters with psychiatric casualties. However, because the roots to combat stress were 
believed to be psychosocial in their pathogenesis, pharmaceuticals were often used as an 
assistive measure to the main psychosocial-based therapies, and they were not regarded as 
an independently feasible treatment to combat stress. Certainly, when compared to other 
treatment methods, psychotropic medication was not the preferred therapy. Furthermore, 
very few drugs actually received favorable endorsement from their prescribing 
psychiatrists. Therefore, when compared to the favorable view on neurobiological 
treatments today, there was a lack of confidence in psychopharmacology as a feasible 
treatment method during the Vietnam War. 
6.3.2 The Military Requirement of Return to Duty 
Understanding the “requirements” in the military sense for a treatment for 
psychiatric conditions is a rather difficult, if not impossible task. This is in part due to the 
fact that there is inevitably an abstract and subjective part of dealing with mental illnesses 
and psychiatric disorders: as an example from PTSD, how does a psychiatrist “objectively” 
evaluate a patient’s remission in terms of “reliving traumatic events,” other than to inquire 
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the patient about his or her experience? Even for conditions in which there could be visible 
signs (such as sweating or trembling in the case of anxiety) or measurable biomarkers 
(speed of heart rate), an improvement in those measures does not automatically constitute 
the full picture as to how a patient “feels,” which is ultimately what accounts for the 
effectiveness for a treatment. 
In addition, as much as a psychiatrist is able to diagnose and treat a patient with 
psychiatric disorder, it is difficult to objectively ascertain the levels of severity or the 
degree of symptom improvement, other than in rather general, comparative terms. In that 
context, the evaluations are likely to be subject to interpretation—whether through a 
patient’s self-reporting or through the psychiatrists’ evaluation. Of course, in illnesses that 
lead to cognitive function impairments, certain measurements of performance deficits or 
improvements can be useful in the diagnostic and rehabilitative processes. However, not 
all psychiatric disorders are tied to cognitive deficits that may be observable or measurable. 
Certain disorders can cause issues in social and relational functions that, while impacting 
a patient’s performance, can be equally challenging to determine. 
This is not to say that there is no way to measure or examine the effect of treatment 
on a psychiatric disorder. As a disorder is established, efforts are made not only to specify 
its criteria but also tools to determine its diagnosis (at least in the post-DSM-III American 
psychiatry). For instance, in the past several decades, diagnostic tools have been developed 
for PSTD: started with DSM-IV, a PTSD Checklist (PCL) has been developed as a self-
screening questionnaire, and a more specific Clinician-Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) 
has also been in use as the “gold standard” for PTSD assessment and diagnosis. Clinical 
trials of PTSD treatments often rely on CAPS score for measuring the treatment’s efficacy. 
Yet, are such diagnostic tools something that the military can use as a way to establish its 
“requirement” on the expected performance of a treatment measure? Certainly, for 
treatment development that will enter clinical trials, such diagnostic tools are likely used 
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to determine a treatment’s suitability and effectiveness. Yet, for military operations, such 
measurements are less helpful in articulating the military’s need. 
While the specifics of the types of requirements from military psychiatry in dealing 
with soldiers afflicted with symptoms of combat stress are difficult to find, historical 
narratives have suggested from the military’s perspective, the ultimate goal for treatment 
and prevention of psychiatric casualty is the preservation of force strength and the 
prevention of psychiatric attrition. As a result, treatment measures, whatever their scientific 
or clinical orientation, are useful to the military insofar that they can return a soldier-patient 
back into the field as quickly as possible in order to preserve the troop’s fighting strength. 
This was the general goal for military psychiatry during the Vietnam War.478 The principles 
of proximity, immediacy, and expectancy, which guided the treatment practice for 
psychiatric casualties, reflect this goal of force preservation and returning a soldier to duty. 
The principle of proximity suggests that soldiers affected with combat stress is 
more likely to recover if they are treated closer to their unit at the frontline, which helps 
the soldiers in maintaining contact with their comrades, which in turn helps preserves their 
unit identity that would be beneficial in rehabilitating them to return to the battlefield. The 
maintenance of this unit identity also provides the rationale for the need for immediacy in 
treatment of combat stress reaction: “acute combat reaction tend to be…potentially 
reversible psychiatric states stemming from the soldier’s having been psychologically 
overwhelmed or worn down by his combat experiences,” and his suggestibility is a 
“consequence of the soldier’s still ongoing internal struggle between his emotional 
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investment in his primary combat group and his heightened self-protective impulses.”479 
Therefore, an immediate intervention is more likely to circumvent the spiraling of 
worsening conditions and better enable the soldier’s ability to resume his duty. 
The principle of expectancy specifically outlines the goal of treating cases of 
battlefield psychiatric casualty, which is to return a soldier to active duty. The attitude of 
expectancy among psychiatric care providers can shape the way that a soldier’s treatment 
unfolds—with all measures taken to restore his self-confidence and to prevent him from 
believing that he would be exempt from future combat. In order to better reach this goal, a 
fourth principle of simplicity has been incorporated into the doctrine, which suggests that 
the treatment regimen for the soldier should be simple and consistent, whereby 
straightforward somatic measures, such as physical recuperation, and psychotherapeutic 
measures, such as ventilation, should be favored over other forms of treatment (including 
the prescribing of medication, which could contradict the effort of convincing a soldier that 
he is in fact not ill but rather suffering from normal reactions to stress).480 
This orientation toward returning a soldier suffering psychiatric casualty to duty as 
the primary goal for treatment was also clearly embodied in the procedures of dealing with 
combat stress reaction as described in TM 8-244, which, as described above, has taken the 
rather specific psychosocial view of war-time stress reactions as an issue of maladaptation. 
Certainly, the view that the root cause of combat stress reaction lies with a soldier’s ability 
to adapt to the stressful war environment is easier to reconcile with the need to preserve 
the force strength than it is to qualify such reactions as a form of illness or disorder. As an 
example to this notion of “return to duty” as the ultimate goal for psychiatric care during 
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the War, at the division-level psychiatric care “‘Every possible step is taken to foster the 
patient’s expectation of return to full duty after a brief rest.”’481 What this included was 
that psychiatric care was operated in a tent where a uniformed specialist was providing the 
care, and “the soldier-patient would sleep on folding cots with neither mattress nor sheets, 
remain ambulatory and wear their regular uniform, serve themselves meals and go the 
latrine unassisted, and perform work details when asked.”482 In other words, soldiers 
afflicted with combat stress during the Vietnam War were expected to behave in every 
possible way as though they were still on active duty in order to maintain this expectation 
that they will return to their assignments as early as possible. 
According to Camp, from the standpoint of military missions, the inherent metric 
that serves to validate these principles for the treatment of combat stress “is the percent of 
psychiatrically disabled soldiers who can be restored and returned to duty, especially 
combat duty. Of course this objective includes the proviso that, upon release from medical 
control, they perform their duties capably.”483 Yet, what should be the target that the 
military psychiatric care should be trying to achieve with their treatment effectiveness in 
returning a soldier to duty? As Camp extrapolates from TM 8-244, “the overall goal with 
respect to all forms of psychiatric attrition—measured in evacuation rate from the theater—
has been to approximate the apparent irreducible minimum, one to two per 1,000 deployed 
troops, which equals the Army’s worldwide rate for psychosis through periods of war and 
peace.”484 Using psychiatric evacuations from the operational theater as the metric seems 
a rather logical way in determining the military requirement of managing and treating 
psychiatric casualties. After all, a soldier who is evacuated would have been unable to be 
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treated by the psychiatric care available (through whatever means) in the theater in a way 
that would allow him or her to return to duty in any capacity during the operation. 
What remains unclear, however, is how difficult is this requirement? Is keeping 
psychiatric evacuation to one to two military personnel per 1,000 deployed a “stringent” 
requirement, in the sense that it would be rather difficult to achieve? And was this 
requirement in particular difficult for psychiatrists deployed during the Vietnam War? The 
best way to have an understanding on the stringency of this requirement is perhaps to 
examine the rates of psychiatric attrition due to evacuation across major wars in which the 
US has engaged. Table 6 below shows the rates of psychiatric evacuations from a select 
set of major US wars from WWII to the recent OEF/OIF in a comparative perspective. 
 
Table 6 - Psychiatric Evacuation Rate from WWII to OEF/OIF 
Major War Psychiatric Evacuations (Per 1,000 Deployed Soldier) 
World War II 13.8 (European Theater) 
Korean War 2.6 
Vietnam War 
1.97 (Through mid-1968) 
~4-5 (Through 1970) 
42.3 (July 1971) 
129.8 (July 1972) 
OEF/OIF 







Sources: Norman M. Camp, US Army Psychiatry in the Vietnam War (2015), 44 and 56; and 
Margaret Wilmoth, Andrea Linton, Richard Gromadzki, Mary J. Larson, Thomas V. Williams, and 
Jonathan Woodson, "Factors Associated with Psychiatric Evacuation Among Service Members 
Deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, January 2004 to September 
2010," Military Medicine 180(1) (January 2015): 54. 
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According to the historical record, in most of the earlier wars, psychiatric 
evacuation rates per 1,000 deployed personnel wars were higher than the upper benchmark 
of two per thousand deployed. The evacuation rate during WWII was in particular quite 
high at almost fourteen soldiers per thousand. Since the TM8-244 was published in 1957, 
its articulated benchmark for psychiatric evacuation was most heavily influenced by the 
experiences in the Korean War, but even then, the rate of evacuation was higher than 
2/1,000. During the Vietnam War era, when the psychiatric evacuation rate seems to have 
been managed quite well during the early years of war, the situation quickly deteriorated 
after 1970. Figure 12 below shows a more granular picture of psychiatric casualty rates 
during the Vietnam War. 
 
Figure 12 - US Army Vietnam Rates for Wounded in Action and Psychiatric 
Casualty485 
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As Figure 12 shows, psychiatric evacuation, somewhat meeting at least the 2/1,000 
mark prior to 1968, became much higher in the second half of the war, surpassing even 
rates of psychiatric hospitalization in theater in 1971 and 1972. Part of this rise was due to 
the increasingly prevalent issue of drug abuse toward the end of the war, but the rate spike 
was quite striking. Furthermore, drug abuse, as would be judged later, was another 
manifestation of the psychiatric difficulties many soldiers had in dealing with their 
deployment. 
Judging by the historical records, one-to-two-per-thousand rate for psychiatric 
evacuation is, in fact, quite difficult to meet. Only during the OEF/OIF, in which the most 
recent and advanced technologies and techniques for dealing with combat stress would 
have been available, was the rate for psychiatric evacuation managed within the goal 
consistently. This is compounded by the fact that not all psychiatric casualties or 
evacuations are due to combat stress (which means in absolute terms of psychiatric 
evacuation rate due to combat stress would be even lower than the 1 to 2 per 1,000 goal) 
and that often in operational psychiatric care more than one therapeutic measure would be 
used to treat cases of combat stress or psychiatric casualty. Therefore, at least during the 
Vietnam War, this requirement of “return to duty,” was difficult to meet. It can also be 
argued that in general, for any single treatment option that is available for handling combat 
stress, the expected success rate for returning an afflicted combatant to duty is set very 
high. 
6.3.3 Institutional Partners and Treatment Alternatives 
Stress-related disorder, as a complex phenomenon, afflicts the military and civilian 
communities alike. Of course, the stressors for military personnel operating in combat 
situations are different from that of what is normally experienced within the civilian 
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population. Nevertheless, ever since the publication of the first DSM in 1952, stress 
reactions, whether acute (such as Acute Stress Disorder in DSM-IV onward and arguably, 
as seen in most cases of combat stress reactions) or delayed (such as the case of PTSD), 
have taken a character that is neither civilian nor military specific. Research and 
development on its treatment, therefore, concerns military and civilian actors alike. 
It is clear from the present discussions and efforts toward addressing PTSD that 
agencies such as the DoD, VA, and National Institutes of Health (NIH) all have a stake. 
According to an Institute of Medicine (IOM) report on the treatment for PTSD in military 
and veteran populations, it is noted that “DoD, VA, and NIH all conduct or support PTSD 
research and they have distinct but complementary research missions.”486 Whereas 
research in the VA tends to focus on the long-term health issues and the DoD focuses on 
the operational needs, they have in recent years engaged in active collaborations, including 
projects that are intended to improve access to mental health for military and veteran 
populations and their families. According to the IOM report, “DoD relies to some extent 
on the expertise and infrastructure of VA and NIH for research in PTSD prevention and 
treatment.”487 This is because the VA is able to support and leverage clinical trials and 
epidemiological studies and can also translate research into care practice, and because the 
NIH has the expertise in funding basic and clinical research, mostly through the National 
Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). Although much of this implicit collaboration has only 
been made explicit and transparent in the recent years from a push toward greater clarity 
in terms of what is being done for veterans afflicted with psychiatric illnesses, the 
relationship between these agencies has been rather longstanding. 
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This relationship between the VA, the DoD, and the NIH can also be traced back 
to post-World War II years preceding Vietnam, where the Cold War environment had in 
general provided very strong support for multiple areas of scientific research by the federal 
government. In fact, from the early 1950s all the way through the early years of the Vietnam 
War, there were significant investments by the federal government in the NIH. Especially 
during the Vietnam era, one researcher recalled, the NIH “was in an enormous boom 
period,” partly because “the best of the output of American medical schools had 
decided…that a couple of years’ research at the NIH was probably preferable to going to 
the jungles of Vietnam,” so instead, “they fought each other to get into the NIH to do their 
military service in that way and the NIH had the pick of the most talented young 
doctors.”488 This increase in investment from the federal government also impacted the 
NIMH, which saw a manifold increase in funding from 1950 all the way to 1966, at which 
point it started to see a gradual decline into the 1980s.489  
Nevertheless, the benefits of the drugs that were discovered in the 1950s to treat 
various psychiatric conditions, many of which had an European origin, only in the early 
1960s started to become better appreciated in North America. As described above, by the 
time the Vietnam War started, the military had already incorporated these new drugs that 
it did not develop off-the-shelf into its arsenal in combatting stress disorders. So in addition 
to the other agencies like the VA and NIMH who have had substantial interests in 
pharmacology, the military also had at least in its purview an alternative partner in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
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Yet, what was perhaps more important to the military during Vietnam was that the 
psychopharmaceuticals had a viable “technology” alternative in psychotherapy. In fact, 
given the dominant status of psychotherapy at the time as the main treatment method 
according the military’s model of psychiatric care, psychotropic medications were the 
alternative to the mainstream psychotherapeutic methods. Unlike their status today which 
endorses their potential as a monotherapy, psychotropic drugs were almost always used in 
conjunction with some other psychosocial-based treatment during the Vietnam War. 
There also seemed to have been a belief that psychosocial therapies are more 
effective in returning a soldier to the battlefield than pharmacological agents. For instance, 
Bourne notes that while psychotropic drugs “have been effectively used in Viet Nam with 
certain groups, their overall impact has been relatively slight. Rest, emotional support, the 
opportunity to ventilate, and time to reintegrate adaptive capacities that are temporarily 
overwhelmed have proven infinitely more effective than any specific pharmacological 
agent in enabling average patient to return to duty.”490 The survey findings by Camp also 
show that during the Vietnam era, there were several treatment measures employed, some 
of which receive more favorable ratings in terms of their effectiveness than 
psychopharmacology. As it does today, the military during the Vietnam War not only had 
a set of institutional alternatives through which advancements in treatment methods for 
psychiatric casualties can be accessed, but it was also equipped with a set of therapeutic 
measures beyond the neuroleptics and the anxiolytics in combatting battle stress disorders. 
6.3.4 Summary 
The above analyses indicate that when compared to the present era, during the 
Vietnam War, there were challenges to recognizing psychopharmacology as an 
independently effective treatment option for cases of combat stress reaction despite its 
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rather prevalent use. Part of this challenge arose from the dominance of a psychosocial 
definition of stress reaction in the military’s model of psychiatric care, which led to a 
conceptual barrier that prevented psychotropic medications, such as neuroleptics and 
anxiolytics, from being viewed as viable means to treat the illness. Furthermore, given the 
dominance of psychotherapy as the preferred treatment method, it was difficult to evaluate 
the effectiveness of psychotropic medications as a monotherapy. Thus, whereas the 
feasibility of neurobiologically-based treatments for stress disorder has been confirmed and 
widely embraced by the scientific as well as clinical communities today, such feasibility 
was very much in doubt during the Vietnam era. 
In addition, the military requirements at the time were also not conducive to the 
development of this nascent treatment option. The military expectation from the psychiatric 
care provided at that time was essentially an “irreducible minimum” of loss of force 
strength due to psychiatric reasons. As shown through comparative historical examples, 
such an expectation would be difficult to meet even under the best circumstances today, 
not to mention that, in retrospect, it was very difficult for psychiatrists deployed in 
Vietnam, especially toward the later years of the war. Vietnam was certainly a difficult 
environment under which the new psychotropic medication had to prove its effectiveness. 
Finally, because the medications used during the Vietnam War were able to be 
incorporated into the operational psychiatric care off-the-shelf, and that there were 
available institutional and technology alternatives to R&D in psychopharmacology, the 
military had little incentive to believe that its independent investment in their further 
research, development, or refinement were necessary. This was likely compounded by the 
fact that earlier in the war, psychiatric casualties seemed to have been managed relatively 
well by existing psychosocial treatment methods (with the assistance of psychotropic 
medication), that there would be little incentive to actively seek out other alternative 
treatment measures. 
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These factors, combined, presented a rather unfavorable condition for 
neurobiologically-based treatment options, such as the psychopharmaceuticals, to be 
looked upon by the military as a fruitful area of emerging technology for investment during 
the Vietnam War, especially when other problems, such as infectious disease and substance 
abuse, seemed to have preoccupied the military’s medical attention, as further discussed 
below. This situation has changed for the present era, not only due to advancements in 
science and technology, but also because there has been a broader transformation from 
understanding psychiatric problems as psychosocial to potentially neurobiological. As will 
also be shown below, the medicalization of psychiatry, and what can be called the 
“neurobiologicalization” of trauma and stress, have contributed to the burgeoning of 
research today on psychiatric disorders such as the PTSD as well as greater interest in 
psychopharmacology. 
6.4 Competing Priorities and Different Models of Psychiatry 
As shown above, the way psychiatric care was practiced during the Vietnam War 
made neuropsychopharmacology unappealing as a R&D investment option for the military. 
What complicated the matter at the time was that there were other medical and mental 
health problems that also demanded the military’s attention aside from the issues of combat 
stress. The tropical climate of Vietnam led to several operational challenges for the US 
military, and one of these challenges was the prevalence of infectious disease. Furthermore, 
as the war wore on, the problem of substance abuse, particularly with narcotics such as 
heroin, became an important problem that occupied the attention of military mental health 
communities, both clinical and research. These other medical priorities of the time likely 
detracted from the military the attention given to the issues of combat stress. 
In addition to these competing priorities, the dominant psychosocial 
conceptualization of combat stress likely prohibited greater investment into the R&D of 
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psychopharmaceutical treatments. The impact of this conceptual barrier becomes more 
apparent as psychiatry as a profession became medicalized in the post-DSM-III era and the 
conceptualization of trauma and stress became more neurobiologicalized in recent decades, 
both of which facilitated the growing investment in pharmacological means to remedy 
psychiatric disorders. The following sections explore these issues in more detail. 
6.4.1 Infectious Diseases and Drug Abuse – Competing Priorities in Vietnam 
6.4.1.1 Infectious Diseases and Therapeutic/Prophylactic Development 
Multiple types of medical problems and challenges confronted the US military in 
Vietnam, and throughout the war some of these problems preoccupied the military and 
demanded its researchers’ attention. In particular, some infectious diseases were running 
rampant among American forces during the Vietnam War, including dengue fever, 
Japanese encephalitis, hepatitis, scrub typhus, amebic dysentery, among others.491 Other 
diseases of concern during the time included respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, and 
skin diseases. According to a 1973 study done by the Army regarding medical support in 
Vietnam from 1965 to 1970, disease admissions accounted for 69% of all hospital 
admissions in Vietnam.492  
Yet, among all the infectious diseases that confronted the US troops in Vietnam, 
the most significant was malaria. The military, of course, has long had a history in 
combating malaria. While significant efforts were made during World War II to address it 
during engagements in southern Europe, North Africa, and South Pacific (due to the fact 
over a half-million cases of malaria had caused significant impact on troop strength), much 
of that effort in treatment research and development came to a halt immediately after the 
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war ended. While the US encountered some issues with malaria during the Korean War, 
its impact on the military became much more pronounced during the Vietnam War, where 
malaria was the leading cause of medical disability in deployed troops. 
What was particularly difficult in dealing with the issue of malaria during Vietnam 
was that a deadly strain of malaria, Plasmodium falciparum, which ran rampant in the 
tropic jungles of Vietnam, had by the time of full-scale US engagement in 1965 became 
resistant to chloroquine, the main treatment then available to combat malaria. Chloroquine 
was developed during the WWII era and has been used both as a therapeutic as well as 
prophylactic for other milder strains of malaria, such as P. vivax, which characterized most 
of the malaria cases in US troops during the Korean War. Since malaria primarily impacted 
those in developing countries, major pharmaceutical companies in the developed world had 
little incentive to conduct the R&D necessary for new drugs that could overcome the drug 
resistance.493 The military, recognizing this need to manage as well as generate antimalarial 
R&D in-house, established in 1963 a sustainable program on malaria drug research 
coordinated through the Division of Experimental Therapeutics at WRAIR. As the war 
wore on and cases of malaria began to impact the force strength, the need for effective 
antimalarial drug that can overcome chloroquine-resistance in P. falciparum became more 
urgently needed. 
The antimalarial search, supported by the federal government, received vast 
resources and commanded the WRAIR’s attention during the Vietnam War. At the field, a 
central rehabilitation hospital was established to collect the data and evaluate new 
therapeutics.494 Over 250,000 potential antimalarial compounds were screened during the 
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course of the war,495 and mefloquine (later marketed as Lariam) and halofantrine (later 
marketed as Halfan) were developed. Both mefloquine and halofantrine, however, only 
received FDA approval years after the Vietnam War ended, in 1989 and 1992, 
respectively.496 In addition to the developmental efforts of antimalarial therapeutics and 
prophylactics, substantial portions of the funding were also devoted to related areas of basic 
research, including immunology. 
What is important to note of this institutional attention to malaria is that it inevitably 
took attention away from other issues that may not have been apparent at the time to be as 
critical. Infectious disease like malaria and the toll it created were of sufficient concern to 
“focus military public health authorities on the immediate need to control malaria in areas 
of high troop concentration in order to preserve operational capabilities.”497 At a minimum, 
such an attention on infectious diseases likely caused more institutional resources to be 
devoted to this area of research, which could cause other areas of research to not receive 
the institutional support needed to move its work beyond sustainment. 
6.4.1.2 Substance Abuse 
Whereas the issues of infectious diseases and research on their treatment and 
prevention may have been the most prominent medical concerns facing the military 
medical communities during the Vietnam War and became the foremost priority for 
research centers like WRAIR, even for the mental health providers, a psychiatric problem 
different from combat stress preoccupied the attention of the researchers. The generally 
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low-intensity nature of combat in Vietnam and the one-year rotational system, which has 
often been attributed as a cause of low levels of troop cohesion, contributed to the 
prevalence of substance abuse, which as the war wore on became an increasingly noticed 
problem. Although substance abuse was a recognized problem, during the earlier stages 
(prior to 1967) it was in some cases silently condoned or intentionally overlooked. 
However, as the war prolonged, its impact on the troops and on the war became more 
apparent. Especially in the second half of active US engagements in Vietnam, substance 
abuse became such a rampant problem that it required research scientists at WRAIR to 
examine its prevalence and work on potential solutions. 
This trend of substance abuse was facilitated by several contributing factors of the 
time. First, although during that time, the value the broader society placed on psychological 
resilience and emotional reticence had become less prominent and there was increasing 
acceptance of the idea of mental disorders, such a changing perception was not quite the 
case within the military where psychological weakness was still stigmatized. As a result, 
troops deployed in Vietnam were less likely to seek help than to attempt to “self-medicate” 
through drugs and alcohol in order to alleviate their reactions to combat stress. Second, the 
use of drugs was also on the rise within the United States at the time, and there was less of 
a social taboo against it, especially among younger generations. Given the less than ideal 
conditions in Southeast Asia and the stress from deployment in an unpopular war, it became 
even easier for many who were deployed in Vietnam to try to “temporarily escape” their 
realities through drugs. Finally, although many of the drugs of abuse, including marijuana, 
amphetamine, and later on in the war, heroin, were clearly illegal under US law, the legal 
status of these drugs was much more ambiguous in Vietnam, and such drugs were thus 
much more widely available. It did not help that some local Vietnamese people had an 
active interest in profiteering from the widening drug epidemic amongst US troops and 
 280 
made narcotics such as heroin excessively easy to access for American soldiers.498 These 
factors combined contributed to the drug problem among the Vietnam War troops. 
The issue of drug abuse nevertheless became not just an operational problem of the 
commanders but also an issue for both psychiatrists deployed in the field as well as 
psychiatric researchers back at home. In the field, the growing awareness of the drug 
epidemic “led to a search for a flexible, nonpunitive response that would encourage drug 
users to seek professional help in solving their problems,”499 and what resulted was that 
hospitals were “flooded with drug cases,” and psychiatrists “fought a losing battle to keep 
beds for psychiatric patients.”500 Although throughout the war and as early as 1967 there 
were periodic attempts at surveying the deployed troops in order to ascertain the prevalence 
of substance abuse,501 it was not until when the main drug of abuse switched from 
marijuana and barbiturates to heroin around 1970 that the military commands took the steps 
to implement any major initiatives. For instance, the Army in December of 1970 published 
Army Regulation 600-32, Drug Prevention and Control, to provide limited rehabilitation 
for restorable drug abusers, and the regulation was followed in the same month by a 
directive for a “Drug Rehabilitation/Amnesty Program” issued by the US Army in Vietnam 
Headquarter.502 Soldiers under this directive were able to voluntarily ask for amnesty and 
rehabilitation with no retribution on their drug use and addiction. Without any specific 
guidelines on how the support programs would be provided, however, implementation 
became an issue and a collection of unstandardized treatment and rehabilitation programs 
ensued amongst the Army commands. 
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Back in the United States, the issue of drug abuse not only attracted the public as 
well as the federal government’s attention, but it also became an area of acute research 
interest from places like WRAIR. The first half of 1971 saw a series of inspections and 
visits due to the increased public scrutiny of the drug addiction issues in Vietnam. In 
March, 1971, Stewart Baker, the Neuropsychiatry Consultant to the Army Surgeon 
General, conducted an inspection, and the reports from the inspection highlighted the non-
standardized nature of the various medical approaches to treating soldiers with addiction. 
In April, a congressional visit to Vietnam reported that an estimated 10-15% of deployed 
soldiers were addicted to drugs, particularly heroin.503 In May, Harry Holloway, a research 
psychiatrist from the Army Medical Research and Development Command (now known 
as Army Medical Research and Materiel Command), who later headed the Division of 
Neuropsychiatry at WRAIR, did a more comprehensive epidemiological survey on drug 
additions in deployed soldiers.504 These studies and inspection yielded some of the first 
meaningful data on drug abuse for the DoD, which in June of 1971, coinciding with 
President Nixon’s announcement of the “War on Drugs,” led to the deployment of urine 
screening for drugs among all soldiers who were scheduled to return to the United States. 
Those screened positive for drugs were then detained in Vietnam for rehabilitation.  
Upon the implementation of the urine screening program, the incidence of drug 
abuse decreased drastically, and this decrease became even more drastic after a random 
urine screening practice was put in place in November of 1971. However, because those 
detained for rehabilitation and detoxification were returned to the US through medical 
(psychiatric) evacuation after they were medically cleared in the theater and were 
distributed among the Army hospitals for further evaluation and treatment upon their 
return, this practice of urine screening also led to highly skewed and biased data on the 
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prevalence of psychiatric evacuations toward the end of the Vietnam War (as seen in Figure 
12). Furthermore, as drug abuse became an increasingly prevalent issue both within the US 
as well as among troops in Vietnam, efforts toward understanding its pathology, 
prevention, as well as potential treatment and rehabilitation also became more pressed. The 
agency that was tasked with initial, more systematic studies, was the USAMRDC.505 
As but one example of R&D efforts on drug abuse undertaken within the military, 
for instance, in 1972, WRAIR conducted research on heroin dependence and withdrawal 
in the US army in Vietnam, and by 1973 an array of research projects were conducted on 
drug abuse at WRAIR, including studies on drugs’ impact on military performance; 
addiction prevention; drug test systems; addiction epidemiology; as well as others 
attempting to understand the nature of drug addiction pathology from a variety of 
approaches including neurophysiology, neuroendocrinology, neurochemistry, cellular 
metabolism, and pharmacokinetics. While these projects were administratively organized 
outside the programs on military psychiatry, they were nevertheless headed by WRAIR 
psychiatric researchers and greatly leveraged the expertise in neuropsychiatry that WRAIR 
had accumulated over the previous decades. 
The full extent to which medical priorities such as infectious diseases and substance 
abuse impacted the military research interest on combat trauma and stress reactions is 
difficult to evaluate, but the above discussions reveal that during the Vietnam War, the 
military, particularly the Army, faced other major medical problems beyond combat stress. 
Of course, malaria and heroin were among the many issues that the military had to confront 
in Vietnam, but their prevalence during the War and the impact they had on operational 
efficiency demanded the services’ attention. Certainly, the war efforts also shifted the focus 
and objectives for military medical R&D institutions like WRAIR, both in terms of broad 
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organizational objectives as well as the focus of researchers in neuropsychiatry: “Rather 
than broad-based studies of the entire nervous system, the group took on a more mission-
focused research program,” according to a centennial report on the Institute’s history.506 
Barring the availability of more direct and granular data, perhaps one crude measure 
to assess the extent to which infectious diseases and drug abuse defined WRAIR’s research 
priorities is the sheer volume of research output in these areas of medical R&D compared 
to issues pertaining to combat stress and military psychiatry. In WRAIR’s Annual Progress 
Reports on research programs from 1963 to 1973, research on malaria alone received three 
times as much coverage (calculated in terms of sheer page count) in the reports compared 
to research on psychiatry. When combined with research on other infectious diseases, such 
a difference in coverage increased to roughly tenfold. Similarly, as the public, the 
government, and the military began to increase their scrutiny of drug abuse in the early 
1970s, research on it was quickly established at WRAIR as a program outside of military 
psychiatry, and within the first few years the drug research program produced research 
outputs that were similar in terms of report coverage to that of malaria-specific research. 
While coverage in the research report is not the most concrete measure of levels and 
intensity of research activities, it does show that WRAIR, and its neuropsychiatry research 
arm in particular, had substantive research activities and interests in other medical issues 
beyond combat stress. 
6.4.2 From Psychosocial to Neurobiological – Impact on Pharmacology 
Malaria and heroin challenged the US military during the Vietnam War, and the 
need to redress these issues preoccupied the attention of military medical and psychiatric 
researchers. Research on the treatment and prevention of combat stress, thus, paled in 
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comparison to these other priorities. This was particularly troublesome because, as 
explained above, treatment measures of combat stress beyond existing psychosocial 
therapeutic measures (such as the use of psychopharmaceuticals) were not perceived as 
particularly appealing areas of investment largely due to the way that combat stress was 
conceptualized. 
The dominance of the psychosocial model in understanding combat stress during 
the Vietnam War nevertheless caused a broader and more deeply rooted issue for research 
on non-psychosocial based treatments such as pharmaceuticals. As described in detail in 
previous sections, combat stress during the Vietnam War was understood specifically as a 
psychosocial issue of maladaptation, and this belief was embodied by the way that 
psychiatric care was practiced. This led to a marginalization of pharmacological therapy as 
an effective means of treating psychiatric reactions to combat stress, which in turn, likely 
undermined the military’s interest in investing in further exploring psychopharmacology. 
This trend of a dominant psychosocial view of psychiatric practice was not 
something that only happened in the military, however. Beyond the practical reasons 
behind which the military deliberately adopted during that time a psychosocial view to 
combat stress (such as minimizing the perception that psychiatric reactions to war stress 
and trauma was a real illness), this dominance also reflected the broader professional norm 
in psychiatry at the time. 
In accounting for the development of psychopharmacology in the second half of 
the twentieth century in the US, Ross Baldessarini made several observations. First, World 
War II caused an emigration of many prominent psychoanalysts from Europe to the United 
States, and from the immediate WWII years to the 1970s, “psychoanalytically based 
psychosocial theories and practices clearly dominated American psychiatry.”507 Second, 
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most of the major breakthroughs in psychopharmacology in the 1950s were of foreign 
origin (for instance, Thorazine prescribed during Vietnam War is produced by 
GlaxoSmithKline, a British company, and Mellaril and Valium are both produced by Swiss 
pharmaceutical companies), and its dispersion in the American market encountered 
skepticism in a profession in which some of the “complex human psychiatric problems” 
were “only trivially and incidentally biologically based and biologically treatable.”508 
Third, this dominance of psychosocial theories and practices in psychiatry led to a 
relatively slow initial introduction of psychopharmaceuticals into clinical practice, because 
“The new pharmacotherapies initially were widely viewed as competing with the 
psychotherapies, which sometimes led to harsh clashes based on dissimilar value systems 
and expectations.”509 Medicinal treatments for psychiatric disorders in the 1950s and 1960s 
were thus often treated as merely palliative, which, it was posited, could lead the 
suppression of symptoms that prevented the patient from pursuing actual resolution to the 
underlying psychic conflicts. 
In other words, the dominant psychosocial view of combat stress and trauma 
became a conceptual barrier to the R&D of psychopharmaceuticals, and this view 
contributed to the lack of visible military investment in this area of treatment and therapy 
for combat stress during the Vietnam War. Although several kinds of psychoactive drugs 
developed in the 1950s had by the time of the Vietnam War been used to treat illnesses 
such as psychosis, depression, anxiety, and manic-depressive disorder510 (and as shown 
above, many were also used by physicians and psychiatrists during the War itself), it was 
recognized that these drugs were not specific enough for the supposedly discrete 
symptoms. Furthermore, as shown above in the analysis of the results obtained from the 
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1982 WRAIR survey as well as other anecdotal evidences, psychiatrists at the time viewed 
pharmaceuticals as at most symptomatic treatments and used them as such. 
The extent to which this psychosocial view of combat stress impacted the directions 
and choices of military R&D in treatments can be observed in the research activities from 
the Division of Neuropsychiatry at WRAIR, which, at the time, was a pioneer in 
interdisciplinary research on neuroscience under David McKenzie Rioch. Since 
establishing the Division in 1951, Rioch had deliberately built an interdisciplinary program 
of research on the human mind and body that welcomed and embraced disciplinary 
differences. In fact, the broad ranging work conducted at WRAIR at the time511 has 
garnered the reputation for Rioch as well as WRAIR as a progenitor in modern 
neuroscience research.512 Despite its broad-based work, Rioch’s Neuropsychiatry Division 
had a deliberate goal to address psychiatric casualties and combat stress within the military. 
According to Robert Galambos, a member of the Division at its founding, Rioch at the time 
of his interview for the job was told by the commandant of WRAIR that “‘psychiatric 
casualties had reached the top of the Army’s list of medical problems,’” and Rioch’s 
mission was “‘to supervise the basic research effort that would drop it to the bottom.’”513 
Research on combat stress and trauma was thus a central concern to Rioch’s 
interdisciplinary research team. 
Given that combat stress was a major concern for the military in general and the 
army in particular (at least as part of their planning for the full-scale deployment), that the 
Division of Neuropsychiatry’s mission was to reduce psychiatric casualty, and that under 
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Rioch’s leadership the research work was deliberately interdisciplinary, it is reasonable to 
assume if any R&D were to be done on the innovation or improvement of treatments for 
combat stress within the DoD during the Vietnam War era, and particularly in a highly 
neuroscience or neurology-influenced field such as psychopharmacology, WRAIR’s 
Division of Neuropsychiatry would be part of, if not leading, this effort. Yet, that was not 
the case. WRAIR, in fact, had little research activity on treatment measures for combat 
stress throughout the Vietnam War. This is not to say that combat stress was not studied 
during this time—certainly, combat stress remained a focus, but the research efforts 
concentrated mostly on its management through psychosocial means, and where the 
somatic components of stress are concerned, the work analyzed primarily the autonomic 
and endocrinal aspects of stress reaction pathology and its impact on performance. Based 
upon available records and research reports, there was little to no R&D activity on non-
psychosocial treatment measures such as the use of psychotropic medications, whether it 
was to examine its effectiveness,514 to understand its underlying pharmacodynamics, or to 
refine its mechanisms. 
There are few records that can directly attest to exactly why, during the Vietnam 
War era, despite its emergent status and increasingly prevalent use both in civilian 
psychiatry and in the military, treatment measures such as psychotropic drugs received 
such little attention from the military R&D community. Some later recollections about 
Rioch lends some insights. From a reflection by Harry Holloway, Rioch “was aware of 
advances in psychopharmacology but clearly did not equate these advances with an 
operational understanding of psychiatric disease.”515 This was not due to some kind of 
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conceptual oversight, however, but rather an understanding of psychopharmacology as 
potentially prohibitive to the study of the underlying mechanisms to psychiatric illnesses. 
According to Holloway, 
[Rioch] was well aware that the contributions of Galen to neuroanatomy 
and physiology in the second century AD were most impressive. He also 
knew that these contributions were followed by medical Dark Ages in which 
pharmacopoeias substituted for scientific studies and Galen’s contribution 
became the end of scientific study, not a beginning. The perception that a 
treatment worked substituted for understanding the operational basis for 
natural phenomenon…He also appreciated that the profits associated with 
medications might lead to the deemphasis of studies required to move 
beyond the superficial.516 
Rioch’s understanding of psychopharmacology during the Vietnam War echoed the 
psychosocial understanding of combat stress in which the somatic and cognitive symptoms 
were epiphenomenal to the underlying causes of maladaption, and the symptomatic 
treatment that psychopharmaceuticals could provide was superficial and ran the risk of 
undermining further research that would be required to resolve the underlying psychosocial 
or intrapsychic tension. The psychosocial conceptualization of combat stress, thus, 
prevented psychopharmacology from being viewed as a favorable investment option but 
rather, as something that could be counterproductive to the research on understanding 
combat stress. 
To what extent was the lack of R&D in psychopharmacology during the Vietnam 
War an intentional avoidance or a situational oversight is not entirely clear, but given the 
available evidence, it is possible to infer that the conceptual barrier did not help. This is 
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especially apparent when comparing investments on psychopharmacology during that era 
to the one post-DSM-III or even more so to the one after the September 11 attacks. As 
described above, DSM-III not only created a common nosology among psychiatric 
researchers and practitioners, but it was also deliberately symptomology-focused and 
intentionally atheoretical. According to Robert Spitzer, who headed the task force that 
developed DSM-III, “the new edition was to be based on two principles: theories of 
pathogenesis would be confirmed by ‘principles of testability and verification,’ and each 
disorder would be identified by criteria accessible to empirical observation and 
measurement.”517 In other words, through DSM-III, psychiatric disorders became more 
“medical” in the sense that they were defined according to explicit diagnostic criteria and 
observable symptoms rather than based on assumed psychopathology. 
The virtues of defining illnesses this way notwithstanding, the medicalization of 
psychiatry made the study of psychiatric disorders experiment-friendly and facilitated the 
growth of more specifically targeting psychoactive drugs. Conceptualizing psychiatric 
disorders, including reactions to traumatic stress, as a medical problem instead of a 
psychological one paved the way for the R&D of biological and neurological based 
therapies, such as the psychopharmaceuticals. According to Shadia Kawa and James 
Giordano, in examining the effect of DSM-III on psychopharmacology, it was noted that 
“while the DSM-III classification system did not explicitly link diagnostic categories to 
any particular treatment options, the symptom-based, somatically-oriented nature of the 
classification scheme was particularly compatible with biological therapies customized to 
discretely constructed disease entities.”518 This medicalization of psychiatry as a profession 
and its impact on opening more avenues for deliberate research on biology or neurology-
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based therapies, including the development of drugs, are significant. Started in the 1980s, 
following the DSM-III, “billions of dollars were allocated by the government and 
pharmaceutical companies for psychopharmacological research,” and during that decade, 
“federal research budget allocated to the NIMH increased by 84 percent, to about $484 
million annually.”519 Furthermore, as the psychiatric profession became more medicalized, 
there was an increase in psychopharmacological interventions on disorders that would have 
previously been treated with psychotherapeutic or behavioral approaches. This further 
enabled research in neurochemistry and pharmacology of allegedly psychopathological 
conditions. 
To a large extent, Rioch’s fear that the rise of psychopharmacology may detract 
research from “understanding the operational basis” of psychiatric disorder never 
materialized. If anything, psychiatric research in the post-DSM-III era took a turn for the 
better and became focused on both the neurobiological substrates of disorders as well as 
the psychocognitive mechanisms. Nevertheless, this turn of psychiatry from the 
psychological to the medical and then to the neurobiological is not without detractors. 
Norman Camp, writing in 2013, notes of this change in the post-DSM-III era of psychiatry: 
The revolutionary change in the American taxonomy of psychiatric disorder 
in 1980, the 3rd edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorder (DSM-III), served by extension to cast doubt on earlier, 
empirically derived theories of causation for combat stress casualties—
theories that encompassed predisposition, psychosocial disturbances, and 
psychic conflict. The resultant vacuum led some to favor neurophysiologic 
theories as alternatives.520 
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Of course, what Camp refers to as “empirically” derived theories of causation for combat 
stress casualties have evolved, for the most part, out of clinical practices on the battlefield, 
which to a large extent also reflects the military’s need to preserve troop strength. This is 
made clear as Camp further contends that the current medicalization and 
“neurobiologicalization” of combat stress appear “to have reverted to the abandoned World 
War I model of shell shock with its disastrous potential for unsustainable psychiatric 
attrition, unnecessary and high soldier morbidity, and the risk of military defeat.”521 
According to Camp, understanding the neurological substrates to combat traumatic stress 
seems to be outdated thinking akin to the way shell shock was once understood. To what 
extent does combat stress impact a soldier neurologically, and whether existing 
neurological research on combat stress reactions and PTSD provide avenues for potentially 
improved treatment measures, thus, do not seem to concern him. 
Others, however, have suggested that compared to what is known now, the way that 
combat stress was conceptualized during wars like Vietnam was in fact too 
“demedicalized” and “normalized,” which not only perpetuated the persistent stigma 
against psychiatric casualty and mental illness within the military, but also could 
circumscribe efforts toward prevention and treatment. In a nutshell, “if all combat stress is 
normal” and non-medical, then “what is there to prevent or treat?”522 From this perspective, 
the increasing neurobiologicalization of combat stress and the medicalization of its reactive 
symptoms are helpful in destigmatizing combat stress reactions and can perhaps facilitate 
more effective and targeted interventions: if combat stress can in fact create neurological 
harm, then psychiatric reactions to it are not based on an individual’s capability, character, 
or predisposed susceptibility. Rather, the trauma and stress of combat experience can 
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wound an individual and lead to functional impairments just like any other physical wound, 
and the impairments would, in this sense, not be due to one’s own failure or weakness. 
Recent policy advances toward destigmatizing disorders like PTSD echoes this view. In a 
town hall meeting at Fort Lee on September 28, 2016, for instance, President Obama, in 
addressing concerns over the stigma of mental disorders within the military, likened 
disorders developed from combat stress to breaking a leg and advocated that there is no 
difference between seeking medical help for PTSD and that for physical injuries. This kind 
of policy endorsement of the medicalization of psychiatric disorders and physicalization of 
trauma suggests an increasing recognition of the neurobiological model of mental illnesses 
in the recent decade. 
Interestingly, the trend of neurobiologicalization of psychiatry, particularly with 
regard to understanding trauma and stress, may inadvertently be undermining a disorder 
like PTSD. Alison Howell, for instance, suggests that “In Western military contexts, and 
especially in the US Army, PTSD is being parsed…through the biomedicalization of 
traumatic events in war, in particular through the diagnosis of mild traumatic brain 
injury…and what might be called the ‘re-physicalization’ of trauma in military 
contexts.”523 By physicalizing trauma, the authority over defining a traumatic experience 
such as combat shift from the mind to the brain, and the diagnosis to the stress reactions 
such traumatic experience causes also changes from an issue of psychology to an issue of 
neurology. This, in turn, could undermine a primarily psychological construct of trauma 
such as PTSD as the defining model of the impact of combat stress. 
Whether neurobiologicalization of combat stress will derail the research on 
underlying causes of war-time psychiatric casualties, lead to a rise in psychiatric attrition 
and soldier morbidity, destigmatize mental health issues among military and veteran 
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populations, or delegitimize the authority of PTSD remains to be seen. One thing that is 
certain, however, is that the way combat stress can be, and is, conceptualized in the post-
September 11 US is the same as what it was during the Vietnam War. The medicalization 
of psychiatry and the neurobiologicalization of traumatic stress helped shift how combat 
stress is conceptualized and diminished the conceptual barrier that casts doubt on the 
feasibility of treatment methods such as psychopharmacotherapy in resolving combat stress 
reactions. This, in turn, has facilitated the growing attention toward cognitive as well as 
neuroscience-based research on the treatment of combat stress in recent decades. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In recent decades, with the emergence of neuroscience research as well as 
increasing demand from overseas military operations, the research and development of 
neuroscience-based therapeutic measures to treat and prevent combat stress-related 
psychiatric disorders such as PTSD have been pursued in earnest in the United States. In 
particular, neuropsychopharmacology has been heralded as one area of emerging S&T that 
could provide the greatest contribution. Interestingly, however, this is not the first time that 
psychopharmacology could be leveraged to address the military’s need to manage 
psychiatric casualties and fight combat stress reactions and other psychiatric disorders that 
arise from war experiences. With great strides made in the discovery of several 
psychoactive drugs during the 1950s, psychopharmacology was an emerging area of S&T 
during the US engagement in the Vietnam War. However, the US military had little interest 
during that time in the R&D of better psychoactive drugs to treat combat stress. Why was 
this so? 
This chapter argues that the reason why treatment measures like 
psychopharmaceuticals attracted such little military R&D investment during the Vietnam 
War was because, first and foremost, the way trauma and stress were conceptualized during 
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the War made psychopharmacology not an appealing area of investment for the purpose of 
redressing combat stress. As has been demonstrated, the dominant psychosocial model of 
stress marginalized the role that psychoactive drugs can play in treating soldiers with CSR. 
Furthermore, a low threshold for the acceptable rate of psychiatric evacuation from theater 
suggested a difficult environment under which newer treatment measures such as 
psychopharmaceuticals would need to demonstrate its independent effectiveness in 
managing combat-related psychiatric casualties. Finally, the military had rather abundant 
alternative accesses to psychopharmacological advancements, which likely reduced its 
interest in investing in this area of emerging research. These factors combined made 
psychopharmacology an unappealing investment for the military during the Vietnam War. 
This chapter further explores and shows that competing medical priorities, such as 
the need to fight against infectious diseases and manage substance abuse, occupied the 
military’s attention during the Vietnam War, and medical research organizations like 
WRAIR devoted much of its effort into remedying these urgent operational concerns. As 
a consequence of these competing priorities, pharmacological developments to treat 
combat stress likely became further sidelined. The chapter concludes by highlighting that 
the recent increase in military R&D interest in psychopharmacology for treating stress 
disorder is likely facilitated by the medicalization of psychiatry as a profession and the 
neurobiologicalization of the concept of trauma and stress as they relate to combat 
experiences. Just like the psychosocial model of combat stress and psychiatric care during 
the Vietnam War created conceptual barriers to recognizing the value of R&D in 
psychopharmacology, the deterioration of such barriers in the recent decades through 
increasing neurobiologicalization of psychiatry has enabled pharmacological means to 
become viewed as effective in managing stress-related disorders. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
Given their prospective military utility, why do some emerging technologies attract 
and sustain military investment in R&D while others do not? While militaries, particularly 
ones that are striving to be a technology first-mover, always seem to be able to find reasons 
to invest in an emerging technology (with the “unassailable” logic of military necessity and 
avoiding technological surprises), some emerging technologies nevertheless do not attract 
or cannot sustain military investment interest despite their purported military utility. This 
dissertation answers this question and argues that the way a technology is understood by 
relevant actors in the R&D process matters for its investment. Under certain technical 
conditions, a technology becomes unappealing as an investment opportunity, which leads 
to its inability to attract or sustain funding. The following sections recount the central 
argument of this dissertation, provide some comparative analysis of the cases examined, 
assess the argument’s generalizability through a mini-case study on Aircraft Nuclear 
Propulsion, and discuss the study’s theoretical and potential policy contributions. 
7.1 Summary of Arguments and Analysis of Evidence 
States desiring to be a first-mover in a military technology invest in emerging areas 
of S&T at the technological frontier. To manage the uncertainties of emerging technologies 
and to mitigate the risk of being technologically blindsided by an adversary, these first-
mover states propel their defense planners to hedge and invest in military technologies 
widely. This logic provides the underpinning of the conventional perception that R&D in 
the defense sector and military technology enjoy a “privileged status” in that any emerging 
technology that purports to have military utility gets invested in. Nevertheless, historical 
records show that some emerging technologies do not get or cannot sustain military 
investment despite their purported utility. Existing systemic-structural, bureaucratic, and 
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organizational explanations of defense acquisition decisions in general fall short in some 
critical aspects in their ability to explain military technology investments, and perhaps 
more importantly, non-investments. This dissertation addresses this shortfall. 
This dissertation ascertains that in order to understand why the military does not 
invest in some areas of emerging technologies, one needs to conceptualize military R&D 
investment not just in the manner of risk mitigation, but also as the pursuit of specific 
opportunities. Opportunity, in this sense, entails not just an expected utility, but also the 
“circumstances” that make achieving the utility possible. In some cases, depending on how 
a technology is understood by relevant actors in the R&D process, it may acquire specific 
characteristics that make it not an appealing investment opportunity. Put differently, the 
circumstance surrounding each technological opportunity is different, and some 
circumstances make a technology unappealing as an investment. This dissertation 
describes this circumstance as the technical condition and posits that in an emerging 
military technology, this condition consists of, at a minimum, how the scientific or 
technical expert community defines the feasibility of the technology, how the military as 
the end user sets the expected performance parameters, and the extent to which technology 
or institutional alternatives exist. The hypotheses derived from these arguments are 
reiterated below:  
Hypothesis 1: As scientific agreement on the feasibility of an emerging military technology 
declines, the investment condition for such technology also becomes less favorable. 
Hypothesis 2: The more stringent a military requirement, the more difficult it is to be 
achieved, and the less favorable are the investment condition for a technology intended to 
address such a requirement. 
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Hypothesis 3: Increased availability of institutional or technology alternatives to address 
a capability gap reduces the interest of the military to invest in any particular technology 
option, resulting in less favorable investment conditions. 
Although the three independent variables that constitute the technical condition and 
their impact on the favorability of an investment are presented separately, the main 
argument of this dissertation is that a certain combination of these variables produces a 
technical condition that is unfavorable. In particular, when the dominant opinion from the 
expert community on the feasibility of the technology is low, when the expected 
performance parameters of the technology from military are high, and when there are 
institutional or technology alternatives to acquiring the capability, the technology becomes 
an unappealing investment. In this dissertation, this central claim is examined using 
congruence method through two cases: the first on the R&D of biochemical incapacitants 
as a non-lethal weapon, and the second on the R&D of psychoactive drugs 
(neuropsychopharmacology) as a treatment option for combat stress-related disorders. The 
results are summarized below in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 - Summary of Evidence 
Case Study Time Frame 
IV   DV   
Feasibility Requirements Alternatives   Military Investment   
Biochemical 
Incapacitants 
Before 2002 Mixed to High Low Yes   Present   
After 2002 Low High Yes   Absent   
Neuropsycho-
pharmacology 
Before 1980 Low High Yes   Absent   
After 1980 High High Yes   Present   
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As highlighted in the table, both cases in general confirm the central claims of this 
dissertation that, 1) militaries sometimes do not invest in an emerging technology even if 
it has military utility, and 2) low feasibility, highly stringent requirements, and available 
alternatives can make a technology an unappealing investment opportunity. In both cases, 
the understanding of the technology’s feasibility changed over time. In the biochemical 
incapacitant case, the prospect of finding biochemical agents capable of incapacitating 
individuals while avoiding the risk of lethality has driven decades of research as well as 
the stockpiling of agent BZ. However, it has also been known that one of the critical 
barriers to the development of a CNS-acting biochemical that is capable of producing 
incapacitation is the dose-response problem, in that for any agent sufficiently strong to 
incapacitate a large group of people there is always the potential for some to die from 
overdosing, leading some technical experts and arms control proponents to conclude that 
it is not feasible to produce a biochemical non-lethal weapon. 
As this technical position gains prominence in the early 2000s and attracts 
endorsement from many in the expert communities after the Dubrovka incident in Moscow 
in 2002, the belief in the technical feasibility of a non-lethal biochemical weapon declined. 
This, coupled with the increasingly stringent requirement for non-lethality that the US 
military has come to expect from its non-lethal weapon systems (at least since the creation 
of JNLWD in 1996), created an unfavorable technical condition for the R&D of 
biochemical incapacitants as a military technology since the early 2000s, which contributed 
to the languished investment by the US military in this area of S&T. 
 In the neuropsychopharmacology case, the feasibility of using psychoactive drugs 
to “treat” combat stress-related psychiatric disorders was very much in doubt during the 
Vietnam War era. The main barrier, in this case, was as much a conceptual one as it was 
technical. The broader American psychiatric practice at the time focused on the 
psychoanalytical aspects of mental disorder, which conceived the underlying mechanisms 
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for mental illnesses as a psychic conflict. The dominance of psychoanalysis meant that 
neurobiological theories of psychiatry were marginalized, and certain therapeutics, such as 
psychoactive drugs, were perceived as symptomatic treatments. The US military, from 
operational experience in previous wars and for pragmatic reasons, adopted this 
psychosocial perspective in its psychiatric practice in dealing with combat stress. 
Therefore, despite the emergence of significant advances in psychopharmacology 
in the 1950s and the use of psychoactive drugs during the Vietnam War, those who 
practiced military psychiatry and directed psychiatric research programs had little faith that 
a neurobiological solution, such as drugs, could effectively solve a problem such as combat 
stress that was perceived as psychosocial in its pathology. This lack of belief in the 
feasibility of psychoactive drugs as effective treatments for combat stress, combined with 
the need to keep psychiatric casualties at a very low rate, meant an unfavorable condition 
under which psychopharmacology, as a treatment option, was to be invested by the military 
during the Vietnam War era. As psychiatry after DSM-III in 1980 became increasingly 
medical and neurobiological, combat stress also became understood as potentially 
neurobiological in its pathology. The perceived feasibility of psychoactive drugs in treating 
the stress reactions that combat experience causes thus also increased, which facilitated the 
growth of investment in neuropsychopharmacology and enabled military R&D efforts in it 
to combat stress disorders in recent decades. 
This dissertation also examines how the favorability of technical conditions impacts 
investment decisions. For a technological opportunity to germinate within the military 
R&D system and attract investment, it requires advocacy, promotion, and endorsement. 
Under unfavorable technical conditions, such activities may become difficult. Furthermore, 
even if an emerging technology can attract initial investments, its sustained funding can 
become challenged for a variety of organizational, political, or social reasons. Under 
unfavorable technical conditions, the technology may become less able to withstand such 
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challenges. Thus, two additional hypotheses are proposed with regard to how the 
favorability of technical conditions impacts investment decisions. 
Hypothesis 4: When the condition is unfavorable, a new technology has difficulty 
generating sufficient support to attract sponsorship and be initiated. 
Hypothesis 5: When the condition is unfavorable, a new technology is less resistant to 
potential organizational, political, or social challenges, making it more difficult to sustain 
should such challenges arise. 
The two cases analyzed in this dissertation tell contrasting stories regarding 
hypotheses 4 and 5. The neuropharmacology case, in general, supports hypothesis 4. The 
lack of belief in the feasibility of using psychoactive drugs to treat combat stress disorders 
is reflected in the way that David Rioch, the director of the Division of Neuropsychiatry at 
WRAIR, thought of psychopharmacology – that it could be counterproductive to 
generating an operational understanding of psychiatric diseases. Because the roots to 
psychiatric disorders were believed to be psychological, and because advancements in 
psychopharmacology were viewed as enabling primarily symptomatic treatments that do 
not address the underlying pathological cause for the disorder, an investment in research, 
development, or refinement of psychoactive drugs would potentially distract the needed 
attention away from the study of psychiatric disorders. Therefore, although combat stress 
was studied by the military and the research on it did take place at WRAIR, research on 
psychoactive drugs, such as the exploration of their pharmacokinetic mechanisms, never 
attracted sufficient attention from the researchers and their leadership. 
The biochemical incapacitant case supports hypothesis 5. The unfavorable 
technical condition that emerged after the Dubrovka Theater incident in 2002 made it 
difficult for the military to justify its continued R&D effort in this area of NLW research. 
Because the dominant view from the technical expert community suggests that a CNS-
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acting biochemical cannot be developed, designed, and used in a manner that would 
meaningfully limit lethality, and since this technical position has slowly gained 
international recognition by states in arms control forums such as the CWC, the rationale 
for military R&D in this area has become increasingly challenged by those in favor of 
tighter arms control. The shift in the US position on the incapacitants as shown in the Third 
Review Conference of the CWC and onward is perhaps reflective of this recognition of the 
rising international political cost for support military R&D in biochemical incapacitants. 
Whereas the US was deliberate in preventing the issue of incapacitants from being 
discussed in the First Review Conference and was silent on the issue during the second 
one, its recent turn to support greater clarity within the CWC on the restriction of 
biochemical incapacitant shows that those in the US who may have favored and supported 
the military investment in this area of NLW development are likely fighting a losing battle 
to keep this research continually funded. 
The two main case studies analyzed above, thus, support the main argument of this 
dissertation, that the technical condition for an emerging military technology becomes 
unfavorable when the feasibility is low, the military requirements are high, and the 
alternatives are present. Furthermore, under this unfavorable technical condition, a 
technology has difficulty attracting sufficient support for its investment by the military, 
Even if it receives some initial investment, such support becomes unsustainable when 
challenges confronting the validity of the investment arise. Nevertheless, the findings 
derived from these two case studies could be subject to some limitations. First, both 
biochemical non-lethal weapons and neuropsychopharmaceuticals for addressing combat 
stress disorders are relatively small-scale R&D projects (despite the latter’s increasing 
investment by the federal government in the recent decade) that do not fall under a more 
traditional, kinetic-weapons-focused conceptualization of military R&D. The distinctively 
biomedical and cognitive neurological character to these two areas of S&T could suggest 
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that the reason why their investment has been marginalized at times is because ultimately, 
they do not fit the bill as mainstream investment programs that interest the military. 
Second, although NLW R&D has since 1996 been unified under the JNLWD, which is 
administered by the Marine Corps under the Navy, most of the research prior to that on 
biochemical incapacitants (such as the BZ development) were conducted at the ERDEC 
(now Edgewood Chemical Biological Center) under the Army. Similarly, although combat 
stress reaction is not unique to the Army, most of the discussion on the psychiatric practices 
during the Vietnam War and the research at WRAIR focused on the Army. As a result, the 
Army-centered focus of these two cases could raise doubts that the variance in their 
investment is related to how Army as a service branch handles R&D in emerging 
technologies. Finally, even though these two cases contain useful within case comparisons, 
the variance in some of the variables that constitute the technical conditions is low (as 
shown in Table 7, for instance, institutional or technological alternatives are present in both 
cases across the time periods studied), which could suggest that these cases do not provide 
sufficient control or support of the impact that each individual variable has on the 
favorability of the technical conditions. These concerns could inhibit the perceived value 
of the insights these two case studies generate. 
In order to overcome these limitations and further assess the generalizability of the 
theoretical model proposed, a mini-case study on Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion, which took 
place in the US from 1945 to 1961, is presented below. The features of this case are helpful 
in extending the generalizability of the model. First, the ANP was a large-scale project that 
fell within the traditional conceptualization of military R&D on weapons systems 
(although, as is shown below, such a conceptualization proved to be problematic). Second, 
the ANP was primarily an Air Force project with the Navy as a minor partner, with little 
to no Army involvement. Third, the ANP case provides additional variance in the variables 
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that constitute the technical condition. The ANP case thus provides a contextual contrast 
to the two main case studies analyzed in this dissertation. 
7.2 Theoretical Extension – Mini-Case Study on Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the US actively engaged in the 
research and development of nuclear power. This R&D included not only nuclear power 
plants but also the emerging nuclear-powered military systems and platforms, including 
strategic bombers, submarines, and aircraft carriers. The Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion 
(ANP) project, a joint technology development program between the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) and the Air Force which aimed to produce nuclear-propelled, manned 
aircraft capable of conducting missions such as strategic bombing, sought to leverage 
nuclear power for extremely long-term continuous flight without the need to refuel. The 
original proposal put forth by the Engineering Division of the Air Technical Service 
Command in 1945, just after WWII ended, argued that it was as important to further 
develop nuclear weapons as it was “‘to develop nuclear energy as propulsive means,’” and 
‘Special consideration should be given to a system whereby nuclear energy would first be 
used for propulsion to the target and then the nuclear matter detonated as an atom 
bomb.’”524 Although originally conceived as a measure to ensure the US’s air superiority 
and ability to conduct long-distance nuclear strikes, as the Cold War wore on and the 
mutual assured destruction logic took hold, the ability to launch a nuclear weapon as a 
“massive retaliation” from a strategic bomber that has tremendous speed, endurance, and 
range seemed appealing and necessary. 
Nevertheless, despite fifteen years of R&D efforts and at least one billion dollars 
in 1950s currency, the project continued to have difficulty in sustaining high-level policy 
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interest and faced constant challenges that threatened its cancellation. By the time the 
project was officially cancelled under the Kennedy administration’s Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara in 1961, it yielded no product and a prototype system was still many 
years away.525 This was not necessarily a result of a lack of incentives from the 
international system. For one, the launch of Sputnik in 1957 raised concerns within the US 
that it had fallen behind the USSR in science and technology and prompted some in the 
government to advocate for a crash program that would lead to an early nuclear flight 
demonstration. In addition, throughout the 1950s, it was known that the Soviet Union also 
had an interest in building a nuclear-powered aircraft. An Aviation Week article in 
December 1958, which claimed (albeit later proven to be false) that the Soviets were able 
to “successfully” test a nuclear-powered aircraft, also caused further program reviews 
despite the slowly declining project support from the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) at that point in time.526 The project nevertheless from the very beginning suffered 
from many of the problems that can plague the development of a military system with high 
levels of funding, including the inter-service rivalry between the Air Force and the Navy 
that led to duplicated efforts and shifting requirements. Yet, inter-service rivalry alone only 
captures a part of why ANP ultimately became abandoned.527 Most importantly, the ANP 
had several significant technical barriers that needed to be overcome, and as the R&D 
process unfolded, the scientific and technical expert opinion became increasingly negative 
toward the feasibility of this project, which created problems for its continued support from 
policymakers. 
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Given the technical concerns, the ANP nevertheless enjoyed some early support 
from some in the scientific community, who believed that the project was feasible despite 
its likely high price tag and long developmental timeline. For instance, in 1948, a group of 
researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, at the request of the AEC, 
conducted a feasibility study of the idea of nuclear-propelled aircraft. The outcome, the 
“Lexington Report,” indicated that manned nuclear-powered flight could be achieved in 
fifteen years if at least one billion dollars and a large quantity of the nation’s vital scientific 
resources were devoted to it. This affirmation gave the needed backing to the initiation of 
the ANP. Basing its judgment on this report, the AEC also remarked at a project review at 
the end of 1950 that ANP was technically feasible and that the AEC could find the 
necessary people and facilities to work on this issue, so long as the need for it can be 
justified. This early enthusiasm was in part because the need for investment in high 
technology programs in order to keep the US competitive against the USSR seemed 
difficult to refute, but also because at the time (in the late 1940s) there were no alternatives 
to the nuclear strike capability besides strategic bombers, which made the need to develop 
a highly capable bomber seemed all that more necessary despite the difficulties. 
Nevertheless, several interrelated technological problems constituted critical 
barriers to the ANP project. As the project continued, some of these problems became 
increasingly apparent. First, in order for a nuclear reactor to be useful in propelling an 
aircraft, it had to be significantly more compact and efficient than what was available due 
to weight considerations. At a minimum, it needed to create some 500 percent more energy 
than the nuclear reactor used in the first Nautilus submarines. What this meant was that 
more resistant materials needed to be developed for the reactor in order for it to operate at 
higher temperatures in a more compact space without a meltdown. Second, the nuclear 
reactor needs to be able to generate power that can be efficiently used in an aircraft engine, 
whether through a direct or indirect power cycle. This meant that in the process of reactor 
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development the design also needed to take into consideration the engines that would be 
used in conjunction. Third, and perhaps the most critical, in order for the aircraft to be 
manned, shielding from the reactor in order for the crews and other aircraft components to 
be protected needs to be significantly more efficient than what was available. The many 
feet of concrete that constituted the shielding for a rector on the ground would certainly not 
work, and even the shielding that would have been sufficient for Nautilus would be too 
heavy for an aircraft. According to Carolyn James, all of these considerations “could be 
rolled up in terms of ‘power loading,’ pounds of vehicle weight per horsepower; on that 
practical scale, the Nautilus nuclear-powered submarine measured more than 150, while a 
supersonic bomber would have to be closer to four.”528 These interlinked technical barriers 
proved to be significant scientific and engineering challenges. 
Despite the Lexington Report, the scientific community was in general skeptical of 
the feasibility of the project due to these technical barriers. Several important figures from 
the Manhattan Project, who then carried the most policy weight on nuclear matters, were 
unequivocal in their lack of confidence of the project’s feasibility. Some were pragmatic 
about the project in terms of its likely significant and unjustifiable cost. For instance, as 
consultants to the AEC, Robert Oppenheimer and James Conant asserted in 1948 that, 
“although the aircraft could be developed, the technological barriers were too immense to 
make the endeavor cost-effective.”529 Others had reservations on a more fundamental level. 
Edward Teller, for instance, expressed in 1953 doubts that a nuclear aircraft could ever 
reach the test-flight stage given the technical barriers.530 More than a decade later, in 1967, 
Teller seemed to still hold the same view. In a National Academy of Sciences report to the 
House of Representatives on applied science in the US, Teller remarked that for the ANP, 
“The weight of the radiation shielding was the decisive factor,” that even the “Use of the 
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greatest ingenuity in designing the best shielding led no further than to the conclusion that 
the weight of the shielding could not be reduced below a very high minimum.”531 What 
resulted was that “no nuclear-propelled aircraft could be competitive with conventionally 
propelled ones unless the aircraft was exceeding large, weighing almost a million pounds 
(in contrast to present airliner weights of a few hundred thousand pounds,” and “For lighter 
aircraft the irreducible weight of the nuclear equipment [including shielding] overbalanced 
the advantage of exceedingly light fuel [in nuclear materials].”532  The weight of the 
scientific opinion was, thus, against the ANP despite the interest from the Air Force (and 
as a minor partner in this project, the Navy) and the Congress.  
Some initial testing in 1956, in which a turbojet engine was coupled to a direct air 
cycle reactor, saw many of these problems come into light. According to Robert Little in 
his historical account on how the ANP ended, “An inherent hazard of the direct air cycle, 
leaks of radioactive material through cracks in the coating of the fuel elements, forced 
several shutdowns of this test system,” and “It was…obvious that reactor operating 
temperatures would have to be raised much higher to secure a useful system,” which “in 
turn would increase the danger of leakage unless new, more heat-resistant materials were 
developed.”533 These technical failures, particularly the leaking of radioactive materials, 
also confirmed many scientists’ belief in the inherent danger of a flying nuclear reactor and 
the public outcry it may create – the exaggerated news reports on the leaks from the testing 
were sufficient to raise public alert that halted further testing and threatened the need to 
relocate the research programs to more isolated areas. 
                                                 
531 Edward Teller, “The Evolution and Prospects for Applied Physical Science in the United 
States,” in Applied Science and Technological Progress: A Report to the Committee on Science and 
Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, edited by the National Academy of Sciences (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), 367. 
532 Teller (1967), 367. It is important to note that Teller also noted the tremendous environmental 
risk that a large nuclear-propelled aircraft would incur should it crash in any populated area. He described 
the resultant casualties as simply “completely intolerable,” which was in fact reflective of the opinion of at 
least some policymakers with regard to the need to end the ANP at the end of the 1950s. 
533 Little (1963), 8. 
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These problems in technical feasibility were coupled by the fact that the Air Force 
envisioned this nuclear-propelled aircraft as a supersonic strategic bomber and pursued its 
R&D in the form of a weapons system.534 This was made apparent when the Air Force in 
1955 generated the operational requirements for weapon system 125A as a move to 
accelerate the ANP into a weapons program. The minimum performance requirements 
specified for WS-125A was 1) a radius of 11,000 nautical miles with a dash radius of 1,000 
nautical miles; 2) cruising altitude at 30,000 feet with a dash altitude at 60,000 feet; 3) 
cruising speed of Mach 0.9 and “maximum possible supersonic” dash speed; and 4) bomb 
load of 10,000 pounds.535 The desired operational parameters, however, were much higher. 
These minimum requirements, in short, surpassed the operational capacity of a B-52, then 
the state of the art conventional (chemical-fueled) strategic bomber, in every aspect except 
the armament payload, which was likely reduced because the reactor itself was expected 
to weigh at least a couple hundred thousands of pounds. 
Although these requirements remained in place for several more years, it was 
realized pretty soon that these performance expectations were extremely high for an aircraft 
in which none of the components, from its propulsion system to the airframe design, were 
close to be mature, and the entire development trajectory was shrouded with high levels of 
uncertainty. In 1957, three different ad hoc groups, reporting to the OSD (Littlewood 
Committee), the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Development (Mills Board), and the 
Air Research and Development Command (Canterbury Committee) all concluded that the 
existing requirements were unrealistic with regard to its expected performance and R&D 
schedule. They also doubted the existing weapons system approach to ANP, suggested the 
project to return to basic research on reactor development, and recommended an adjustment 
                                                 
534 Whereas the Navy in fact saw the ANP a little differently as primarily an anti-submarine, 
reconnaissance, and advanced warning seaplane. 
535 Little (1963), 7. 
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of the initial goal to the development of a subsonic, low-altitude experimental aircraft.536 
When the principal contractors testified in Congress in mid-June that year and none of them 
could promise a flyable experimental aircraft for at least another five years, the Air Force 
changed its requirements for the ANP project to focus mostly on reactor-propulsion system 
research with an expectation on the accelerated development of at least an experimental 
aircraft, even if it would be far below the then existing standards for a bomber. 
Even with this reduction in expected requirements in the late 1950s on the ANP, 
given the state of R&D in reactor, propulsion, and shielding technologies, to produce an 
experimental aircraft at subsonic speed and low altitude that had little military utility 
remained a tall order that needed concerted effort and large sums of money. However, the 
Air Force’s switch to this goal of an accelerated development of an experimental aircraft 
caused another problem – what would be the point to spend more money and time on the 
ANP, if the foreseeable result was an experimental aircraft that had no military utility? The 
proponents of the ANP argued that the demonstration of nuclear flight, even as an 
experiment, could have significant psychological value in reassuring the domestic as well 
as international audiences that the US had not fallen behind, but even that argument was 
difficult to support when other areas of strategic weapon R&D had seen significant 
breakthroughs during the same timeframe. Over the 1950s, conventional, chemical-fueled 
strategic bombers have improved their operational capacity with greater range, speed, and 
altitude, which has led to less of an urgent need for the theoretically superior albeit much 
more costly nuclear-fueled ones. Furthermore, although beaten by the Soviet launch of 
Sputnik, the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) development, which started around 
the same time as nuclear flight, also had made significant headway and was within grasp 
at the end of the decade (the first successful flight of the Atlas missile took place before 
the end of 1958). These new and improved strategic weapons alternatives, which were not 
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 310 
available when the ANP was first conceived, raised questions whether there was truly a 
military necessity to develop a nuclear aircraft, especially given the expected additional 
cost it would take. 
This problem became an acute concern in 1959 when Donald Quarles, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense under Eisenhower, who was in general supportive of the ANP, died 
unexpectedly. His successor, Thomas Gates, passed the duty of overseeing the ANP within 
the OSD to Herbert York, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. York, who 
worked on the Manhattan Project and was the first director of Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, commanded respect both within the DoD as well as the White House. 
Unlike Quarles, York was convinced that the primary problem of the ANP concerned the 
development of an efficient reactor-propulsion combination and was not inclined to support 
what he termed the “brute force” approach of an accelerated development for an 
experimental aircraft that carried no military utility.537 York remarked in a report to the 
Secretary of Defense in 1959, for instance, that “no ‘reasonably possible’ program could 
lead to militarily useful flight before 1970.”538 Based on York’s recommendations, 
buttressed by reports from the Air Force Science Advisory Board and the Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force, which endorsed York’s position, the program was reoriented to 
reactor research. When McNamara took office as the Secretary of Defense under Kennedy, 
he cancelled the program by reorienting efforts to reactor development strictly within the 
AEC largely following York’s rationale: the significant amounts of accumulated and 
projected costs, the technical uncertainties and hazards, and the lack of a clearly defined 
military need. 
The ANP case presented above also confirms the main argument of this 
dissertation, that low feasibility, stringent requirements, and available alternatives led to 
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an unfavorable technical condition for investment in an emerging military technology. The 
increasingly negative opinion toward the technical feasibility of the project, the stringent 
performance requirements that were set too high and too early in the developmental 
process, and the arrival of technology alternatives that placed increasing doubt over the 
military necessity all made the ANP increasingly unappealing as an investment as the R&D 
process unfolded.539 These factors contributed to the changing technical conditions from 
the initial conceptualization of the project to its demise that led to significant costs, lengthy 
development timelines, with very little observable results. For these reasons, despite some 
initial interest, the ANP continued to have difficulty sustaining investment during its 
developmental process and ultimately was cancelled. Table 8 below shows the preliminary 
evidence from the ANP case in juxtaposition to the two major studies. 
 
Table 8 - Summary of Evidence (with ANP Case) 
Case Study Time Frame 
IV   DV   
Feasibility Requirements Alternatives   Military Investment   
Biochemical 
Incapacitants 
Before 2002 Mixed to High Low Yes   Present   
After 2002 Low High Yes   Absent   
Neuropsycho-
pharmacology 
Before 1980 Low High Yes   Absent   
After 1980 High High Yes   Present   
Aircraft Nuclear 
Propulsion 
Early Years  
(Before 1955) 
Mixed to  
Low 
Low  
(Unspecified) No   Present   
Later Years  
(After 1955) Low High Yes   Absent   
                                                 
539 Henry Lambright’s study on the ANP echoes this conclusion. See W. Henry Lambright, 
Shooting Down the Nuclear Plane (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1967): 32. 
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The ANP case, when contrasted with the two main case studies, yields some 
important insights. For one, in the ANP case, the role of technology alternative is 
highlighted. Whereas in the incapacitant case and the neuropsychopharmacology case, 
alternative accesses to fulfilling the capability gap, whether through R&D efforts from 
institutional partners or other “technological” solutions, were in general available during 
the time periods examined, in the earliest stages of the ANP project, alternatives to strategic 
bombers for long-distance delivery of a nuclear weapon were scant. This lack of alternative 
options made the investment in improvements on the strategic bombers, including the 
potential of nuclear-powered ones, that much more compelling in spite of the low 
feasibility of the project that many in the scientific community believed. In this sense, the 
lack of alternatives can play a critical role in the investment of otherwise unappealing 
technological options. 
In addition, similar to how the stringent lethality threshold the military has come to 
expect from a NLW likely made the use of biochemical incapacitants too risky and their 
R&D unappealing, the ANP case also highlights that the way requirements are set can 
impact the perception on the need for an investment. When the Air Force set the 
requirements for WS-125A in 1955, it likely envisioned that the high expected performance 
would justify the need to invest more time and money into the project. However, by setting 
the requirements so high, the Air Force also raised the perceived value of the ANP’s utility: 
investing in the ANP was worthwhile because it was expected to perform much better than 
conventional strategic bombers. This became problematic when, realizing that the high 
performance requirements were unlikely to be met anytime soon, the Air Force reduced 
the scope of the project. This change in the goals caused doubts over the value of a crash 
down investment program on an experimental aircraft that carried no military utility. In 
other words, the Air Force overpromised the ANP project and its expected operational 
ability and did so too early in the developmental process. When such an expectation was 
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shown to be very difficult to meet, the perceived value and need for the technology 
declined.  
The three cases presented in this dissertation confirm that the way a technology is 
understood by relevant actors in the R&D process matters for its investment. Under certain 
conditions, these understandings can jeopardize or degrade the technology’s appeal as a 
good investment opportunity. The following sections discuss the theoretical contributions 
and policy implications of this research. 
7.3 Theoretical Contributions 
Existing literature in international relations and security studies, particularly as it 
pertains to defense acquisition or military R&D, has not adequately answered the question 
of why militaries invest in some areas of emerging technology but not others. For the most 
part, structural, organizational, or bureaucratic accounts treat technology investment from 
a demand perspective – these explanations are based on the need to have and use a 
technology. The arguments and research presented in this dissertation show that the 
demand perspective is only one side of the coin – the supply of R&D comes from the 
scientific and technical community, and their understanding of what a technology is and 
what it can do, in fact, can and does matter for investment decisions. This is especially true 
for emerging technologies, where uncertainties in developmental trajectories mean that the 
technical community possesses the authority in defining (or in some cases, interpreting) 
what is technically possible and feasible. As shown in the three case studies presented in 
this dissertation, the judgement on the feasibility of a technology from the technical and 
expert communities plays an important role in conditioning whether or not a technology is 
an appealing investment opportunity. Examining the R&D investment decision from both 
the supply and the demand perspectives can provide a more complete picture of who is 
involved in this process, how they are involved, and why their involvement matters. 
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As discussed, the demand-side explanations often obscure technology as 
meaningful variable in military R&D investment decisions. Because demand-side 
explanations focus on the need and the desirability for a technology and place the analytical 
weight on the structural incentives, organizational ideas, and bureaucratic interests 
surrounding these factors, they often treat technology itself as exogenous to the political 
(and sometimes, economic) decision of investment. This dissertation shows that treating 
technology as a static concept that is exogenous to the politics of defense acquisition is 
problematic, because technology itself is a sociopolitical product, and its defining 
characteristics as well as its meaning to those doing the R&D can change over time. As the 
case studies in this dissertation show, even as technical a concept as feasibility can change 
over time depending on how the critical barriers that determine it are understood and 
accepted by those in the expert community. 
Furthermore, the recognition of a technology’s feasibility or infeasibility is itself a 
sociopolitical product: The opinion that a biochemical, incapacitating NLW is not feasible 
due to the dose-response problem arose to prominence as the dominant opinion after the 
Dubrovka incident in 2002 by the deliberate advocacy of those in the technical community 
in favor of tighter arms control on chemical weapons. The recognition of 
neuropsychopharmacology as a meaningful treatment for combat stress came not only as a 
result of the improvement of neuroscientific techniques, but also as a result of the rise of 
cognitive neuroscience as a discipline, which facilitated a broader conceptual change 
within psychiatry from understanding stress-related disorders from being psychoanalytical 
to neurobiological. Without understanding how a technology and certain characteristics 
associated with it can change over time, why certain R&D investments occur or disappear 
may seem puzzling, especially when demand-side explanations cannot seem to account for 
such a change. 
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Because this dissertation argues that technology is a product of the time and that a 
feature such as feasibility is a constructed concept by those who hold power in defining 
and interpreting it, this dissertation also shows that an explanation that emphasizes the role 
of technology as a variable need not be understood as technological deterministic. In this 
sense, the reason for a technology’s military investment or non-investment is neither 
strictly political nor technical. The meaning and the utility of a technology depend on how 
they are understood by relevant actors in the R&D process. Whether or not a technology is 
appealing as an investment is a result of the interactions between how the technical details 
are interpreted and the needs are defined by both those in the expert community, as well as 
those in the military. This research shows that feasibility, requirements, and alternatives as 
components that determine the favorability of a technology’s investment interact with each 
other. Thus, it is important for analysts of military R&D to be cognizant that neither 
technology nor politics alone determines the outcome of investment decisions. 
More broadly, this dissertation synthesizes a framework to understand how states 
may respond to an emerging military technology and shows that risk mitigation is but only 
one perspective to understand the expected behavior of a technology first-mover. To an 
extent, the explanatory model of this dissertation helps clarify why there is the perception 
that states tend to hedge its bets when it comes to emerging military technologies: under 
most circumstances, the technical conditions are not sufficiently unfavorable to prevent the 
military from investing in a technology. As shown in the biochemical incapacitant case and 
the ANP case, the military did spend money to explore the possibility of these technologies 
early on, and it is only when the feasibility, requirements, and alternatives change to a very 
specific configuration (low feasibility, high requirement stringency, and available 
alternatives) that investments in those technologies become sufficiently unappealing. In 
this sense, it is true that militaries tend to hedge and most military technology investments 
would seem to be justifiable. What is not true, however, is to assume that all military 
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technology investments are justifiable and that the military always hedges. This 
dissertation shows that under certain technical conditions, a technology may not be 
sufficiently appealing for the military to invest in spite of its military utility. To understand 
this is important for analyzing military R&D and defense acquisition, particularly with 
regard to how states react to emerging technologies. This dissertation shows a way to divert 
the analytical thinking on defense acquisition from a dominant, risk-driven perspective to 
a more nuanced understanding where the conditionality of a technology matters. 
Finally, this dissertation provides empirical examples in understudied areas of 
defense R&D that could be helpful in extending the knowledge on the early stages of 
defense acquisition. To date, most studies on defense acquisition focus on major programs, 
such as military weapon systems or platforms. Because the ramifications for these 
expensive programs’ success or failure are significant, these studies focus more on the later 
stages of defense acquisition (including technology development, testing, evaluation, and 
procurement) and by nature emphasizes the dynamics of military-industry relations. Yet, 
the insights derived from these studies are not the most directly useful when examining 
emerging S&T, where activities often occur at a basic or early applied level of research. 
This dissertation provides conceptualization of important factors (such as feasibility) as 
well as actors (such as scientist or technical experts outside the defense industry) and their 
role in defense R&D, both of which matter for understanding emerging technologies. In 
addition, since both major case studies examined in this dissertation fall outside the domain 
of weapons systems or platforms and are unconventional areas of S&T for studies in 
acquisition, the dissertation provides an initial step at addressing this empirical gap in the 
analysis of defense acquisition and military R&D. 
7.4 Policy Implications 
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Science and technology have advanced at a very rapid pace in recent eras, and states 
today face a myriad of emerging technologies, many of which carry implications for the 
military. Understanding how a state invests in these military-relevant emerging 
technologies is of critical importance to those desiring to be technologically superior to its 
adversaries or peer competitors in military terms. This dissertation shows, nevertheless, 
not all emerging military technologies will get invested by a first-mover state despite its 
tendency to hedge against uncertainty. As shown in this research, whether or not a 
technology gets invested depends on the favorability of its technical condition – if the 
condition is unfavorable, the technology can have difficulty attracting or sustaining 
investment despite its military utility. 
Internationally, this knowledge is important for states that have an interest in 
understanding the investment behavior of a technology first-mover, which may include 
states investing as second movers or ones competing to be the first-mover. Among the 
emerging military technologies, what may have attracted a first-mover’s investment does 
not necessarily represent the full scope of technological opportunities. Some technologies 
may in fact fail to attract a state’s investment because they are not perceived as appealing 
for technical reasons. Yet because the factors that determine the technical condition for a 
technology are not necessarily universal and can be highly contextual to a specific state, 
what may be neglected or abandoned in one state does not mean that it carries no utility or 
R&D potential for another. In a similar vein, an emerging military technology that is 
invested by one state does not automatically mean that its potential could be realized in 
another. 
In this sense, for those observing the international military S&T investment 
landscape, high level measures that assess a state’s R&D capacity, security requirements, 
military organization, or bureaucratic structure may, in some cases, not provide sufficiently 
granular information on whether or not, and how, this state will invest in an emerging 
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military technology. In some cases, information on how this technology is understood by 
the technical community within the state and whether there is a dominant position on the 
technology’s feasibility, what are the performance expectations of this technology by the 
military and from what sources does it likely derive its expectations, and what technologies 
are regarded as alternatives and to what extent are they available, may be important in 
understanding a state’s investment behavior. Efforts to evaluate and assess the 
directionality of a state’s investment in emerging military technology can require not just 
technical or military expertise, but also more detailed knowledge of the state’s technical 
communities.   
For defense planners managing a state’s military investment in an emerging 
technology, this research shows that the way requirements articulated by the military can 
adversely impact the prospect of developing the technology. As shown in the biochemical 
incapacitant and the ANP case, performance requirements that are derived from what may 
be perceived as comparable technologies could, in some cases, be unreasonably high for 
an emerging technology. Such a high expectation can threaten a R&D program when it 
faces potential challenges because the possibility for the goals to be reached within a 
reasonable cost and schedule can come in doubt. Furthermore, benchmarking the 
performance expectations of an emerging technology against a more mature alternative can 
inadvertently cause the value of the investment to be questioned if the emerging technology 
fails to meet the goals. In comparison to a mature and available alternative, an emerging 
technology that may work better but would take significantly more time and funding to 
achieve runs the risk of becoming unappealing in the eyes of budget and schedule-
conscious policymakers. Military requirements for an emerging technology, in this sense, 
can be set too early and too high. When managing the R&D in an emerging technology 
that has the potential to face significant political challenges, an incremental approach to 
goal setting whereby the performance expectation are benchmarked by what can be 
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realistically expected from the technological horizon rather than a mature alternative 
technology whose performance this emerging technology is expected surpass is more likely 
to ensure the research program’s long-term viability.540  
 This research also shows that in order to better understand and manage emerging 
technology investments, supplementing the dominant risk-mitigation analytical policy 
thinking with a more nuanced understanding of the opportunities new emerging 
technologies represent is critical. Because risk mitigation behavior, by nature, avoids 
prioritizing a technology when decisions need to be made with great uncertainty, it carries 
the potential of overlooking important differences between technological options. More 
importantly, without some knowledge as to how the feasibility is understood, how the 
requirements are derived, and where alternatives may lie, risk-avoidance driven 
investments in emerging technologies may yield little to no result or at its worst jeopardize 
the long-term viability of developing a potentially promising technology. In this sense, as 
important as it is to hedge one’s bet in order to avoid technological surprises, understanding 
the conditions that can make a technology an unappealing investment opportunity is 
equally important. Greater efforts at understanding and analyzing the scientific or technical 
opinions surrounding the technology, with particular attention to where technical barriers 
may lie and how they are understood, for instance, could be beneficial for defense planners 
managing investments in emerging technologies. 
 Finally, buying knowledge can be as important as buying flexibility in the 
investment management of emerging military technologies. Faced with broadened scope 
of military missions, rapidly developing technologies, and increased budget pressure, since 
2010 the DoD has engaged in efforts at changing its acquisition system through the Better 
                                                 
540 This of course does not apply to R&D efforts that are deliberately meant to be high-risk, high-
payoff, limited (and temporary) in scope, and problem-driven (rather than requirements-driven), and most 
critically, insular from political challenges that may arise should they fail, like how DARPA programs are 
managed. 
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Buying Power, with the most recent iteration (Better Buying Power 3.0) launched in 2015. 
This initiative, which seeks to make the defense acquisition system more agile, efficient, 
and cost-effective, emphasizes in its most recent iteration the importance of rapid 
prototyping. This effort, which enables quicker access to new technologies for field testing 
and avoids early commitments to production, allows the DoD and the military to have 
greater flexibility in its ability to respond to changing technological needs. However, as 
demonstrated by the research conducted in this dissertation, particularly through the 
neuropsychopharmacology case, science and technology operate outside the military 
domain with their own set of political as well as social forces, and sometimes a potential 
technological solution to a problem can be marginalized because the existing state of 
knowledge limits how the problem and solution can be conceptualized. It was through 
increased knowledge of the human brain resulting from basic research on cognitive 
sciences, along with significant sociopolitical efforts in medicalizing psychiatry, that a shift 
from a psychosocial to a neurobiological model of psychiatry was able to occur. 
Thus, while a quick route to a solution, such as rapid prototyping, may help the 
DoD’s acquisition system reduce cost and increase its responsiveness, it can also 
inadvertently lead to what David Rioch was wary of in his belief about investing in 
psychopharmacology: obtaining a perceived “silver bullet” may prohibit the additional 
scientific research needed to better understand the underlying mechanisms of a problem. 
In this sense, it is important that policymakers and defense planners in their pursuit to have 
flexibility in dealing with emerging technologies not undermine the need for basic research. 
Use-inspired research that pushes scientific and knowledge-boundary, such as the kinds 
that would fall under the Pasteur’s quadrant, could be very important in broadening the 
knowledge base, which may ultimately enable different and novel routes to defining and 
solving a problem.  
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Understanding and managing investment for emerging military technologies is 
difficult, and uncertainty can be a strong motivator that pushes states to behave in a risk-
avoidance manner that undermines their ability to appreciate important differences that 
may exist between emerging technologies. Sensitivity to how an emerging technology is 
understood by relevant actors in the R&D process, particularly in regard to its feasibility 
as interpreted by the technical community, its requirements as defined by the military, and 
its potential alternatives can lead to not only greater insight about investment decisions, 







“Functions of the 935th KO Team.” US Army Vietnam Medical Bulletin (April-May 
1966): 20-21. 
“Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS).” JCIDS Manual. February 12, 2015. 
“News Chronology: February through April 2003.” The CBW Conventions Bulletin 60 
(June 2003): 25-50. 
“‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons, the CWC and the BWC.” The CBW Conventions Bulletin 61 
(September 2003): 1-2. 
“Squeezing the Pentagon: The Wrong Way to Cut America’s Military Budget.” The 
Economist (July 6, 2013). 
Adolphs, Ralph A., Daniel Tranel, Hanna Damasio, and Antonio R. Damasio. “Impaired 
Recognition of Emotion in Facial Expressions Following Bilateral Amygdala 
Damage to the Human Amygdala.” Nature 372(6507) (15 December 1994): 669-
672. 
Adolphs, Ralph A., Daniel Tranel, Hanna Damasio, and Antonio R. Damasio. “Fear and 
the Human Amygdala.” Journal of Neuroscience 75(9) (September 1995): 5879-
91. 
Alexander, Walter. “Pharmacotherapy for Post-traumatic Stress Disorder in Combat 
Veterans: Focus on Antidepressants and Atypical Antipsychotic Agents.” 
Pharmacy and Therapeutics 37(1) (January 2012): 32-38. 
Alic, John A. “Managing US Defense Acquisition.” Enterprise & Society 14(1) (March 
2013): 1-36. 
Alic, John A. Trillions for Military Technology: How the Pentagon Innovates and Why It 
Costs so Much. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007. 
 323 
Alic, John A., Lewis M. Branscomb, Harvey Brooks, Ashton B. Carter, and Gerald L. 
Epstein. Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing 
World. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992. 
Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. New York, NY: Addison-Wiley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999. 
Altmann, Jürgen. Military Nanotechnology: Potential Applications and Preventive Arms 
Control. New York, NY: Routledge, 2006. 
American Association for the Advancement of Science. “Total R&D by Agency, 1976-
2016,” R&D Budget and Policy Program – Historical Trends in Federal R&D.” 
http://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/Agencies_4.jpg (accessed February 11, 
2016). 
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual: Mental Disorders. 
Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1952. 
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (Third Edition). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 
1980. 
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth Edition. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 
1994. 
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fifth Edition. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 
2013. 
American Psychiatric Association. Practice Guidelines for the Treatment of Patients with 
Acute Stress Syndrome and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. November 2004. 
Andreasen, Nancy C. “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A History and a Critique.” Annals 
of New York Academy of Sciences 1208 (October 2010): 67-71. 
Andresen, Brian D. and Patrick M. Grant, “Dose Safety Margin Enhancement for 
Chemical Incapacitation and Less-Than-Lethal Targeting: NIJ Final Report and 
Recommendations.” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Forensic Science 
 324 
Center R-Division, Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International Security 
Directorate, 1997. 
Andriole, Stephen J. and Gerald W. Hopple. Defense Applications of Artificial 
Intelligence. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988. 
Armacost, Michael H. The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter 
Controversy. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1969. 
Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt, eds. In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the 
Information Age. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997. 
Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. “Cyberwar is Coming!” In In Athena’s Camp: 
Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age, edited by John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt, 23-60. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997. 
Baker, Bob. “Fiscal Year 2011 President’s Budget Request for the DoD Science and 
Technology Program.” Briefing at the 12th Annual Science & Engineering 
Technology Conference, National Defense Industrial Association, North 
Charleston, SC, June 21, 2011. 
Barker, William. “Division Psychiatry, 9th Infantry Division, January – October 1967.” 
US Army Vietnam Medical Bulletin (November-December 1967): 5-9. 
Baldessarini, Ross. “American Biological Psychiatry and Psychopharmacology, 1944-
1994.” In American Psychiatry after World War II, 1944-1994, edited by Roy W. 
Menninger and John C. Nemiah, 371-412. Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Press, Inc., 2000. 
Ballali-Mood, Mahdi, Pieter S. Steyn, Leiv K. Sydnes, and Ralf Trapp. “Impact of the 
Science Developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention (IUPAC Technical 
Report),” Pure and Applied Chemistry 80(1) (January 2008): 175-200. 
Barchas, Jack D. and JoAnn Difede, eds. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 
Volume 1208: Psychiatric and Neurologic Aspects of War. New York, NY: The 
New York Academy of Sciences, 2010. 
Beard, Edmund. Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 1976. 
 325 
Beaumier, Coreen M., Ana Maria Gomez-Rubio, Peter J. Hotez, and Peter J. Weina. 
“United States Military Tropical Medicine: Extraordinary Legacy, Uncertain 
Future.” PLOS Neglected Tropical Diseases 7(12) (December 2013): e2448. 
Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, Sonia. Barriers to Bioweapons: The Challenges of Expertise 
and Organization for Weapons Development. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2014. 
Berger, William, Mauro V. Mendlowicz, Carla Marques-Portella, Gustavo Kinrys, 
Leondardo F. Fontenelle, Charles R. Marmar, and Ivan Figueira. “Pharmcaologic 
Alternatives to Antidepressants in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Systematic 
Review.” Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology and Biological Psychiatry 
33(2) (March 2009): 169-180. 
Biddle, Stephen. Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004. 
Bijker, Wiebe E., Thomas Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, eds. The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of 
Technology. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2012. 
Boleyn-Fitzgerald, Miriam. Pictures of the Mind: What the New Neuroscience Tells Us 
About Who We Are. Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press, 2010. 
Booth, Ken and Nicholas Wheeler. The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust 
in World Politics. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
Bostrom, John A. “Manage of Combat Reactions.” US Army Vietnam Medical Bulletin 
(July-August 1967): 6-8. 
Bourne, Peter G. “Combat Psychiatry.” US Army Medical Bulletin (January 1966): 11-12. 
Bourne, Peter G. “Military Psychiatry and the Viet Nam Experience.” American Journal 
of Psychiatry 127(4) (October 1970): 481-488. 
Brady, Joseph V. and Walle J.H. Nauta, eds. Principles, Practices, and Positions in 
Neuropsychiatric Research:  A Volume in Honor of Dr. David McKenzie Rioch. 
New York, NY: Pergamom Press, 1972. 
 326 
Brady, Kathleen T., Therese K. Killeen, Tim Brewerton, and Sylvia Lucerini. 
“Comorbidity of Psychiatric Disorders and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.” The 
Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 61(Supplement 7) (2000): 22-32. 
Bray, Dennis. “The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change Revisited.” Environmental 
Science & Policy 13 (2010): 340-350. 
Bremner, J. Douglas. “Stress and Brain Atrophy.” CNS & Neurological Disorders – Drug 
Targets 5(5) (2006): 503-12. 
Bremner, J. Douglas, ed., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: From Neurobiology to 
Treatment. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016. 
Brett, Elizabeth, A., Robert L. Spitzer, and Janet B.W. Williams. “DSM-III-R Criteria for 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.” The American Journal of Psychiatry 145(10) 
(October 1988): 1232-1236. 
British Medical Association. The Use of Drugs as Weapons: The Concerns and 
Responsibilities of Healthcare Professionals. London, UK: British Medical 
Association, 2007. 
Brown, Michael E. Flying Blind: The Politics of the U.S. Strategic Bomber Program. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992. 
Brown, Michael E., Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds. 
Offense, Defense, and War. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004. 
Camp, Norman M. US Army Psychiatry in the Vietnam War: New Challenges in 
Extended Counterinsurgency Warfare. Fort Sam Houston, TX: Office of the 
Surgeon General, Borden Institute, US Army Medical Department Center and 
School, 2015. 
Carter, Ashton B., Marcel Lettre, and Shane Smith. “Keeping the Technological Edge.” 
In Keeping the Edge; Managing Defense for the Future, edited by Ashton B. 
Carter and John P. White, 129-163. Cambridge, MA: Preventive Defense Project, 
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 
2000. 
 327 
Carter, Ashton B. and John P. White, eds. Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the 
Future. Cambridge, MA: Preventive Defense Project, Belfer Center for Science 
and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2000. 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction. CJCSI 3170.01I. “Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS).” January 23, 2015. 
Cheung, Tai Ming. “The Chinese Defense Economy’s Long March from Imitation to 
Innovation.” In China’s Emergence as a Defense Technological Power, edited by 
Tai Ming Cheung, 31-60. New York, NY: Routledge, 2013. 
Cheung, Tai Ming, ed. China’s Emergence a Defense Technological Power. New York, 
NY: Routledge, 2013. 
Clayton, Nancy M. and William P. Nash. “Medication Management of Combat and 
Operational Stress Injuries in Active Duty Service Members.” In Combat Stress 
Injury: Theory, Research, and Management, edited by Charles R. Figley and 
William P. Nash, 219-246. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007. 
Cohen, Eliot A. “A Revolution in Warfare.” Foreign Affairs 72(2) (March/April 1996): 
37-54. 
Cohen, W. Maxwell, Donald H. Harter, and Eric R. Kandel. “The Emergence of Modern 
Neuroscience: Some Implications for Neurology and Psychiatry.” Annual Review 
of Neuroscience 23 (2000): 343-391. 
Colbach, Edward M. “Ethical Issues in Combat Psychiatry.” Military Medicine 150(5) 
(1985): 256-265. 
Colbach, Edward M. and Matthew D. Parrish. “Army Mental Health Activities in 
Vietnam: 1965-1970.” Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic 34(6) (1970): 340. 
Quoted in Norman M. Camp. US Army Psychiatry in the Vietnam War: New 
Challenges in Extended Counterinsurgency Warfare. Fort Sam Houston, TX: 
Office of the Surgeon General, Borden Institute, US Army Medical Department 
Center and School, 2015. 
Collins, Craig. “The Center for Military Psychiatry and Neuroscience: To Protect and 
Promote Soldier Resilience, CMPN Researchers Focus on Both Body and Mind.” 
In 120 Years of Advances for Military and Public Health, 55-65. Tampa, FL: 
Faircount Media Group, 2013. 
 328 
Collins, Harry. Gravity’s Shadow: The Search for Gravitational Waves. Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2004. 
Council on Foreign Relations. Non-Lethal Technologies: Military Options and 
Implications. New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1995. 
Council on Foreign Relations. Non-Lethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects. New 
York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999. 
Council on Foreign Relations. Non-Lethal Weapons and Capabilities. New York, NY: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2004. 
Coupland, Robin M. “Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons: Risks and Uncertainties.” In 
Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons: Promise or Peril? edited by Alan M. 
Pearson, Marie Isabelle Chevrier, and Mark Wheelis, 225-230. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2007. 
Costanzo, Michelle E., Yi-Yu Chou, Suzanne Leaman, Dzung L. Pham, David Keyser, 
Dominic E. Nathan, Mary Coughlin, Paul Rapp, and Michael J. Roy. “Connecting 
Combat-Related Mild Traumatic Brain Injury with Posttraumatic Stress Disorders 
Through Brain Imaging,” Neuroscience Letters 577 (2014): 11-15. 
Cook, John, Dana Nuccitelli, Sara A. Green, Mark Richardson, Bärbel Winkler, Rob 
Painting, Robert Way, Peter Jacobs, and Andrew Skuce. “Quantifying the 
Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the Scientific Literature.” 
Environmental Research Letters 8 (2013): 1-7. 
Cowan, W. Maxwell, Donald H. Harter, and Eric R. Kandel. “The Emergence of Modern 
Neuroscience: Some Implications for Neurology and Psychiatry.” Annual Review 
of Neuroscience 23 (2000): 345-346. 
Crevald, Martin van. Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present. New York, 
NY: The Free Press, 1991. 
Crocq, Marc-Antoine and Louis Crocq. “From Shell Shock and War Neurosis to 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A History of Traumatology.” Dialogues in Clinical 
Neuroscience 2(1) (March 2000): 47-55. 
 329 
Croft, Ashley M. “A Lesson Learnt: The Rise and Fall of Lariam and Halfan.” Journal of 
the Royal Society of Medicine 100 (April 2007): 170-174. 
Crowley, Michael. Application of the OPCW Mechanisms for Reviewing and Addressing 
Science and Technology Developments: The Case of Incapacitating Chemical 
Agents (ICAs). Policy Paper 1, Biochemical Security 2030 Project. Bath, UK: 
University of Bath, 2013. 
Crowley, Michael. Chemical Control: Regulation of Incapacitating Chemical Agent 
Weapons, Riot Control Agents and Their Means of Delivery. New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 
Dando, Malcolm and Martin Furmanski. “Midspectrum Incapacitant Programs.” In 
Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons since 1945, edited by Mark Wheelis, Lajos 
Rózsa, and Malcolm Dando, 236-251. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2006. 
Dando, Malcolm R. “Scientific Outlook for the Development of Incapacitants.” In 
Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons: Promise or Peril? edited by Alan M. 
Pearson, Marie Isabelle Chevrier, and Mark Wheelis, 123-147. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2007. 
Dando, Malcolm. A New Form of Warfare: The Rise of Non-Lethal Weapons. London, 
UK: Brassey’s Ltd., 1996. 
Dando, Malcolm. Neuroscience and the Future of Chemical-Biological Weapons. New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
Datel, William E. and Arnold W. Johnson. Psychotropic Prescription Medication in 
Vietnam. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Surgeon General, Department of the 
Army, 1978. 
Davis, M. and P. J. Whalen. “The Amygdala: Vigilance and Emotion.” Molecular 
Psychiatry 6(1) (2001): 13-34. 
Davis, Paul K. “Uncertainty Sensitive Planning.” In New Challenges, New Tools for 
Defense Decisionmaking, edited by Stuart E. Johnson, Martin C. Libicki, and 
Gregory F. Treverton, 131-155. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003. 
 330 
Davis, Zachary S. and David Frankel, eds. The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear 
Weapons Spread and What Results. New York, NY: Routledge, 1993. 
Davison, Neil. ‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Day, George S. and Paul J.H. Schoemaker. “A Different Game.” In Wharton on 
Managing Emerging Technologies, edited by George S. Day, Paul J.H. 
Schoemaker, and Robert E. Gunther, 1-23. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2000. 
Day, George S., Paul J.H. Schoemaker, and Robert E. Gunther, eds. Wharton on 
Managing Emerging Technologies. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000. 
Deagle, Jr., Edwin A. “Organization and Process in Military R&D.” In The Genesis of 
New Weapons: Decision Making for Military R&D, edited by Franklin A. Long 
and Judith Reppy, 161-181. New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1980. 
Dean, Jr. Eric T. Shook Over Hell: Post-Traumatic Stress, Vietnam, and the Civil War. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. 
Defense Innovation Market Place. “About Independent Research & Development.” 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/about.html (accessed October 7, 
2016). 
Defense Science Board. Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century 
Strategic Technology Vectors, Volume III: Strategic Planning. Washington, D.C.: 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics, 2006. 
Defense Science Board. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Basic 
Research. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 2012. 
Department of Defense. “DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and 
NLW Policy.” DoDD 3000.03E (April 25, 2013). 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300003p.pdf (accessed December 
10, 2015). 
 331 
Department of Defense. Chemical and Biological Defense Program. “Topic CBD00-108: 
Chemical Immobilizing Agents for Non-lethal Applications.” Small Business 
Innovation Research Solicitation, FY 2000. 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/osbp/sbir/solicitations/sbir20001/cbd001.doc (accessed 
September 10, 2016). 
Department of Defense. Defense Budget Priorities and Choices. Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense, 2012. 
Department of Defense. Non-Lethal Weapons Program. “Active Denial System FAQs.” 
http://jnlwp.defense.gov/About/FrequentlyAskedQuestions/ActiveDenialSystemF
AQs.aspx (accessed March 25, 2015). 
Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 2001. 
Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2001. 
Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2006. 
Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2006. 
Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010. 
Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2010. 
Department of Defense. Risk, Issue, and Opportunity Management Guide for Defense 
Acquisition Programs. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering, 2015. 
Department of Defense. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2012. 
Department of Justice. “Department of Justice and Department of Defense Joint 
Technology Program: Second Anniversary Report.” February 1997. 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/164268.pdf (accessed February 20, 2016). 
Department of Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense. VA/DoD Clinical Practice 
Guideline: Management of Post-Traumatic Stress Guideline Summary. 
Washington, D.C.: Department of Veterans Affairs, 2010. 
 332 
Department of Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense. VA/DoD Clinical Practice 
Guideline for Management of Post-Traumatic Stress. Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Veterans Affairs, 2010. 
Department of Veterans Affairs and Department of Defense. VA/DoD Clinical Practice 
Guideline for the Management of Concussion-Mild Traumatic Brain Injury. 
Washington, D.C.: Department of Veterans Affairs, 2016. 
Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and Commandant, Marine Corps. 
Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical 
Injuries. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters of Department of Army, Navy, and Air 
Force, and Commandant of the Marine Corps, 1995. 
Din, Allan M. Arms and Artificial Intelligence: Weapons and Arms Control Applications 
of Advanced Computing. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1987. 
Dinan, Stephen. “DoD Reversal: Sequester Pain Less Than Anticipated.” Washington 
Post (August 6, 2013). 
Dombrowski, Peter and Eugene Gholz. Buying Military Transformation: Technological 
Innovation and the Defense Industry. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 
2006. Kindle Edition. 
Dugan, Regina E. and Kaigham J. Gabriel. “‘Special Forces’ Innovation: How DARPA 
Attacks Problems.” Harvard Business Review 91(10) (October 2013): 74-84. 
Dunlop, John B. The 2002 Dubrovka and 2004 Beslan Hostage Crises: A Critique of 
Russian Counter-Terrorism. Stuttgart, Germany: Ibidem-Verlag, 2006. 
Dupont, Daniel G. “Storm Before the Calm: Can Knockout Gases Really Be Nonlethal?” 
Scientific American (February 2003): 17-18. 
Dursa, Erin K., Matthew J. Reinhard, Shannon K. Barth, and Aaron I. Schneiderman. 
“Prevalence of a Positive Screen for PTSD Among OEF/OIF and OEF/OIF-Era 
Veterans in a Large Population-Based Cohort.” Journal of Traumatic Stress 27(5) 
(October 2014): 542-549. 
Eden, Lynn. Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, & Nuclear Weapons 
Devastations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 
 333 
Edgewood Research, Development and Engineering Center (1989-94). Scientific 
Conference on Chemical and Biological Defense Research: Abstract Digest. US 
Army Chemical and biological Defense Command. Aberdeen Proving Ground, 
MD. Quoted in Malcolm Dando. A New Form of Warfare: The Rise of Non-Lethal 
Weapons. London, UK: Brassey’s Ltd., 1996. 
Edmonds, Martin. “International Military Equipment Procurement Partnerships: The 
Basic Issues.” In International Arms Procurement: New Directions, edited by 
Martin Edmonds, 1-23. New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1981. 
Edmonds, Martin, ed. International Arms Procurement: New Directions. New York, NY: 
Pergamon Press, 1981. 
Einsiedel, Edna F. “Introduction: Making Sense of Emerging Technologies.” In 
Emerging Technologies: From Hindsight to Foresight, edited by Edna Einsiedel, 
3-9. Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 2009. 
Einsiedel, Edna, ed. Emerging Technologies: From Hindsight to Foresight. Vancouver, 
Canada: University of British Columbia Press, 2009. 
Engineering Division, Air Service Technical Command. “Proposed Air Engineering 
Development Center.” December 10, 1945. TBL. Records of the President’s APC. 
Box 28. Quoted in Carolyn C. James. “The Politics of Extravagance: The Aircraft 
Nuclear Propulsion Project.” Naval War College Review 53(2) (Spring 2000): 
158-190. 
Enserink, Marin and Richard Stone. “Questions Swirl Over Knockout Gas Used in 
Hostage Crisis.” Science 298(5596) (November 8, 2002): 1150-1151. 
Erichsen, John Eric. Railway and Other Injuries of the Nervous System. Philadelphia, PA: 
Henry C. Lea, 1867. 
Evangelista, Matthew. Innovation and the Arms Race How the United States and the 
Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1988. 
Fahrenthold, David A. and Lisa Rein. “They Said Sequester would be Scary. Mostly, 
They were Wrong.” Washington Post (June 30, 2013). 
 334 
Farrell, Jr., Lawrence P. “Sequester Impact: More Than Meets the Eye.” National 
Defense (September 2013). 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 31.205-18. “Independent Research and 
Development and Bid and Proposal Costs.” 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/FAR_31.pdf (accessed 
October 6, 2016) 
Ferguson, C. Antipersonnel Chemical Immobilizers: Sedatives. Research Proposal, April 
27, 1994. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD: US Army ERDEC. Quoted in Neil 
Davison. ‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Fidler, David. “The Meaning of Moscow: ‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons and International Law 
in the Early 21st Century.” International Review of the Red Cross 87(859) 
(September 2005): 525-552. 
Figley, Charles R. and William P. Nash, eds. Combat Stress Injury: Theory, Research, 
and Management. New York, NY: Routledge, 2007. 
Foley, Shannon. “Non-Lethal Weapons Human Effects.” November 19, 2014. 
French, Louis M. “Military Traumatic Brain Injury: An Examination of Important 
Differences.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1208 (October 2010): 
38-45. 
Fuchs, Erica R.H. “Rethinking the Role of the State in Technology Development: 
DARPA and the Case for Embedded Network Governance.” Research Policy 39 
(2010): 1133-1147. 
Fuhrmann, Matthew. “Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear 
Cooperation Agreements.” International Security 34(1) (Summer 2009): 7-41. 
Fukuda, Mark and Tom Cullison. U.S. Department of Defense Contributions to Malaria 
Elimination in the Era of Artemisinin Resistance. Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, 2014. 
Furmanski, Martin. “Historical Military Interest in Low-Lethality Biochemical Agents.” 
In Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons: Promise or Peril? edited by Alan M. 
 335 
Pearson, Marie Isabelle Chevrier, and Mark Wheelis, 35-66. Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2007. 
Gazzaniga, Michael S., Richard B. Ivry, and George R. Mangun. Cognitive 
Neuroscience: The Biology of the Mind. Third Edition. New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton & Company, 2009. 
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in 
Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005. 
Gilli, Andrea and Mauro Gilli. “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, 
Organizational, and Infrastructural Constraints.” Security Studies 25(1) (February 
2016): 50-84. 
Glaser, Charles L. “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help.” International 
Security 19(3) (Winter 1994): 50-90. 
Glaser, Charles L. and Chaim Kaufmann. “What is Offense-Defense Balance and Can 
We Measure It?” In Offense, Defense, and War, edited by Michael E. Brown, 
Owen R. Coté Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 266-304. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004. 
Glaser, Charles. “The Security Dilemma Revisited.” World Politics 50(1) (October 
1997): 171-201. 
Glasser, Susan B. and Peter Baker. “Gas in Raid Killed 115 Hostages; Only 2 Slain by 
Rebels; More Than 600 Remain Hospitalized in Moscow.” The Washington Post 
(October 28, 2002): A.01. 
Glasser, Susan B. and Peter Baker. “Russia Confirms Suspicions About Gas Used in 
Raid; Potent Anesthetic Pumped Into Theater; 2 More Hostages Die From Drug’s 
Effects.” The Washington Post (October 31, 2002): A.15. 
Glickstein, Mitchell. Neuroscience: A Historical Introduction. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2014. 
Goldman, Emily O. and Leslie C. Eliason, eds. The Diffusion of Military Technology and 
Ideas. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. 
 336 
Greenwoold, Ted. Making the MIRV: A Study on Defense Decision Making. Cambridge, 
MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1975. 
Grinker, Roy R. and John P. Spiegel. Men Under Stress. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., Inc., 1945. 
Gupta, Amit. Building an Arsenal: The Evolution of Regional Power Force Structures. 
Westport, CT: Prager Publishers, 1997. 
Guthrie, Richard. “CWC Review Conference Report: The Run-up to the Conference: 
Preparations and Expectations.” April 7, 2008. http://www.cbw-
events.org.uk/cwcrc01.pdf (accessed December 10, 2015). 
Guthrie, Richard. “The Second Chemical Weapons Convention Review Conference.” The 
CBW Conventions Bulletin 79 (June 2008): 1-5. 
Haas, Peter M. “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination.” International Organization 46(1) (Winter 1992): 1-35. 
Hackett, Edward J., Olga Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch, and Judy Wajcman, eds. The 
Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Third Edition. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 2008. 
Halperin, Morton H. and Priscilla A. Clapp. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006. 
Hampton, Tracy. “Traumatic Brain Injury a Growing Problem among Troops Serving in 
Today’s War.” Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) 306(5) 
(August, 2011): 477-479. 
Hannas, William C., James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi. Chinese Industrial 
Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization. New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2013. 
Hoge, Charles W., Dennis McGurk, Jeffrey L. Thomas, Anthony L. Cox, Charles C. 
Engel, and Carl A. Castro. “Mild Traumatic Brain Injury in the U.S. Soldiers 
Returning from Iraq.” The New England Journal of Medicine 358(5) (January 
2008): 453-463. 
 337 
Holland, Lauren H. and Robert A. Hoover. The MX Decision: A New Direction in U.S. 
Weapons Procurement Policy? Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1985. 
Holloway, Harry C. “Epidemiology of Heroin Dependency among Soldiers in Vietnam.” 
Military Medicine 139(2) (February 1974): 108-113. 
Holloway, Harry C. “Interpersonal Psychotherapy and Neuroscience.” Psychiatry 66(2) 
(Summer 2003): 99-103. 
Horowitz, Michael C. The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for 
International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. 
Horstman, Judith. The Scientific American Brave New Brain. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass, 2010. 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Global Security: Non-Proliferation: 
Fourth Report of Session 2008-09, Report, Together with Formal Minutes, Oral 
and Written Evidence. London: The Stationery Office Limited, 2009. 
Howell, Alison. “The Demise of PTSD: From Governing through Trauma to Governing 
Resilience.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 37(3) (August 2012): 214-226. 
Huettel, Scott A., Allen W. Song, and Gregory McCarthy. Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, 2nd Edition. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates, Inc., 2008. 
Hughes, Thomas P. Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930. 
Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. 
Institute of Medicine. Treatment for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Military and 
Veteran Populations: Final Assessment. Washington, D.C.: The National 
Academies Press, 2014. 
Institute of Medicine. Treatment for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Military and 
Veteran Populations: Initial Assessment. Washington, D.C.: The National 
Academies Press, 2012. 
 338 
Isserlin, Leanna, Gadi Zerach, and Zahava Solomon. “Acute Stress Responses: A Review 
and Synthesis of ASD, ASR, and CSR.” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 
78(4) (2008): 423-429. 
Iversen, Leslie. “Neuroscience and Drug Development.” In The Pharmacologists II, 
Interviews by David Healy. 325-350. London, UK: Arnold, 1998. 
James, Carolyn C. “The Politics of Extravagance: The Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion 
Project.” Naval War College Review 53(2) (Spring 2000): 158-190. 
Jasanoff, Sheila S. The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1990. 
JASON. S&T for National Security. McLean, VA: The MITRE Corporation, 2009. 
Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under Security Dilemma.” In Offense, Defense, and War, 
edited by Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven 
E. Miller, 3-50. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004. 
Jayaram, Kaushik and Robert J. Full. “Cockroaches Traverse Crevices, Crawl Rapidly in 
Confined Spaces, and Inspire a Soft, Legged Robot.” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 113(8) (February 2016): 
E950-957. 
Johnson, Stuart E., Martin C. Libicki, and Gregory F. Treverton, eds. New Challenges, 
New Tools for Defense Decisionmaking. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2003. 
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate. JNLWD Newsletter. 2nd Quarter 2001. Quantico, 
VA: JNLWD. Quoted in Neil Davison. ‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons. Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program. “Non-Lethal Human Effects Fact Sheet.” October 
2011. 
Jones, David R. “U.S. Air Force Combat Psychiatry.” In War Psychiatry, edited by 
Franklin D. Jones, Linette R. Sparacino, Victoria L. Wilcox, Joseph M. Rothberg, 
and James W. Stokes, 177-210. Falls Church, VA: Office of the Surgeon General, 
United States Army, 1995. 
 339 
Jones, Edgar and Simon Wessely. Shell Shock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to 
the Gulf War. New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2006. 
Jones, Edgar, Robert Hodgins Vermaas, Helen McCartney, Charlotte Beech, Ian Palmer, 
Kenneth Hyams, and Simon Wessel. “Flashbacks and Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder: The Genesis of a 20th-Century Diagnosis.” British Journal of 
Psychiatry 182(2) (February 2003): 158-163. 
Jones, Franklin D. “Chronic Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.” In War Psychiatry, edited 
by Franklin D. Jones, Linette R. Sparacino, Victoria L. Wilcox, Joseph M. 
Rothberg, and James W. Stokes, 409-430. Falls Church, VA: Office of the 
Surgeon General, United States Army, 1995. 
Jones, Franklin D. “Military Psychiatry Since World War II.” In American Psychiatry 
After World War II (1944-1994), edited by Roy W. Menninger and John C. 
Nemiah, 3-36. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, Inc., 2000. 
Jones, Franklin D. “Psychiatric Lessons of War.” In War Psychiatry, edited by Franklin 
D. Jones, Linette R. Sparacino, Victoria L. Wilcox, Joseph M. Rothberg, and 
James W. Stokes, 1-34. Falls Church, VA: Office of the Surgeon General, United 
States Army, 1995. 
Jones, Franklin D. “Traditional Warfare Combat Stress Casualties.” In War Psychiatry, 
edited by Franklin D. Jones, Linette R. Sparacino, Victoria L. Wilcox, Joseph M. 
Rothberg, and James W. Stokes, 35-61. Falls Church, VA: Office of the Surgeon 
General, United States Army, 1995. 
Jones, Franklin, D., Linette R. Sparacino, Victoria L. Wilcox, Joseph M. Rothberg, and 
James W. Stokes, eds. War Psychiatry. Falls Church, VA: Office of the Surgeon 
General, United States Army, 1995. 
Kaldor, Mary. “The Weapons Succession Process.” World Politics 35(4) (July 1986): 
577-595. 
Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. The Cultures of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1997. 
Kawa, Shadia and James Giordano. “A Brief Historicity of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders: Issues and Implications for the Future of Psychiatric 
 340 
Cannon and Practice.” Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 7(2) 
(January 2012): 1-9. 
Kelle, Alexander. “The CWC after Its First Review Conference: Is the Glass Half Full or 
Half Empty?” Disarmament Diplomacy 71 (July 20003): 31-40. 
Kennedy, Jan E., Michael S. Jaffee, Gregory A. Leskin, James W. Stokes, Felix O. Leal, 
and Pamela J. Fitzpatrick. “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder-Like Symptoms and Mild Traumatic Brain Injury.” Journal of 
Rehabilitation Research and Development 44(7) (2007): 895-920. 
Kenny, John M. “Human Effects Advisory Panel Program.” Presented to NDIA Non-
Lethal Defense IV. March 22, 2000. 
Ketchum, James S. and Frederick R. Sidell. “Incapacitating Agents.” In Medical Aspects 
of Chemical and Biological Warfare, edited by Frederick R. Sidell, Ernest T. 
Takafuji, and David R. Franz, 287-305. Falls Church, VA: Office of the Surgeon 
General, United States Army, 1997. 
Ketchum, James S. and Harry Salem, “Incapacitating Agents.” In Medical Aspects of 
Chemical Warfare, edited by Joan Redding, 411-439. Falls Church, VA: Office of 
the Surgeon General, United States Army, 2008. 
Kier, Elizabeth. Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997. 
Kirschbaum, Clemens, O. T. Wolf, Mark May, W. Wippich, and Dirk H. Hellhammer. 
“Stress- and Treatment-Induced Elevations of Cortisol Levels Associated with 
Impaired Declarative Memory in Healthy Adults.” Life Sciences 58(17) (22 
March 1996): 1475-83. 
Kitchen, Lynn W., David Vaughn, and Donald R. Skillman. “Role of US Military 
Research Programs in the Development of US Food and Drug Administration-
Approved Antimalarial Drugs” Clinical Infectious Diseases 43(1) (July 2006): 
67-71. 
Klein, Burton H. “Policy Issues Involved in the Conduct of Military Development 
Programs.” In Economics of Research and Development, edited by Richard A. 
Tybout, 309-326. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1965. 
 341 
Klotz, Lynn, Martin Furmanski, and Mark Wheelis. “Beware the Siren’s Song: Why 
‘Non-Lethal’ Incapacitating Chemical Agents are Lethal.” Federation of 
American Scientists. https://fas.org/cw/documents/sirens_song.pdf (accessed 
February 12, 2016). 
Kok, Brian C., Richard K. Herrell, Jeffrey L. Thomas, and Charles W. Hoge. 
“Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Associated with Combat Service in Iraq or 
Afghanistan: Reconciling Prevalence Differences Between Studies.” The Journal 
of Nervous and Mental Disease 200(5) (April 2012): 444-450. 
Kosal, Margaret E. “The Security Implications of Nanotechnology.” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 66(4) (July 2010): 58-69. 
Kosal, Margaret E. Nanotechnology for Chemical and Biological Defense. New York, 
NY: Springer, 2009. 
Kozaryn, Linda. “U.S. Troops in Bosnia Get Nonlethal Weapons.” American Forces 
Press Service (September 5, 1997). 
http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=41128 (accessed March 21, 
2016). 
Krepinevich, Andrew. “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions.” The 
National Interest 37 (Fall 1994): 30-42. 
Kroenig, Matthew. Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010. 
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Third Edition. Chicago, IL: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
Lakoski, Joan M., W. Bosseau Murry, and John M. Kenny. The Advantages and 
Limitations of Calmatives for Use as Non-Lethal Technique. The Pennsylvania 
State University College of Medicine Applied Research Laboratory, 2000. 
Lambright, W. Henry. Shooting Down the Nuclear Plane. Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc., 1967. 
Lavoy, Peter R. “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation.” Security 
Studies 2(3&4) (Spring/Summer 1993): 192-212. 
 342 
Lehner, Paul E. Artificial Intelligence and National Defense: Opportunity and Challenge. 
Blue Ridge Summit, PA: Tab Professional and Reference Books, 1989. 
Lele, Ajey. Strategic Technologies for the Military: Breaking New Frontiers. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc., 2009. 
LeVine, Susan D. and Joseph A. Rutigliano, Jr. “U.S. Military Use of Non-Lethal 
Weapons: Reality vs Perceptions.” Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law 47(1) (Spring 2015): 239-264. 
Lieber, Keir and Gerard Alexander. “Waiting for Balancing: Why the World Is Not 
Pushing Back.” International Security 30(1) (Summer 2005): 109-139. 
Lieber, Keir. War and Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2005. 
Little, Robert D. Nuclear Propulsion for Manned Aircraft: The End of the Program, 
1959-1961. Washington, D.C.: Us Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, 
1963. 
Long, Franklin A. and Judith Reppy. “Decision Making in Military R&D: An 
Introductory Overview.” In The Genesis of New Weapons: Decision Making for 
Military R&D, edited by Franklin A. Long and Judith Reppy, 3-18. New York, 
NY: Pergamon Press, 1980. 
Long, Franklin A. and Judith Reppy, eds. The Genesis of New Weapons: Decision 
Making for Military R&D. New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1980. 
MacKenzie, Donald. “Missile Accuracy: A Case Study in the Social Processes of 
Technological Change.’ In The Social Construction of Technological Systems: 
New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, edited by Wiebe E. 
Bijker, Thomas Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, 189-216. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2012. 
MacKenzie, Donald. Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile 
Guidance. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993. 
MacKenzie, Donald and Judy Wajcman, eds. The Social Shaping of Technology, Second 
Edition. Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press, 1999. 
 343 
Mahnken, Thomas G. Technology and the American Way of War. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2008. 
Marin, Peter. “Living in Moral Pain.” In The Vietnam Reader, edited by Walter Capps, 
40-53. New York, NY: Routledge, 1991. Quoted in Ben Shephard. A War of 
Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2000. 
McAllister, Thomas W. and Murray B. Stein. “Effects of Psychological and 
Biomechanical Trauma on Brain and Behavior.” Annals of the New York Academy 
of Sciences 1208 (October 2010): 46-57. 
McKitrick, Jeffrey, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard 
Blanchfield, and Dale Hill. “The Revolution in Military Affairs.” In Battlefield of 
the Future: 21st Century Warfare Issues, edited by Barry R. Schneider and 
Lawrence E. Grinter, 65-97. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1995. 
McNaugher, Thomas L. New Weapons, Old Politics: America’s Military Procurement 
Muddle. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989. 
Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: W. W. Norton 
& Company, Inc., 2001. 
Menninger, Roy W. and John C. Nemiah, eds. American Psychiatry after World War II 
(1944-1994). Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, Inc., 2000. 
Meyer, Stephen M. The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984. 
The MITRE Corporation. JASON Program Office. “The $100 Genome: Implications for 
the DoD.” December 2010. 
Mogl, Stefan, ed. Technical Workshop on Incapacitating Chemical Agents: Spiez, 
Switzerland, 8-9 September 2011. Spiez, Switzerland: Spiez Laboratory, 2012. 
Morrow, James D. “Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security.” 
International Organization 47(2) (Spring 1993): 207-233. 
 344 
Nash, William P., Caroline Silva, and Brett Litz. “The Historic Origins of Military and 
Veterans Mental Health Stigma and the Stress Injury Model as Means to Reduce 
It.” Psychiatric Annals 39(8) (August 2009): 789-794. 
The National Academies Keck Futures Initiative Smart Prosthetics Steering Committee. 
Smart Prosthetics: Exploring Assistive Devices for the Body and Mind. 
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2007. 
National Academy of Sciences, ed. Applied Science and Technological Progress: A 
Report to the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of 
Representatives. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967. 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Report of the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders. Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 1969. 
National Research Council. A Survey of Attitudes and Actions on Dual Use Research in 
the Life Sciences: A Collaborative Effort of the National Research Council and 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Washington, D.C.: The 
National Academies Press, 2009. 
National Research Council. An Assessment of Non-Lethal Weapons Science and 
Technology. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2003. 
National Research Council. Assessment of Department of Defense Basic Research. 
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2005. 
National Research Council. Avoiding Surprise in an Era of Global Technology Advances. 
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2005. 
National Research Council. Avoiding Technology Surprise for Tomorrow’s Warfighter: A 
Symposium Report. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2009. 
National Research Council. Emerging and Readily Available Technologies and National 
Security: A Framework for Addressing Ethical, Legal, and Societal Issues. 
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2014. 
National Research Council. Emerging Cognitive Neuroscience and Related Technologies. 
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2008. 
 345 
National Research Council. Opportunities in Neuroscience for Future Army Applications. 
Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2009. 
National Research Council. Strategic Engagement in Global S&T: Opportunities for 
Defense Research. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2014. 
Neel, Spurgeon. Vietnam Studies: Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965-
1970. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1973. 
Nixon, Richard M. “Statement on Chemical and Biological Defense Policies and 
Programs,” in Richard Nixon: 1969: Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, 
and Statements of the President (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal 
Registrar, 1971): 968. 
Ockenhouse, Christian, Alan Magill, Dale Smith, and Wil Milhous. “History of U.S. 
Military Contributions to the Study of Malaria.” Military Medicine 170(4S) (April 
2005): 12-16. 
Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. DoD Research 
and Engineering Enterprise. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2014. 
Okie, Susan. “Traumatic Brain Injury in the War Zone.” New England Journal of 
Medicine 352(20) (May 2005): 2043-2047. 
OPCW. Australia. Statement by H.E. Ambassador Dr. Brett Mason, Permanent 
Representative of Australia to the OPCW at the Twentieth Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties. C-20/NAT.31 (December 1, 2015). 
OPCW. Australia, Weaponisation of Central Nervous System Acting Chemicals For Law 
Enforcement Purposes. C-19/NAT.1 (November 14, 2014). 
OPCW. Conference of the States Parties. Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on the 
Developments in Science and Technology for the Third Special Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. RC-3/DG.1 (October 29, 2012). 
OPCW. Joint Paper by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Finland, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, United States of 
 346 
America, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Aerosolisation 
of Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals for Law Enforcement Purposes. C-
20/NAT.2/Rev.2 (December 3, 2015). 
OPCW. Norway: Statement by H.E. Ambassador Anniken R. Krutnes, Permanent 
Representative of Norway tot the OPCW at the Third Review Conference. RC-
3/NAT.25 (April 8, 2013). 
OPCW. Opening Statement by the Director General to the Second Special Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operations of the Chemical 
Weapons Convention. RC-2/DG.2 (April 7, 2008). 
OPCW. Statement by Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, United States Delegation to the 
OPCW at the Seventy-Second Session of the Executive Council. EC-72/NAT.8 
(May 6, 2013). 
OPCW. Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Mallory Stewart, Delegation of the 
United States of America at the Twentieth Session of the Conference of the States 
Parties. C-20/NAT.19 (December 1, 2015). 
OPCW. Statement by H.E. Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, Permanent Representative of 
the United States of America to the OPCW at the Seventy-Eighth Session of the 
Executive Council. EC-78/NAT.10 (March 17, 2015). 
OPCW. Statement by H.E. Ambassador Robert P. Mikulak, Permanent Representative of 
the United States of America to the OPCW at the Seventy-Ninth Session of the 
Executive Council. EC-79/NAT.36 (July 7, 2015). 
OPCW. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Statement by Mr. 
Alistair Burt, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, at the Third Review Conference. RC-3/NAT.22 (April 9, 
2013). 
Oreskes, Naomi. “Beyond the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate 
Change.” Science 306(5702): 1686. 
Oreskes, Naomi. “Science and Public Policy: What’s Proof Got to Do with It?” 
Environmental Science & Policy 7 (2004): 369-383. 
 347 
Paul, T.V. Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons. Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000. 
Pearson, Alan. “Late and Post-Cold War Research and Development of Incapacitating 
Biochemical Weapons.” In Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons: Promise or 
Peril? edited by Alan M. Pearson, Marie Isabelle Chevrier, and Mark Wheelis, 
67-101. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007. 
Pearson, Alan M., Marie Isabelle Chevrier, and Mark Wheelis, eds. Incapacitating 
Biochemical Weapons: Promise or Peril? Langham, MD: Lexington Books, 
2007. 
Pielke, Jr., Roger A. The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Pilant, Lois. Science and Technology: Less-than-Lethal Weapons: New Solutions for Law 
Enforcement. Alexandria, VA: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
1993. 
Pinch, Trevor J. and Wiebe E. Bijker. “The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or 
How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit 
Each Other.” In The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New 
Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, edited by Wiebe E. 
Bijker, Thomas Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, 11-44. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 2012. 
Posen, Barry. Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the 
World Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984. 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society. Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1967. 
Price, Richard M. The Chemical Weapons Taboo. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1997. 
Quester, George H. Offense and Defense in the International System. New York, NY: 
Wiley, 1977. 
 348 
Rao, Vani and Constantine G. Lyketsos. “Psychiatric Aspects of Traumatic Brain Injury.” 
Psychiatric Clinics of North America 25(1) (2002): 43-69. Quoted in Jan E. 
Kennedy, Michael S. Jaffee, Gregory A. Leskin, James W. Stokes, Felix O. Leal, 
and Pamela J. Fitzpatrick. “Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder-Like Symptoms and Mild Traumatic Brain Injury.” Journal of 
Rehabilitation Research and Development 44(7) (2007): 895-920. 
Ratner, Daniel and Mark A. Ratner. Nanotechnology and Homeland Security: New 
Weapons for New Wars. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2004. 
Redding, Joan, ed. Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare. Falls Church, VA: Office the 
Surgeon General, United States Army, 2008. 
Reppy, Judith and F. A. Long. “U.S. Military R&D: A Set of Questions,” Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists 34(5) (May 1978): 34-41. 
Reppy, Judith and Franklin A. Long. “The Decision-Making Role of Congress.” In The 
Genesis of New Weapons: Decision Making for Military R&D, edited by Franklin 
A. Long and Judith Reppy, 182-193. New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1980. 
Richanbach, Paul H., Thomas P. Christie, Ronald A. Finkler, David R. Graham, 
Frederick R. Riddell, William J. Schultis, Edwin S. Townsley, and Victor A. 
Utgoff. The Future of Military R&D: Towards a Flexible Acquisition Strategy. 
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1990. 
Rieder, Josef, Christian Keller, Georg Hoffmann, and Phillipp Lirk. “Moscow Theatre 
Siege and Anaesthetic Drugs.” The Lancet 361 (March 29, 2003): 1131. 
Robinson, J.P. Perry. “Non Lethal Warfare and the Chemical Weapons Convention.” 
Further HSP Submission to the OPCW Open-Ended Working Group on 
Preparations for Second CWC Review Conference. Harvard Sussex Program 
(October 24, 2007). http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/Papers/421rev3.pdf 
(accessed December 10, 2015). 
Robinson, J. Perry. Disabling Chemical Weapons: A Documented Chronology of Events, 
1945-200. Harvard Sussex Program, University of Sussex. Unpublished 
manuscript version dated October 8, 2003, 68. Quoted in Neil Davison. ‘Non-
Lethal’ Weapons. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
 349 
Rock, Nicholas L. James W. Stokes, Ronald J. Koshes, Joe Fagan, William R. Cline, and 
Franklin D. Jones. In War Psychiatry, edited by Franklin D. Jones, Linette R. 
Sparacino, Victoria L. Wilcox, Joseph M. Rothberg, and James W. Stokes, 149-
175. Falls Church, VA: Office of the Surgeon General, United States Army, 1995. 
Roco, Mihail C. and William Sims Bainbridge, eds. Converging Technologies for 
Improving Human Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information 
Technology and Cognitive Science. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2003. 
Rosen, Stephen Peter. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991. 
The Royal Society. Brain Waves Module 3: Neuroscience, Conflict, and Security. 
London, UK: The Royal Society Science Policy Centre, 2012. 
Sagan, Scott D. “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation.” Annual Review of 
Political Science 14 (June 2011): 225-244. 
Sagan, Scott. “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a 
Bomb.” International Security 21(3) (Winter 1996/1997): 54-86. 
Sapolsky, Harvey M. The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic 
Success in Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972. 
Sapolsky, Robert M. “The Possibility of Neurotoxicity in the Hippocampus in Major 
Depression: A Primer on Neuron Death.” Biological Psychiatry 48(4) (October 
2000): 755-765. 
Schiermeier, Quirin. “Hostage Deaths Put Gas Weapons in Spotlight.” Nature 420 
(November 7, 2002): 7. 
Schneider, Barry R. and Lawrence E. Grinter, eds. Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century 
Warfare Issues. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1995. 
von Schomberg, René, ed. Science Politics and Morality: Scientific Uncertainty and 
Decision Making. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwar Academic Publishers, 
1993. 
 350 
von Schomberg, René. “Controversies and Political Decision Making.” In Science 
Politics and Morality: Scientific Uncertainty and Decision Making, edited by 
René von Schomberg, 7-26. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwar Academic 
Publishers, 1993. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, 
Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers, 1983. 
Sciarretta, Albert, Richard Chait, Joseph Mait, and Jordan Willcox. A Methodology for 
Assessing the Military Benefits of Science and Technology Investments. 
Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Center for Technology and 
National Security Policy, 2008. 
Selye, Hans. “Stress and Psychiatry.” The American Journal of Psychiatry 113(5) 
(November 1956): 423-427. 
Shephard, Ben. A War of Nerves: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. 
Shwed, Uri and Peter S. Bearman. “The Temporal Structure of Scientific Consensus 
Formation.” American Sociological Review 75(6) (December 2010): 817-840. 
Sidell, Frederick R., Ernest T. Takafuji, and David R. Franz, eds. Medical Aspects of 
Chemical and Biological Warfare. Falls Church, VA: Office of the Surgeon 
General, United States Army, 1997. 
Simonis, Frank and Steven Schilthuizen. Nanotechnology: Innovation Opportunities for 
Tomorrow’s Defense. Netherlands: TNO Science and Industry Future Technology 
Center, 2006. 
Sismondo, Sergio. “Science and Technology Studies and an Engaged Program.” In The 
Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Third Edition, edited by Edward J. 
Hackett, Olga Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch, and Judy Wajcman, 13-32. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2008. 
Smallwood, Katie, Ralf Trapp, Robert Mathews, Beat Schmidt and Leiv K. Sydnes. 
“Impact of Scientific Developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(IUPAC Technical Report).” Pure Applied Chemistry 85(4) (February 2013): 851-
881. 
 351 
Smith, III, Frank L. “A Casualty of Kinetic Warfare: Military Research, Development, 
and Acquisition for Biodefense.” Security Studies 20(4) (November 2011):  
Smith, III, Frank L. American Biodefense: How Dangerous Ideas about Biological 
Weapons Shape National Security. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014. 
Solingen, Etel, ed. Scientists and the States: Domestic Structures and the International 
Context. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1994. 
Solingen, Etel. “Domestic Structure and the International Context: Toward Models of 
State-Scientists Interaction.” In Scientists and the States: Domestic Structures and 
the International Context, edited by Etel Solingen, 1-31. Ann Arbor, MI: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1994. 
Solingen, Etel. “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint.” International Security 
19(2) (Fall 1993): 126-169. 
Spiegel, David. “War, Peace, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.” In American Psychiatry 
After World War II, 1944-1994, edited by Roy W. Menninger and John C. 
Nemiah, 37-51. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Press, 2000. 
Spiers, Edward M. A History of Chemical and Biological Weapons. London, UK: 
Reaktion Books Ltd., 2010. 
Spinardi, Graham. From Polaris to Trident: The Development of US Fleet Ballistic 
Missile Technology. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
Spitz, Gershon, Jerome J. Maller, Richard O’Sullivan, and Jennie L. Ponsford. “White 
Matter Integrity Following Traumatic Brain Injury: The Association with Severity 
of Injury and Cognitive Functioning.” Brain Topography 26(4) (October 2013): 
648-660. 
Stanley, Theodore. “Human Immobilization: Is the Experience in Moscow Just the 
Beginning?” European Journal of Anaesthesiology (20) (2003): 427-428. 
Stanton, M. Duncan. “Drugs, Vietnam, and the Vietnam Veteran: An Overview.” 
American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse 3(4) (February 1976): 557-570. 
 352 
Statement of the Cuban Ambassador on Behalf of the NAM and China. 15th Meeting of 
the Open Ended Working Group preparing for the Second CWC Review 
Conference. OPCW Headquarters, The Hague. Quoted in Michael Crowley. 
Application of the OPCW Mechanisms for Reviewing and Addressing Science and 
Technology Developments: The Case of Incapacitating Chemical Agents (ICAs). 
Policy Paper 1, Biochemical Security 2030 Project. Bath, UK: University of Bath, 
2013. 
Stein, Murray B. and Thomas McAllister. “Exploring the Convergence of Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder and Mild Traumatic Brain Injury.” American Journal of 
Psychiatry 166(7) (July 2009): 768-776. 
Stein, Murray B., Neal A Kline, and Jeffrey L. Matloff. “Adjunctive Olanzapine for 
SSRI-Resistant Combat-Related PTSD: A Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled 
Study.” The American Journal of Psychiatry 159(10) (October 2002): 1777-1779. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. SIPRI Yearbook 2012: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2012. 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The Problem of Chemical and 
Biological Warfare: A Study of the Historical, Technical, Military, Legal, and 
Political Aspects of CBW, and Possible Disarmament Measures, Volume 1. New 
York, NY: Humanities Press, 1971. 
Stokes, Donald E. Pasteur’s Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation. 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997. 
Stulberg, Adam N. “Flying Blind into a New Military Epoch: The Nanotechnology 
Revolution, Emerging Security Dilemmas, and Russia’s Double-Bind.” Paper 
presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New 
York, NY, February 2009. 
Stulberg, Adam N., Michael D. Salomone, and Austin G. Long. Managing Defense 
Transformation: Agency, Culture, and Service Change. Burlington, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 2007. 
Summerall, E. Lanier and Thomas W. McAllister. “Comorbid Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder and Traumatic Brain Injury in Military Population.” Psychiatric Annals 
40(11) (November 2010): 563-572. 
 353 
Summerfield, Derek. “The Invention of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and the Social 
Usefulness of a Psychiatric Category.” British Medical Journal 322(7278) 
(January 13, 2001): 95-98. 
Switzerland. Riot Control and Incapacitating Agents Under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, Second Review Conference. RC-2/NAT.12 (April 9, 2008). 
Szinicz, Ladislaus. “History of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents.” Toxicology 
214 (2005): 167-181. 
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. “Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great 
Power Intervention in the Periphery.” Political Psychology 25(2) (2004): 177-
211. 
Tanielian, Terri and Lisa H. Jaycox, eds. Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and 
Cognitive Injuries, Their Consequences, and Services to Assist Recovery. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008. 
Tannenwald, Nina. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Nonuse of Nuclear 
Weapons since 1945. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
Tavernise, Sabrina and Sophia Kishkovksy. “Hostage Drama in Moscow: The Scene; The 
Survivors Dribble Out, All With a Story to Tell.” The New York Times (October 
28, 2002). 
Taw, Jennifer Morrison. Mission Revolution: The U.S. Military and Stability Operations. 
New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012. 
Teller, Edward. “The Evolution and Prospects for Applied Physical Science in the United 
States.” In Applied Science and Technological Progress: A Report to the 
Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, edited by 
the National Academy of Sciences, 1967. 365-398. Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office. 
Townes, Charles H. How the Laser Happened: Adventures of a Scientist. New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Tracey, Irene and Rod Flower. “The Warrior in the Machine: Neuroscience Goes to 
War.” Nature Reviews Neuroscience 15(12) (December 2014): 825-834. 
 354 
Tschiffely, A. E., S. T. Ahlers, and J. N. Norris. “Examining the Relationship Between 
Blast-Induced Mild Traumatic Brain Injury and Posttraumatic Stress-Related 
Traits.” Journal of Neuroscience Research 93 (September 2015): 1769-1777. 
Tucker, Jonathan B. and Erin R. Mahan. President Nixon’s Decision to Renounce the 
U.S. Offensive Biological Weapons Program. Washington, D.C.: National 
Defense University Press, 2009. 
Tucker, Jonathan B. War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare from World War I to Al-Qaeda. 
New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2006. 
Tybout, Richard A., ed. Economics of Research and Development. Columbus, OH: Ohio 
State University Pres, 1965. 
United States Army Research Laboratory, “Micro Autonomous Systems and Technology 
(MAST) – Objective.” http://www.arl.army.mil/www/default.cfm?page=332 
(accessed February 11, 2016). 
United States Comptroller General. Report to the Congress of the United States: Review 
of Manned Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program, Atomic Energy Commission 
and Department of Defense. Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 1963. 
United States Patent Office. “Opiate Analgesic Formulation with Improved Safety.” 
United States Patent 5,834,477. November 10, 1998. 
United States/United Kingdom. US/UK Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW)/Urban Operations 
Executive Seminar, November 30, 2000. London. Assessment Report, ONR-
NLW-038. Quoted in Neil Davison. ‘Non-Lethal’ Weapons. Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. 
US Army Medical Research & Materiel Command. USAMRMC: 50 Years of Dedication 
to Warfighter, 1958-2008. Fort Detrick, MD: US Army Medical Research & 
Materiel Command, 2008. 
US Department of the Army. Military Psychiatry. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters of the 
Department of the Army, 1957. Technical Manual 8-244, 75. Quoted in Norman 
M. Camp. US Army Psychiatry in the Vietnam War: New Challenges in Extended 
Counterinsurgency Warfare. Fort Sam Houston, TX: Office of the Surgeon 
General, Borden Institute, US Army Medical Department Center and School, 
2015. 
 355 
US Senate’s Conditions to Ratification of the CWC. Senate Resolution 75. 105th 
Congress, 1st Session (April 24, 1997) Section 2.(26). 
http://www.cwc.gov/cwc_authority_ratification_sec2.html (accessed December 
10, 2015). 
Vogel, Kathleen. Phantom Menace or Looming Danger: A New Framework for 
Assessing Bioweapons Threats. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2013. 
Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill 1979. 
Warden, Deborah. “Military TBI During the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.” Journal of 
Head Trauma and Rehabilitation 21(5) (September-October 2006): 398-402. 
Weinberger, Sharon. “The Changing Face of Military Science: Basic Research funded by 
the Pentagon is Facing an Uncertain Future.” Nature 477 (22 September 2011): 
386-387. 
Weiss, Danielle M. “Calming Down: Could Sedative Drugs Be a Less-Lethal Option?” 
NIJ Journal (261) (2007): 42-46. 
Wheelis, Mark. “Biotechnology and Biochemical Weapons.” The Nonproliferation 
Review 9(1) (Spring 2002): 48-53. 
Wheelis, Mark. “Nonconsensual Manipulation of Human Physiology Using 
Biochemicals.” In Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons: Promise or Peril? edited 
by Alan M. Pearson, Marie Isabelle Chevrier, and Mark Wheelis, 1-17. Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2007. 
Wheelis, Mark, Lajos Rózsa, and Malcolm Dando, eds. Deadly Cultures: Biological 
Weapons since 1945. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. 
White House. “Fact Sheet: Over $300 Million in Support of the President’s BRAIN 
Initiative.” 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/brain_fact_sheet_9
_30_2014_final.pdf (accessed September 30, 2014). 
 356 
White House. National Security Decision Directive 189. “National Policy on the Transfer 
of Scientific, Technical, and Engineering Information” (September 21, 1985). 
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-189.htm (accessed October 6, 2016). 
Williams, Cindy. Making Defense Affordable. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 
2013. 
Wilmoth, Margaret, Andrea Linton, Richard Gromadzki, Mary J. Larson, Thomas V. 
Williams, and Jonathan Woodson. "Factors Associated with Psychiatric 
Evacuation Among Service Members Deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom, January 2004 to September 2010." Military 
Medicine 180(1) (January 2015): 53-60. 
Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. 
New York, NY: Basic Books, 1989. 
Wilson, Mitchell. “DSM-III and the Transformation of American Psychiatry: A History.” 
The American Journal of Psychiatry 150(3) (March 1993): 399-410. 
Wong, Wilson W.S. Emerging Military Technologies: A Guide to the Issues. Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2013. 
World Health Organization (WHO). Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological 
Weapons. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization, 1970. 
Young, Allan. The Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. 
Zohar, Joseph, Daniela Amital, Chanoch Miodownik, Moshe Kotler, Avi Bleich, Roger 
M. Lane, and Carol Austin. “Double-Blind Placebo-Controlled Pilot Study of 
Sertraline in Military Veterans with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.” Journal of 
Clinical Psychopharmacology 22(2) (March 2002): 190-195. 
